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ÉTUDE SUR LE LOGEMENT ET L’EXCLUSION: POLITIQUES
SOCIALES, ACCÈS AU LOGEMENT ET MARCHÉS DU TRAVAIL
MESSAGES CLES
 La politique de logement peut contribuer à réduire, mais non pas éliminer, le lien
entre les salaires et les faibles résultats en matière de logement.
 Les résultats en matière de logement des plus pauvres sont dictés par les
résultats en matière de logement dans le pays entier. Ils reflètent le niveau
général des salaires dans le pays, tout autant que les politiques de logement.
Cependant, les normes élevées de logement absolu pour les plus pauvres ne se
traduisent pas nécessairement en une égalité entre les personnes à pauvres
revenus et les non pauvres.
 Les allocations de logement montrent une influence beaucoup plus marquée sur
les résultats en matière de logement des personnes en situation de pauvreté. Le
logement locatif social réduit faiblement le lien entre la pauvreté et le logement,
alors que la propriété directe entraîne des résultats favorables pour les ménages
les plus pauvres parmi différents indicateurs de logement.
 Les ménages sans emploi ont de moins bons résultats en matière de logement
que les ménages avec emploi, mais les résultats en matière de logement des
pauvres avec emploi sont seulement légèrement meilleures que ceux des
pauvres sans emploi. Le taux de pauvres avec emploi percevant des allocations
de logement est remarquablement bas, et il est important de s’assurer que le
“travail rapporte” en termes de logement.
 Les systèmes de logement peuvent contrarier la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre si
l'on prend en considération les listes d’attente pour l’accès aux logements locatifs
sociaux, les difficultés rencontrées par les propriétaires dans la vente de leurs
habitations occupées et le coût élevé des logements dans les zones de
croissance de l’emploi. L’administration gérant les allocations de logement peut
aussi se révéler être un autre obstacle. Le logement doit jouer un rôle plus
important dans les stratégies de flexicurité.
 Les régimes d’aides sociales ont une grande influence sur les causes et la
nature du « sans-abrisme ». Le « sans abrisme » structurel est moindre dans les
zones où les instruments de la sécurité sociale sont forts.
 Le « sans-abrisme» est intrinsèquement lié à l’évolution du marché du travail à
court terme seulement dans les pays où la protection sociale est faible. La
marginalité du marché du travail à long terme est plus importante.
 L'état générale du marché du logement est un facteur majeur du « sans
abrisme»: L’accès à un logement traditionnel abordable est l’une des principales
inquiétudes des groupes vulnérables et ceci même dans les pays avec une
protection sociale forte. Ceci est spécialement le cas dans les régions sous
xpression et où les fournisseurs de logements sociaux n’ont pas l’obligation de
donner la priorité à ceux qui ont les besoins les plus urgents.
 Certains contextes structurels difficiles peuvent être supplantés par des
interventions ciblées et donner des résultats satisfaisants chez les sans-abri,
mais les migrants sans abri forment souvent le groupe le moins bien protégé.
RESUME
Introduction
A travers toute l’Union Européenne, les États membres ont mis en place des « régimes
d’aide sociale » caractéristiques : des façons d’organiser les marchés du travail, les
impôts et les systèmes de sécurité sociale. Ceux-ci influencent le niveau de l’emploi et
la distribution des salaires. Ces dernières années, nombre de pays ont réformé leur
régime d’aide sociale en tant que partie intégrante de leurs stratégies pour l’emploi et
l’intégration.
Bien que le logement soit majoritairement reconnu comme un déterminant essentiel
dans le bien-être de la population et comme une plateforme de participation dans les
communautés et le marché du travail, peu d’attention a été portée à la relation entre les
régimes d’aide sociale et les systèmes de logement.
Cette étude analyse la relation entre les régimes d’aide sociale et les systèmes de
logement dans six pays qui ont été choisis pour fournir un panel varié de régimes d’aide
sociale: l’Allemagne (corporatiste), la Hongrie (transitionnel), les Pays-Bas (Hybride
entre corporatiste et socio démocrate), le Portugal (Méditerranéen), la Suède (socio
démocrate) et le Royaume-Uni (libéral).
Le cadre théorique qui a été adopté est illustré dans le diagramme 1. Il suppose un
certain nombre de relations fondamentales entre le régime d’aide sociale, le système de
logement et les résultats en matière de logement, le « sans-abrisme» inclus :
 Les régimes d’aide sociale (A) influent sur les niveaux de pauvreté (B) et
d’emploi (C) qui à leur tour influent sur les résultats en matière de logement (D),
qui sont définis par les chiffres des indicateurs sur la privation de logement (F) et
les sans-abri (G).
 Le système de logement peut contenir un certain nombre de politiques et de
fonctions (E) qui peuvent contribuer à réduire le lien entre pauvreté et situation
professionnelle d’une part et le résultat en matière de logement (F, G) d’autre
part.
 D’autres facteurs individuels (H) et les interventions ciblées (I) peuvent influer sur
les niveaux de «sans-abrisme» (G).
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 Le système de logement (E) et bien sûr certains résultats en matière de
logement (F) peuvent rétroagir et affecter le niveau de l’emploi (C).
Cette étude utilise des méthodes quantitatives et qualitatives (analyse de l’UE-SILC,
groupes de discussion et entretiens individuels) pour aborder les questions de
recherche suivantes:
 Quel est l’effet de la pauvreté sur les résultats en matière de logement ?
 Quel est l’effet des interventions de la politique de logement sur les résultats en
matière de logement (pour les ménages en situation de pauvreté)?
 Quel est l’effet de la situation professionnelle sur les résultats en matière de
logement (pour les ménages en situation de pauvreté)?
 Quel est l’effet du logement sur la situation de l’emploi?
 Quel est l’effet du régime d’aide sociale et du système de logement sur la nature
et les causes du « sans-abrisme », et quelle est l’efficacité des réponses ciblées?
Les régimes d’aide sociale et les systèmes de logement
Même si les réformes de la sécurité sociale et du marché de l’emploi ont été
importantes ces dernières années, les régimes d’aide sociale traditionnels définissent
toujours le caractère de chaque pays et ceci est reflété dans le taux de pauvreté des six
pays sélectionnés pour cette étude. Ces taux sont les plus bas en Hollande et en Suède
et les plus élevés au Royaume-Uni. L’étude montre aussi que la nature des régimes
d’aide sociale a des répercussions dans une certaine mesure sur les systèmes de
logement. Les régimes socio-démocrates et corporatistes (Suède, Hollande et
Allemagne) ont chacun un grand système de location « unitaire » (où les logements
locatifs sociaux exercent un effet modérateur sur les locations privées et brouillent la
distinction entre les deux modes d’occupation). Ils ont aussi tendance à avoir des
secteurs de la propriété directe plus réduits. Les pays de type transitionnel (Hongrie) et
méditerranéen (Portugal) ont de petits secteurs de logements locatifs sociaux, de
grands secteurs de la propriété directe et des systèmes limités d’allocations de
logement. Dans le régime libéral (Royaume- Uni), on trouve un important secteur de
logements locatifs sociaux, un système d’allocations de logement étendu et ciblé et un
grand secteur de la propriété directe.
Cependant, notre étude confirme que ces liens sont contingents et non essentiels. On
trouve des différences importantes au sein des différents types de régime : l’Allemagne
corporatiste a maintenant un secteur de logements sociaux réduit en comparaison avec
son voisin de type hybride, corporatiste et socio-démocrate, la Hollande, qui a le plus
grand secteur de logements locatifs sociaux en Europe. Les choix politiques se sont
succédés au Royaume Uni pour constituer l'éventail des interventions sur le logement.
Mais le niveau relativement élevé de propriétaires directs et le secteur toujours
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significatif de la location sociale sont le résultat de politiques et de décisions qui, elles,
ont été possibles grâce à l’héritage des programmes de locations sociales de masse
des dernières décennies. La décision de la Hongrie a été de privatiser le secteur du
logement public, alors que d’autres pays de type transitionnel ne l’ont pas fait
totalement. Les gouvernements ont donc la capacité de modeler leurs systèmes de
logement selon le contexte du régime d’aide sociale. Jamais totalement dépendante ou
totalement indépendante, il s’agit d’une relation symbiotique, et nous considérons que
c’est cette relation qui a une influence significative dans la vie de la population.
L’influence de la pauvreté et de la politique de logement sur les résultats
en matière de logement.
Notre étude démontre que la politique de logement (allocations de logement incluses)
peut réduire mais pas éliminer les liens entre la pauvreté salariale et le dénuement des
résultats en matière de logement. Ceci ne veut pas dire que chaque personne pauvre a
de mauvais résultats en matière de logement mais que chaque personne qui vit dans la
pauvreté est systématiquement plus à même d'en avoir que ceux qui ne sont pas
pauvres. Mais ceci varie grandement entre les différents pays.
Une des principales conclusions de cette étude est que les résultats en matière de
logement des personnes en situation de pauvreté sont influencés par les résultats en
matière de logement sur l’ensemble du pays. Dans les zones où les résultats sont
généralement bons, les résultats en matière de logement des pauvres le seront aussi et
là où les standards sont faibles, ils se refléteront alors sur la population vivant avec de
faibles revenus. Ceci est imputable au niveau général des revenus dans chaque pays,
aux pressions du marché du logement mais aussi aux interventions de la politique de
logement.
Une autre conclusion importante est que de hauts standards de logement pour les
pauvres ne se traduisent pas nécessairement en une égalité entre les revenus des
pauvres et des non pauvres. Certains des écarts les plus grands dans les résultats en
matière de logement se retrouvent dans les pays avec des standards élevés pour les
pauvres (mais des standards encore plus élevés pour le reste de la population), et
certains des écarts les plus minimes se manifestent là où les standards pour les
pauvres sont bas (comme le sont ceux de beaucoup d’autres personnes). Ceci est
partiellement imputable à la manière dont les résultats en matière de logement sont
mesurés, mais ceci n’est pas toujours le cas.
Les pays de type transitionnel (la Hongrie) et de type méditerranéen (le Portugal) ont de
hauts niveaux de propriété directe en général et ceci aussi parmi les populations
pauvres. Au niveau national, ils connaissent un compromis entre l’accessibilité d’une
part (où ils obtiennent de bons résultats) et le surpeuplement et la qualité physique des
logements d’autre part (où ils obtiennent de mauvais résultats).
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Dans les autres pays étudiés, la multitude des interventions politiques est importante
par son influence sur les résultats en matière de logement des pauvres. L'Allemagne
est remarquable pour ses difficultés à identifier l’influence des politiques individuelles de
logement, mais ses résultats en matière de logement des pauvres sont généralement
similaires à ceux appréciés dans les autres pays de type non
méditerranéen/transitionnel où les politiques individuelles sont plus facilement
identifiées. Le Royaume-Uni a un panel de politiques de logement individuel qui
semblent fournir des compensations pour les hauts niveaux de pauvreté en termes de
revenu. Des standards de logement pour les ménages en situation de pauvreté qui sont
comparables à ceux des régimes corporatistes et socio-démocrates se combinent avec
des écarts de résultats en matière de logement relativement réduits entre pauvres et
non pauvres.
Notre étude a établi que les allocations de logement ciblées sont l’instrument des
politiques de logement qui se traduisent par l’amélioration la plus clairement
démontrable des résultats en matière de logement des pauvres. Ces améliorations sont
plus prononcées chez les locataires de logements sociaux que chez les autres (chez
les propriétaires, elles sont négligeables).
Cependant, l’impact isolé des locations sociales est plus difficile à démontrer. Ceci est
en partie dû aux problèmes d’identification des secteurs dans certains pays et à des
inquiétudes quant à la fiabilité des données dans d’autres pays. Néanmoins le secteur
semble produire des résultats qui ne sont pas aussi favorables qu’on pourrait le
penser : il ne réduit que faiblement la relation entre les faibles revenus et les mauvais
résultats en matière de logement. Les données n’ont cependant pas indiqué que les
mauvaises conditions soient en rapport avec la qualité du quartier, ce que de
nombreuses enquêtes suggèrent être une conséquence de la concentration
géographique des ménages à bas revenus dans les logements sociaux.
Même si un niveau élevé de propriétaires occupants ayant des faibles revenus peut être
évidemment problématique, notre étude démontre que la propriété directe est un
vecteur de résultats favorables en matière de logement dans presque la totalité des
indicateurs, pour les pauvres mais aussi pour les non pauvres. Il est surprenant de
constater que la propriété directe a de bons résultats en termes d’accessibilité (même
lorsque les dépenses relatives au logement sont définies de manière générale comme
dans notre étude). Pourtant le compromis entre l’accessibilité et la qualité physique des
logements (ce qui est prévisible si les propriétaires pauvres ne peuvent payer les
réparations) n’est pas évident au sein des pays (même s’il est clair que ces compromis
existent au niveau national tel que nous le mentionnons plus haut). Sur certains
indicateurs, bien sûr, les résultats en matière de logement des propriétaires occupants
pauvres sont en fait supérieures à ceux de la population globale.
Cette analyse a des implications politiques importantes :
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 Les standards de logement pour les personnes vivant dans la pauvreté sont
déterminés par les standards de logement de la population globale. Il est
nécessaire de disposer de politiques qui visent à améliorer les standards de
logement en général, plus particulièrement dans les pays de l’Union Européenne
avec des revenus plus faibles.
 Lorsque nous comparons les résultats en matière de logement entre les
différents pays, il apparaît que de hauts niveaux de propriétés directes
produisent des compromis entre l’accessibilité et la qualité. La propriété directe
ne semble pas fournir une solution générale pour le logement des personnes à
faibles revenus. Cela semble être un mode d'occupation inapproprié pour des
personnes qui auront probablement de faibles revenus toute, ou une grande
partie de leur vie.
 Mais au sein de chaque pays, la propriété directe produit des résultats en
matière de logement remarquablement bons pour les personnes en situation de
pauvreté, et ceci est plus évident dans les pays avec les niveaux de propriétés
directes les plus modestes. Ceci nous laisse suggérer que l’acquisition de biens
immobiliers peut être un moyen utile pour distribuer les ressources le long du
cycle de vie, en d’autres termes lorsque les personnes ont de faibles revenus
pendant une période de leur vie seulement.
 Les interventions groupées de politiques de logement semblent être à l’origine
des plus fortes améliorations des résultats en matière de logement. Une
association de subventions sur les demandes spécifiques de logement (les
allocations de logement) et les subventions sur l’approvisionnement (location
sociale ou inférieure au marché) améliore les résultats en matière de logement
des personnes en situation de pauvreté.
 Toutefois, les allocations de logement jouent un rôle important dans l’aide aux
personnes pauvres. Leur intervention peut être plus clairement ciblée, et
améliorer l’accessibilité du marché de la location sans nécessairement amener
les bénéficiaires sous le seuil d’accessibilité qui avait été adopté (où les
dépenses de logement ne représentent pas plus de 40% des revenus).
 Les locations sociales ou inférieures au marché peuvent améliorer les résultats
en matière de logement des pauvres uniquement si ces personnes peuvent y
avoir accès : un attachement à la “mixité sociale” ne devrait pas être une excuse
pour exclure les pauvres et les plus vulnérables de ce mode d'occupation.
L’influence de la situation professionnelle sur les résultats en matière de
logement.
L’emploi réduit la probabilité d’être pauvre, mais la plupart des personnes en situation
de pauvreté (en âge de travailler) vivent au sein d’un ménage où un membre a un
travail salarié.
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Notre étude démontre la relation claire entre la situation professionnelle et les résultats
en matière de logement. Nous voyons qu’à travers le panel d’indicateurs, les personnes
qui sont sans emploi ont presque toujours tendance à avoir des résultats en matière de
logement plus médiocres que ceux qui travaillent. De plus, les personnes qui vivent au
sein de ménages souffrant du chômage à long terme ont de pires résultats en matière
de logement que ceux vivant dans des ménages touchés par le chômage à court terme.
Ceci suggère que la durée du chômage a une influence sur les résultats en matière de
logement indépendamment du salaire lui-même. Nous ne pouvons être sûrs des
raisons de ce phénomène mais elles pourraient sûrement inclure la capacité des
chômeurs à court terme de maintenir des résultats en matière de logement grâce à la
sécurité sociale et aux allocations de logement mais aussi grâce à l’utilisation de leurs
économies et de la solidarité familiale.
Bien que cette indication suggère que le “travail rapporte”, si nous comparons les
résultats en matière de logement des pauvres sans emploi avec ceux des salariés
pauvres, l’influence de la situation professionnelle est beaucoup moins évidente. Bien
qu’il existe des éléments qui sous-entendent que les résultats en matière de logement
des salariés pauvres sont supérieurs à ceux des pauvres sans-emploi, ces indications
sont faibles. Ceci est particulièrement vrai au niveau des indicateurs d’accessibilité qui
montrent clairement que les allocations de logement sont beaucoup plus utiles aux
pauvres sans-emploi qu’aux salariés pauvres. Cette indication d’ordre qualitative
suggère qu’en général, le système de logement, et en particulier les allocations de
logement, sont un avantage pour les personnes qui ont des revenus fluctuants. De
telles fluctuations de revenus sont vraisemblablement la caractéristique de personnes
qui entrent et sortent du monde du travail ou dont l’emploi est sujet à des variations
substantielles dû à des changements de temps de travail ou encore à des commissions.
Les implications politiques de ces conclusions sont claires :
 Les systèmes de sécurité sociale et les allocations de logement jouent un rôle
crucial dans la limitation de l’influence du chômage sur les résultats en matière
de logement sur le court terme mais ce rôle de protection s’affaiblit si la durée de
chômage se prolonge.
 Les systèmes de logement doivent être adaptés aux besoins des salariés
pauvres. Les logements locatifs sociaux ne s’adaptent pas à la mobilité des
travailleurs, alors que la location sur le marché avec l’aide des allocations de
logement allie flexibilité et aide au logement par le travail.
 Cependant, les allocations de logement doivent être plus réceptives aux salariés
pauvres, plus particulièrement ceux qui souffrent de revenus fluctuants ou de
contrats précaires. L’amélioration de l’administration afin de mettre un terme aux
retards et une approche “asymétrique” du monde de l’emploi quant aux
changements de revenus contribueraient à assurer que le “travail rapporte” en
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protégeant la population contre la perte de revenus, sans pénaliser les
augmentations modestes.
L’influence du logement sur les résultats en matière d’emploi.
Notre étude montre que les systèmes de logement ont une influence sur l’emploi, mais
de façon plus complexe qu’il a été souvent supposé dans les études précédentes.
Le système de logement peut entraver la mobilité des travailleurs entre différentes
régions. Notre étude réaffirme le phénomène bien connu qui veut que les listes
d’attente associées aux logements locatifs sociaux dans les régions où la demande est
élevée se révèle être une barrière. Le secteur du marché locatif est considéré comme le
mode d’occupation qui facilite le plus la mobilité, et il est clair que les allocations de
logement peuvent jouer un rôle dans l’accès aux secteurs plus coûteux. Il faut toutefois
noter que les taux de bénéficiaires des allocations logement parmi les salariés pauvres
sont bas.
Notre analyse suggère aussi que le rôle de la propriété est assez différent de ce qui en
a été pensé auparavant. Les coûts ne semblaient pas être importants, mais la difficulté
de vendre une propriété et la perspective d’avoir à mettre en location la propriété dans
le cas d’un déménagement dans un quartier plus cher étaient, quant à elles,
considérées comme importantes. Une des conclusions particulièrement intéressantes a
été que l’importance attachée à la famille et aux réseaux sociaux empêchent la mobilité.
Ces réseaux ne font pas qu’améliorer la qualité de vie, mais fournissent également
souvent une aide essentielle aux personnes quand elles travaillent. Ceci est d’une
grande importance pour les ménages à revenus modestes qui ne peuvent pas s’offrir
les services de garde d’enfant.
Notre étude démontre que le chômage est plus élevé dans le secteur des logements
locatifs sociaux. Cependant, nous avons remarqué aussi le lien entre ce taux élevé de
chômage, la perception des allocations de logement et la propriété directe. Ces
conclusions sont cohérentes avec l’hypothèse qui affirme que si une personne qui est
au chômage est protégée, elle est moins motivée pour travailler. (Dans le cas de la
propriété directe, l’effet est quasiment similaire à celui des allocations de logement: la
perte de la perception d’un revenu n’induit pas des économies sur le logement.) Nous
soulignons toutefois qu’aucun lien de causalité n’a été établi.
L’argument qualitatif suggère que l’administration d’allocations de logement pourrait
créer un effet dissuasif à travailler à cause de la peur de perdre son emploi et
l’obligation d’attendre pour récupérer les allocations.
Nous avons trouvé des preuves de la corrélation entre le chômage et les quartiers de
qualité précaire. On y trouve une conception généralisée d’une culture persistante de la
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pauvreté. Dans un pays (Hongrie), cette culture correspondait à l’emploi dans
l’économie parallèle, dans d’autres, au chômage à long terme. Certains éléments
suggéraient qu’une stigmatisation existait envers les personnes vivant dans les
quartiers pauvres. Toutefois, le rôle des transports publics dans l’accès aux marchés du
travail ne semblait pas être un facteur important
Il convient des conclusions :
 La promotion de la mobilité géographique des travailleurs implique l’utilisation
plus importante du marché des logements locatifs sociaux qui semble être le
mode d’occupation le plus flexible.
 Le logement a un rôle important à jouer dans les stratégies de “flexicurité” mais
une aide à l’obtention de meilleurs revenus (principalement les allocations de
logement) est nécessaire pour les travailleurs pauvres, dans le contexte de la
mobilité et du changement vers un travail précaire et faiblement rémunéré.
 Une mobilité plus importante sur le marché du travail implique aussi le
remplacement des aides qui étaient fournies par la famille et les réseaux sociaux
par des aides professionnelles. Les employeurs et les gouvernements qui
cherchent à encourager la mobilité devront sans doute se concentrer plus
vivement sur ces services d’aide.
 Différentes stratégies peuvent être utilisées pour promouvoir l’emploi dans les
quartiers pauvres : si la répartition des logements sociaux sur une grande
étendue du parc peut contribuer à empêcher l'apparition de ces quartiers, des
avantages sociaux individualisés pourraient mener à une réintégration réussie
des personnes vivant dans la pauvreté sur le marché du travail, et à l’érosion
progressive des « cultures de la pauvreté ».
Le « sans-abrisme » et le régime d’aide sociale.
Une des hypothèses centrales sur laquelle se fondait notre étude était que l’étendue et
la nature du “sans-abrisme” sont liées à l'interaction des régimes d’aide sociale
(sécurité sociale, impôt et dispositions du marché du travail), des systèmes de logement
et des politiques (qui ont selon nous la capacité d’améliorer ou aggraver l’exclusion liée
au logement et les autres problèmes qui touchent les ménages à faibles revenus).
Quand nous avons découvert que le manque de données empêchait fortement la
comparaison de l’étendue du “sans-abrisme”, nous avons pu tirer une conclusion
importante sur la différence de cause et de nature du “sans-abrisme” dans chaque
pays, et l’importance des réponses données aux groupes à risques les plus importants.
Notre nouvelle conclusion indiquait que les régimes d’aide sociale influençaient
profondément les causes et la nature du « sans-abrisme ». Ceci était démontré non
seulement par l’absence relative de « sans-abrisme structurel » en Suède et aux Pays-
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Bas où les principaux instruments de sécurité des aides sociales sont
exceptionnellement forts, mais aussi par la menace du « sans-abrisme » (dans les
périodes de récession économique surtout) qui pèse sur les immigrés qui n’ont pas
suffisamment accès aux avantages de la sécurité sociale.
Cependant, la relation entre le « sans-abrisme » et le marché du travail est complexe et
semble être directe uniquement dans les pays (Hongrie et Portugal) et parmi les
groupes (immigrés) qui ont la plus faible protection sociale. Même dans ces cas, il s’agit
d’une précarité et d’une marginalité du marché du travail très souvent associées à une
dépendance vis-à-vis de l’économie parallèle. Ce cas de figure est généralement plus
important que de soudains chocs sur le marché du travail. Dans les pays, et pour les
groupes, qui bénéficient d’une meilleure protection sociale, il semble que la pauvreté
continue et/ou le chômage contribue au « sans-abrisme » non pas vraiment de manière
directe, matérielle, mais plutôt sur le long terme, de manière plus indirecte, en exerçant
des pressions sociales sur la cellule familiale.
Étant donné que les systèmes de sécurité sociale, et plus particulièrement les
allocations de logement, sont habituellement les instruments qui brisent le lien entre la
perte de son travail et/ou la chute soudaine de revenu et le « sans-abrisme », nous
pourrions nous attendre à ce que des droits restreints et une conditionnalité accrue
auraient tendance à augmenter le « sans-abrisme ». Pourtant on trouve peu de preuves
jusqu’ici que les récentes restrictions sur les droits à la sécurité sociale dans des pays
comme l'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni ont engendré une augmentation directe du
« sans-abrisme ». De plus, au Royaume-Uni au moins, des experts soutenaient
l’augmentation de la conditionnalité associée à des efforts pour reconnecter les sans-
abri avec le marché du travail, même si, aussi bien ici qu’en Allemagne, l’augmentation
des sanctions était considérée par des experts comme étant une stratégie à haut-risque
envers les groupes les plus vulnérables tels que les jeunes.
Notre étude a fortement soutenu l’hypothèse selon laquelle les conditions et les
systèmes du marché du logement ont un effet indépendant des régimes d’aide sociale
sur la nature et l’ampleur du « sans-abrisme ». Ceci a été très clairement illustré en
Allemagne où un ralentissement du marché du travail dans de nombreuses régions du
pays a réduit le « sans-abrisme ». De la même façon au Royaume-Uni, le « sans-
abrisme statutaire » est intimement lié au cycle du marché du travail. Le « sans-
abrisme » structurel dans ces pays semble ainsi bien plus étroitement lié aux résultats
en matière de logement qu'aux facteurs dépendants du marché du travail ou de la
sécurité sociale. De plus, dans tous les pays étudiés, et même ceux avec de fortes
protections sociales (la Suède et les Pays-Bas), l’accès des groupes vulnérables à un
logement traditionnel abordable était préoccupant. Ceci était surtout le cas dans les
régions sous pression et dans des contextes où les fournisseurs de logements sociaux
n’étaient pas obligés de donner la priorité aux ménages sans-abri ou ayant les besoins
les plus urgents.
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Les interventions ciblées dans la lutte contre le « sans-abrisme » parmi les groupes à
hauts risques est un domaine où le logement a de l’importance. Avec l’Allemagne, le
Royaume-Uni semblait disposer des interventions ciblées les plus sophistiquées dans la
prévention du « sans-abrisme » et du « sans-abrisme » parmi les jeunes. Cependant,
tous les pays étudiés, avec leurs systèmes d’aide sociale et de logement très variés,
ont été en mesure de fournir des exemples d’interventions ciblées efficaces sur le
« sans-abrisme ». Ces interventions semblent pouvoir surpasser des contextes
structurels complexes pour fournir de bons résultats pour les sans-abri. Il était clair
aussi que certains groupes étaient beaucoup mieux traités que d’autres. Les femmes
avec enfants fuyant la violence sont mieux protégées que les différents groupes
d’immigrés qui sont, eux, les moins protégés (surtout ceux qui n’ont pas accès aux
fonds publics).
Même dans les pays avec les plus forts instruments de protection, il reste des zones de
faiblesse pour lesquelles des leçons pourraient être tirées d’autres pays. En Suède, il
existe d’importants obstacles au niveau de l’aide aux sans-abri avec des problèmes
d’alcoolisme et de dépendance à la drogue. Aux Pays-Bas, on pourrait apprendre
beaucoup sur la protection des femmes fuyant la violence de pays comme le Royaume-
Uni, la Suède et l'Allemagne. Dans le cas du Royaume-Uni, les instruments de
protection pour les familles avec des arriérés de prêt hypothécaire sont beaucoup plus
faibles que dans le reste de l’Europe de l’Ouest, et très faibles également pour les
immigrés qui n’ont pas accès aux fonds publics (comme c’est le cas aussi aux Pays-
Bas). Au Portugal et en Hongrie, on est bien en retard par rapport à l’aide fournie aux
sans-abri en comparaison avec les autres pays étudiés. Ces États membres sont bien
sûr moins riches que les autres étudiés (et il est possible que la famille étendue y joue
un rôle protecteur plus fort qu’ailleurs). Il est toutefois encourageant de voir que des
progrès sont réalisés dans certains domaines, et plus particulièrement dans les
interventions ciblées et stratégiques au Portugal.
Les principales implications politiques sont:
 Les systèmes de logement et les interventions, allocations de logement inclus,
sont plus importants dans la gestion du « sans-abrisme » que les changements
sur le marché du travail et la sécurité sociale, sauf dans les pays avec une
protection sociale faible et une forte dépendance à l’économie parallèle.
 Les interventions ciblées sur le « sans-abrisme » peuvent être très efficaces et
constructives dans une grande variété de contextes structuraux.
 Même les pays avec les aides sociales les plus fortes ont des lacunes dans leurs
systèmes de protection de groupes spécifiques exposés au « sans-abrisme ».
Ces lacunes mettent en lumière des opportunités d’échanges de politiques et de
connaissances entre les États membres de l’Union Européenne.
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 Il est nécessaire de prendre en charge les problèmes des migrants sans-abri et
sans ressources, en particulier des migrants d’Europe centrale et d’Europe de
l'est, des demandeurs d’asile déboutés et des sans papiers, à un niveau national
et supranational (Union européenne).
Conclusion
Ce rapport a été fondé sur l’hypothèse que les politiques de logement peuvent réduire
le lien entre les faibles revenus et les conséquences négatives sur le logement. Cette
étude fournit de très nombreuses preuves qui soutiennent cette assertion. Bien
qu’aucun système n’élimine le lien entre la pauvreté et les résultats en matière de
logement, il peut être réduit grâce à diverses politiques. Parmi celles-ci, l’allocation de
logement est la plus importante.
Alors que la pauvreté et la situation professionnelle sont étroitement liées, les résultats
en matière de logement des travailleurs en situation de pauvreté ne sont pas
systématiquement meilleurs que ceux des chômeurs en situation de pauvreté. Il existe
encore beaucoup de marge pour améliorer le rôle joué par le logement dans les
stratégies qui visent à démontrer que le “travail rapporte”. Nous avons identifié un
certain nombre de caractéristiques des systèmes de logement qui peuvent entraver
l’emploi mais aussi une quantité d’approches qui peuvent aider à mettre un terme à « la
culture de la pauvreté ». Néanmoins, nous avons aussi remarqué que les systèmes de
logement ne sont pas très réceptifs aux besoins des personnes ayant des emplois
précaires ou à bas salaire. Si les gouvernements souhaitent prouver que le « travail
rapporte » et qu’il est la meilleure solution pour sortir de la pauvreté, les systèmes de
logement et les politiques devraient être mieux adaptées pour satisfaire leurs besoins.
En bref, une plus grande attention devrait être portée au logement dans les stratégies
d’inclusion active.
Concernant les groupes les plus marginalisés, ceux qui sont menacés par le « sans-
abrisme », il était clair que les conditions du marché du logement et les systèmes de
logement sont aussi très importants. Même dans le contexte structurel le plus
complexe, les interventions ciblées peuvent protéger les groupes à risques du « sans-
abrisme ». La priorité devrait être accordée à l’amélioration des instruments de
protection des migrants vulnérables et de ceux qui sont dépendants de l’économie
parallèle.
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Diagramme 1 : La relation entre les régimes d’aides sociales et le logement
Relation de cause
Relation de nécessité
Relation de contingence
(A) RÉGIME D’AIDES
SOCIALES
(Impôt, sécurité sociale, marché
du travail)
(E) SYSTEME DE LOGEMENT
a) Marché immobilier
b) Interventions politiques importantes et
caractéristiques du système:
1. locations sociales et autres locations
inférieures au marché
2. allocations logement
3. propriété directe
(B) ECHELLE ET
DISTRIBUTION DE
LA PAUVRETE ET
DES INEGALITES
(C) ETAT DU
MARCHE DU
TRAVAIL
(D) CONDITIONS DE
LOGEMENT
(F) PERTE DE LOGEMENT
1. Coût du logement
2. Quantité de logement
3. Qualité physique du logement
4. Qualité du quartier
(G) EXCLUSION / SANS
ABRISME
1. Niveau de «sans abrisme»
2. Nature/causes du «sans
abrisme»
(H) CAUSES/FACTEURS INDIVIDUELS
(I) INTERVENTIONS CIBLANT LE
«SANS ABRISME»
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STUDIE ZU WOHNBAU UND AUSGRENZUNG:
WOHLFAHRTSSTRATEGIEN, WOHNBAU UND ARBEITSMÄRKTE
HAUPTPUNKTE
 Wohnbaustrategien können dabei helfen die Verbindungen zwischen
Einkommensarmut und den resultierenden schlechten Wohnverhältnissen zu
schwächen, diese aber nicht aufheben.
 Die schlechten Wohnverhältnisse einkommensschwacher Gruppen werden von
den allgemeinen Wohnverhältnissen eines Landes allgemein bestimmt. Diese
spiegeln allgemeine Einkommensniveaus wie auch Wohnbaustrategien wider.
Allerdings ergibt sich aus hohen absoluten Wohnungsstandards nicht
zwangsläufig Gleichheit zwischen einkommensschwachen und
einkommensstarken Gruppen.
 Wohnbeihilfen zeigen den am deutlichsten nachweisbaren Einfluss auf
Wohnverhältnisse für einkommensschwache Gruppen; Sozialmietwohnungen
schwächen die Verbindung zwischen Armut und Wohnverhältnissen geringfügig,
während selbstgenutztes Wohneigentum im Vollbesitz günstige Ergebnisse für
einkommensschwache Haushalte hinsichtlich einer Reihe von Wohnindikatoren
erzielt.
 Menschen in Haushalten ohne Arbeit haben schlechtere Wohnverhältnisse als
Menschen in Haushalten mit Arbeit; die Ergebnisse für arbeitende arme
Personen („working poor“) sind aber nur geringfügig besser als für arme
Personen ohne Arbeit. Die Kategorie der „working poor“ weist eine
bemerkenswert niedrige Rate bezüglich des Erhalts von Wohnbeihilfen auf,
woraus sich schlieβen lässt, dass dafür gesorgt werden müsste, das Arbeit sich
in Bezug auf Wohnen wieder lohnt.
 Wohnsysteme können die Arbeitskräftemobilität durch Wartelisten für soziale
Mietunterkünfte, Schwierigkeiten beim Verkauf von selbst genutztem
Wohneigentum und hohe Wohnkosten in Gebieten mit Beschäftigungswachstum
einschränken. Die Vergabe von Wohnbeihilfen kann ein weiteres Hindernis sein.
Wohnen muss bei „Flexicurity“-Strategien eine gröβere Rolle spielen.
 Weit verbreitet ist die Ansicht, dass arme Wohngegenden eine „Kultur der Armut“
begünstigen, die sich in Arbeitslosigkeit oder Beschäftigung in der
Schattenwirtschaft ausdrückt.
 Wohlfahrtssysteme wirken sich nachhaltig auf die Gründe und die Art von
Wohnungslosigkeit aus. Strukturelle Wohnungslosigkeit ist dort am niedrigsten,
wo die sozialen Netze am stärksten sind.
 Kurzfristiger Arbeitsmarktwechsel führt nur in solchen Ländern direkt zu
Wohnungslosigkeit, in denen schwacher Sozialschutz besteht; langfristige
Arbeitsmarktmarginalität ist gewöhnlich wichtiger.
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 Die allgemeinen Bedingungen des Wohnbaumarkts sind ein Hauptfaktor für
strukturelle Wohnungslosigkeit, und Zugang zu erschwinglichem Wohnraum auf
dem normalen Wohnungsmarkt für gefährdete Gruppen ist selbst in jenen
Ländern ein grundlegendes Anliegen, in denen starker Sozialschutz vorhanden
ist. Dies ist besonders in wirtschaftlichen schwachen Gebieten der Fall und auch
dort, wo Sozialwohnungsanbieter nicht dazu gezwungen sind, die Bedürftigsten
vorrangig zu behandeln.
 Gezielte Maβnahmen können schwierige strukturelle Kontexte ‚überwinden’ und
relativ gute Ergebnisse für Wohnungslose erzielen, jedoch sind wohnungslose
Migranten oft die am wenigsten geschützte Gruppe.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Einleitung
Innerhalb der Europäischen Union betreiben Mitgliedsstaaten typische
„Wohlfahrtssysteme“ - Organisation der Arbeitsmärkte, Steuern und
Sozialversicherungssysteme. Diese beeinflussen die Arbeitslosigkeitsrate und die
Einkommensverteilung. In letzter Zeit haben viele Länder ihre Wohlfahrtssysteme als
Teil ihrer Beschäftigungs- und Eingliederungsstrategien reformiert.
Obwohl das Wohnungswesen allgemein als grundlegendes Bestimmungsmerkmal für
den Wohlstand von Menschen und als Plattform für die Beteiligung an der
Gemeinschaft und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt gilt, wurde dem Verhältnis zwischen
Wohlfahrtsmaβnahmen und dem Wohnungswesen bisher wenig Beachtung geschenkt.
Diese Studie untersucht das Verhältnis zwischen Wohlfahrtssystemen und dem
Wohnungswesen in sechs Ländern, die so ausgesucht wurden, dass sie einen
Querschnitt durch verschiedene Wohlfahrtssysteme darstellen: Deutschland
(korporatistisch), Ungarn (Übergangsland), Niederlande (Mischung aus
korporatistisch/sozialdemokratisch), Portugal (Mittelmeerland), Schweden
(sozialdemokratisch) und Groβbritannien (liberal).
Der verwendete theoretische Rahmen wird in Schaubild 1 dargestellt. Darin wird
hypothetisch eine Reihe von Schlüsselbeziehungen zwischen Wohlfahrtssystemen,
Wohnungswesen und resultierenden Wohnverhältnissen, inklusive Wohnungslosigkeit,
aufgezeigt:
 Wohlfahrtssysteme (A) haben einen Einfluss auf Armutsniveaus (B) und
Beschäftigung (C), das wiederum Wohnverhältnisse (D) beeinflusst, die durch
eine Anzahl von Indikatoren bezüglich Wohnungsmangel (F) und
Wohnungslosigkeit (G) definiert sind.
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 Das Wohnungswesen kann eine Anzahl von Strategien oder anderen Merkmalen
(E) beinhalten, die dazu beitragen können, die Verbindung zwischen Armut und
Beschäftigungsstatus auf der einen Seite und daraus resultierenden
Wohnverhältnissen (F, G) auf der anderen Seite zu schwächen.
 Weitere einzelne Faktoren (H) und gezielte Maβnahmen (I) können einen
Einfluss auf die Wohnungslosigkeitsrate (G) haben.
 Das Wohnungswesen (E) und selbst einige Wohnverhältnisse (F) können die
Beschäftigungsrate (C) beeinflussen.
Die Studie verwendete quantitative und qualitative Methoden um die folgenden
Forschungsfragen zu untersuchen:
 Welche Auswirkungen hat Armut auf Wohnverhältnisse?
 Welche Auswirkungen haben Wohnbaustrategien auf Wohnverhältnisse (für
arme Haushalte)?
 Welche Auswirkungen hat der Beschäftigungsstatus auf Wohnverhältnisse (für
arme Haushalte)?
 Welche Auswirkungen haben Wohnverhältnisse auf Beschäftigung?
 Welche Auswirkungen haben das Sozialwesen und das Wohnungswesen auf die
Art und Gründe von Wohnungslosigkeit, und wie wirksam sind gezielte
Maβnahmen?
Sozialwesen und Wohnungswesen
Obwohl die Reformen des Sozialversicherungssystems und des Arbeitsmarktes in
jüngster Zeit wichtig waren, definieren die herkömmlichen Sozialsysteme noch immer
den Charakter einzelner Länder, und dies spiegelt sich im Spektrum der relativen
Armutsraten der für diese Studie ausgewählten sechs Länder wider. Diese sind in den
Niederlanden und in Schweden am niedrigsten und in Groβbritannien am höchsten. Die
Untersuchung zeigt auch, dass sich die Art der Sozialsysteme bis zu einem gewissen
Grad in den Wohnsystemen widerspiegelt. Die sozialdemokratischen und
korporatistischen Staaten (Schweden, die Niederlande und Deutschland) haben jeweils
ein groβes ganzheitliches Mietsystem. Der Eigentumssektor ist in diesen Staaten auch
kleiner. Länder in der Übergangskategorie (Ungarn) und der Mittelmeerkategorie
(Portugal) weisen kleine soziale Mietsektoren im Gegensatz zu einem groβen
Eigentumssektor auf und begrenzte Wohnbeihilfesysteme. In liberalen Staaten
(Groβbritannien) gibt es einen beträchtlichen und gezielten Sektor von
Sozialmietwohnungen, ein weitreichendes und gezieltes Wohnbeihilfesystem und einen
wichtigen Sektor von selbstgenutztem Wohneigentum im Vollbesitz.
Die Untersuchung bestätigt allerdings, dass diese Verbindungen zufällig sind und
einander nicht bedingen. Innerhalb der Systemtypen bestehen wichtige Unterschiede:
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das korporatistische Deutschland hat nun einen kleinen Sektor an
Sozialmietwohnungen im Vergleich zu seinem vermischt korporatistischen/sozialen
Nachbarn Holland, das den gröβten Sektor an Sozialmietwohnungen in Europa
aufweist. In Groβbritannien wurde die sozialpolitische Entscheidung getroffen, die
Bandbreite der Wohnbaumaβnahmen zu erweitern. Die relative hohe Rate an selbst
genutztem Wohneigentum im Vollbesitz und der immer noch beträchtliche Sektor der
Sozialwohnungen resultieren aus strategischen Entscheidungen, die ihrerseits aufgrund
der Entstehungsgeschichte der massiven sozialen Wohnbauprogramme vergangener
Jahrzehnte möglich waren. Ungarn entschloss sich zur Privatisierung seines staatlichen
Wohnbauwesens, während andere Übergangsländer dies nicht im selben Ausmaβ
taten. Regierungen sind daher in der Lage ihre Wohnsysteme im Kontext des
Sozialwesens zu gestalten. Weder zur Gänze abhängig, noch zur Gänze unabhängig,
handelt es sich um eine Symbiose, und zwar eine, die, wie im Folgenden gezeigt wird,
einen bedeutenden Einfluss auf das Leben von Menschen hat.
Die Auswirkung von Armut und Wohnbaumaβnahmen auf
Wohnverhältnisse
Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass Wohnbaustrategien (einschlieβlich Wohnbeihilfe) zwar
dabei helfen können, die Verbindung zwischen Einkommensarmut und daraus
resultierenden schlechten Wohnverhältnissen zu schwächen, sie diese aber nicht
unterbrechen können. Das bedeutet nicht, dass jede arme Person in schlechten
Wohnverhältnissen lebt. Es bedeutet jedoch, dass bei in Armut lebenden Menschen
eine systematisch höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass sie in schlechten
Wohnverhältnissen leben als jene Menschen, die nicht verarmt sind. Allerdings
bestehen groβe Erfahrungsunterschiede zwischen einzelnen Ländern.
Ein wichtiges Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist die Tatsache, dass die Wohnverhältnisse
armer Menschen von den Wohnverhältnissen eines Landes im Allgemeinen bestimmt
werden. Wenn die Wohnverhältnisse eines Landes generell auf einem hohen Niveau
liegen, sind die Wohnverhältnisse der armen Bevölkerung ebenfalls gut; dort, wo die
Wohnqualität generell schlecht ist, zeigt sich dies auch in den einkommensschwachen
Gruppen. Dies kann mit den allgemeinen Einkommensniveaus in einzelnen Ländern
und dem Druck des Immobilienmarktes in Verbindung gebracht werden, ebenso wie mit
strategischen Wohnbaumaβnahmen.
Ein zweites wichtiges Ergebnis ist die Tatsache, dass hohe absolute Wohnstandards für
arme Menschen nicht notwendigerweise zu Chancengleichheit zwischen
einkommensschwachen und nicht-einkommensschwachen Gruppen, führen. Einige der
gröβten Unterschiede in Bezug auf Wohnverhältnisse liegen in Ländern mit hohen
absoluten Standards (aber noch höheren Standards für den Rest der Bevölkerung) für
einkommensschwache Gruppen vor; und einige der kleinsten Unterschiede treten dort
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auf, wo absolute Standards für einkommensschwache Gruppen niedrig sind (aber die
Standards für viele andere ebenfalls). Dies lässt sich teilweise auf die Art und Weise
zurückführen, wie relative Wohnverhältnisse gemessen werden, jedoch ist dies nicht
immer der Fall.
Die untersuchten Übergangsländer (Ungarn) und Mittelmeerländer (Portugal) haben ein
hohes Niveau an Wohnungseigentum sowohl im Allgemeinen als auch in der in Armut
lebenden Bevölkerung. Auf staatlicher Ebene gleichen sich die Bereiche
Erschwinglichkeit (in dem sie gut abschneiden) und Überbelegung (in dem sie schlecht
abschneiden) einander aus.
In anderen Ländern haben “gebündelte” Strukturmaβnahmen einen wichtigen Einfluss
auf die Wohnverhältnisse der armen Bevölkerung. Am Beispiel Deutschland wird die
Schwierigkeit bei der Identifizierung der Auswirkungen einzelner Wohnbaustrategien
deutlich, die Wohnverhältnisse der einkommensschwachen Bevölkerung sind aber im
allgemeinen ähnlich wie jene in anderen Ländern, die nicht der Mittelmeer-
/Übergangskategorie angehören und in denen einzelne Wohnbaustrategien besser
identifiziert werden können. Groβbritannien hat eine Reihe einzelner
Wohnbaustrategien, die den hohen Grad an Einkommensarmut scheinbar
kompensieren: absolute Wohnstandards für arme Hauhalte, die mit solchen in
korporatistischen und sozialdemokratischen Systemen vergleichbar sind, bestehen
neben kleinen Unterschieden bezüglich der Wohnverhältnisse zwischen armen
Gruppen und solchen, die dies nicht sind.
In der Untersuchung wurde festgestellt, dass gezielte Wohnbeihilfen jene einzelne
Maβnahme ist, die die deutlichsten Verbesserungen für die Wohnverhältnisse
einkommensschwacher Gruppen ergibt. Diese Verbesserungen sind am stärksten
innerhalb der Gruppe der Sozialmieter sichtbar und weniger deutlich innerhalb der
Gruppe der Privatmieter (und kommen innerhalb der Gruppe der Eigenheimbesitzer oft
nicht infrage).
Es ist hingegen schwieriger, die individuellen Auswirkungen des sozialen
Wohnungsbaus zu demonstrieren. Dies stammt teilweise daher, dass es in manchen
Ländern problematisch ist den Sektor zu identifizieren und Bedenken hinsichtlich der
Verlässlichkeit der Daten in anderen bestehen. Trotzdem scheint der Sektor zu
Ergebnissen zu führen, die ungünstiger sind als erwartet: die Verbindung zwischen
Einkommensarmut und schlechten Wohnverhältnissen wird nur geringfügig
geschwächt. Das Datenmaterial belegt hingegen nicht jene schlechten Ergebnisse in
Bezug auf die Qualität der Wohngegend, die laut vieler landesweiter Untersuchungen
infolge der geografischen Konzentration von Haushalten mit geringem Einkommen in
Sozialwohnungen entstehen können.
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Obwohl hohe Eigenheimbesitzraten bei einkommensschwachen Personen offensichtlich
problematisch sein können, hat die Studie ergeben, dass in allen Ländern Eigentum
günstige Wohnverhältnisse in Bezug auf beinahe alle Indikatoren ergibt, und zwar für
beide Gruppen. Es überrascht nicht, dass Eigentum in Bezug auf Erschwinglichkeit gut
abschneidet (selbst wenn Wohnausgaben, wie in dieser Studie, als weit gefasster
Begriff verstanden wird). Aber das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Erschwinglichkeit
und der physischen Wohnqualität (die anzunehmen ist, wenn verarmte Besitzer sich
keine Reparaturen leisten können) ist innerhalb der Länder nicht sichtbar (selbst wenn
es Beweise dafür auf staatlicher Ebene gibt, wie oben beschrieben). In Bezug auf
manche Indikatoren in einigen Ländern liegen verarmte Eigentümer sogar über der
Gesamtbevölkerung.
Die Analyse hat einige wichtige Auswirkungen auf politische Strategien:
 Absolute Wohnbaustandards für einkommensschwache Menschen werden von
Wohnbaustandards in der Bevölkerung insgesamt bestimmt. Besonders in EU
Ländern mit niedrigeren Einkommen besteht Bedarf an politischen Strategien, die
eine Verbesserung der allgemeinen Wohnstandards zum Ziel haben.
 Beim Vergleich von Wohnverhältnissen zwischen Ländern ergeben hohe
Wohneigentumsniveaus (im Vollbesitz) scheinbar einen Ausgleich zwischen
Erschwinglichkeit und Qualität. Vollbesitz scheint keine allgemeine Lösung für
das Wohnungsproblem einkommensschwacher Gruppen zu sein. Es scheint,
dass diese Eigentumsvariante nicht für Personen geeignet ist, bei denen die
Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass sie entweder ihr ganzes Leben oder über einen
groβen Zeitraum hinweg einkommensschwach sein werden.
 Aber innerhalb der Länder entstehen durch Eigentum bemerkenswert gute
Wohnverhältnisse für Menschen, die in Armut leben und dies ist in jenen Ländern
am deutlichsten, die bescheidenere Eigentumsniveaus aufweisen. Dies legt
nahe, dass der Erwerb von Wohnungseigentum eine wertvolle Art der Verteilung
von Ressourcen über einen Lebenszyklus hinweg sein kann, mit anderen Worten
wenn Personen nur über einen gewissen Zeitraum hinweg einkommensschwach
sind.
 Gebündelte Wohnbaumaβnahmen ergeben scheinbar die wirksamsten
Verbesserungen der resultierenden Wohnverhältnisse. Eine Mischung von
spezifischen, auf Wohnbau gerichteten, Zuschüssen auf der Bedarfsseite
(Wohnbeihilfe) und Zuschüssen auf der Angebotsseite (Sozialwohnbau oder eine
andere Art der Unterkunft mit Miete unter dem Marktniveau) verbessern die
Wohnverhältnisse der in Armut lebenden Personen, während der isolierte Einsatz
nur der einen oder anderen Maβnahme weniger wirksam ist.
 Dennoch spielen Wohnbeihilfen eine wichtige Rolle bei der Unterstützung von
Menschen, die einkommensschwach sind. Es handelt sich hierbei um die
Maβnahme, die am gezieltesten eingesetzt werden kann, und die die
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Erschwinglichkeit von Mietunterkünften auf dem Immobilienmarkt verbessert,
ohne das Menschen notwendigerweise unter die allgemein festgelegte
Leistbarkeitsschwelle fallen (bei der die Ausgaben für Wohnen nicht mehr als
40% des Einkommen betragen).
 Sozialer Wohnbau oder andere Formen von Unterkünften mit Mieten unter dem
Marktwert, können nur dann die Wohnverhältnisse armer Menschen verbessern,
wenn diese Zugang dazu haben: ein Bekenntnis zu „sozialer Durchmischung“
sollte nicht als Ausrede dafür gelten, arme und gefährdete Gruppen von dieser
Form der Wohnungsversorgung auszuschlieβen.
Die Auswirkungen der Beschäftigung auf Wohnverhältnisse
Beschäftigung verringert die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Armut, aber die meisten Menschen
(im arbeitsfähigen Alter) leben in Haushalten, in denen jemand einer bezahlten Arbeit
nachgeht.
Die Untersuchung zeigt eine klare Verbindung zwischen Beschäftigungsstatus und
Wohnverhältnissen. Wir zeigen in Bezug auf eine Reihe von Indikatoren, dass für
Menschen, die arbeitslos sind, beinahe immer eine höhere Wahrscheinlichkeit
schlechterer Wohnverhältnisse besteht als für jene, die eine Anstellung haben. Darüber
hinaus neigen Menschen, die in Haushalten leben, in denen Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit
vorliegt, dazu, in schlechteren Wohnverhältnissen zu leben als jene, die in Haushalten
mit Kurzzeitarbeitslosigkeit leben. Das legt nun den Schluss nahe, dass die Dauer der
Arbeitslosigkeit sich auf Wohnverhältnisse auswirkt, und zwar unabhängig vom
Einkommen. Die Gründe dafür können nicht mit Sicherheit festgestellt werden, aber
dazu gehört wahrscheinlich die Tatsache, dass kurzfristig Arbeitslose ihre derzeitigen
Wohnverhältnisse mithilfe von Wohnbeihilfen, Ersparnissen oder Hilfe der Familie
aufrecht erhalten können.
Obwohl das Beweismaterial die These nahe legt, dass “Arbeit sich lohnt”, zeigt der
Vergleich der Wohnverhältnisse der arbeitslosen verarmten Personen mit den „working
poor“, dass die Auswirkung des Beschäftigungsstatus bei weitem weniger klar ist.
Obwohl Hinweise darauf vorliegen, dass die Wohnverhältnisse der „working poor“ über
denen von arbeitslosen verarmten Personen liegen, sind die Beweise schwach. Das ist
ganz besonders beim Leistbarkeitsindikator der Fall, bei dem deutlich ist, dass
Wohnbeihilfen arbeitslosen verarmten Personen bei weitem mehr helfen als den
„working poor“. Unser qualitatives Beweismaterial legt nahe, dass das Wohnbauwesen
allgemein und Wohnbeihilfen im besonderen sich nicht auf Personen einstellen, deren
Einkommen schwanken. Solche schwankenden Einkommen sind eher charakteristisch
für Personen, die abwechselnd arbeiten und dann wieder arbeitslos sind oder deren
Einkommen aufgrund wechselnder Arbeitsstunden oder eines signifikanten
Provisionselements beträchtliche Schwankungen aufweist.
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Die Implikationen dieser Ergebnisse sind klar:
 Sozialversicherungssysteme und Wohnbeihilfen spielen eine zentrale Rolle bei
der Eindämmung der Auswirkungen von Wohnungslosigkeit auf
Wohnverhältnisse über einen kurzen Zeitraum, jedoch nimmt diese
Schutzwirkung ab je länger die Arbeitslosigkeit in einem Haushalt andauert.
 Wohnsysteme müssen sich den Erfordernissen der “working poor” anpassen.
Soziale Mietwohnungen sind in Bezug auf Arbeitsmarktmobilität zu unflexibel,
wohingegen das Mieten auf dem freien Wohnungsmarkt gepaart mit
Wohnbeihilfen Flexibilität mit Wohnbeihilfe während einer Beschäftigung
kombiniert.
 Wohnbeihilfen an sich müssen auf die Bedürfnisse der “working poor” besser
reagieren, besonders für jene, die schwankende Einkommen beziehen oder
unsichere Verträge haben. Verbesserte Vergabe zur Verminderung von
Verzögerungen und ein ‘asymmetrischer’ Ansatz bezüglich schwankender
Einkommen könnten dabei helfen, dass “Arbeit sich lohnt”, indem Personen vor
Einkommensverlusten geschützt würden ohne sie aber gleichzeitig für geringe
Einkommenssteigerungen zu bestrafen.
Die Auswirkungen der Wohnverhältnisse auf Beschäftigung
Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass sich Wohnbausysteme auf Beschäftigung auswirken,
aber auf eine Art und Weise, die viel komplexer ist, als in früheren Studien oft
angenommen wurde.
Das Wohnungswesen kann die Arbeitsmarktmobilität zwischen Regionen hemmen.
Unser Datenmaterial bestätigt das bekannte Phänomen, dass Wartelisten für
Sozialwohnungen in Gebieten, für die groβes Interesse besteht, eine Barriere schaffen.
Mieten auf dem Privatsektor gilt als jene Variante der Wohnungsversorgung, die
Mobilität am besten unterstützt, und es ist darüber hinaus klar, dass Wohnbeihilfen
Personen dabei helfen können, in Gebiete mit höheren Wohnkosten zu ziehen. In
diesem Zusammenhang ist aber zu beachten, dass nur wenige der „working poor“
Wohnbeihilfen beziehen.
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten auch darauf hin, dass Eigenheimbesitz eine andere Rolle
spielt als bisher angenommen wurde. Transaktionskosten scheinen unwichtig zu sein,
aber die Schwierigkeiten, die mit dem Verkauf einer Immobilie zu einem Zeitpunkt an
dem sich der Wohnungsmarkt auf einem Tiefstand befindet, einhergehen und die
Aussicht, bei einem Umzug in eine teure Gegend Besitz gegen Miete einzutauschen,
waren wichtig. Ein besonders interessantes Ergebnis war die Bedeutung, die der vor
Ort lebenden Familie und dem sozialen Netz in Bezug auf Mobilitätshemmnisse
zukommen. Diese Netze verbessern nicht nur die Lebensqualität der Menschen, sie
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stellen auch ein unbedingt notwendiges Netz für arbeitende Menschen dar, und dies ist
für Haushalte mit niedrigem Einkommen, die Dienstleistungen wie z.B.
Kinderversorgung nicht kaufen können, besonders wichtig.
Unsere Untersuchung ergab Beweise für die bekannte Tendenz, dass Arbeitslosenraten
im sozialen Mietwohnungsbereich höher sind. Es zeigte sich aber auch, dass zwischen
hoher Arbeitslosenrate und sowohl Bezug von Wohnbeihilfe als auch Eigentumsbesitz
eine Verbindung besteht. Diese Ergebnisse entsprechen der allgemeinen These, dass
der Schutz arbeitsloser Menschen dazu führt, dass der Anreiz einer Arbeit
nachzugehen, abnimmt. (Im Fall von Eigentumsbesitz ist dieser Effekt ziemlich gleich
wie bei Wohnbeihilfe: Einkommensverlust erzeugt keinen Druck bei der Unterkunft zu
sparen. Es muss jedoch betont werden, dass keine Kausalität nachgewiesen werden
konnte).
Das qualitative Datenmaterial weist allerdings darauf hin, dass das System der
Wohnbeihilfen den Anreiz zur Arbeit nehmen könnte, wobei die Angst, den Arbeitsplatz
zu verlieren, und die Wartezeit bis zum Erhalt von Beihilfen die Hauptfaktor waren (und
nicht die übliche Arbeitslosigkeitsfalle).
Es zeigte sich eine Verbindung zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und Gegenden mit schlechter
Wohnqualität, und auch die weitverbreitete Auffassung einer beharrlichen
“Armutskultur” in diesen Bezirken. In einem Land (Ungarn) wies dies auf Beschäftigung
in der Schattenwirtschaft; in anderen auf Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit. Es bestehen
Hinweise auf die Stigmatisierung von Personen, die in einer armen Nachbarschaft
leben, aber die Rolle des öffentlichen Verkehrs bei der Verbindung von Menschen mit
örtlichen Arbeitsmärkten schien kein wichtiger Faktor zu sein.
Aus diesen Resultaten ergeben sich eine Anzahl von Implikationen für Strategien:
 Die Förderung geografischer Arbeitsmarktmobilität impliziert den vermehrten
Einsatz des Mietwohnungmarktes, und dies scheint die flexibelste
Eigentumsvariante zu sein.
 Die Wohnungsversorgung spielt eine wichtige Rolle bei ‘Flexicurity’ Strategien,
aber bessere einkommensbezogene Unterstützung (besonders Wohnbeihilfen)
für die Gruppe der “working poor“ ist notwendig, besonders im Kontext der
Förderung von Mobilität und des Einstiegs in relativ schlecht bezahlte und
unsichere Arbeit.
 Gröβere Arbeitsmarktmobilität impliziert auch, dass die Unterstützung, die von
örtlichen Familien- und sozialen Netzen bereitgestellt werden, durch
professionelle Hilfe ersetzt werden müssen. Arbeitgeber und Regierungen, die
Mobilität fördern möchten, müssten unter Umständen diesen Hilfsdiensten mehr
Beachtung schenken.
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 Um in armen Gegenden Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen, müssten alternative
Strategien angewendet werden: obwohl die Bereitstellung von subventionierten
und/oder geförderten Unterkünften innerhalb des gesamten Wohnungsbestands
das Entstehen verarmter Nachbarschaften verhindern kann, können einzelne
Stützpakete für Menschen, die in solchen Gebieten wohnen zu ihrer
erfolgreichen Re-Integrierung in den Arbeitsmarkt führen und zu einem
langsamen Abbau der „Armutskulturen“ beitragen.
Wohnungslosigkeit und Wohlfahrtssystem
Eine der zentralen Hypothesen, auf die sich diese Untersuchung stützt, war die
Verbindung zwischen Grad und Art von Wohnungslosigkeit und der Interaktion
zwischen Wohlfahrtssystemen (Sozialversicherung, Steuer- und
Arbeitsmarktmaβnahmen) und Wohnbauwesen und politischen Strategien (die
hypothetisch das Potenzial haben, Ausgrenzung vom Wohnungsmarkt und andere
Ergebnisse für Haushalte mit niedrigem Einkommen positiv oder negativ zu
beeinflussen). Obwohl es sich zeigte, dass die geringe Verfügbarkeit von Datenmaterial
Vergleiche in Bezug auf Grade von Wohnungslosigkeit stark einschränkt, konnten
dennoch einige wichtige Schlüsse bezüglich der unterschiedlichen Gründe und der Art
von Wohnungslosigkeit zwischen Ländern gezogen werden, wie auch hinsichtlich der
Robustheit der Antworten zu den wichtigsten gefährdeten Gruppen.
Unsere neuen Daten weisen darauf hin, dass Wohlfahrtssysteme starke Auswirkungen
auf die Gründe und Arten von Wohnungslosigkeit haben. Dies zeigt sich nicht nur durch
das relative Fehlen von „struktureller” Wohnungslosigkeit in Schweden und den
Niederlanden, wo die allgemeinen sozialen Netze des Wohlfahrtsstaates ungewöhnlich
stark sind, sondern auch dadurch, dass jene Einwanderer, die keinen Zugriff zu
Sozialbeihilfen haben, ganz besonders stark von Wohnungslosigkeit bedroht sind
(besonders in Zeiten einer Wirtschaftskrise).
Das Verhältnis zwischen Wohnungslosigkeit und Änderungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ist
aber komplex und scheint nur in jenen Ländern ein direktes zu sein (Ungarn, Portugal)
und bei jenen Gruppen (Einwanderern), die den geringsten sozialen Schutz haben.
Selbst in diesen Fällen sind Marginalität des Arbeitsmarktes und Unsicherheit, oft
verbunden mit einer Abhängigkeit von der Schattenwirtschaft, im allgemeinen wichtiger
als plötzliche Schwankungen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Es scheint, dass in jenen Ländern
und für jene Gruppen, die besseren sozialen Schutz aufweisen, anhaltende Armut
und/oder Arbeitslosigkeit zu Wohnungslosigkeit nicht so sehr direkt, materiell, beiträgt,
sondern eher langfristig in indirekter Weise, über negativen sozialen Druck auf Familien.
In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Sozialversicherungssysteme und insbesondere
Wohnbeihilfen gewöhnlich die Verbindung zwischen dem Verlust des
Arbeitsplatzes/einem plötzlichen Einkommensrückgang und Wohnungslosigkeit
xxxiii
unterbrechen, könnte man annehmen, dass ein Eingrenzen der
Anspruchsberechtigungen oder eine Erweiterung der Bezugsbedingungen zu erhöhter
Wohnungslosigkeit führen müsste. Es gibt aber nur wenige Anzeichen darauf, dass
jüngst eingeführte Beschränkungen bei Sozialbeihilfen in Deutschland und
Groβbritannien direkt zu einem Anstieg der Obdachlosenrate geführt haben. Darüber
hinaus gab es, zumindest in Groβbritannien, Expertenstimmen, die erweiterte
Bezugsbedingungen im Zusammenhang mit Bemühungen Obdachlose auf den
Arbeitsmarkt zurückzuführen, befürworteten. Allerdings wurden verstärkte Sanktionen
sowohl hier als auch in Deutschland als Risikostrategie in Bezug auf die am meisten
gefährdeten Gruppen wie z.B. junge Menschen, angesehen.
Unser Datenmaterial untermauerte die These, dass sich Wohnungsmarktbedingungen
und -systeme positiv und negativ auf die Art und den Grad von Wohnungslosigkeit
auswirken, und zwar unabhängig von Wohlfahrtssystemen. Dies zeigte sich am
deutlichsten in Deutschland, wo eine Flaute auf dem Wohnungsmarkt die
Wohnungslosigkeit in vielen Teilen des Landes verringerte. In Groβbritannien ist
gesetzlich definierte Wohnungslosigkeit eng mit dem Wohnungsmarktzyklus verknüpft.
“Strukturelle” Wohnungslosigkeit scheint in beiden Ländern daher viel enger verbunden
mit Entwicklungen auf dem Wohnungsmarkt als mit dem Arbeitsmarkt oder
Sozialversicherungsfaktoren.
Überdies war das Problem von Zugangsbarrieren zu erschwinglicher Unterkunft auf
dem normalen Wohnungsmarkt für die am meisten gefährdeten Gruppen in allen
Ländern ein vorrangiges Thema, und zwar auch in jenen mit der besten Sozialschutz.
Dies war besonders in wirtschaftsschwachen Regionen der Fall und in Situationen, in
denen die Anbieter von Sozialunterkünften nicht gezwungen waren, obdachlose und
bedürftigste Haushalte vorrangig zu behandeln.
Das Wohnungswesen spielt auch im Zusammenhang mit gezielten Maβnahmen zur
Bekämpfung von Wohnungslosigkeit bei besonders gefährdeten Gruppen eine wichtige
Rolle. Neben Deutschland hat Groβbritannien die ausgefeiltesten gezielten Maβnahmen
gegen Wohnungslosigkeit, besonders hinsichtlich der Prävention von
Wohnungslosigkeit und Jugendwohnungslosigkeit. Trotz ihrer stark unterschiedlichen
Sozial- und Wohnbausysteme, fanden sich jedoch in allen untersuchten Ländern
Beispiele wirksamer gezielter Maβnahmen gegen Wohnungslosigkeit. Diese gezielten
Maβnahmen scheinen schwierige strukturelle Kontexte „beseitigen“ zu können und
relativ gute Ergebnisse für Wohnungslose zu erbringen. Es stellte sich aber ebenfalls
heraus, dass manche Gruppen wirksamere Hilfsmaβnahmen erhielten als andere,
wobei vor Gewalt flüchtende Frauen und Kinder in den meisten Ländern den besten
Schutz erhielten und verschiedene Einwanderergruppen (besonders jene ohne Zugriff
zu öffentlichen Geldern) gewöhnlich den schlechtesten Schutz.
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Selbst Länder mit den besten Wohlfahrtssystemen haben Schwachstellen in ihren
Sicherheitsnetzen, und in dieser Hinsicht könnten Länder noch von einander lernen. So
gab es in Schweden groβe Hürden bezüglich der Unterstützung von Wohnungslosen
mit anhaltenden Alkohol- oder Drogenproblemen, und in den Niederlanden könnte man
viel über den Schutz von Frauen, die vor Gewalt flüchten, von anderen
westeuropäischen Ländern wie z.B. Groβbritannien, Schweden und Deutschland
lernen. In Groβbritannien sind die sozialen Netze für Familien mit Hypothekenschulden
deutlich schlechter als in anderen Ländern Westeuropas und besonders schlecht für
Einwanderer ohne Zugriff zu öffentlichen Geldern (wie dies in den Niederlanden der Fall
ist). In Portugal und noch mehr in Ungarn, liegt der Schutz weit hinter dem zurück, der
obdachlosen Gruppen in anderen untersuchten Ländern zuteil wird, was zum Teil
wahrscheinlich darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass diese Mitgliedsstaaten weniger
wohlhabend sind als andere untersuchte Länder (es ist ferner auch möglich, dass die
Groβfamilie eine wichtigere Rolle als soziales Sicherheitsnetz spielt als anderswo.)
Positiv war aber, dass in manchen Bereichen, besonders in Bezug auf strategische und
gezielte Maβnahmen in Portugal, Fortschritte gemacht worden waren.
Die wichtigsten Konsequenzen für politische Strategien sind daher:
 Wohnsysteme/Maβnahmen, einschlieβlich Wohnbeihilfen sind bei der
Entstehung und dem Management von Wohnungslosigkeit wichtiger als eine
Änderung des Arbeitsmarktes/Sozialversicherung, mit Ausnahme jener Länder,
in denen es geringe soziale Sicherheit gibt und eine hohe Abhängigkeit von der
Schattenwirtschaft besteht.
 Gezielte Maβnahmen gegen Wohnungslosigkeit können in vielen
unterschiedlichen strukturellen Kontexten äuβerst wirksam und erstrebenswert
sein.
 Selbst Länder mit den besten Wohlfahrtssystemen haben Lücken in ihren
Sicherheitsnetzen in Bezug auf spezifische von Wohnungslosigkeit gefährdete
Gruppen, was auf beträchtliches Potenzial für Politiktransfer und
Informationsweitergabe innerhalb der EU Mitgliedsstaaten hinweist.
 Das Problem wohnungsloser und mittelloser Migranten – insbesondere EWG
Migranten, abgewiesene Asylbewerber und Migranten ohne Ausweispapiere –
muss dringend auf nationaler und übernationaler (EU) Ebene angesprochen
werden.
Schlussfolgerungen
Dieser Bericht basiert auf der Hypothese, dass Wohnbaustrategien die Verbindung
zwischen Einkommensarmut und den jeweiligen Wohnverhältnissen schwächen
können. Die Untersuchung stellt eine groβe Menge an Beweismaterial zur Verfügung,
dass diese Behauptung belegt. Obwohl kein System die Verbindung zwischen Armut
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und Wohnverhältnissen vollkommen trennt, kann diese mithilfe einer Reihe von
strategischen Maβnahmen geschwächt werden. Von diesen hat die Wohnbeihilfe die
deutlichste Wirkung.
Obwohl Armut und Beschäftigungsstatus eng miteinander verbunden sind, sind die
Wohnverhältnisse der „working poor“ nicht systematisch besser als jene der
arbeitslosen armen Bevölkerung. Die Rolle des Wohnbaus in politischen Strategien, die
zeigen möchten, dass ‚Arbeit sich lohnt’, kann noch beträchtlich verbessert werden. Wir
habe eine Anzahl von Merkmalen von Wohnbausystemen identifiziert, die
Beschäftigung erschweren, aber auch eine Anzahl von Ansätzen, die beim Abbau der
‚Armutskultur’ helfen können. Nichtsdestoweniger hat sich auch gezeigt, dass
Wohnbausysteme nicht gut auf die Bedürfnisse der Menschen in schlecht bezahlten
und unsicheren Arbeitsplätzen reagieren. Wenn Regierungen beweisen wollen, dass
Arbeit sich lohnt und der beste Weg aus der Armut ist, müssen Wohnbausysteme und
Strategien besser darauf abgestimmt sein, die Bedürfnisse jener Menschen zu decken.
Kurz gesagt, dem Thema Wohnungsversorgung muss in aktiven integrativen Strategien
mehr Beachtung geschenkt werden.
In Bezug auf die marginalisierteste Gruppe – Personen, die von Wohnungslosigkeit
bedroht sind – war offensichtlich, dass die Bedingungen auf dem Wohnbaumarkt und
Wohnbausysteme ebenfalls entscheidend sind. Selbst in den schwierigsten
strukturellen Situationen, können gezielte Maβnahmen gefährdete Gruppen vor
Wohnungslosigkeit schützen. Ein verbessertes Sicherheitsnetz für schutzbedürftige
Migranten und anderen Personen, die von der Schattenwirtschaft abhängig sind, sollte
vorrangig sein.
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Schaubild 1 Verknüpfungen zwischen Wohlfahrtssystemen und Wohnungswesen
(A) WOHLFAHRT
(Steuer, Sozialversicherung,
Arbeitsmarkt)
(E) WOHNUNGSWESEN
a) Wohnungsmarkt
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nahmen und Systemmerkmale:
4. soziale Mietwohnungen und andere
Unterkünfte unter Marktmietniveau
5. Wohnbeihilfe
6. Vollbesitz
(B) AUSMASS &
VERTEILUNG
VON ARMUT &
UNGLEICHHEIT
(C)
ARBEITSMARK
TERGEBNISSE
(D)
WOHNVERHÄLTNISSE
(F) WOHNRAUMUNTERVERSORGUNG
1. Wohnungskosten
2. Wohnungsmenge
3. Zustand der Wohnungen
4. Beschaffenheit der Wohngegend
(G) WOHNUNGS-
AUSGRENZUNG/
WOHNUNGSLOSIGKEIT
1. Grad der Wohnungslosigkeit
2. Art/Gründe für
Wohnungslosigkeit
(H) EINZELNE GRÜNDE/FAKTOREN
(I) GEZIELTE MASSNAHMEN BEZ.
WOHNUNGSLOSIGKEIT
Kausale Verknüpfung
Bedingte Verknüpfung
Zufällige Verknüpfung
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STUDY ON HOUSING AND EXCLUSION: WELFARE
POLICIES, HOUSING PROVISION AND LABOUR MARKETS
KEY MESSAGES
 Housing policy can help to weaken, but not remove, the links between income
poverty and poor housing outcomes.
 The housing outcomes of the poor are driven by the housing conditions in the
country as a whole. This reflects general levels of income in countries as well as
housing policies. However, high absolute housing standards for the poor do not
necessarily translate into equality between the income poor and the non poor.
 Housing allowances have the clearest demonstrable impact on housing
outcomes for the poor; social rented housing weakly reduces the link between
poverty and housing outcomes, while outright ownership generates favourable
outcomes for poor households across a range of housing indicators.
 People in workless households have worse housing outcomes than people in
working households, but the housing outcomes of the working poor are only
slightly better than the workless poor. There is a notably low receipt of housing
allowances among the working poor, suggesting there is a need to ensure that
‘work pays’ in terms of housing.
 Housing systems can inhibit labour mobility through waiting lists for social rented
housing, difficulties in selling owner occupied dwellings and high housing costs in
employment growth areas. Housing allowance administration can be a further
impediment. Housing needs to play a stronger role in ‘flexicurity’ strategies.
 Poverty neighbourhoods are widely believed to foster cultures of poverty which
take the form of worklessness or working in the informal economy.
 Welfare regimes impact profoundly on the causes and nature of homelessness.
Structural homelessness is lowest where welfare safety nets are strong.
 Homelessness is directly connected to short-term labour market change only in
countries where welfare protection is weak; long-term labour market marginality
is usually more important.
 The general condition of the housing market is a major driver of structural
homelessness, and access to mainstream affordable housing for vulnerable
groups is a major concern even in countries with the strongest welfare protection.
This is especially the case in pressurised regions and where social housing
providers are not obliged to prioritise those in greatest need.
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 Targeted interventions are capable of ‘overriding’ difficult structural contexts to
deliver reasonably good outcomes for homeless people, but homeless migrants
are often the least well protected group.
1PART I: THE CONTEXT
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background to project
Reports of the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion
have identified ‘ensuring decent accommodation’ as a key policy priority across the
European Union. The 2006 report urged Member States to develop integrated and co-
ordinated responses to multiple disadvantages and to address the needs of groups at
particular risk by improving access to mainstream provision of services and, where
necessary, targeted measures.
Homeless people are one of the target groups covered by the active inclusion strategy
and social housing is an element within the pillar of this strategy that stresses the
importance of access to quality social services. Housing provision is seen as having an
impact on labour mobility, household formation and the development of sustainable
communities.
At the level of the European Union, the relationships between social and employment
policies are widely recognised, for example in the recent Joint Report on Social
Protection and Social Inclusion (CEC, 2010). However, there is little evidence and
analysis on the relationship between housing and exclusion and housing and
employment. This study is intended to fill this gap.
1.2 Aims of Project
The study aims to analyse the interactions between welfare regimes and housing
systems. ‘Welfare regimes’ are defined as the operation of labour market institutions
and tax and social security systems that determine the levels and distribution of
incomes. ‘Housing systems’ are defined as the both the operation of housing markets
and housing policy interventions.
The relationships between welfare regimes and housing systems can operate in both
directions, as is reflected in our research aims.
The first aim of the project is to establish the link between income poverty and housing
outcomes, and the role that housing policy interventions play. Welfare regimes impact
on housing outcomes by affecting the ability of people to attain sufficient affordable
housing at a reasonable cost, but individuals’ ability to attain decent housing is also
influenced by housing policy interventions. Thus we wish to understand how welfare
2regimes and housing systems generate different housing outcomes at a country level
and the way in which different housing policy instruments perform within countries.
The second aim of the project is to establish the link between employment status and
housing outcomes, including whether the duration of unemployment or other forms of
inactivity leads to worsening housing outcomes and whether the in-work poor
experience different housing outcomes from the working poor. We also explore the
relationship between housing outcomes and precarious employment and variable
incomes that have been a growing feature of labour markets.
The third aim of the project is to establish whether housing systems assist or hinder
employment, particularly for individuals seeking to enter the labour market. This is
based on the recognition that housing systems may affect employment by creating or
reducing financial incentives to take employment, through ‘area effects’, or by affecting
people’s geographical mobility.
The fourth aim of the study is to investigate the relationship between welfare regimes
and the scale and nature of homelessness, which is interpreted as being an extreme
‘housing outcome’. In so doing, the study will establish key risks factors in
homelessness and highlight good practices in terms of prevention and the reintegration
of homeless people into wider social institutions including employment.
1.3 Structure of report
The report is divided into four main parts.
The first part includes three further chapters. Chapter 2 contains a critical review of
existing evidence on the relationships between welfare regimes, employment and
housing. This informs the establishment of the theoretical framework and the research
methods in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the welfare regimes and
housing systems in the six countries selected for inclusion in this study.
The second part contains three chapters that provide new evidence on the relationship
between welfare regimes and housing outcomes, and between housing systems and
employment. Chapter 5 examines the impact of income poverty on housing outcomes at
a country level; Chapter 6 examines the role that individual policies (or features of
housing systems) play in determining housing outcomes, particularly for people living in
income poverty. In Chapter 7 the impact of employment status on housing outcomes is
analysed. The role that the housing system plays in influencing employment outcomes
is analysed in Chapter 8.
The third part contains three chapters that examine the relationship between welfare
regimes, housing policies and homelessness. Chapter 9 reviews the existing evidence
3on housing exclusion and homelessness, including its definitions, its causes and
policies to address it. Chapter 10 presents new evidence on the causes and nature of
homelessness, including the role of the labour market, welfare reform and the situation
of especially vulnerable groups such as immigrants. New evidence on policies and
responses to homelessness is presented in Chapter 11. This includes detailed
examination of responses to particular groups at high risk of homelessness such as
single men with support needs, young people, and women fleeing domestic violence.
The fourth part contains a single chapter, Chapter 12, which contains the overall
conclusions for the study.
4
5Chapter 2: Welfare Regimes, Employment and Housing: A review of
existing evidence
2.1 Introduction
The study of welfare regimes, labour market outcomes and housing systems has
developed in distinct strands, and has been located in several different social science
disciplines. This explains why existing knowledge on the links between welfare regimes,
labour markets outcomes and housing systems is disjointed: relationships between
housing and employment, for example have been explored entirely separately from
relationships between poverty and housing. It is therefore not surprising that existing
knowledge of the relationships between welfare regimes, employment and housing are
lacking any unifying conceptual basis let alone a firm empirical base.
In this chapter we examine the following four currently disjointed areas of knowledge:
 welfare regimes, identifying the link between social security systems and labour
market institutions;
 the links between welfare regimes and housing systems;
 the link between welfare regimes, employment and income distribution; and
 the links between housing systems and employment.
2.2 Welfare Regimes and Housing Systems
Welfare regimes: links between social security systems and labour market
institutions
Over many decades, European countries developed distinctive labour market
institutions (LMIs) and tax and social security systems. Their growth was associated
with economic development, particularly industrialisation and urbanisation, and in the
west with the growth of democracy and organised labour (Harloe, 1995). Early studies
tended to see the development of welfare states as being an inevitable consequence of
economic development, and represented the ‘old convergence’ tradition in social
science (Doling, 1997). It was later replaced by a ‘new convergence’ that stressed the
pressures of international competition and fiscal austerity that would lead to a seemingly
inevitable retreat of welfare states (Tanzi, 2000).
Yet another academic tradition, ‘divergence’, emerged stressing the distinctive nature of
institutions. By far the most influential manifestation of this tradition has been Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) typology of ‘welfare regimes’. His concept of ‘welfare regime’
focussed on two types of institution: labour markets and tax/ social security systems; in
6other words focussed primarily on income, and his typology provides the starting point
for virtually every (non-economics) study of these institutions.
The study itself is now dated (the data was collected in the 1980s), and its coverage
was incomplete, focussing only on advanced economies (Luxembourg was the only
non-OECD member covered), under-representing the southern European countries (of
these only Italy is included), and omitting entirely the (then) socialist countries governed
by Communist Parties. Such critiques provoked a series of refinements, with academics
in many countries claiming that they were exceptions (e.g. the ‘wage earner’ welfare
state in Australia), many complaining that the study ignored gender and ethnicity, while
others attempted to broaden its geographical scope.
The study is striking for the opaqueness of much of the data and the way in which some
of the key concepts were operationalised. Esping-Andersen uses three types of
concepts to identify welfare regimes:
 the degree of ‘decommodification’ which represents the degree to which people
can maintain an acceptable standard of living independently of the labour market;
 the degree of ‘stratification’ which is indicative of the system operating to
preserve inequalities based on status in the labour market (for example through
profession-specific social insurance arrangements); and
 the degree of mix between state, market and family in the provision of welfare
programmes.
Of these, ‘decommodification’ is the core concept, as it maps relatively easily with
indicators that are more broadly employed, notably income poverty. It is also the
indicator that is most obviously outcome orientated, and it is outcomes that are our
principal concern (see below).
Yet, despite these conceptual and empirical controversies, Esping-Andersen’s study
provides a powerful characterisation of social and economic systems, and one of the
reasons for its durability is that it has broadly equivalent categorisations in the
economics literature (for example see Hutton, 1995, p. 282).
As an ideal-type categorisation, Esping-Andersen’s typology can be summarised with
generally accepted refinements and additions:
 liberal regimes are characterised by deregulated labour markets and social
security systems that emphasise means-tested benefits paid at low levels; such
regimes are gender blind in that female employment is neither discouraged
through generous maternity or childcare benefits, nor encouraged by state
childcare provision. The ‘archetypal’ representative of the liberal regime is the
United States, though in Europe the UK is normally allocated to this category.
7 corporatist regimes are characterised by regulated labour markets designed to
preserve differentials, an approach mirrored in strong earnings-related social
insurance systems that may also be discriminatory in gender terms. Such
regimes have been noted to depend heavily on the male-breadwinner model,
with maternity benefits acting to discourage mothers from working. Germany is
normally treated as the ‘archetypal’ representative of the corporatist regime type.
France and Austria are also often added to this. The Netherlands is often
regarded as a hybrid corporatist/ social democratic regime.
 social democratic regimes are the most egalitarian of the regimes existing in
democratic countries, being underpinned by a strong commitment to universalism
in social security and public services. The cost of these benefits and services
demands very high levels of both male and female employment. This is achieved
in part through services such as provision of childcare and a high level of
conditionality in the benefits system. Sweden is normally treated as the
‘archetypal’ representative of this regime-type, although (as noted above) the
Netherlands is often treated as a hybrid corporatist/social democratic regime.
 Mediterranean (‘rudimentary’) regimes have been added to Esping-Andersen’s
typologies (Leibfried, 1992). They combine weak social security systems (with
the exception of pensions) with strong labour market regulation that creates a
segmented or dual labour market divided between a heavily protected formal
sector and a weakly protected informal sector. These conditions are favourable to
clientalism and familialism - the high level of inter-generational inter-dependence
in part provides a substitute for income redistribution by the state (e.g. Allen,
2006).
 socialist and post-socialist regimes should be added with the accession of some
Central and East European countries to the European Union. Under the socialist
regime, the workplace in the state-enterprise system was a locus of much
welfare, in large part to supplement inadequate ‘individual’ wages and to
encourage female employment. Prices of essentials were also kept low, which
contributed to permanent shortages (see Kornai, 1992). Typologies of post-
socialist regimes have sometimes found similarities with the corporatist regimes
of western Europe (Fenger, 20071), but the importance of the informal economy
and the family in maintaining incomes provide similarities with the Mediterranean
regimes.
1 Fenger also argues that the adoption of the open method of co-ordination which places emphasis on
mutual learning increases the chances of new Member States converging towards one of the west
European typologies.
8Links between housing systems and welfare regimes
The nature of the housing system was not considered by Esping-Andersen in his
classification of welfare regimes. This omission is often attributed to the role of housing
as the ‘wobbly pillar’ of the welfare state (Torgersen, 1987), reflecting the predominance
of private provision, at least in the western European countries and it has been noted
that ‘[v]ery little work in housing has been based on Esping-Andersen’s analysis’ (Allen,
2006, p. 259).
Nonetheless the omission has prompted two types of responses from housing
academics: some have attempted to adapt Esping-Andersen’s typology to housing;
while the most influential intervention has been to create a separate typology for
housing rental systems.
Adapting Esping-Andersen to housing
The most systematic attempt to apply Esping-Andersen’s typology to housing was
conducted by Hoekstra (2003), although his study is confined to the Netherlands.
He suggests ways in which Esping-Andersen’s indicators can be adapted to housing.
For example he defines housing decommodification as ‘the extent to which households
can provide their own housing, independent of the income they acquire on the labour
market’ (Hoekstra, 2003, p. 60). He creates a scheme of analysis deductively from
Esping-Andersen’s ideal-type:
 decommodification: housing subsidisation and price regulation;
 stratification: social housing allocation rules; and
 mix of provision: is said to be the determinant of decommodification and
stratification.
Examples of how the framework is applied include:
 social housing allocations: in a social democratic system allocations are on the
basis of ‘need’; in a liberal system allocation is primarily by the market, but the
small social rented sector is reserved for low income groups2;
 subsidies: in a social democratic system, there would be large production
subsidies; in a liberal regime there would be few; and
 regulation: is strong in a social democratic system; it is weak in a liberal system.
2 The empirical basis of this is questioned below.
9Categorisation is made on the basis of a qualitative assessment, so in this respect the
approach is quite different from Esping-Andersen’s quantitative approach.
Hoekstra’s framework is applied to the Netherlands, though in principle it could be
applied to other countries, and the situation in the 1990s is compared to the 1980s in
particular to identify whether significant reforms that took place in the 1990s had an
impact on the nature of the country’s housing regime. He concludes that the
Netherlands has shifted away from social democracy and towards corporatism,
although he then discusses at length alternative definitions of corporatism, preferring to
interpret it as a means of mediating conflicting interests in a consensus model. In
focussing on processes rather than outcomes, the Hoekstra framework shares the
characteristic of other housing typologies (see below).
The observed focus on processes rather than outcomes points to a significant gap in
the knowledge base.
Housing regimes
By far the most influential attempt at creating a typology of housing systems was
established by Kemeny (1995). Conducted outside Esping-Andersen’s framework,
Kemeny constructed a two-part typology of rental systems: unitary and dualist.
Kemeny suggested that housing shortages (especially after 1945) prompted
governments to provide supply-side subsidies to promote social (or ‘cost’) rental
housing. Over time, such building programmes were reduced as shortages were met
and this allowed rental systems to ‘mature’. As the debt burden diminished, supply-side
subsidies could be reduced and pressures on rents declined. He argues that at this
point the ‘cost’ rental sector becomes able to compete strongly with owner-occupation
as well as market renting, but that governments face a ‘critical juncture’ whereby they
can either allow the ‘cost’ rental sector to enjoy its competitive advantage, or intervene
to curb its position by extracting surpluses. He suggests that the former strategy is
followed in countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany where the ‘cost’
rental sector is said to either dominate, influence or lead the market so depressing rents
across the whole of the rental sector, which is characterised as a ‘unitary’ whole. In
contrast, the latter strategy has been pursued in the English-speaking countries, where
governments have intervened to recoup surpluses in the ‘cost’ rental sector, by
encouraging discounted sales to tenants, or taking the funds back itself, so forcing up
rents. Home-ownership has been promoted as the ideal tenure while the ‘cost’ sector is
kept separate from the rest of the housing market, and assumes the character of a
safety net.
Kemeny suggests that unitary systems can operate with relatively low levels of
subsidies (in contrast to Hoekstra, 2003), that ‘cost’ rental landlords are often
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independent of the state, that there are relatively low levels of regulation and that rents
are ‘demand sensitive’ that is vary according to the value of the dwelling, albeit at sub-
market levels. In contrast ‘dualist’ systems are characterised by state-owned ‘cost’
rental landlords, or at least landlords that are heavily regulated by the state within a
‘command’ structure; while rents do not reflect the relative value of the property. Thus
the ‘unitary’ systems are characterised as operating like a social market; the ‘dualist’
systems like a Soviet-style command economy.
This typology represents a quite different interpretation of government housing
strategies from much policy-orientated literature that points to the reduction in supply-
side financial subsidies from government to social landlords in recent decades.
Kemeny’s argument is that financial subsidies are no longer necessary in a ‘mature’
system that tends towards surplus; although he is reluctant to identify formally what
economists would interpret as ‘economic’ subsidies. The evidence suggests that in
many systems there is a need for continued subsidy to finance reinvestment
(renovation) of the housing stock (for example in Hungary where sub-market rents do
not cover management and maintenance costs, Hegedüs, 2007) and that even where
landlords are financially strong (despite the near abolition of financial subsidies, for
example in the Netherlands) the incentives to invest are weak (Whitehead, 2008).
Czischke’s (2009) survey of social landlords in Europe suggested that social landlords
appear to face a tension between fulfilling a ‘social mission’ and operating in a more
commercial (less subsidised) environment. Nonetheless, there is a clear difference
between systems such as the Netherlands where social landlords have largely been
able to retain surpluses and the UK (England) where surpluses in both the local
authority and housing association sectors have been extracted. Other countries, for
example Sweden where privatisation to tenants is again being encouraged and in
another example Germany where municipal and other public housing has been sold en
masse to international investors may be facing important turning points (Magnusson
Turner, 2008; Stephens, et al., 2008).
Yet despite these ambiguities that arise from the interpretation of the evidence,
Kemeny’s typology dominates comparative housing studies, although (like Esping-
Andersen’s), it is often applied rather casually. Hoekstra (2009) represents a more
structured attempt to test for the existence of unitary/ dualist regimes. He uses four
criteria to identify housing regimes: the share of owner occupation; the quality of
housing in the owner occupied sector compared to the social rented sector; the
concentration of households from the bottom third of the income distribution in the social
rented sector and the difference in rents between the social and private rented sector.
He uses data from the European Community Household Panel (2001) and finds that the
evidence does broadly support the existence of dualist (e.g. UK, Ireland) and unitary
(e.g. Denmark, Netherlands, Austria) regimes. However, he harbours severe concerns
about the reliability of the data.
11
The typology carries limitations of time and geography. It is predicated on the strong
supply-side interventions that were prompted by post-1945 housing shortages that
ultimately led to the ‘critical juncture’ at which governments decided which path to
follow. It is also difficult to see how it is relevant to countries, such as those in southern
Europe, that never created significant social rented sectors. Hegedüs’ review of social
housing in the transition countries observed that ‘the disintegration of the EEHM [East
European Housing Model] did not lead to a new housing regime’ (2008, p. 173).
Kemeny’s is therefore a time and era specific typology whose relevance, whilst currently
important, might be expected to diminish over time and the broader the range of
countries that are studied. The typology is also only suggestive of outcomes, the extent
to which housing policy protects income poor households from poor housing, for
example.
Kemeny’s approach is similarly merely suggestive of links between housing systems
and welfare systems, the author himself commenting that ‘each system tends to be
associated with a particular kind of welfare state’ (1995, p. 5) so no clear link is
established between housing and welfare regimes. Instead Kemeny locates his thinking
within wider political ideologies, suggesting that unitary systems are associated with
corporatism, which he interprets as the means by which decisions are made through the
representation of interest groups on a broadly consensus model, suggesting that the
systems that identified separately as ‘social democratic’ and ‘corporatist’ by Esping-
Andersen are in fact part of the same corporatist family.
The link between housing regimes and ideologies is an important debate for political
theorists, but it leaves us with another gap in the knowledge. The emphasis is again on
processes rather than on outcomes; and no clear link between welfare regime and
housing regime is established.
Linking welfare regimes and housing systems
In a series of publications (Stephens, et al, 2002; 2003; Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007;
Stephens, 2008) the relationship between housing systems and welfare regimes is
developed. The authors suggest that the welfare regime defines the parameters within
which housing systems (and policies) can operate, so a housing system cannot be
developed completely independently of a welfare regime.
For example, both the US and UK’s welfare regimes produce relatively high levels of
income poverty, but the extent of housing market intervention through social rented
housing is much greater in the UK. Housing policy makes a difference: the small social
rented sector in the USA performs the role of an ‘ambulance service’ (that is temporary
assistance to the very most needy), but the much larger social sector in the UK provides
for a much greater proportion of the population a ‘safety net’ (that is long-term
assistance to a wider range of needy households) (Stephens, 2008). However, the high
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level of poverty in the UK would make it difficult for the social rented sector to perform a
‘broader affordability function’ (that is providing assistance further up the income
spectrum), as it does in countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands which have
much lower levels of poverty (ibid.). Hence, the relationship between housing systems
and welfare regimes is to some extent ‘contingent’ rather than ‘necessary’ (Sayer, 1992)
and there is scope for housing systems to exercise some independent influence on
welfare outcomes.
The mimicking of the welfare regime by the housing system is a theme of Allen’s (2006)
analysis of housing and welfare systems in southern Europe, but elsewhere in Europe
there are examples of housing systems which have a less predictable relationship with
their country’s welfare regime. The central and east European countries, for example,
provide interesting variations on the links between housing regimes and welfare
regimes. Unlike corporatist countries in western Europe, quite a few central and east
European countries have promoted home-ownership, which is the dominant tenure in,
for example, Hungary. But this pattern is not universal. In the Czech Republic and
Poland larger rent controlled sectors have been retained. In both systems something of
an insider/ outsider divide can be seen, between established households benefiting
from controlled rents or lowly indebted home-ownership, and new households who have
to access housing from the market (see Lux (ed.) 2003). The phenomenon of the ‘weak
state’ is identified in the Hungarian country report, whereby efficient policy development
is hindered by inertia (the ability of the opposition to block reforms); the high influence of
interest groups to distort programmes in their conception and implementation; and a low
technical capacity to develop policies in the first place. Budgetary pressures are
heightened by the scale of the informal economy (cutting tax take) and the significance
of the informal economy also makes the design and implementation of means-tested
programmes problematic.
There are strong theoretical reasons to support the contention that housing can
exercise an independent influence on welfare outcomes by breaking the link between
current incomes and housing consumption. Part of the reason arises from ‘asset rich,
income poor’ households – the low income (often older) home-owners with no
mortgage, whose prevalence in some countries may compensate for ungenerous state
pensions (Castels, 1998). Privatisation and the (self or state) promotion of low income
home-ownership in many countries in southern and central Europe may be important in
this respect, although the distribution arising from privatisation reflects socialist-era
inequalities, and if not replaced diminishes the supply of affordable housing in the
future. Social rented (and other rent controlled) housing can also perform the same
function depending on its allocation: the fact that it is more tightly targeted in countries
with high levels of poverty suggests that income-in-kind is in part a substitute for cash
transfers through the social security system. Housing allowances are a further way of
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weakening the link, although their status as a housing or social security policy is
ambiguous (Kemp, 2000).
These theoretical/ conceptual developments have yet to be supported fully by evidence.
Identifying housing outcomes, poverty and benchmarks
This review has shown that the most developed accounts of the relationships between
welfare regimes and housing have a tendency to focus on institutions and processes
rather than on outcomes. As we have seen these are generally implied. Moreover, the
links with welfare regimes is not clear. Some studies have taken into account housing
outcomes, for example Czasny (2004) who uses the European Community Household
Panel for 1998. This gave some support for suggesting that at least some housing
outcomes (housing costs and quality) for households living in poverty in some countries
with high levels of income poverty (for example Spain and the UK) appeared to reflect a
break between welfare regime and housing regime. The study encountered some
problems with data reliability and the links between housing outcomes and housing
policies were rather crude. This points to another important gap that needs to be filled:
that housing outcomes need to be embedded in an understanding of the features of
housing systems that may cause the link between income poverty and housing poverty
to be broken. This provides a motivation for the elaboration of the key features of
housing systems that might be expected to weaken the link between incomes and
housing outcomes in Chapter 4.
There is a gap in knowledge between the concept of ‘income poverty’ and ‘housing
poverty’. A key value added of this project lies in the distinction between absolute and
relative notions of housing poverty. In other words we need to distinguish between basic
universally applicable housing standards and housing standards that are relative to the
general expectations of the society in which people live. A preliminary investigation of
EU-SILC suggests that some indicators (e.g. sole use of toilet; inside bath/ shower) are
almost universally obtained in the majority of EU countries, but a notable minority of the
population lack these facilities in a few countries (for example Hungary and Poland) and
in four (Romania and the Baltic States) quite substantial proportions lack them.3 We also
know that expectations rise over time with economic growth and this is reflected for
example in rising criteria for housing standards at a national level. This provides the
basis for also considering ‘housing poverty’ to be a relative concept, in much the same
way as ‘income poverty’ (with the 60% of equivalised income at the national level being
widely used as the poverty threshold in the EU).
3 EC Set of Indicators approved on 30 June 2009: definitions and data tables, 8/7/09, unpublished
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The notion of ‘housing poverty’ also points to another gap in the analysis of housing
outcomes: that is how they are benchmarked. When using an absolute concept of
housing poverty we would expect direct comparisons of housing standards between
countries. But when a relative concept of housing poverty is employed we would expect
to compare the position of the income poor compared to the non-poor within each
country, and in turn compare that relationship to the position of the poor compared to
the non-poor in other countries.
Linking homelessness and welfare regimes
We have emphasised the need to identify housing outcomes in order to establish the
links between welfare regimes and housing systems. Homelessness can be
characterised as being the most extreme form of poor housing outcome, and one that is
distinct from other bundles of housing outcome (i.e. the cost, quality and quantity of
housing consumption).
Based on limited evidence, Stephens and Fitzpatrick (2007) hypothesise that welfare
regimes also affect the level and nature of homelessness. High levels of poverty and
inequality at the national level are likely to be associated with high levels of
homelessness. This arises in part from the lack of purchasing power of households
living in poverty. It also reflects the relationship between poverty and ‘social
dislocations’ – such as relationship breakdown, mental health problems and substance
misuse – which can ‘trigger’ homelessness.
Welfare regimes are likely to affect the nature as well as scale of homelessness.
Structural causes of homelessness (arising from households facing access and
affordability problems) are likely to be more important in countries with high levels of
poverty/ inequality; and individual causes (such as alcohol or drug abuse, or mental
illness) proportionately more significant in countries with low levels of poverty/
inequality.
However, evidence suggests that the ‘tightness’ of the housing market is also an
important determinant of homelessness, with higher levels of homelessness found in
the least affordable housing markets areas (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007). This may
lead to quite complex regional patterns with respect to the scale of homelessness: if
poorer parts of a country are associated with better housing affordability, as a result of
weaker demand, homelessness may in fact be lower there than in wealthier (but more
unequal) areas where low income households have greater difficulty gaining access to
housing.
Evidence from Germany and England suggests that targeted ‘homelessness prevention’
strategies can have substantial beneficial effects if they are carefully targeted on the key
“triggers” for homelessness and underpinned by appropriate resources and governance
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arrangements (Busch-Geertsema and Fitzpatrick, 2008). Such positive outcomes
appear possible even in the context of unhelpful structural trends (rising poverty and
unemployment in Germany; worsening housing affordability in England). These issues
are examined more fully in Part III.
2.3. Welfare Regimes, Employment and Housing Systems
Welfare regimes, poverty and employment
The nature of welfare regimes became of much greater interest to economists and
policy makers from the 1980s when western Europe’s labour markets began to perform
poorly in terms of unemployment, employment and job creation. The traditional
emphasis on Keynesian demand-management as a means of securing full employment
gave way to a much greater emphasis on the operation of supply-side institutions,
including the labour market and the tax/ social security system.
It became common to contrast the United States, which enjoyed relatively high rates of
employment growth with the large countries of continental Europe where job creation
was much weaker and in some cases unemployment persistently high. Yet, income
inequality in the United States rose dramatically in the 1980s while it was much more
stable in continental Europe. These observations prompted Krugman’s famous
comment that, ‘Many people on both sides of the Atlantic believe that the United States
has achieved low unemployment by a sort of devil’s bargain, whose price is soaring
inequality and growing poverty’ (quoted in Giordano and Persaud, 1998, p.101).
The OECD’s influential Jobs Study (published in 1994) presented evidence broadly
supportive of this view, and also provided an analytical framework which is commonly
used in studies of employment. Its conclusions and recommendations, included:
 Unemployment benefits: should be reduced in generosity (level). Their
generosity, measured by the ‘replacement ratio’ (proportion of in-work income
preserved by out-of-work benefits), lowers the cost of unemployment, whilst also
discouraging employment by raising the ‘reservation wage’ (the wage that has to
be reached to be materially better off in work).
 Support Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) by encouraging training and job
experience to increase skills and employability (human capital).
 Curb labour union power.
 Decentralise wage bargaining as collectively negotiated and centralised wage
setting often leads to pricing low-skilled (especially young) workers out of work.
 Weaken employment protection. Excessive protection discourages employers
from taking on new workers, especially young workers.
 Cut payroll taxes because these act as a tax on jobs by creating a ‘tax wedge’.
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The study provoked much debate and assessments of the evidence – with authors often
reaching opposite conclusions (for example, contrast Siebert, 1997 with Nickell, 1997).
A later study by Nickell (2003) found that just over half of the cross-country variation in
unemployment changes since the early 1980s could be explained by changes in labour
market and social security institutions. Summarising studies published since 2000,
Stiglbauer (2006) found the strongest evidential support for high unemployment benefits
and payroll taxes being correlated with high unemployment. Fewer studies suggest
evidence for union power raising unemployment, while centralised or co-ordinated wage
bargaining was more commonly associated with lower unemployment. There is strong
evidential support for Active Labour Market Policies as a means of lowering
unemployment; and the balance supports the contention that employment protection
raises unemployment.
Yet many economists (for example, Nickell, 2003) noted the apparent paradox that in
the early 2000s, average unemployment among the EU-15 was higher than among the
non-European OECD countries, whilst most EU-15 countries enjoyed unemployment
levels that were below the OECD average. The explanation lay in the high levels of
unemployment in four of the largest European economies (Germany, France, Spain and
Italy). It was also noted that the simple trade-off between inequality and employment
appeared to have been avoided in a number of mostly smaller European countries
(including Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) where low levels of
inequality have been combined with high levels of employment. The trade-off between
employment and inequality appeared more pronounced among the larger EU Member
States, with the UK exhibiting high levels of employment and inequality while France
and Germany exhibited the converse.
A significant caveat should be added in that the evidence relates to the way in which
labour markets interacted with tax/ social security systems in the period before the
credit crunch and the onset of world recession. Not only are these micro-institutions
operating alongside a strong cyclical downturn in employment, it is possible that the
outcomes arising from inter-relationships that existed before 2008 might change as a
result of the recession. (Such a change arguably occurred after the first oil crisis in the
1970s.) It may be some years before any such structural changes become apparent.
There is a wide acceptance that welfare regimes impact on income distribution and
employment levels, but, ‘Experience shows that there is no single golden road to better
labour market performance’ (OECD, 2006, quoted in Stiglbauer, 2006, pp. 70-71). Such
evidence has led the European Union in its Lisbon Strategy to recognise the
possibilities of combining social protection with greater labour market flexibility in an
approach that is called ‘flexicurity’ (and most closely associated with Denmark). The
Commission recognises that ‘raising employment levels is the strongest means of
generating growth and promoting socially inclusive economies’ and encourages
Member States to attract more people into employment through tax and benefit reforms
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to remove unemployment traps, active labour market policies and active ageing
strategies.4 Moreover, the Social Agenda seeks to support the Commission’s strategic
objectives that include both the promotion of employment and equal opportunities and
inclusion.5 More recently the Commission has supported Member States’ efforts ‘to
mobilise those who can work and provide support for those who cannot… [and] has
proposed a holistic strategy that can be termed “active inclusion”.’6
However, there is a large gap in the knowledge base in that housing is not taken into
account in these studies of the link between employment and housing.
Linking housing and employment
There are prima facie reasons to assume that housing systems will have important
impacts on employment levels. Existing knowledge can be divided into three areas:
 housing systems may impact on employment levels by affecting inter-regional
mobility;
 housing systems may impact on employment levels by impacting on effective
marginal tax rates, especially through the operation of means-tested housing
allowances; and
 housing may impact on employment levels through neighbourhood (or area)
effects that may be associated with inter or intra tenure polarisation.
These are considered in turn.
Housing and mobility
Labour market literature places a high importance on the ability of households to move
between regions in order to find employment. It has long been observed that inter-
regional mobility in Europe is lower than in the United States, and this could be
expected to become more important as the Single Market and Economic and Monetary
Union place increased pressures on internal factors of production to respond to external
economic shocks in order to restore equilibrium (Eichengreen, 1997).
4 COM (2005) 24 Working Together for growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy
5 COM (2005) 33 final. Communication on the Social Agenda
6 COM (2007) 620 final. Modernising social protection for greater social justices and economic cohesion
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The impact of home-ownership on labour mobility has received most attention over the
past 15 years. The so-called ‘Oswald thesis’ (Oswald, 1996) suggested that certain
attributes of the tenure made home-owners less mobile than households in other
tenures and consequently rising levels of home-ownership contributed to increasing the
structural level of unemployment in advanced economies. The thesis has received
some support from other studies based on macro-data, for example Green and
Hendershott (2001) on the USA and Nickell (1997) on OECD countries. The
characteristics of the tenure that are seen as inhibiting mobility are transaction costs
(e.g. transaction taxes and legal fees) and an attachment to ‘home’ that make people
reluctant to move. One weakness of these studies is that they assume certain
characteristics for home-ownership and renting, when in fact the transaction costs
associated with each tenure varies greatly between countries (Maclennan, et al., 2000).
Moreover, Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2009) observe that macro-level studies do not
reveal the underlying behaviour of individuals. Micro-level studies employing
longitudinal data find that home-ownership is associated with lower levels of both
residential and job-to-job mobility, but suggest that this may imply a higher level of job
commitment and job security. Using Dutch data they find that ‘the housing decision is
strongly affected by job commitment; the estimated impact of homeownership strongly
decreases if we control for this effect. Thus, the housing market is affected by the labour
market, rather than the reverse’ (ibid., p 202). Such direction of causality issues are also
reflected in research that suggests that home-ownership is connected with early
retirement (Doling and Horsewood, 2003) as owners can enjoy substantial net imputed
rental incomes once mortgage debt is eroded. Moreover, home-owners in some
countries can access housing equity either through equity withdrawal or equity release.
Other researchers have suggested that regional variations and cyclical fluctuations in
the housing market might reduce mobility. Henley (2002) used UK longitudinal data and
found that negative equity experienced by many home-owners in the 1990s recession
impeded labour mobility, a finding supported by Boheim and Taylor (2002). Cameron, et
al. (2006), using 28 years of panel data also in the UK, found that high house price
regions can choke off migration, but these effects can be outweighed by expected
capital gains and earnings growth.
The emphasis on home-ownership in the literature is perhaps surprising, given that
employment levels tend to be high, and social rented housing presents more obvious
barriers to mobility arising from its rationing that usually requires households to move to
an area in order to gain eligibility and then wait in order to be allocated housing.
Systems that place more emphasis on housing need also seem unlikely to favour
mobility. The work of Hughes and McCormack (e.g. 1981) found that, ‘[British] council
tenants find it much more difficult to migrate from one region to another than do owner
occupiers’ (1981, p. 934). More recently Hills (2007) highlighted the same problem in his
independent review of English social housing. The likely reason why the knowledge of
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social housing and employment is neglected is that it is subsumed within the debate
about whether concentrations of low income households in particular neighbourhoods
(‘poverty neighbourhoods’) depress employment below levels one would expect given
the characteristics of the population. Such area effects are discussed further below.
Housing and work incentives
Although housing is not generally considered in the mainstream economics literature on
work incentives, in principle we might expect elements of the housing system to
influence financial incentives for employment. In this respect, the impact of means-
tested housing allowances has received the most attention in the literature.
It is worth noting that researchers have traditionally found it difficult to identify the impact
of means-tested benefits on labour market behaviour, Dilnot and Webb for example
observing that ‘there is remarkably little evidence that these incentive “problems” cause
any change in behaviour’ (1988, p. 52-53). Reviewing the evidence relating to the
British Housing Benefit system, Stephens (2005) found relatively little evidence to
suggest that the reduction in or loss of assistance when moving into work had much
impact. Hulse and Randolph’s (2005) study of the Australian Rent Assistance scheme
for private tenants also found little evidence that the scheme impacted on work
incentives. However, they found that the system of income-related rents in the public
sector appeared to be an important consideration for many households when they were
looking for work. Nordvik and Ahren (2005) examined whether the Norwegian housing
allowance system created a ‘dependency culture’, but concluded that relatively high
(30%) annual exit rates suggested that there was no such dependency culture.
There is less focus in the literature on the impacts of below market rents on employment
incentives. On the one hand they can act as protection if income is lost, but on the other
they should lower the reservation wage. Hills (2007) is unusual in addressing this point,
but finds little evidence to support this point even in London where social rents are well
below market levels. He suggests that the lack of an apparent positive employment
effect arising from below-market rents might arise from poor awareness of the impact of
subsidised rents among tenants, a deterrent effect arising from the administration of the
Housing Benefit system, mobility problems (see above) or neighbourhood effects (see
below).
Area or neighbourhood effects
The role of housing in affecting employment levels among low income households has
emerged as a major element in urban studies literature, mostly among west European
countries and the United States.
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There is an observed tendency for housing systems to concentrate low income
households in particular neighbourhoods. In some countries there is a strong link
between spatial concentration and ethnicity and/or immigration.
This tendency has occurred both within systems such as the UK where social housing
performs a safety net function and in countries such as the Netherlands and Sweden
where it performs a broader affordability function. As Hamburger (2004) observed,
‘[T]he Nordic countries share the tendencies for negative development spirals to
emerge in large suburban developments from the 1960s and 1970s that are
characterised by large, uniform and monotonous buildings, building damage and
physical deterioration, high tenant turn-over, departure of advantaged tenants, etc.’ (p.
235). The explanation lies in neighbourhood concentration arising from tenure
polarisation in the UK, but for intra-tenure polarisation to occur in countries such as
Sweden, with lower income households concentrated on the less popular estates built in
the 1970s (Magnusson Turner, 2008).
The evidence suggests that concentrations of deprived people have a negative impact
on their quality of life (Droste, et al., 2008). Whilst it would be expected that
neighbourhoods with high concentrations of low income households would exhibit high
levels of worklessness, there are a number of reasons why neighbourhood might be
expected to exert an independent affect on employment levels. These include greater
transport costs from (peripheral) poverty neighbourhoods to employment centres;
detachment from informal networks that provide the route into much low-skilled
employment; and cultures that are inimitable to work.
The evidence from statistical studies on area effects in western Europe are reviewed by
Galster (2007). He concludes that ‘[t]here is a consistent (though small) set of studies
showing that adults with little labor market attachment/ and or low incomes, whether
they be ethnic minorities (immigrants [sic]) or not, have their economic prospects
diminished when they remain for extended periods in neighbourhoods with sizeable
percentages of other low-income and/ or immigrant populations’ (Galster, 2007, p. 538).
Moreover, income mixing with middle (rather than high) income groups appears to
improve labour market outcomes. However, the evidence is often contradictory and he
observes that ‘policy makers have no idea what mix of advantaged neighbors provides
the best environment for the disadvantaged’ (p. 540).
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have reviewed critically the existing knowledge on the link between
housing, welfare regimes and labour markets. The evidence is incomplete and
disjointed, and we have drawn this evidence together in a structured way, crossing
boundaries between usually bounded areas of study and between the dominant
academic disciplines that tend to prevail in different subject areas.
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The review of existing knowledge has shown that distinct ‘welfare regimes’ can be
identified within the European Union that draw on characteristics of labour market
institutions and tax/ social security arrangements; and these can be extended beyond
Esping-Andersen’s original categorisation to include countries of southern Europe and
the transition countries in central and eastern Europe.
There have been few attempts to locate housing systems within conventional welfare
regimes. Those that have tended to focus on processes and institutions and neglect
‘housing outcomes.’ A typology of rental systems was formulated in the 1990s and has
come to dominate housing studies. However, it is empirically questionable, and appears
to be specific to time and geography. It also neglects housing outcomes and fails to
establish an explicit link with welfare regimes.
A few studies that assess housing outcomes find that poor housing conditions do not
necessarily equate with income poverty. These studies weakly link these findings with
the nature of housing systems themselves and do not have an adequate framework for
conceptualising the notion of ‘housing poverty’ or of benchmarking findings for the
purposes of comparative analysis. The links between welfare regimes and
homelessness – which can be interpreted as an extreme housing outcome – have been
the subject of hypotheses but the existing empirical base is weak.
The review of evidence also suggested that aspects of welfare regimes impact on levels
of employment and on income distribution, although there is no crude trade-off between
employment and inequality. The review identified suggestive links between housing and
mobility, working through the impact of housing on labour mobility, financial work
incentives and area/ neighbourhood effects.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Research Methods
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we build on the extensive and critical review of the links between welfare
regimes, housing and employment to first construct a theoretical framework that forms
the basis for this study. Second, we outline the key research questions that arise from
the objectives of the study and the critical review. Third, we detail the methods
employed to collect and analyse new data in order to answer the key research
questions that this project seeks to answer.
3.2 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions
The theoretical framework is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1, and the following
provides a commentary on it.
We hypothesise that labour market institutions and social security systems (collectively
referred to as ‘welfare regimes’ in Box A) determine ‘primary’ levels and distribution of
incomes. Distinctive welfare regimes have operated in Europe throughout the post-1945
period, but governments have responded to common pressures and reforms have been
introduced in many of them aimed at increasing employment. Welfare regimes still
produce different patterns of employment, poverty and inequality (Boxes B and C) and
the evidence suggests that such relationships are complex, though it does support the
idea that the relationship between in-work incomes and out-of-work incomes exert
labour market (dis)incentives.
Levels and patterns of income distribution arising from the operation of welfare regimes
will be a strong determinant of housing outcomes (Box D). Indeed in a housing system
that was based purely on market rental housing we would expect differences in housing
outcomes to mirror income differentials very closely.
Yet there are sound theoretical reasons to suggest that income poverty and inequality
need not necessarily result in housing poverty. Housing policy and other features of the
housing system (Box E) may serve to disrupt the link between current income and
housing outcomes. The key public policy interventions that we identify as facilitating
access to levels of housing consumption that could not be obtained in a system that
allocated resources purely by market mechanisms are as follows:
 social rented and other below market rental housing;
 housing allowances; and
 outright home-ownership.
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical framework
(A) WELFARE REGIME
(tax, social security, labour
market)
(E) HOUSING SYSTEM
a) Housing market
b) Key housing policy interventions and system
features:
1. social rented and other below market
rental housing
2. housing allowances
3. outright home-ownership
(B) SCALE &
DISTRIBUTION
OF POVERTY &
INEQUALITY
(C) LABOUR
MARKET
OUTCOMES
(D) HOUSING OUTCOMES
(F) HOUSING DEPRIVATION
1. Cost of housing
2. Quantity of housing
3. Physical quality of housing
4. Quality of neighbourhood
(G) HOUSING EXCLUSION /
HOMELESSNESS
1. Level of homelessness
2. Nature/causes of
homelessness
(H) INDIVIDUAL CAUSES/FACTORS
(I) TARGETED INTERVENTIONS ON
HOMELESSNESS
Causal relationship
Necessary relationship
Contingent relationship
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Both the Welfare Regime (Box A) and the Housing System (Box E) have a strong
influence on Housing Deprivation (Box F), which we identify as related to:
 the cost of housing consumption;
 the quantity of housing consumed;
 the physical quality of housing consumption; and
 the quality of the neighbourhood in which housing is consumed.
We have established that the measurement of these ‘housing outcomes’ needs to be
conceptualised clearly, so that we can distinguish between absolute housing standards
that we might aspire for all households to attain in the European Union, regardless of
country; and relative housing standards that relate to the norms that apply in individual
countries, and which we would expect to rise with economic growth. We would therefore
expect country-level housing outcomes to be higher in countries with higher per capita
incomes. It is important that these concepts are properly benchmarked. Moreover, we
have also established that it is also important that the findings are interpreted by being
embedded in an understanding of the institutional framework of housing policy.
So we can summarise the key principles for interpreting the link between housing
outcomes and welfare regimes as:
 conceptualised: We must be clear whether (or when) the concept of ‘housing
poverty’ is absolute or relative;
 benchmarked: We must ensure that comparisons between countries are
conducted in a meaningful way so that we can identify performance; and
 embedded: We require the attribution of housing outcomes to public policies or
other features of the housing system to be embedded in an understanding of
distinctive national institutional structures.
On the basis of existing evidence we also hypothesised that the Welfare Regime and
Housing System will causally impact on both the level and nature of homelessness (Box
G), which we identify separately from the other housing outcomes. Thus, we suggested
that strong welfare regimes that deliver relatively low levels of poverty, especially when
combined with strong housing policies, will lead to lower levels of homelessness than in
countries where welfare regimes deliver high levels of poverty, especially where
housing policies are also limited. With respect to the nature of homelessness, we
postulate that structural causes will be more important in weak welfare regimes, and
individual causes (Box H) will be proportionately more important in strong welfare
regimes. We also expect that targeted homelessness interventions (Box I) can have
positive effects even in malign structural contexts. (Some additional hypotheses on
homelessness are offered in Chapter 9 after a more detailed examination of the existing
literature on this topic.)
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Finally, we suggest that the housing system can feed-back into having impacts on
employment through three routes:
 impacts of the housing system on inter-regional labour mobility (Box E);
 the financial work incentives implied by the housing system (Box E);
 any independent impacts on employment that arise from poverty neighbourhoods
(Box F).
There is evidence that financial incentives established by welfare regimes have some
impact on employment levels, but relatively little is known about the impacts of housing
systems on employment levels. Existing knowledge focuses on owner-occupation
where employment levels are generally high, but neglects the financial incentives
implied by sub-market rents, outright home-ownership and housing allowances. There is
also limited evidence that poverty neighbourhoods create independent area effects on
employment levels. Both will also benefit from qualitative research that can identify
behavioural patterns that may be lost in statistical analysis and institutional nuances –
such as housing allowance administration – that may be significant yet remain
unobserved in statistical analysis.
Five essential research questions arise from the aims of the project and the theoretical
framework:
 What is the impact of poverty on housing outcomes?
 What is the impact of housing policy interventions on housing outcomes (for poor
households)?
 What is the impact of employment status on housing outcomes (for poor
households)?
 What is the impact of housing on employment outcomes?
 What is the impact of the welfare regime and housing system on the nature and
causes of homelessness, and how effective are targeted responses?
3.3 Overview of Research Methods
The approach adopted to address these research questions is:
 comparative;
 embedded in an understanding of institutional structures; and
 mixed method.
Six countries were adopted for comparison, this number being determined by two
criteria:
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 to ensure sufficient countries to provide a range of welfare regimes and housing
systems exhibiting differing levels of employment of social rented housing,
housing allowances and outright home-ownership; and
 to ensure a manageable quantity of data to be analysed within the principle that
the data is embedded in an understanding of the institutional structures of the
individual countries.
The countries selected on these criteria were: Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden and the UK. Their selection is discussed further in Chapter 4. To
comply with the principle of embeddedness, as well as to collect new qualitative data
(see below), the project involved the participation of a national team in each of the six
countries, who supported the central team with expert knowledge and analysis in their
own countries. Each of the six national teams produced a ‘country report’. These
country reports are published separately on the project website and provide more
detailed analysis of each individual Member State than is possible in this comparative
report.
This comparative report, as well as all six country reports, drew on the evidence
generated by the three key principal stages of the research.
 Review of existing knowledge: The national teams completed structured pro
formas in the early stages of the project. These provided details of housing
policies and housing systems, including those related to homelessness, within
the wider context of the labour market and social security systems. This
information was supplemented by information provided by the European Social
Housing Observatory (CECODHAS) and by FEANTSA/The European
Observatory on Homelessness.
 Quantitative data analysis: Extensive analysis was undertaken by the central
team on the EU Statistics on Incomes and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) (see
further below). This had two elements: analysis of housing outcomes; and
modelling of the links between housing and employment outcomes. Both are
explained further below.
 Qualitative fieldwork: The national teams undertook a series of focus groups and
in-depth interviews and identified good practice case studies in all six
participating countries (see further below).
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3.4 Quantitative Data Analysis
Data source
The quantitative data analysis is based on the EU Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC). This decision was made following a data set review undertaken
at the start of the project. Although nationally-based data sets in some countries contain
larger samples and more variables, this is not the case in all countries. Moreover, EU-
SILC is itself a rich source of data that has the obvious advantage of allowing
comparisons to take place on a consistent basis.
EU-SILC is the main EU-wide instrument for collecting comparable micro-level
information on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions annually. It
replaced the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) in 2004. The EU-SILC
was launched under a Regulation (EC no. 1177/2003) with twelve EU-15 countries as
well as Estonia, Norway and Iceland in 2004, with the rest of the EU-25 countries joining
in 2005 and Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Switzerland joining in 2006.
Unlike the ECHP, EU-SILC is not a survey using the same set of questionnaires for all
participating countries. Instead, EU-SILC is a common framework that defines the
harmonised list of target variables, common guidelines and procedures as well as
common concepts and classifications. This is intended to ensure that the comparability
of data to be produced and delivered to Eurostat7. In addition to a common set of target
variables produced annually, the EU-SILC specifies secondary variables to be produced
no more frequently than once in four years. The 2007 cross-sectional edition of the EU-
SILC contains a list of such secondary target variables on housing conditions (‘Housing
Module’).
The Housing Module contains information on housing quality and overall satisfaction
with the dwelling, accessibility of neighbourhood services, and recent change of
dwelling. These variables complement the household level information from the main
EU-SILC database, such as tenure type, housing costs, availability of essential
amenities (e.g. indoor bath or shower and toilet), and housing or neighbourhood
problems (e.g. noise from neighbours, pollution, crime in the area). For instance, in
addition to the main database variables ‘problems with dwelling: too dark, not enough
light’ and ‘leaking roof, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rot in window frames or floor’,
7 Eurostat, ‘Income, Social Exclusion and Living Conditions’ at
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/living_conditions_and_social_protection/introduction/income_socia
l_inclusion_living_conditions (accessed 20 January, 2010).
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the Housing Module contains information on shortage of space in the dwelling,
adequate electrical and plumbing installations, whether the dwelling is equipped with
heating and air conditioning facilities, and whether it is comfortably cool during summer
and comfortably warm during winter. Thus, the Housing Module provides more detailed
information on housing conditions and allows the construction of indicators of housing
outcomes.
The EU-SILC framework allows collecting information from different sources and by
different modes. Household level information, such as the type and quality of housing,
are obtained from selected household respondents, who are responsible for the
accommodation, are at least 16 years old and are best placed to provide the
information. Individual-level information on all adult household members, such as basic
demographic data, and information on labour and education, is collected through
personal interviews, proxy interviews or registers. Individual-level information on income
is collected through personal interviews or registers. Proxy interviews to collect
individual income information are only allowed for household members temporarily
away or unable to respond due to incapacity.8
This study uses cross-sectional data from the EU-SILC 2007 on six countries: Sweden,
Netherlands, Germany, UK, Portugal and Hungary. Table 3.1 below reports the sample
sizes of the studied countries. Missing information on the tenure variable is excluded
from the reported count. The final sample sizes may be somewhat lower for the
analyses of other variables with missing values.
Table 3.1 Sample sizes in EU-SILC
Sample size (unweighted number of households)
DE 14,153
HU 8,696
NL 10.217
PT 4,310
SE 7,136
UK 9,272
There are some differences between results from EU-SILC and nationally-based
surveys. Those relating to particular variables (e.g. the categorisation of ‘below market
rental housing’) are discussed below. Some apparent differences occur because of our
choice of unit of measurement. We have measured housing outcomes at the level of the
household (because housing is consumed at this level), but reported them on the basis
of individuals who live in these households. This is in line with the traditions of ‘poverty’
8 EUROSTAT “EU-SILC User Database Description (Version 2007-1 from 01-03-09)”
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research. This contrasts with the tradition in ‘housing studies’ which is to report housing
outcomes on the basis of households. This explains some of the apparent differences in
tenure between EU-SILC and national surveys. Other differences may arise because of
differences in the choice of indicator (e.g. what is counted as an item of ‘housing
expenditure’) which are reported below. However, there is no obvious explanation for
some instances where results may contradict those in nationally based surveys. For
example, the proportion of Dutch market renters receiving housing allowances seems
high; and in UK surveys social rented tenants record lower levels of dissatisfaction than
market rental tenants, but EU-SILC reports the converse. Like all such surveys EU-SILC
may be subject to respondent error or sampling issues and this reservation should be
noted.
The quantitative data was applied to four research questions:
 What is the impact of poverty on housing outcomes? (Chapter 5)
 What is the impact of housing policy interventions on housing outcomes (for poor
households)? (Chapters 5 and 6)
 What is the impact of employment status on housing outcomes (for poor
households)? (Chapter 7)
 What is the impact of housing on employment outcomes? (Chapter 8)
Housing outcomes
‘Housing outcomes’ provide a conceptualisation of the idea of ‘housing poverty’ that
may be linked to ‘income poverty’.
We have taken income poverty to be a relative concept within each country, and we
have used the widely used poverty line of 60 per cent of net median incomes. An
important implication of using a relative poverty line in an international study is that
many people who are classified as being poor in a relatively high income country would
be classified as non-poor on the basis of the same income in another country. The
converse also applies.
Incomes are equivalised using the modified OECD scale to take into account the
composition of households. Incomes include social security (social insurance and social
assistance) payments (with the exception of housing allowances, whose impacts are of
specific interest) and exclude income tax and social insurance contributions.
Housing outcomes were measured using a range of indicators based on the conceptual
framework:
 the cost of housing consumption: is housing affordable (affordability)?
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 the quantity of housing consumption: do people have adequate space standards
(overcrowding)?
 the quality of housing consumption: do people live in houses in adequate
physical condition and with basic amenities (physical quality)?
 neighbourhood quality: do people live in decent neighbourhoods with adequate
access to neighbourhood services (neighbourhood quality and neighbourhood
services)?
The indicators are summarised in Table 3.2. They are mostly self-explanatory, but the
following points should be made:
 Affordability: we chose a broad definition (see Table 3.2) of housing expenditure
for a number of reasons. The tradition in some western European countries is to
examine quite a narrow range of housing expenditure (e.g. rent or mortgage
interest), while in the transition countries utility costs tend to receive more
emphasis. Some items such as heating might be regarded as not being strictly
housing expenditure, but of course are linked to the size and physical (insulation)
quality of the dwelling. The broad definition also pointed to using a 40 per cent
threshold, as opposed to a lower 30 per cent threshold that is often applied
where a narrower range of housing expenditure is used.
 Overcrowding: we used both objective and subjective measures of overcrowding.
This is partly because the size of rooms can vary and a measure based on
perception can ‘compensate’ for this. We have included single person
households because the study is of entire populations and to use a separate
measure based on excluding single person households would create
unmanageable amounts of data.
As noted above, unless reported otherwise, all figures from EU-SILC apply to
individuals, but income and housing outcomes are measured at the level of the
household. We have adopted this convention because housing is consumed at the level
of the household, but we wish are results to reflect the numbers of people affected,
whereas household measures will under-represent people in large households. So, for
example, the poverty rate is the proportion of individuals living in households with net
incomes under 60 per cent of the median.
Analysis is often based on more detailed information than is given in individual graphs
or tables in the text. The source tables, containing the complete data on which the
analysis is based, are included in a statistical appendix where they are ordered
alphabetically.
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Table 3.2 Housing outcome indicators
Indicator Additional details Additional indicator
Affordability Percentage of individuals living in
households whose gross housing
expenditure exceeds 40% of net income
Percentage of individuals living in
households whose net housing expenditure
exceeds 40% of net income
Housing Allowance is deducted
from gross housing expenditure to
produce net housing expenditure
Housing expenditure = mortgage
interest payments, rent, structural
insurance, mandatory charges (e.g.
sewerage, refuse collection),
regular repairs and maintenance,
taxes and the cost of utilities (water,
electricity, gas and heating)
In assessing the relationship
between poverty and housing
outcomes we also examined poverty:
(a) before housing costs, (b) after
gross housing costs and (c) after net
housing costs
Objective overcrowding Percentage of individuals living in
households below this threshold:
1 room for household
1 room for each couple
1 room for each single person aged 18+
1 room for 2 single people of same sex
aged 12-17
1 room for each single person for each
single person of different sex aged 12-17
1 room for 2 people aged under 12
Includes single person households -
Subjective overcrowding Percentage of individuals
reporting a shortage of space Includes single person households -
Physical Quality of Housing Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting one or more problems
(from list of five) relating to the physical
quality of their housing.
People living in dwellings that are
reported as:
having a leaking roof, damp walls/
floors/ foundation, or rot in window
being too dark or do not have
enough light
having no bath/ shower and no
indoor flushing toilet for sole use of
the household
inadequate electricity or plumbing
not comfortably cool in summer or
not comfortably warm in winter
percentage of individuals who live in
households failing none, 1, 2, 3, 4 or
all 5 of these indicators
Continued on next page
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Indicator Additional details Additional indicator
Neighbourhood Quality Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting one or more
problems (from list of three) relating to
the quality of their neighbourhood
Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting:
noise from neighbours or from the
street
pollution, grime or other
environmental problems
crime, violence or vandalism in the
area
percentage of individuals living in
households failing 0, 1, 2, or all 3
of these indicators
Neighbourhood Services Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting some or great
difficulty in accessing one or more of
six neighbourhoods services
Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting some or
great difficulty in accessing:
groceries
banking
postal services
public transport
primary health care
compulsory schooling
percentage of individuals living in
households failing 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
or all 6
Dissatisfaction Percentage of individuals living in
households reporting dissatisfaction
with the dwelling including
neighbourhood
- -
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The housing outcomes are analysed as follows:
The link between income poverty and housing outcomes is examined at a country level
in Chapter 5. Outcomes are examined absolutely for the population as a whole, for the
poor population and relatively for the poor compared to the non-poor. This allows us to
capture the link between poverty and housing outcomes at the level of the system.
The impact of individual housing policy instruments or system features on the
relationship between income poverty and housing outcomes is examined in Chapter 6.
Outcomes for each of the three policy instruments/systems features identified in Figure
3.1 are examined in turn, and outcomes are checked for any compositional effect that
might arise from the distribution of household types across tenures. The following
household types are considered: single, couples without children, couples with children,
lone parents, pensioners and others.
The policy instruments/system features can be identified in EU-SILC with the following
qualifications:
Social rented housing: Social rented housing is not identified as a tenure in EU-SILC.
The categorisation ‘below market rent’ (BMR) housing is used, but is applied in ways
that make it difficult to identify ‘social rented’ housing in some countries. The BMR
categorisation is most closely related to the ‘social rented’ sector in the UK, where the
amount of BMR housing that is not social rented is now very small. However, in Sweden
and in the Netherlands, the mainstream social and municipal rented sectors have been
categorised as ‘market rental’ housing. In the case of the Netherlands we are able to
capture what is normally recognised as the social rented and rent controlled sector
because private sector rents are decontrolled above a certain level. We use information
about the maximum level of rent subject to rent control from external sources to
distinguish between the two types of tenancy. The maximum rent for an unfurnished
dwelling subject to rent control was € 615.01/month as of July 2006 and €621.78 as of
July 2007.9 We take the average of these two values to derive the proxy threshold for
the survey year 2007. Tenants with the reported monthly rent related to the unfurnished
dwelling below this threshold are classified as reduced rate tenants and the rest as
market renters. Unfortunately, such an exercise is not possible in Sweden, as rents in
the municipal rental sector are used as the basis of rent-setting in the private rented
sector. There is also ambiguity in the meaning of the German BMR sector, and
9 Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment at
http://www.vrom.nl/get.asp?file=Docs/wonen/mg2005_03.pdf and
http://www.vrom.nl/get.asp?file=docs/wonen/mg2006_01.pdf
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interpretation is complicated further by the blurred distinctions between social and
private housing. However, the social rented sector is now of much reduced significance
in Germany, and the sector is small in Hungary and Portugal. However, this does give
us two countries (the Netherlands and the UK) with sizeable social rented sectors that
are primarily used in the analysis of the impacts of social rented housing, while the
results for ‘BMR’ housing are reported for the other four countries. (In the Netherlands
what we describe as ‘social rented housing’ when discussing the indicators is strictly
predominantly social rented housing since it also includes rent-controlled private rental
housing.)
Housing allowances: While each of the countries identify ‘housing allowances’ in EU-
SILC, there are instances where social security payments that are specifically housing-
related are not identified separately from other social security payments. This is most
pronounced in Germany where housing-related assistance for recipients of social
assistance is directed through social assistance payments, and is not identified as a
housing allowance. This means that care must be taken in interpreting the impact of
housing allowances in affordability calculations.
Outright home-ownership: The variable ‘tenure type’ does not distinguish between
outright owners and owners with a mortgage. Therefore, to derive ownership status this
study uses information on mortgage interest repayments, as recommended by Eurostat.
However, this variable does not have any valid values for Germany, making it
impossible to distinguish between the two types of ownership for the German sample.
Chapter 7 examines the data from EU-SILC on the impact of employment status on
housing outcomes. These are measured at the country level and we do not attempt the
level of analysis on the individual components of the housing system that are explored
in relation to income poverty. This allows us to give more detailed attention to the length
of time that people have been out of work (to establish whether the housing outcomes
of the short term workless are different from the long term workless) and also to make
an explicit comparison between the housing outcomes of the working and the workless
poor. This EU-SILC analysis can be enhanced by the use of qualitative data, particularly
in relation to the impact of employment on housing outcomes. This is because, while
EU-SILC can identify the housing outcomes of people in particular employment
circumstances, it cannot identify the dynamics of what occurs when people experience
transitions between employment and non-employment, or the impacts of qualitative
elements to employment (such as fluctuating commission-based incomes or short-term
contracts) on housing outcomes. The qualitative analysis that was undertaken is
described in more detail below in section 3.5 below.
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Modelling the links between housing and employment outcomes
In Chapter 8 we use EU-SILC to provide quantitative evidence concerning the links
between features of the housing system (social and other below market rental housing,
housing allowances and outright ownership) and employment outcomes. It involved
estimates using two kinds of model: discrete choice models and duration models. The
first is used to identify relationships between the housing system and employment, while
the second is used to identify the impact of the housing system on the duration of
unemployment. These are outlined in turn.
Discrete choice models
In a discrete choice model it is assumed that respondents can choose from a number of
alternatives. The choice made is treated as the dependent variable, whereas all kinds of
other information can play a role as independent variables.
Discrete choice models specify a link function between the dependent variable and a
linear combination of independent variables (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). In practice
the logit function is often taken as the link. This yields a so-called logit model. In a logit
model it is assumed that the odds of making a specific choice can be written as follows:
log(p /(1 – p)) = β0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 + · · · + βk xk
For purposes of the current study p may be though of as the probability of accepting
paid work. The variables x1, x2 …, xk are the exogenous variables. The parameters β0,
β1, β2, …, βk describe the relationship between the exogenous variables and the
eventual choice, which is the information of interest. The parameters are estimated in
such a way that the estimated values are most likely, given the model specified.
Interpretation of the parameter values of a logit model is less straightforward than those
of a classical regression model. This is because the relationship between the odds of
making a specific choice and the exogenous variables is non-linear. Moreover, most
people prefer to think in terms of probabilities, rather than in terms of odds. This
requires a translation of odds to probabilities:
p = (1/(1+Odds)), where Odds = p/(1 – p)
Duration models
Duration models deal with the time it takes until an event occurs. It is a relatively young
branch of statistics. Duration modelling may be used to model the length of spells. In
economics it is often used to answer questions such as: ‘how long will a person remain
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unemployed?’, and ‘how do specific circumstances or characteristics increase or
decrease the probability of their unemployment spell?’
Duration models usually depart from a so-called hazard function, h(t), that describes
how the probability of an event, changes over time t. An exponential distribution is a
possible parametric specification of the hazard function:
log(hi(t)) = β0 + β1 xi1 + β2 xi2 + · · · + βk xik
Here i denotes the respondents in experiment, 1...k is the number of exogenous
variables used to explain the length of a spell. In this model β0 represents the baseline
log-hazard, because β0 is the value of log(hi(t)) when all the covariates x1 … xk are zero.
A commonly used hazard function is provided by the proportional hazards model Cox
(1972). It leaves β0 unspecified:
hi(t) = β0 · exp(β1 xi1 + β2 xi2 + · · · + βk xik)
An important property of this model is that the ratio
hi(t) / hj(t) = exp(β1 xi1 + β2 xi2 + · · · + βk xik) / exp(β1 xj1 + β2 xj2 + · · · + βk xjk)
is independent of time. This explains the name proportional hazards model. The main
advantage is that it does not require arbitrary, and thus possibly incorrect assumptions,
on the specification of the baseline log hazard.
3.5 Qualitative Fieldwork
All six national teams undertook an intensive period of qualitative data collection,
comprising a series of focus groups, in-depth interviews and the generation of good
practice case studies. The details of the work conducted are noted in Table 3.3. This
qualitative data was applied to three research questions:
 What is the impact of employment status on housing outcomes (for poor
households) (Chapter 7)?
 What is the impact of housing on employment outcomes (Chapter 8)?
 What is the impact of the welfare regime and housing system on the nature and
causes of homelessness and how effective are targeted responses (Chapters 10
and 11)?
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Table 3.3 Qualitative fieldwork
Country No. of focus
groups
No. of
interviews
Total number of
participants
Good practice
case studies
DE 5 0 50 3
HU 4 6 32 2
NL 4 6 25 2
PT 4 5 31 2
SW 4 7 22 2
UK 4 5 29 2
In all countries focus group participants and in-depth interviewees included both high-
level policy makers and practitioners who worked directly with service users, and
included stakeholders with both a national and a more local perspective. Participants
were drawn from housing, homelessness, employment, welfare, health, youth services,
social services, finance and regeneration sectors as appropriate in each country. Both
Government representatives (local and national/federal) and NGOs were involved in
every country, and in some cases private sector representatives (e.g. mortgage lenders)
also participated.
The locally-focused practitioners and stake-holders in each country were drawn mainly
but not exclusively from specific geographical areas, for both pragmatic and
methodological reasons (to obtain an account of responses that was ‘embedded’ in a
rounded understanding of the local context and structures). These local areas were as
follows:
 Germany – Berlin, Munich, Cologne, Dortmund, Freiburg, Münster, Herford,
Freistadt
 Hungary – Budapest, Békéscsaba and Székesfehérvár
 Netherlands – Rotterdam
 Portugal – Porto and Amadora
 Sweden – Stockholm and Uppsala
 UK - London
The systematic comparison of the qualitative results across countries has been
significantly aided by the use of ‘vignettes’ (standardised ‘typical cases’) in both the
focus groups and the in-depth interviews to elicit the likely policy and practice responses
to those at risk of homelessness, housing exclusion or employment exclusion. The
vignettes employed are detailed in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Details of vignettes
Topic Description of Vignette
Housing and
Employment
A A young couple with a small child live with the woman’s parents. They would like their own home. The man has a
sales job. His total income is usually quite good, but it varies. He has a basic salary, but most of his salary is based on
commission. (Prompt: explore obtaining a mortgage as well as renting)
B A single male migrant worker who lives in a private rented flat loses his job (prompt to check if there is a difference
between non EU, new EU and old EU countries).
C A single woman with one child (aged 7) is living in a private rented flat. She has been out of work for some time but
has been offered a temporary job which may or may not become longer-term. She is concerned about paying the rent
if she comes off unemployment and housing-related benefits and about the delays in receiving the benefits if the
employment contract is not renewed and she has to apply again for benefits.
D An owner occupier, who lives with his wife and two dependent children in a small town with low house prices, is
offered a better paid job in the capital city. He is not sure whether it is worth moving. Commuting will take three hours
a day.
E A single unemployed woman who lives in a flat on a peripheral estate in a large city is offered a low paid job with
flexible hours in the city centre. She has no car and is dependent on public transport.
Homelessness A A middle aged man (50 years old) is due to leave prison after 5 years. At present, he has no housing or job organised
for when he leaves and no family to turn to. He has a history of homelessness and alcohol abuse.
B A 17 year old young man is living at home but his mother and step-father have asked him to leave. He is not in work,
education or training and has a low level of educational qualifications.
C A woman with two children (aged 2 and 4) is fleeing domestic violence. She is currently living in a refuge/temporary
relief centre. She was financially dependent on her partner and has no independent income.
D A couple with two children (aged 10 and 12) are living in an owner occupied dwelling. The man has lost his job in the
economic downturn and they are struggling to pay the mortgage.
E A 35 year old single male immigrant has been undertaking casual work but this has declined with the economic
downturn. He can no longer afford to pay the rent in his flat from his earnings and has accumulated rent arrears.
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The national teams also provided good practice case studies. These case studies were
selected on the grounds that they:
 offered robust evidence of good results, based on existing evaluations;
 were of potential interest to other countries; and
 involved innovative, multi-dimensional or partnership working.
We endeavoured to achieve a good spread of case study examples across the
countries, including those which focused on addressing homelessness/housing
exclusion, and those which focused on promoting employment/social inclusion amongst
disadvantaged groups. We also attempted to ensure that a range of key groups were
covered, such as rural as well as urban deprived communities, and older men, women,
young people and families with children. A selection of these good practice examples
are presented at appropriate points in Chapters 8 and 11, and all are included as
appendices in the relevant country reports.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have built on the critical review of existing evidence to create a
theoretical framework for the study. This has been used to establish five key research
questions, around which our approach and methods have been designed.
We have outlined the importance of adopting a comparative approach using mixed
methods and ensuring that the analysis is designed and interpreted with regard to the
institutional structures in each country.
Finally we have detailed the use of both quantitative and qualitative research methods.
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Chapter 4: Housing Systems in Six Countries
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter we detail the selection of the six countries selected for this study and
provide an assessment of the key policy interventions or system features that we have
identified as potentially weakening the link between income poverty and housing
poverty in the countries selected for study:
 social rented and other below market rental housing;
 housing allowances; and
 outright home ownership.
These are assessed in turn and the chapter ends with an overview of the housing
systems in the six countries.
The chapter is based on the review of knowledge undertaken by the six national teams
employed in this project, and also through the analysis of EU-SILC. Each team
completed standardised pro-formas to allow information to be presented comparatively.
This is supplemented by information collected by the European Social Housing
Observatory (CECODHAS, 2007) and by data collected from country experts in another
comparative project on social housing and homelessness undertaken for Communities
and Local Government (CLG) in the UK (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007). The
CECODHAS data was compiled through observatory correspondents, independent
country experts, a survey and by country visits. The CLG data was compiled by country
experts who completed a pro-forma.
4.2 Selection of countries
The need to embed the analysis of housing outcomes in knowledge of housing systems
provides a key justification for selecting a number of countries from across the different
welfare regime types. A range of regime types was the principal criteria for their
selection; though we also wished to include countries that exhibit different features in
their housing systems so that we might be better able to identify their relationship with
the welfare regime. The countries selected were Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden and the UK (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1 Selection of countries
Welfare
regime
Countries Selected GDP per capita Features of housing
system in countries
selected
Social
Democratic
Sweden,
Denmark, Finland,
(Netherlands)a
Sweden 122.8 Historic tenure neutrality;
‘unitary’ rental system
Corporatist Netherlandsa,
Germany, Austria,
France, Belgium,
Luxembourg
Netherlands 132.2 Largest social rented
sector; unitary state;
‘unitary’ rental system
Germany 115.8 Small and shrinking social
rented sector, but within
‘unitary’ rental structure.
Liberal UK, Ireland UK 116.7 Significant social rented
sector, but long history of
privatisation; legally
enforceable
homelessness rights;
‘dualist’ rental system
Mediterranean/
‘Rudimentary’
Portugal, Spain,
Italy, Greece,
Cyprus, Malta
Portugal 75.6 High level of home-
ownership, ‘familialism’;
history of self-build
Transition Czech Rep.,
Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia,
Slovakia, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Bulgaria, Romania
Hungary 62.6 ‘Super’ home-ownership
state
Total Countries 27 6 EU-27 = 100 -
Note: (a) The Netherlands is often treated as hybrid social democratic/ corporatist regime
Source: authors’ assessment except GDP per capita = Eurostat
Table 4.2 shows that the levels of income per capita vary, with a clear divide between
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK each having much higher per capita
incomes than Portugal and Hungary. We would expect these to have a material impact
on housing outcomes. Otherwise the table suggests that the levels of income poverty
are broadly in line with what would be suggested by the ‘welfare regimes’. The lowest
poverty levels are in social democratic/ borderline corporatist regimes of Sweden and
the Netherlands and also in the selected transition country, Hungary. Germany as the
archetypal corporatist state has an intermediate level of poverty, while Portugal and the
UK as the Mediterranean and liberal regimes respectively register the highest levels of
income poverty. Of course it should be remembered that because poverty is measured
relatively, many of the poor in a rich country will have higher incomes than the non poor
in a poorer country.
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The most consistent pattern between countries is the disproportionate levels of poverty
among lone parents and single person households in all of the countries, suggesting
that they are the groups at most risk of poverty. Pensioners are almost always at above
average risk of poverty, but couples without children are almost always at below
average risk of poverty.
Table 4.2 Percentage of individuals living in households in poverty (2007)
Single Couple Couple
with
children
Lone
Parent
Pensioner Other All
DE 27.4 11.7 8.5 34.1 15.1 8.7 14.0
HU 20.4 8.3 16.7 29.7 6.3 6.8 12.2
NL 25.3 6.0 8.8 38.2 13.1 5.4 11.5
PT 25.7 17.2 16.8 32.1 27.3 11.6 17.2
SE 22.0 5.8 6.9 28.1 16.0 8.3 11.6
UK 23.1 10.4 15.4 49.2 32.7 13.3 19.7
Before housing costs; poverty threshold = 60% of median household income
Source: Table A5A
4.3 Social Rented and Other Below Market Rental Housing
Social rented housing is one of the key interventions that has been employed by
governments, and which might be expected to weaken the link between income and
housing outcomes. There is no standardised definition of social rented housing. For
example it is often provided on a not-for-profit basis (for example in the Netherlands,
Sweden and the UK), but not always (notably in Germany). However, we can identify
two features that characterise social rented housing:
 it is normally provided at below market rents; and
 it is allocated (or rationed) by administrative criteria (not price) normally on the
basis of some assessment of need.
The impact that social rented housing has on weakening the link between income
poverty and housing poverty depends on a number of factors:
 supply, which determines how much is available;
 demand, which determines how many people want to live in social rented
housing;
 eligibility, which determines who qualifies to be considered for social rented
housing; and
 allocations policies, which determine who from the pool of eligible households is
actually allocated the housing.
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When eligibility criteria are drawn narrowly, allocations policies are less important;
allocations policies become crucial when eligibility criteria are drawn widely.
The supply of and demand for social rented housing
Social rented sectors in Europe often had their origins in private, often charitable,
initiatives in the nineteenth century that sought to improve housing in the industrialised
cities. State subsidy of social rented housing was a feature of the twentieth century, with
widespread sub-standard (slum) housing combining with severe shortages (often
exacerbated by wartime destruction) underpinning political support. Hence, one of the
historic purposes of social rented housing programmes in Hungary, Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK was the drive to remove housing shortages and to
raise the overall quality of the urban housing stock. Portugal, which experienced neither
the degree of industrialisation nor of wartime destruction, was the one country in our
study not to adopt a significant social housing programme.
However, this phase of social housing is over. Attributed variously to shifts in economic
priorities and political ideology, an obvious factor was that both general housing
shortages and the general quality of the urban housing stock had been improved, and to
a large extent the supply function of social housing had been met. This did not mean
that all shortages were removed, but the supply of new social housing was unlikely to
assume the importance it did in many European countries up until the 1970s or 1980s.
Nonetheless a significant social rented sector remains in three of our six countries.
About one-fifth of the stock in Sweden and the UK remains in the social rented sector;
and one-third in the Netherlands (Table 4.3). The other three countries have much
smaller social sectors, each six per cent or less, although it once occupied a much more
prominent position in Hungary and Germany.
In recent years, however, the sector has been in absolute and relative decline in each of
the six countries. However, in only three of them has there been a large absolute
decline and in each of these cases this is attributable to policy design:
 privatisation by sales of social housing to tenants: This has been important in the
UK where tenants gained the ‘right to buy’ their dwellings at large discounts in
1980; and in Hungary where social housing was sold at discounts to tenants after
1989.
 the ‘natural’ shift to the market sector: This has been a consequence of the
distinctive features of German social housing. Social housing has always been
defined by the receipt of subsidy, which was provided to for-profit private
landlords as well as municipal housing and other non-profit companies. Once the
subsidy expires the ‘social’ housing passes into the ‘private’ rented sector. This
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has accounted for the long-term decline of the German social rented sector,
although other factors (see next bullet point) have become important.
 privatisation by sales of social housing to for-profit investors: This has been a
relatively recent trend in Germany, where entire individual and other public stocks
of housing amounting to 600,000 units have been sold to foreign institutional
investors.
In contrast, although sales of social rented housing have occurred in the Netherlands
and Sweden, these have been relatively modest, although the Swedish government
elected in 2006, is now promoting sales. Consequently, these countries have
experienced only modest and gradual declines in the position of social rented housing.
The evidence suggests that at national levels there is an excess demand for social
rented housing, although this varies according to demographic and economic
pressures, as well as affordability in the open housing market. For example, in recent
years there has been a 60 per cent increase in local authority waiting lists for social
housing in England (see Table 4.3).
There are very large regional variations in demand for social rented housing within
countries. In the new Länder in Germany, for example, there are very large surpluses of
housing and this has prompted widespread demolition programmes; but in some of the
prosperous cities, such as Munich, there are acute shortages. In Sweden the continued
shift in population from rural and smaller urban centres to the ‘university’ cities created
large scale voids for many municipal housing companies and also prompted demolition
programmes. In the UK surplus social housing has been a feature of urban areas that
lost population as a result of depopulation, again prompting some very large demolition
programmes; meanwhile there are acute pressures on the sector in growth areas,
including London. Hungary has experienced declining demand in the rural east and the
de-industrialising areas, while demand in Budapest is high. In the Netherlands, demand
is highest in the Randstad.
Thus the severity of rationing that is required in allocating social rented housing exhibits
considerable regional variation.
46
Table 4.3 Social rental housing stock
Stock Landlords Trend Demand/ Supply
DE 6% (2007) MHC
PHC
Co-op/ HA
Charities
Private
Absolute and relative decline. In
addition to ‘natural’ tenure
conversion, some MHC stocks
transferred to private landlords.
Large regional variations: excess
demand in prosperous areas, but
surplus of > 1m. mostly in
eastern states
HU 3.7%
(2007)
LA (80% cos.
owned by
LAs)
Absolute and relative decline,
though sales have slowed
Excess demand (24,400 on
waiting lists) especially in high
cost areas, but decline in rural
east and de-industrialising areas
NL 33% (2007) HA (99%) Absolute and relative decline National shortage, but large
regional variations between
Randstad (high demand) and
peripheral regions
PT 3.3%
(2001)
LA/ MHC
Some NGO
Relative decline Excess demand especially in
metropolitan areas
SE 22% (2006) MHC Shrinking as sales (to co-ops)
restart (2007) and low level of
new build
Excess demand in most
metropolitan and larger cities,
and in centres of most others.
Demolition programme was used
to deal with excess supply in
‘industrial’ municipalities
UK 18% (2007) LA (54%)
HA (46%)
Absolute and relative decline,
though sales have slowed
Overall growth in waiting lists
(England) from 1m to 1.6 m
(2001-2006); some areas of low
demand in Midlands and North,
tackled with mix of demolition
and refurbishment
Key: HA = housing association; LA = local authority direct ownership; MHC = municipal housing company; NGO =
non-government organisation
Source: pro-forma, supplemented by CECODHAS (2007)
Eligibility and target groups
Social housing is often characterised as being either ‘universalistic’ or ‘targeted’ (e.g.
CECODHAS, 2007): ‘universalistic’ systems indicating that social housing is intended
for the whole population in contrast to those where the housing is targeted on the poor
or vulnerable. Indeed in Sweden the term ‘social’ housing has been rejected, although
the policy of tenure neutrality was abandoned in the 1990s, in part to make it clear that
its municipal housing sector was quite unlike social housing seen in other countries –
especially public housing in the United States and more recently social housing in the
UK. Yet it is axiomatic that social rented sectors cannot house everyone and to include
one person is to exclude another. In exploring eligibility and allocation policies we seek
to establish where the lines of inclusion and exclusion are drawn (Table 4.4).
Income limits provide the principal means by which eligibility for social housing is
established in four of our six countries. Income limits imply that households in the
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bottom third of the income distribution are eligible for social housing in Germany and
Hungary (although in the latter local authorities are free to set their own limits). In the
Netherlands, eligibility is also drawn sufficiently broadly to permit income mixing. In
Portugal other resource tests apply (property ownership; receipt of other forms of
housing support). There are no upper income limits in Sweden and the UK – though the
dramatically different results through the allocation process indicate the importance of
the latter when eligibility is drawn broadly. Most Swedish municipal housing companies
also apply minimum income requirements that can act to exclude those with very low or
unstable incomes. In the Netherlands, there is no minimum income requirement for the
sector as a whole, but different types of social housing are matched to different income
groups and it has been estimated that one-fifth of the stock is subject to a minimum
income (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007).10
The fairly broad eligibility criteria are tempered by exclusions in four of the six countries.
In the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and the UK (England) a history of rent arrears
can jeopardise eligibility and is most likely to affect low income households. Large
housing companies in Germany almost always subscribe to credit information services
to gain information about the debt history of applicants. Anti-social behaviour can also
result in a household losing eligibility for social housing in these countries. The standard
of evidence can be quite low in Sweden (for example complaints received by the
landlord), and can be exacerbated by the requirement for references from a former
landlord. In England ‘seriously unacceptable behaviour’ is a relatively new exclusion,
which requires quite a high standard of proof: needing to be such for the landlord to
secure an eviction.
10 It should be noted that our six countries can be contrasted to social housing programmes in the United
States and Australia where additional eligibility criteria are often applied to specific social housing
programmes: not only are income limits applied, there is an additional requirement to fall into a specific
vulnerable group, for example to have a physical disability or some other special need (Fitzpatrick and
Stephens, 2007).
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Table 4.4 Eligibility criteria for social rented housing
Basic
eligibility
Income
limits
Minimum
income
Residency
requirement
Language
requirement
Exclusions Characterisation of target
DE All Yes
(c. 33%
eligible)
No No No None in principle New housing for families with special
needs and below average incomes, but not
for poor; older housing for poor
HU Varies by LA Set by
LAs (c.
33%
eligible)
No, in
principle
No No None in principle For poor households
NL All Yes No (but
incomes
linked to
type of
housing)
Sometimes No Rent arrears;
Anti-social
behaviour
Low and middle income households; trend
is towards lower income
PT All Yes No No No Property
ownership;
receipt of other
public support
for housing
For neediest; in recent decades bulk has
been used for shanty resettlement
SE All No Yes No No Rent arrears or
other bad debts;
no good landlord
reference
For all subject to good behaviour and
ability to pay rent; trend has been to house
higher %s of vulnerable households
UK All No No No No ‘seriously
unacceptable
behaviour’
(England)
In practice low income
Source: pro-formas
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Allocations
We have seen that eligibility is quite broadly defined in our six countries, but that this is
tempered by some exclusions, such as the requirement for minimum incomes, and
histories of rent arrears or anti-social behaviour. This implies that in areas of high
demand the allocation system is the principal rationing mechanism (Table 4.5). In most
of our six countries, landlords are given a high level of discretion in allocating social
housing.
The UK is something of an outlier in the relative lack of discretion given to local authority
landlords. In the UK (England) local authorities have a statutory obligation to give
‘reasonable preference’ to four groups, including homeless people; and a statutory duty
to provide ‘suitable accommodation’ to unintentionally homeless households in priority
need (which historically has been discharged through allocation of social rented
housing, although especially in high demand areas more emphasis has recently been
placed on the use of the private rented sector).
In Portugal priority is given to people who live in ‘provisional structures’ such as
shanties, people living in very low quality housing; people with special needs; and
economic vulnerability.
Given the level of discretion enjoyed by social landlords in the four other countries
(Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands and Hungary), mechanisms exist that are intended
to ensure that the most needy or households requiring housing are not neglected.
Local authority nominations systems are used in some countries to assist with lower
income/ more needy households. In Germany many local authorities operate ‘social
allocation contracts’ with social landlords and in some cases direct placements. The
nomination system can leave room for discrimination as landlord has choice of one
household from three; but practice varies and other municipalities run effective
integration programmes for stigmatised households. In Sweden local authorities have
traditionally nominated up to a quarter of allocations to municipal housing, but some
have become more reluctant to use this instrument for fear of increasing residualisation,
especially as the trend has been to house greater proportions of vulnerable households
in the sector. The ‘declaration of urgency’ system, which operates on a discretionary
basis in the Netherlands, is operated to deal with pressing cases and accounts for as
many as one-fifth of allocations.
The existing evidence on homelessness is discussed in detail in Chapter 9, but so far as
allocation criteria are concerned it is rarely an explicit priority, although homeless people
may be prioritised as part of a wider urgent case category. The statutory obligation for
local authorities in the UK to house priority needs groups who are unintentionally
homeless is unique amongst our six countries. The Scottish Government has extended
50
these obligations further than in the rest of the UK by undertaking to abolish the priority
need criterion by 2012.
The imposition of additional terms to tenancy agreements above those relating to the
payment of rent and other normal expectations (conditionality) do not appear to exist in
any of the countries. The idea of linking tenancies in the UK (England) to work or
training were mooted by a Housing Minister in 2008, but there have been no formal
proposals to date.
Sub-sectors
The question of exclusionary criteria that affect especially lower income and other
vulnerable households has been neglected in most studies. Sub-sectors are distinct
from mainstream social rented housing and are intended to house people who are
excluded from mainstream social housing (Table 4.5). The best-known example of a
sub-sector is the ‘very’ social housing sector in France (which is not part of this study,
but see Levy-Vroelant and Tutin, 2007), which has received explicit government
support. Sub-sectors are often physically distinct; are of lower quality and are cheaper
(lower rent), less secure and are more likely to have conditions that are not normally
part of a tenancy contract applied.
We can distinguish between emergency housing that is used until mainstream social
housing becomes available (e.g. temporary accommodation for the statutory homeless
in UK; and emergency accommodation for homeless people in Germany) and quite
separate sectors. Sub-sectors exist in three of the countries covered in this study. In
Hungary physically distinct settlements sometimes known as ‘Roma housing’ are used
to house very poor households. In Sweden the sub-sector takes the form of ‘secondary
housing’, which is housing that is leased by local authorities to house people that MHCs
will not house. There is a high degree of conditionality attached to tenancies (for
example, tenants must not drink and must grant access to social workers). In Germany
social rental agencies rent or buy housing and sublet it to social work clients. This
housing is used to house not only homeless people, but also a range of vulnerable
households such as ex-offenders, people with mental health problems and clients of
youth welfare services.
Other below market rental housing
Widespread rent control in private rental housing exists in three of the six countries
(Table 4.6) – so the weakening of the link between income and housing consumption
may be extended more widely than the social rented sector alone, although it is likely to
be less targeted due to allocation criteria being applied in the social sector.
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Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have been characterised as having ‘unitary’
rental systems as rent setting in the social rented effectively influences the rents
charged in the ‘private’ rented sector. Rent control covers the whole of the ‘private’
rented sectors in Germany and Sweden and almost all of it in the Netherlands (there is
a price threshold above which market rents apply).
Most important is Germany where the majority of the stock (53%) falls into this category
– so is much more significant than the now very small social rented sector. Indeed much
of this sector is former ‘social’ rented housing. The private rent controlled sector is
almost as large as the social rented sector in Sweden (17%); and is around 10% in the
Netherlands (which brings the total stock of rent-controlled housing up to 45%).
These systems contrast with the ‘historic’ rent control systems that remain in Portugal
and the UK. In both of these countries historic rent controls were removed from new
tenancies so the rent controlled sectors are shrinking rapidly (and in the case of the UK
is now very small). In these countries, rent control was associated with disinvestment
and declining quality – side-effects that are far less pronounced or absent in the three
unitary systems.
52
Table 4.5 Allocations
Where
policies are
formed
Mechanism Criteria Homelessness
and other
priority need
Outcomes Conditionality Sub-sector
DE Landlord Landlord selects; but
many LAs have
nomination rights
(‘social allocation
contracts’) and in
some cases direct
placements
Nomination
rights mean
landlord must
choose one
from three
nominated
LA may prioritise
homeless within
nomination rights
Nominations
leave room for
discrimination,
although some
LAs operate
effective
integration
policies for
stigmatised
households
No; housing
cost component
of social
benefits usually
exempt from
conditions
Small
‘emergency’
sector; lowest
income/ most
vulnerable not
excluded from
mainstream
housing
HU Local
authorities
Waiting lists; points
systems
Inability to
access market
– i.e. limited
income and
wealth
No priority for
homeless, but
priority for private
tenants and
households
sharing
accommodation
Opportunities
are few, so
difficult to
access; but
stock
unattractive so
allocated to
poor
No, but
participation in
employment or
training
programme
may help with
allocation
In some areas;
tenants in rent
arrears may be
moved to low
quality ‘Roma’
settlements
where very
poor live
NL Broad national
framework,
implemented
locally
Primarily choice-
based lettings; also
waiting lists and a
few lotteries
Mostly time-
waited (new
applicants); or
length of
residency
(transfers)
No explicit
priority; and need
address.
‘Declaration of
urgency’ for
urgent cases (c.
20% allocations);
established by
committee of HA,
tenants and
sometimes LA
Movers within
the stock tend
to gain better
quality hosing
than new
entrants – a
housing ladder
No Cheaper ‘core
stock’ reserved
for lower
income groups;
not seen as
separate sub-
sector;
‘second’ or ‘last
chance’
housing for
tenants facing
eviction
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PT Local
authorities
-
People with no
dwelling; those
living in
‘provisional
structures’ (e.g.
shanties); low
quality housing;
special needs;
lone parents;
economic
situation
No explicit priority Lack of
evidence
No No
SE MHC within
broad
framework
(non-
discrimination)
Mostly date
order
No explicit priority
for homeless.
Priorities include
medical, family
separation (if
small children)
social (services),
economic need to
move
Trend has been
towards
housing poorer
households
No ‘Secondary’
housing: flats
leased by LAs
to households
that MHCs
reluctant to
house
UK
(England)
Local
authorities
within statutory
framework;
HAs obliged to
co-operate
Shift towards choice-
based lettings
(CBLs); away from
waiting list/ points
LA must give
‘reasonable
preference’ to 4
groups:
homeless;
unsatisfactory
housing;
medical/
welfare;
hardship;
requires move
to area
LA have duty to
provide ‘suitable
accommodation’
to unintentionally
homeless
households in
priority need
CBLs have not
disadvantaged
homeless or
minority ethnic
groups
No No
Source: pro formas supplemented by CECODHAS (2007)
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Table 4.6 Other below market rental housing
% stock Landlords Basis Trend Beneficiaries Spillover-effects
DE 53 (2005) Mixture of co-
operative,
MHC, PHC,
institutional
investors and
small-scale
landlords
Across whole sector Slight
decline
Spread widely Has not discouraged supply or harmed
quality
HU 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NL 10 (2006) 60%
institutional;
40%
individuals
and small
companies
Rents below
‘quality point’
threshold
Declining Almost all rental
housing is regulated
Illegal sub-lets; low mobility
PT 8 (2001) - Applied to all rented
before 1990; 2005
law seeks to shift
these to market
levels
Declining Older people Deterred landlords and led to decline in
quality
SE 17 Mix of small-
scale and
institutional
investors
All rents set in
relation to MHC
rents
Rising In general helps poor Encourages developers to build co-
operative flats
UK 0.6
(2006/7)
Almost all
small-scale
landlords
Only rents on
tenancies begun
before 1989 are
regulated
Declining Older people Long-term decline in sector attributed in
part to rent control; and its revival to
rent decontrol and non-secure
tenancies
Source: pro formas
55
Social and other below market rental housing and poverty
Table 4.7 gives some indication of the concentrations of poverty in the social and other
below market rental sectors. The distinction between social rented housing and the
categories used in EU-SILC are also not distinct, and are difficult to interpret. These are
identified as ‘below market rents’ in EU-SILC. The data for Sweden needs to be treated
with extreme caution as the bulk of the municipal housing sector is classified as being
let at market rents in the data set, hence the very small proportion of individuals living in
the ‘below market rent’ (BMR) sector. The Dutch BMR sector has also been treated in
this way, but because rent controls apply to rents below a certain limit we have been
able to separate out what is predominantly the social rented sector. The BMR sector in
the UK reflects the social rented sector, as the rent controlled private rented sector is
non-existent or very small.
The poverty rate in social rental and other below market rental housing is above the
average in each of the countries (Table 4.7). The poverty rate is around one-quarter in
the sector in five of the six countries which is between 1.6 and 2.2 the average.
However, in the UK the poverty rate in the sector is much higher than in any other
country – at almost one half, which is almost 2.5 times the average in the country with
the highest general poverty rate of the six.
Table 4.7 Poverty and social /other below market rental housing
BMR - %
individuals who
live in tenure
BMR - %
individuals in
povertyb
Poverty (%) BMR
Poverty:
Poverty
% Poor
housed in
BMR
DE 5.3 24.5 14.0 1.8 10.1
HU 3.6 23.7 12.2 1.9 5.9
NL 27.7 23.1 11.5 2.0 61.2
PT 7.6 27.4 17.2 1.6 11.5
SE 2.0 25.5 11.6 2.2 4.5
UK 17.7 47.6 19.7 2.4 42.2
BMR = below market rent; as identified in EU-SILC, except NL where = rents < €622
Source: Tables A2B, A5A, AP2A
However, the significance of social rented and other below market rental housing
depends on the size of the sector as well as the poverty rate. It is clear that – at least in
the EU-SILC data – the sector plays by far the most significant role in housing people
living in poverty in the UK (where it houses more than 40 per cent of the poor) and the
Netherlands (where it houses more than 60%) (Table 4.7). Mainstream municipal rental
housing in Sweden also plays an important role in housing poor households but it
cannot be identified separately in the data.
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4.4 The Role of Housing Allowances
Housing allowances, here defined as a means-tested income transfer designed to lower
housing costs, represent the closest interface between the social security system and
the housing system.
National housing allowance schemes are a relatively recent feature of housing and
social security systems, although their importance has grown and has been associated
with the deliberate shift from ‘supply’ to ‘demand’-side subsidies in a number of
countries (including Sweden and the UK), ‘marketisation’ in a number of transition
countries, and private sector rent decontrol (in Portugal).
The role that housing allowances play is closely linked to the generosity of the wider
social insurance and assistance systems and whether the latter makes separate
provision for housing costs.
For this reason we provide a brief overview of the social insurance and assistance
systems in our six countries, and their treatment of housing costs. We then discuss
housing allowance systems.
Interface with social security system
It is usual for advanced economies to operate a two tier system to help households to
deal with income loss due to unemployment.
The first tier of the system is social insurance, which is here defined as non-means-
tested payments based on a contributions record built up through the payment of payroll
taxes when the claimant was in employment. Usually, but not always, payments are
linked to previous earnings up to a maximum amount, and are time limited. A second
tier is provided by social assistance, which is here defined as means-tested payments
paid from general taxation; entitlement usually begins if the claimant fails to qualify for
social insurance, or entitlement for social insurance has expired. Social assistance is
normally unrelated to previous income and operates as a kind of safety net. Some
countries operate an intermediate benefit, known as unemployment assistance, that is
less generous than social insurance, but more generous than social assistance.
Social insurance
Each of our six countries operates a social insurance system (Table 2.8). With the
exception of the UK payments are related to former earnings. Replacement rates (which
represent the percentage of former salary met by social insurance) normally vary
between 60 and 80 per cent, although there is usually an upper limit in the five countries
that operate earnings-related systems, i.e. the payments are normally subject to a
57
maximum amount. Whilst comparisons are difficult to make, it seems that the German,
Dutch and Portuguese systems have the highest maxima (90-113% of the average
wage), while lower maxima arise in Sweden (57%) and Hungary (29%). The flat rate
payments (subject to household type and size) that are made under the British social
insurance system appear to be much less generous, and have been estimated at only
about 10 per cent of the average wage, although this will be higher for larger
households with children.
The duration of entitlement also varies between countries according to contribution
record, and sometimes also age (Germany and Portugal) and household type
(Sweden). The maximum duration of benefit ranges from six months in the UK to about
a year in Sweden and Germany and to more than three years in the Netherlands.
Each of the systems has an expectation that at least some housing costs will be met
from social insurance payments, the exception being the flat-rate UK system where
there is no allowance for housing costs in the benefit rates. The Dutch system has an
explicit expectation that minimum housing costs (up to a specified ‘basic rent’ of €200
per month) costs be met from social insurance. In the other countries the expectation is
implicit.
Three of the six countries operate intermediate schemes between social insurance and
social assistance. Unemployment assistance is available in Hungary, Portugal and
Sweden. In Hungary and Sweden the rate is set in relation to a minimum wage; in
Sweden it is paid at a flat rate. In Hungary the maximum duration of entitlement is three
months, in Sweden about 10 months. Germany’s unemployment assistance scheme
was merged into the social assistance (or UBII) system in 2006, but there is still a
transitional allowance that eases the shift from unemployment insurance to social
assistance.
Social assistance
Social assistance schemes are operated in all of our six countries (Table 4.9). They are
not earnings-related so they are generally less generous than social insurance, except
in the UK where the rates are largely the same as for social insurance benefit.
Entitlement is not time-limited.
Again only the Dutch system has an explicit expectation for a specific amount of
housing costs to be met from the basic benefit – thereafter the household has access to
the housing allowance system.
In Germany since 2005 housing support for social assistance recipients has been
entirely divorced from the housing allowance system, i.e. social assistance claimants
are ineligible for housing allowance. Reasonable housing costs are added to the
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standard needs allowance in the benefit calculation, so in principle all housing costs can
be met. After six months a ceiling applies according to region and household type. For a
household of three the rent ceiling varies between €350 and €760 per month.
A similar principle applies to home-owners in the UK. Additions are made for home-
owners’ mortgage interest subject to a waiting period and a ceiling (both of which have
been relaxed in the recession, having been tightened considerably in the mid-1990s).
But more importantly, British tenants are expected to rely wholly on the housing
allowance system – quite the opposite situation to their German counterparts.
One of the Portuguese systems of housing support works on an income support
principle: when housing costs exceed one-quarter of the social assistance payment,
housing costs are met up to a ceiling.
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Table 4.8 Social insurance for unemployment
Social
Insurance
system
Replacement
ratio Maximum
a Time limit
Expected to cover
(some) housing
costs
DE Yes
60% net income
(67% if
dependant
children)
€5,280
(west)
90%AW
12 (aged <
55) or 18
months (aged
> 55)
Yes, but may claim
housing allowance
HU Yes
60% (40% for
less complete
contribution
record)
120% of
minimum
salary (€288
per month)
29%AW
9 months Yes
NL Yes
75% gross
income (months
1+2); 70%
(month 3+)
€183 per day
113% AW 3-38 months
Yes – up to ‘basic
rent’ (€200 per
month)
PT Yes 65% gross 3 times
Social
Support
Index
101% AW
30 days per 5
years’
contribution
up to 120
days (aged
<45); 60 days
per 5 years’
contribution
up to 240
days (aged
>45)
Yes
SE
Yesa (voluntary
and risk
related)
80% (first 200
days)
70% (201-300
days; 450 if
dependant
children)
SEK18700
gross per
month
57% AW
300 days (450
if dependant
children)
Yes
UK Yes
Benefit rate is
flat rate
(household
type) – same as
social
assistance (est.
10% AWa)
n.a. 6 months No
Note:
(a) AW = average wage. Based on 40 year old single worker with no children and 22-year employment record
(OECD)
Source: Pro-formas, supplemented by OECD
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Table 4.9 Social assistance for unemployment
Social assistance
scheme
Rate Time limit Housing costs
DEb Yes Flat rate Indefinite Paid in addition
HUa Yes Flat rate Indefinite No separate
system
NL Yes Related to
minimum wage
Indefinite Expected to meet
basic rent
PTa Yes 80% (single) or
100% (couple) of
IAS
Same as social
insurance unless
transfer from
insurance in which
case half the time
Safety net system
SEa Yes National norms
generally followed
by local
authoritiess
Indefinite Will meet
reasonable
dwelling costs;
assets (including
housing) must be
sold
UK Yes Flat rate Indefinite Renters depend
on housing
allowance;
additions for
mortgage interest
Notes:
(a) Also operate intermediate unemployment assistance scheme
(b) Operates transitional allowance between social insurance and assistance
Source: pro-formas
Housing allowances
Generally housing allowance systems have two functions: a housing affordability
function and an income support function (Kemp, 2000). The housing affordability
function relates mainly to enabling households to increase the quantity and quality of
housing consumption beyond that which they would otherwise be able to afford. The
income support function is concerned with preventing housing costs from taking income
after housing costs to an unacceptably low level and so jeopardise other areas of
consumption Systems often share both functions (so, as Kemp (2007) put observed the
housing allowance is a ‘hybrid policy instrument’ (p. 5)), but one feature tends to be
dominant in each system.
The key features of housing allowances systems are summarised in Table 4.10. The
income support function is most clearly present in the UK system: it will meet all tenants’
eligible housing costs because there is no allowance for housing costs in either the
mainstream social insurance or assistance systems. While the housing allowance also
provides assistance for households not in receipt of social insurance or assistance
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benefits, it became much more closely targeted on these groups when it underwent a
major reform in 1988, and its housing affordability function is now quite muted. In
Germany and Sweden, as well as among UK home-owners, 100 per cent of eligible
housing costs are also in principle payable, but crucially as part of the social assistance
system, and not through the housing allowance system.
This means that the German and Swedish housing allowance systems are more
obviously intended to provide wider housing affordability functions. The German
housing allowance system now excludes social assistance recipients, while the Swedish
system was also reformed (in 1997) to exclude childless people aged over 29 (and a
separate system operates for pensioners). Ultimately, these households can gain help
with their housing costs from the social assistance system.
The Dutch system is the most obviously hybrid system. Explicit amounts are contained
within both social insurance and assistance benefits that are intended to meet housing
costs, but for all tenants any additional assistance with housing costs is delivered
through the housing allowance system. Moreover, the structures of the German,
Swedish and Dutch systems contain the distinctive ‘gap’ structure that declining
proportions of housing costs above a minimum and below a maximum are eligible for
assistance. This contrasts to the ‘residual income’ structure whereby eligible housing
costs are in effect added to the needs allowance in the UK housing allowance, and in
systems where help with housing costs is delivered through social assistance.
Housing allowances play a more limited role in Hungary and Portugal, where a number
of schemes to help with housing and related costs have been established. There is no
general scheme in Portugal. The rent subsidy scheme is intended to compensate
households who face sudden increases in housing costs due to private sector rent
deregulation and also to households who suffer sudden income loss; it is structured on
the affordability/ gap model. A separate support scheme exists for young adults and is
intended to help them to attain independence. It is interesting that Portugal and Sweden
favour young households in that they provide explicit housing assistance to them, whilst
they are disadvantaged in the German, Dutch and British systems.
There is no entirely comprehensive housing allowance system in that owner occupiers
are excluded from the Dutch and British systems, social assistance recipients are
excluded from the German system, and non-pensioner childless households aged over
29 are excluded from the Swedish system. Meanwhile the Hungarian and Portuguese
systems apply to specific circumstances.
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Table 4.10 Housing allowances
Introduced Last major
reform
Tenures National/
local
Exclusions Who
claims?
Costs
covered
Take-up Withdrawal
rate
DE 1960s 2005 All Federal
legislative
framework;
Länder
regulations;
local practice
Excludes social
assistance
cases; students;
most singles
<25
pensioners
(47%); in-
work (37%);
out-of-work
(7%)
Rents,
mortgage and
management
Historically
low (40-
50%); but
may have
risen with
reforms
-
HU 5 schemes (a) local
housing allowance
(1993); (b) energy
costs subsidy (2007);
(c) normative housing
allowance 2004); (d)
national rent
allowance (2006) ; (e)
local schemes
- (a) and (d) =
tenants only;
(b), (c), (e) =
all
(b), (c), (d) =
national
(a) = national
framework,
local rules
(e) = local
None - Between them
rents,
mortgage
payments,
utilities,
heating
- -
NL 1975 1997 Tenants only National Students Pensioners
(37%)
Rent + various
management
and
maintenance,
and communal
costs
73% c. 35%
PT 3 schemes to (a)
safety net; (b)
compensate for rent
rises; (c) for young
(18-29)
(a) 2006
(b) 2005
(c) 2007
Tenants only National - - Rents only - -
SE
1967/8 1997 All National Excludes
childless
couples and
singles > 30
- Rent; part
mortgage;
heating/
utilities;
property tax
- c. 20%
UK
1972/3 2008
(private
sector)
Tenants only National Students; young
singles are
disadvantaged
Aged >60
(42%);
disabled
(25%); lone
parent (22%);
unemployed
(1%)
Rent 81-87% 65%
Source: pro formas
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Extent of housing allowances
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 give an indication of the importance of housing allowances. The
tables need to be treated with some caution, particularly in Germany where social
assistance recipients may receive additional payments to meet housing costs which are
not recorded as ‘housing allowances’. This also applies in Sweden and to British home-
owners who may receive housing cost-related social assistance.
These data suggest that around 10 per cent of individuals live in households that
receive housing allowances in the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The smallest
proportion of households in receipt of housing allowances is in Germany, but as noted,
this figure undercounts means-tested assistance for housing costs as social assistance
recipients receive assistance outwith the housing allowance system. More than nine in
ten recipients of social assistance received help with their housing costs representing
around 7-9 per cent of the population. The average support is in the region of €3,300
per year. The housing allowance schemes in Portugal and Hungary assist 6 and 7 per
cent of individuals respectively.
The prevalence of housing allowance support is generally higher among tenants than
owners, and much higher in the UK and the Netherlands (where owners are excluded
from the scheme) (Table 4.11). Some 30 per cent of Dutch tenants and more than 40
per cent of British tenants receive housing allowances. However, the highest
proportions of owners who receive assistance through housing allowances are in
Hungary and Portugal. Housing allowances are also targeted on the poor. More than 40
per cent of poor people live in households assisted by housing allowances in the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, and more than a quarter do so in Hungary. This
contrasts to fewer than 10 per cent of the non poor. The only country where a greater
proportion of non poor people than poor people are assisted by housing allowance is
Portugal.
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Table 4.11 Percentage of Individuals in receipt of housing allowances
All tenants All owners All tenures Poor (all
tenures)
Non poor (all
tenures)
DEa 4.8 0.9 2.7 10.3 1.5
HU 9.0 7.8 8.0 25.9 5.5
NL 30.4 0.9 10.7 44.6 6.3
PT 1.1 8.3 6.5 2.2 7.4
SE 23.2 4.0 10.2 45.2 5.7
UK 43.8 0.0a 11.8 41.0 4.6
Note: (a) excludes additions to social assistance payments for housing costs
Source: Table B3, BX3
Levels of assistance vary greatly between countries, even allowing for differences in
incomes and housing costs (Table 4.11). The value of support is lowest in Hungary and
Portugal. By far the highest levels of assistance occur in the UK, which reflects the
omission of any allowance for housing costs in mainstream social security benefits,
which means that housing allowance recipients may receive the whole of their eligible
rent. The figure for Germany is depressed by the exclusion of social assistance
recipients, whom might be expected to receive the highest average levels of support
with housing costs.
Table 4.12 Average yearly amount of housing allowance received per recipient (Euros)
(2007)
Tenants Owners All tenures
DEa 1,175 [1,354] 1,198
HU 256 199 204
NL 1,813 [1,781] 1,812
PT [-] 548 576
SE 2,523 1,874 2,339
UK 5,356 [-]a 5,356
Note: (a) excludes additions to social assistance payments for housing costs
[ ] average based on fewer than 50 cases
[-] average based on fewer than 20 cases
Source: EU-SILC
4.5 Outright Home-ownership
Home-ownership can play an ambiguous role in the relationship between income
poverty and housing poverty.
The link between current income and housing consumption can be broken because of
the nature of home-ownership as an asset from which housing services (such as shelter
and home) are derived, but whose cost varies greatly according to the size of the debt
secured on the property and its relation to the capital value of the property. The
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divisions between those owners who are heavily indebted and those who own houses
with little or no debt could be very considerable (Table 4.13). Thus home-ownership is a
tenure that pulls both ways within countries. It also does so within households over the
life cycle, as mortgage debt may be onerous when a house is first purchased, but over
time the real value of the debt will diminish and eventually the property will be owned
outright (the ‘front-end loading’ problem, described by Hills, 1990).
Privatisation of formerly state/ social properties through sales to tenants has been
important in Hungary and the UK. It has been calculated that more than 90 per cent of
the Hungarian public housing stock in 1990 has been sold to tenants (Hegedüs and
Struyk, 2005). This has contributed not only to a very large owner occupied sector
(almost 90 per cent of individuals live in owner occupied households), but also to the
phenomenon whereby three-quarters own their properties outright. Of our six countries,
Hungary has the lowest amount of mortgage debt (just 12% of GDP) and of outstanding
mortgage debt per capita.
Privatisation of social housing through the ‘right to buy’ has been crucial to the growth in
both low income and lowly indebted home-ownership in the UK. Under this scheme
more than 1.75 million discounted sales have taken place since 1980 (CLG Live Table
676), and helped to raise the home-ownership rate to around 70 per cent of households.
However, this has combined with the general growth in home-ownership acquired at
market price and financed through mortgage debt. The natural repayment of mortgage
debt and its combination with long-term real house price growth reduces the value of
debt in relation to mortgage values. While EU-SILC identifies 73.1 per cent of
individuals living in owner-occupied households; more than one-quarter per cent are
outright owners. However, the UK has a high proportion of mortgage debt: GDP (86%)
and a high level of mortgage debt per capita (€28,760). This reflects in part the ease of
remortgaging and the presence of a significant sub-prime sector (around 10 per cent of
lending, according to Stephens and Quilgars, 2008) at least before the credit crunch.
Quite different traditions have contributed to a large owner-occupied sector in Portugal.
The sector houses three quarters of individuals. The sector has been characterised by
high levels of self-build and inter-generational support. Mortgage debt has grown in the
economy, but after Hungary, per capita debt is the lowest of our six countries, and,
according to EU-SILC, more than half of individuals live in owner occupied housing with
no debt attached, the second highest after Hungary.
The owner-occupied sectors in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are smaller than
in the other countries. The EU-SILC data giving a figure of 69.5 per cent of individuals
living in owner-occupied households clearly includes co-operative owners, who are
normally treated as a separate tenure category in Sweden. (Note that tenure
percentages expressed as proportions of individuals are often rather different from
those expressed as proportions of households with which some readers will be more
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familiar.) If co-operative owners are treated as owner occupiers, it seems that around
15.2 per cent of individuals live mortgage-free; whilst more than half live in households
with mortgages. Only just over one-half (54%) of Germans live in owner-occupied
households, the lowest among our six countries, and this is reflected in a low level of
mortgage debt to GDP. Unfortunately, EU-SILC does not provide a breakdown of
mortgaged and outright owners in Germany.
Home ownership in the Netherlands can be seen as being in transition. Whilst the
country still has one of the lower owner occupation levels in the EU, the mortgage
system has liberalised greatly and mortgage debt is supported by extremely generous
tax benefits. According to EU-SILC two-thirds of individuals in the Netherlands live in
owner occupied households, but fewer than nine per cent are outright owners. Of our
six countries, the Netherlands has the highest proportion of individuals living in
mortgaged owner occupation – almost 55 per cent. These figures are supported by the
macro-level data that suggests that mortgage debt in the Netherlands represents 100
per cent of GDP, and the country also has the highest level of per capita mortgage debt
outstanding. In this sense, the Netherlands appears to have the most ‘commodified’
owner-occupied sector of our six countries, i.e. least likely to break the link between
current income and housing consumption.
Table 4.13 Owner occupation and mortgage debt
Owner
occupationa
Outright
ownersa
Mortgaged
ownersa
Mortgage
debt: GDP
(2007)
Mortgage debt
per capita (€
’000) (2007)
DE 54.0 - - 47.7 14.05
HU 88.5 73.6 14.9 12.4 1.25
NL 66.6 8.4 58.1 100.0 34.14
PT 74.5 50.0 24.4 62.1 9.52
SE 69.5 15.2 54.3 57.0 20.71
UK 73.1 26.4 46.8 86.3 28.76
Note: a. Proportion of individuals who live in owner occupied households
Source: Table A2B, except Mortgage Debt = European Mortgage Federation
More than a quarter of poor people live in owner occupied households in each of the
countries; in Portugal more than 60 per cent of poor people live in owner occupied
households and in Hungary 80 per cent do so. In Portugal more than half of poor people
live in households that own their property outright and in Hungary almost 70 per cent do
so. In the UK, more than four in ten poor people are home owners and more than a
quarter are outright owners. Thus the potential for this tenure to produce some
‘decommodifying’ effect is quite extensive in three of the six countries.
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Table 4.14 Percentage of poor who are home owners
Owners Outright owners Mortgaged owners
DE 30.0 - -
HU 80.9 69.7 11.2
NL 27.9 11.4 16.5
PT 61.2 52.7 8.5
SE 35.4 14.5 20.8
UK 43.4 27.6 15.8
Source: Table AP2B
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have examined the six selected housing systems drawn from across
the range of welfare regimes. We have examined the role of three policies or system
features that might weaken the link between income and housing consumption:
 the provision of social rented housing, and the below market rental sector;
 housing allowances; and
 outright home-ownership.
An assessment of the relative importance of these policies/ system features is
summarised in Table 4.15.
Table 4.15 Welfare Regimes, poverty rates and housing characteristics
Welfare regime Poverty
ratea
Social
rented
sector
Unitary
rental
sector
Outright
home
ownership
Housing
allowance
DE Corporatist 14.0 + ++++ + +
HU Transition 12.2 + 0 +++++ +
NL Corporatist/
Social
Democratic
11.5 ++++ ++++ + +++
PT Mediterranean 17.2 + 0 ++++ +
SE Social
Democratic
11.6 +++ ++++ ++ +++
UK Liberal 19.7 +++ 0 +++ ++++
Note: a. Proportion of individuals living in households with equivalised incomes (excluding housing allowance and
before housing costs) < 60% median.
b. 0 = no or negligible importance; + low importance; ++ low-to-medium importance; +++ medium importance; ++++
medium-to-high importance; +++++ high importance
Source: authors’ assessment; except poverty rate = Table A5A
There is clearly no simple link between welfare regime and the clusters of housing
system characteristics, but some patterns do emerge from our review.
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Germany and Sweden are at opposite ends in the scale of provision of social rented
housing, suggesting an absence of link between housing and welfare regimes.
However, if we look to a broader ‘unitary’ rental sector, which is the combination of
social and private rental sectors that are characterised by below market rents, or market
rents that are subdued by the role of the social rented sector, then it is possible to
discern a cluster of housing characteristics among the three social democratic/
corporatist countries of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. (The distinction
between ‘social’ and wider ‘unitary’ market is blurred and is reflected in the traditional
objection to the term ‘social’ sector in Sweden, and the allocation of the mainstream
municipal housing sector to the ‘market’ rented sector in EU-SILC.) These are combined
with relatively small low-debt home-owner sectors, although the Netherlands may be in
a transitional phase whereby debt-financed home-ownership is growing.
Low debt home-ownership is much more pronounced in the countries from the other
regime types. Hungary as a transition country has very high levels of home-ownership,
and around three-quarters of individuals live in households who own their homes
outright. This situation is linked to privatisation as well as the tradition of self-build, so
shares characteristics of the UK (where privatisation has also helped to create a
significant low debt home-owner sector) and Portugal (where self-build is of historic, if
declining importance). The UK stands out among this group in having a significant
social rented sector, but it is a tenure that is not generally regarded as influencing the
growing deregulated private rental sector (so there is no unitary rental sector).
We have identified housing allowances as being of some importance in four of the
countries, but that their differing relationship with the social security system means that
their importance is difficult to interpret. Their greater importance in the UK compared
especially to Germany and also Sweden lies (in part at least) in their playing the safety
net/ income maintenance role that is played by the social assistance system in
Germany. Taking into account the average amounts paid as well the proportions of the
population whom they assist, their significance appears to be greater in Sweden,
Germany, the Netherlands and (especially) the UK than in Hungary or Portugal.
Having reviewed this evidence, we can draw the following preliminary conclusions
concerning the relationship between housing systems and welfare regimes:
 The countries in the corporatist and social democratic regimes (Sweden, the
Netherlands and Germany) are characterised as having significant ‘unitary’ rental
markets; these are largely absent in the countries in the transitional,
Mediterranean and liberal regimes.
 The UK (liberal regime) has a significant and targeted social rented sector, and
this is a distinctive characteristic (as the social democratic/ corporatist regimes
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provide less targeted unitary sectors and the other countries do not have
significant social sectors).
 Housing allowances are most significant (when we take into account their value
as well as the prevalence of receipt) in the UK (liberal regime), and also
important in (some) corporatist/ social democratic countries (the Netherlands and
Sweden). The low rate of receipt in Germany is in part be explained by the
alternative assistance provided to social assistance recipients.
 Hungary (transition country) and Portugal (Mediterranean regime) have large
low-debt owner occupied sectors, but there is also a significant low-debt owner-
occupied sector in the UK (liberal regime).
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PART II HOUSING, POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT
Chapter 5: The Impact of Poverty on Housing Outcomes
5.1 Introduction
This is the first of two chapters that aim to establish the links between income poverty
and housing outcomes. The principal hypothesis being tested is that income poverty,
whose levels vary between welfare regimes, will impact on housing outcomes. We
would therefore expect the housing outcomes of the poor to be inferior to those of the
non-poor. However we also hypothesise that housing policy and other features of the
housing system may seek to weaken the links between income poverty and housing
outcomes.
In this Chapter we examine the impact of income poverty on housing outcomes at a
country level. We are examining the overall relationship between poverty, the housing
system and housing outcomes. This means that the analysis considers the population
as a whole and the population living in poverty. It does not examine the influence of
individual housing policy instruments or the outcomes between different tenures. These
are examined in Chapter 6.
In this chapter we employ the following indicators that capture range of ‘housing
outcomes’:
 Affordability
 Overcrowding (objective and subjective)
 Physical quality of housing
 Neighbourhood quality
 Neighbourhood services
 Dissatisfaction
Housing outcomes are reported using an absolute benchmark for the general population
and the poor population. They are also reported using a relative benchmark in which the
position of the poor is compared to the non poor.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.
In Sections 5.2-5.7 we examine housing outcomes according to each of the above
indicators in turn. In Section 5.8 these results are analysed between different groupings
of countries according to their welfare regimes. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.9.
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5.2 Affordability
In this chapter affordability is assessed using two concepts:
 the impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates; and
 the burden of housing expenditure.
These are considered in turn.
The impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates
The overall impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates can be made by comparing
poverty before housing costs (BHC) with poverty after net housing costs (ANHC) in
Figure 5.1. This captures the effect of housing expenditure once housing allowances
have been taken into account. The ANHC poverty rate has the advantage of being
neutral between the different methods of assisting people with their housing costs: it
does not matter whether assistance is identified separately as a housing allowance.
Figure 5.1 The impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates
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Source: Tables A5B, A5C
Poverty rates before housing costs lie in the range 11.5 per cent (the Netherlands) and
19.7 per cent (UK). There is a rise in poverty rates in all of the countries as a result of
net housing expenditure. The smallest increase is in Portugal (3 percentage points,
henceforth abbreviated as pp) and largest in the Netherlands (5.4 pp). After net housing
costs, poverty rates range from 16 per cent (in Hungary) to 23.9 per cent in the UK. The
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range of poverty rates is slightly smaller after net housing costs, but the analysis does
not suggest that the housing systems in the countries examined disrupt the pattern of
poverty levels created by the welfare regimes. In Chapter 6 we conduct further analysis
to explore whether housing expenditure might have a larger impact on poverty if there
were no policy interventions.
The burden of housing expenditure: the ratio approach
The proportions of individuals living in households devoting more than 40 per cent of
their incomes to meeting net housing costs varies greatly between countries (Table 5.1).
The proportions are lowest in Portugal (7.5%), Hungary (7.3%) and Sweden (8.5%). In
these countries fewer than 10 per cent of people are in households that are over this
threshold. In the UK (16.6%) and the Netherlands (18%) the proportions are twice as
high as this, and in Germany the proportion exceeds one-fifth (22.7%) of people. This
higher figure in Germany is likely to be inflated by the way in which some housing-cost
assistance is delivered through the social assistance system.
The absolute level of people failing the thresholds is substantially higher among the
poor population, but the order remains much the same between countries: in Portugal
just under one-quarter (24.0%) of the poor pay more than 40 per cent of their net
incomes in housing costs; in Hungary fewer than one-third (31.7%) (Table 5.1). In
Sweden (44.0%) and the UK (45.2%) it is under half. More than half of poor people fail
this indicator in the Netherlands (57.2%) rising to more than two-thirds (68.1%) in
Germany.
Table 5.1 Percentage with net housing expenditure to income exceeding 40%
40% Poor Not poor All Poor: Not poor
DE 68.1 15.8 22.7 4.3
HU 31.7 3.9 7.3 8.1
NL 57.2 12.9 18.0 4.4
PT 24.0 4.1 7.5 3.2
SE 44.0 3.8 8.5 5.2
UK 45.2 9.6 16.6 4.7
Source: Table BX6
When affordability is examined relatively (i.e. the poor are compared to the non poor)
we see quite wide differentials between the proportions of each group failing the 40 per
cent threshold (Table 5.2). The smallest differential is in Portugal (3.2) which also has
the lowest absolute failure rate among the poor. The differential is between four and five
in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and a little higher (5.2) in Sweden. This
leaves Hungary as an outlier with a differential of over eight (8.1), even though the
country has the second lowest absolute failure rate among the poor on this indicator.
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5.3 Overcrowding
Two concepts of overcrowding are used as detailed in Chapter 3.
Objective overcrowding
The Netherlands, Germany and the UK each record overall levels of ‘objective’
overcrowding below five per cent on the objective measure. Sweden and Portugal lie in
a middle range of 9-14 per cent, while Hungary records what appears to be a very high
level of overcrowding at almost 45 per cent (44.2) (Table 5.2). Almost the same order is
replicated when ‘objective’ overcrowding among the poor is examined separately, with
the Netherlands, Germany and the UK recording overcrowding among the poor of
between five and nine per cent. Portugal’s level of ‘objective’ overcrowding among the
poor is 16.5 per cent while more than a quarter of poor individuals live in ‘objectively’
overcrowded homes in Sweden. Hungary is once again an outlier with an ‘objective’
overcrowding rate among the poor in excess of 60 per cent (62.6%).
Table 5.2 Percentage overcrowded (objective measure)
O/c objective Poor Not poor All Poor: Not poor
DE 7.0 2.0 2.7 3.5
HU 62.6 41.6 44.2 1.5
NL 4.9 1.0 1.5 4.9
PT 16.5 12.8 13.5 1.3
SE 26.0 6.7 9.0 3.9
UK 8.7 3.2 4.3 2.7
Source: Table CX1
A different pattern emerges using the relative measure of ‘objective’ overcrowding (the
ratio of the overcrowding rate among the poor compared to the non poor). The smallest
differentials in ‘objective’ overcrowding rates between poor and non poor occur in
Portugal (1.3) and Hungary (1.5) (Table 5.2). So although Hungary has very high
absolute levels of overcrowding the gap between non poor and poor is quite small.
Conversely, the Netherlands, which has the lowest absolute ‘objective’ overcrowding
rates among both the poor population and the population as a whole, has the greatest
differential between the two (4.9).
Subjective overcrowding
Some different levels and patterns of overcrowding emerge when the ‘subjective’
definition is used (Table 5.3). The range of overcrowding rates is greatly compressed
between countries. It rises in Germany, which has the lowest level of overcrowding on
both measures, to 8.2 per cent, but falls in Hungary, which has by far the highest rate
on the ‘objective’ measure, from more than 40 per cent to 15.5 per cent. This places
75
Hungary in line with the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, and leaves Portugal as the
outlier with a ‘subjective’ of more than one-fifth. A similar pattern emerges among poor
households with the lowest ‘subjective’ overcrowding rate in Germany (12.9%), of
around one-fifth in Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, and in excess of one
quarter (27.3%) in Portugal.
Table 5.3 Percentage overcrowded (subjective measure)
O/c subjective Poor Not poor All Poor: Not Poor
DE 12.9 7.5 8.2 1.7
HU 22.6 14.5 15.5 1.6
NL 21.8 13.2 14.2 1.7
PT 27.3 20.1 21.4 1.4
SE 19.6 13.9 14.6 1.4
UK 19.9 14.8 15.8 1.3
Source: Table CX3
The relative position of the poor compared to the non-poor is also much more
compressed on the subjective measure. The UK has the smallest differential in
‘subjective’ overcrowding rates when we compare the poor with the non poor (1.3)
whereas the greatest differentials are in Germany and the Netherlands (both 1.7). At the
country level there is no obvious relation between either welfare regime or housing
system and either absolute levels or differentials in ‘subjective’ overcrowding.
5.4 Physical Quality of Housing
There are large variations in the proportion of individuals living in dwellings where one
or more indicator of physical quality is not met (Table 5.4). Sweden has by far the
lowest failure rate (of just over one-quarter (27.6%)) among the population as a whole.
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK bunch around 40 per cent. The failure rate rises
to a half (50.3%) in Hungary and three-quarters (74.3%) in Portugal.
The absolute failure rate among the population living in poverty is systematically higher
than among the non poor in all countries. As with the population as a whole Sweden
records the lowest failure rate among the poor. The failure rate among Swedes living in
poverty is one-third (33.8%). The failure rate among the poor population in the UK
(48.0%) is around seven percentage points lower than in Germany (54.9%) and the
Netherlands (55.4%). The failure rate among the poor population in Hungary is higher
still (62.5) and is highest in Portugal where more than eight (83.2%) in ten poor
households fail at least one of these indicators.
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Table 5.4 Percentage failing one or more indicators of physical quality
Quality Poor Not poor All Poor: Not poor
DE 54.9 36.2 38.8 1.5
HU 62.5 48.6 50.3 1.3
NL 55.4 36.4 38.6 1.5
PT 83.2 72.5 74.3 1.1
SE 33.8 26.8 27.6 1.3
UK 48.0 38.6 40.4 1.2
Source: Derived from Table D2A
Ironically the smallest gap in the failure rate between poor and non poor populations
occurs in Portugal (1.1) where the absolute failure rate is highest. This seems to
indicate nothing more than a relative equality of poor housing quality. There is a
comparatively small gap between the poor and non poor in the UK (1.2) where just
under a half of the poor population fail one of the indicators. In the Netherlands and
Germany the poor population are 50 per cent more likely to fail one of the indicators of
physical quality and in each of these cases this represents more than half of the poor
population.
Figure 5.2 shows the scale of failure of between on and five of the indicators of physical
quality among the population as a whole and among the poor population. In only two
countries (Hungary and Portugal) do more than ten per cent of people live in dwellings
where two indicators are failed and in only one (Portugal) do more than two in ten
inhabit such dwellings. Among the poor population 15 per cent of people inhabit
dwellings failing two or more of the indicators (Germany, Hungary and Portugal). The
proportions drop rapidly as the number of indicators fails rises, but the failure rate
among the poor on four indicators is 4.5 per cent in Portugal and 6.4 per cent in
Hungary.
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Figure 5.2 Failure of 1-5 indicators of physical quality
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5.5 Neighbourhood Quality
There is a wide variation in the proportion of people experiencing one or more
neighbourhood quality problems (Table 5.5). Around a quarter experience one or more
such problems in Sweden (25.1%) and Hungary (27.4%), just over one-third (35.8%) do
so in Germany; while the figure is between 40 and 45 per cent in Portugal (40.9%), the
UK (42%) and the Netherlands (44.7%).
The absolute failure rate among the poor population is higher than the average in all of
the countries apart from Portugal, although the differences are often very small (see
below) (Table 5.5). The lowest absolute failure rates among the poor are in Sweden
(30.1%) and Hungary (30.6%) and highest in the Netherlands (46.2%).
There is no difference in the failure rate of the poor compared to the non poor in the
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. The greatest differential is in Germany where it is 1.3
(Table 5.5).
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Table 5.5 Percentage failing one or more indicators of neighbourhood quality
Neighbourhood
quality
Poor Not poor All Poor: Not Poor
DE 44.8 34.4 35.8 1.3
HU 30.6 26.9 27.4 1.1
NL 46.2 44.5 44.7 1.0
PT 38.6 41.3 40.9 1.0
SE 30.1 24.4 25.1 1.2
UK 43.0 41.7 42.0 1.0
Source: Derived from Table E1A
Figure 5.3 shows the scale of failure of between one and three of the indicators of
neighbourhood quality among the population as a whole and among the poor
population. Two indicators are failed by more than 10 per cent of the population in four
countries (Hungary and Sweden are the exceptions), but fewer than five per cent fail
three in all six countries. Among the poor population more than 15 per cent of people
fail two indicators in Germany and more than 10 per cent do so in the Netherlands,
Portugal and the UK. In Germany and Portugal more than five per cent of the poor
population fail all three indicators of neighbourhood quality.
Figure 5.3 Failure of 1-3 indicators of neighbourhood quality
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5.6 Access to Neighbourhood Services
There is a wide range in the proportions of people having difficulty accessing at least
one neighbourhood service (Table 5.6). These range from fewer than 30 per cent
(28.1%) in the UK to 45 per cent (45.8%) in Germany. The UK also records the lowest
failure rate among the poor population at 35 per cent (35.2%) and in Hungary more than
half (51.1%) of poor people report difficulty in accessing at least one service. The failure
levels are higher among the poor population in each of the countries other than
Germany where the poor record a slightly (1 pp) lower failure rate than the non poor.
When the failure rate is examined relatively, there is almost no difference between the
poor and non poor in Germany and very small differences in the Netherlands and
Sweden (1.1). Ironically, the UK which records the lowest absolute failure rate among
the poor population records the greatest difference in failure rates between poor and
non poor (1.4).
Table 5.6 % Percentage failing one or more indicators of access to neighbourhood
services
Neighbourhood
services
Poor Not poor All Poor: Not poor
DE 44.9 45.9 45.8 1.0
HU 51.1 41.5 42.6 1.2
NL 38.7 34.7 35.1 1.1
PT 47.7 35.5 37.5 1.3
SE 41.1 37.6 38.0 1.1
UK 35.2 25.9 28.1 1.4
Source: Derived from Table F1A
More than 10 per cent of all people record difficulty in accessing two services (Germany
and Hungary) and these same countries also record that more than five per cent have
difficulty accessing three (Figure 5.4). More than 10 per cent of the poor report difficulty
in access two services in three countries: Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands and
more than five per cent of the poor have difficulty in access three services in the same
countries.
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Figure 5.4 Failure of 1-6 indicators of access to neighbourhood services
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5.7 Dissatisfaction
At a country level there is a very wide range in dissatisfaction rates (Table 5.7). The
Netherlands (3.2%) and Sweden (4.8%) record dissatisfaction levels of under five per
cent in the population as a whole, and the UK (6.3%) clearly under ten per cent.
Germany (16.8%) and Portugal (17.9%) record dissatisfaction levels under 20 per cent.
Hungary is an outlier where the dissatisfaction rate is almost 40 per cent (38.3%).
Absolute dissatisfaction levels among the poor are around ten per cent or under in the
Netherlands (7.1%), Sweden (9.6%) and the UK (10.2%). In Germany the
dissatisfaction rate among the poor is twice this level (21.8%) rising to one quarter
(25.9%) in Portugal. Again Hungary stands out with a dissatisfaction rate of one-half
(50.9%).
The pattern changes on the relative measure: the countries with the lowest overall
dissatisfaction rates and indeed lowest absolute dissatisfaction rates among the poor
(especially the Netherlands and Sweden, but also the UK) also have the widest gap
between poor and non poor (Table 5.7).
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Table 5.7 Dissatisfaction rates
Dissatisfaction Poor Not poor All Poor: Not poor
DE 21.8 16.0 16.8 1.3
HU 50.9 36.6 38.3 1.4
NL 7.1 2.7 3.2 2.6
PT 25.9 16.3 17.9 1.6
SE 9.6 4.2 4.8 2.3
UK 10.2 5.4 6.3 1.9
Source: Derived from Table GX1
82
Table 5.8 Summary of housing outcomes
(a) All
GDP per
capita (EU-
27=100)
Affordability
(40%)
Overcrowding
(objective)
Overcrowding
(subjective)
Physical
quality
Neighbourhood
quality
Neighbourhood
services
Dissatisfaction
DE 115.8 22.7 2.7 8.2 38.8 35.8 45.8 16.8
HU 62.6 7.3 44.2 15.5 50.3 27.4 42.6 38.3
NL 132.2 18.0 1.5 14.2 38.6 44.7 35.1 3.2
PT 75.6 7.5 13.5 21.4 74.3 40.9 37.5 17.9
SE 122.8 8.5 9.0 14.6 27.6 25.1 38.0 4.8
UK 116.7 16.6 4.3 5.8 40.4 42.0 28.1 6.3
(b) Poor
Affordability
(rise in
poverty)
Affordability
(40%)
Overcrowding
(objective)
Overcrowding
(subjective)
Physical
quality
Neighbourhood
quality
Neighbourhood
services
Dissatisfaction
DE 4.3 68.1 7.0 12.9 54.9 44.8 44.9 21.8
HU 3.8 31.7 62.6 22.6 62.5 30.6 51.1 50.9
NL 5.4 57.2 4.9 21.8 55.4 46.2 38.7 7.1
PT 3.0 24.0 16.5 27.3 83.2 38.6 47.7 25.9
SE 4.8 44.0 26.0 19.6 33.8 30.1 41.1 9.6
UK 4.2 45.2 8.7 19.6 48.0 43.0 35.2 10.2
(c) Poor: not poor
Affordability
(rise in
poverty)
Affordability
(40%)
Overcrowding
(objective)
Overcrowding
(subjective)
Physical
quality
Neighbourhood
quality
Neighbourhood
services
Dissatisfaction
DE - 4.3 3.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.0 1.3
HU - 8.1 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4
NL - 4.4 4.9 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.1 2.6
PT - 3.2 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.6
SE - 5.2 3.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 2.3
UK - 4.7 2.7 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.9
Source: Tables A5B, A5C, BX6, CX1, CX3, D2A, E1A, F1A, GX1
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5.8 Analysis
The country level outcomes are summarised in Table 5.8. This has three elements
which are considered in the following sections:
 absolute housing outcomes for the populations as a whole (Table 5.8a);
 absolute housing outcomes for the poor populations (Table 5.8b); and
 relative housing outcomes comparing those of the poor with the non poor (Table
5.8c).
The country level analysis has been organised to reflect the welfare regimes and the
distinctive features of the housing systems that are associated with them.
The transition and Mediterranean welfare regimes: Hungary and Portugal
The transition (Hungary) and Mediterranean (Portugal) regimes are characterised by
large ownership sectors and high levels of outright ownership, small social rented
sectors and a low reliance on housing allowances. It is also relevant that these two
countries have substantially lower per capita incomes than the other four (Table 5.8a).
Overall the countries from in the transition and Mediterranean regimes score well on
affordability: they have the lowest proportions of people with housing expenditure that
exceeds 40 per cent of their incomes. There does however appear to be a trade off
between affordability and housing quality: both countries register the highest
overcrowding rates (on both objective and subjective measures) and the greatest
propensity for people to experiencing at least one of five physical deficiencies with their
dwellings. While neighbourhood quality appears to be less of a problem compared to
other countries, they record the highest dissatisfaction rates, though Hungary’s
dissatisfaction rate is much higher than Portugal’s. Overall these countries score well on
affordability, badly on the physical housing conditions and poorly on overall satisfaction.
These trends are replicated among the population who live in poverty. The poor in
Hungary and Portugal are less likely than the poor in the other countries to have
housing costs that exceed more than 40 per cent of their incomes. Net housing costs
also contribute to a smaller percentage point increase in poverty in these countries than
in the others. This is achieved without significant housing allowances or social rented
housing. However, as with the population as a whole these countries exhibit the highest
overcrowding rates among the poor and the highest levels of reporting one or more
physical defects. These countries perform better on neighbourhood quality among the
poor, but again have the highest proportions of poor people reporting difficulties
accessing one or more neighbourhood services. Dissatisfaction rates are the highest
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among the poor in these countries, although the dissatisfaction level among the poor in
Hungary is twice that of Portugal.
The performance of these countries on the relative measure of housing outcomes
improves overall, very markedly so in Portugal. Portugal has the lowest or second
lowest difference on affordability and the indicators of physical quality (overcrowding
and physical quality); near equality is implied by the neighbourhood quality indicator, but
not on neighbourhood services. In contrast, despite Hungary scoring well on absolute
levels of affordability among the poor, in relative terms it scores very badly. It seems
that objective overcrowding is so widespread in Hungary that the relative difference
between poor and non poor is quite small. Other indicators are less remarkable but the
general pattern is for the country to perform better on relative indicators than on
absolute ones. The difference in dissatisfaction rates confirms this pattern. These
countries have the second and third lowest differentials in dissatisfaction rates between
poor and non poor, in contrast to the highest levels of absolute dissatisfaction among
the poor and the general population.
The liberal welfare regime: UK
The liberal regime (UK) has the highest level of poverty among any of the six countries
in this study. Its housing system is characterised by a high owner-occupation rate and
an outright ownership rate that is higher than among the other three non-Mediterranean/
transition countries. The UK has a large social rented sector, which is targeted on
poorer households, and an extensive reliance on housing allowances. So a high poverty
level combines with an active housing policy.
Housing outcomes among the population as a whole are summarised in Table 5.8a.
Among the population as a whole, a much higher proportion spend more than 40 per
cent of their income on net housing costs than in the Mediterranean/ transition
countries, but there are low levels of overcrowding on both objective and subjective
measures: the former is under five per cent and the latter is the lowest of any of the
countries. Far fewer people experience one or more physical defects with their housing
than in the Mediterranean/ transition countries, but the situation seems to be similar to
Germany and the Netherlands. The country records the lowest level of reported
neighbourhood service access problems and overall records low dissatisfaction rates.
The country performs notably poorly in comparison to others on neighbourhood quality.
The ‘failure’ rate on each of the indicators is higher among the poor population, but the
general pattern when compared to other countries is very similar to the population as a
whole (Table 5.8b). Of the non Mediterranean/ transition countries, the UK experiences
the smallest rise in poverty as a result of housing costs and of the four countries in this
group, with Sweden, records a substantially lower ‘failure rate’ on the affordability
indicator. So this suggests that the housing system limits the impact of housing costs on
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the poor. The general pattern of low overcrowding rates (on both objective and
subjective indicators) is maintained among the poor population, and while almost half of
the poor experience one or more physical defects with their housing, this is lower than
in all but one other country in the study. Compared to other countries the generally good
performance on access to neighbourhood services and satisfaction is maintained
among the poor population. Neighbourhood quality, while only slightly worse than
among the population as a whole, is still among the worst.
Across the indicators as a whole the differential between the poor and non poor is
among the lowest (Table 5.8c). The largest differentials are on affordability and
objective overcrowding; the smallest on physical and neighbourhood quality. However,
the relative indicator does need to be treated with caution: the differential between poor
and non poor in regard to access to neighbourhood services is greater than in any other
country, but on the absolute indicator the UK has the lowest recorded level of service
access problems among the poor. Conversely the comparatively low differential
between poor and non poor on neighbourhood quality reflects a generally low level of
neighbourhood quality.
The social democratic welfare regimes: Sweden and the Netherlands
The Netherlands is usually regarded as being a hybrid social democratic/ corporatist
regime, but here is examined with Sweden as a social democratic regime due to the
greater similarities of their housing systems. Both countries retain large social rented
sectors, although in the data we have not been able to identify Sweden’s municipal
housing sector separately from a wider ‘unitary’ rental sector. Both make extensive use
of housing allowances, but have lower levels of ownership and outright ownership
compared to the liberal, transition and Mediterranean countries.
Among the populations as a whole these countries produce some rather diverse results,
but the general picture is of high housing standards (Table 5.8a). Sweden almost
matches the transition/ Mediterranean countries on affordability, but the Netherlands
does not, despite a very large social rented sector and an extensive housing allowance
system. These two countries have the lowest level of failure on the physical quality
indicator, but while the Netherlands records very low (objective) overcrowding rates
(1.5%) Sweden records a rather high figure (9%). The neighbourhood quality and
services indicators also show rather mixed results. These countries record the lowest
dissatisfaction rates of any (both under 5%).
The ‘failure’ rate of poor people on each of the indicators is higher than among the
population as a whole, but the overall pattern compared to other countries is similar to
the population as a whole (Table 5.8b). Again this suggests that the housing standards
of the population as a whole have a strong influence on the housing standards of the
poor. However, these two countries do perform poorly on affordability. They record the
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greatest increases in poverty caused by housing expenditure and the Netherlands has a
notably high level of poor people with a housing expenditure burden exceeding 40 per
cent of net income (57.2%). Among the poor Sweden retains its poor performance on
objective overcrowding and good performance on physical quality; the Netherlands
retains its good performance on objective overcrowding and poor performance on
neighbourhood quality. The two countries have the lowest dissatisfaction rates among
the poor (as they do among the population as a whole).
On the relative measure, some importance differences emerge. Despite having the
lowest level of objective overcrowding and the lowest level of dissatisfaction among the
poor the Netherlands has the greatest differential between poor and non poor on both
indicators; while it records the highest level of neighbourhood quality problems among
the poor but the smallest differential between poor and non poor. Some of these
differences between absolute and relative positions of the poor also occur in Sweden,
though are less pronounced. For example Sweden records the second lowest absolute
level of dissatisfaction among the poor, but the second highest differential between poor
and non poor. Again this reflects some problems with the interpretation of the relative
measure.
The corporatist welfare regime: Germany
Germany is the archetypal corporatist welfare regime and has a distinctive housing
system. It has the least easily identifiable set of policy instruments or system features
that might be expected to weaken the link between income poverty and housing
outcomes: the social rented sector is now small, it does not have an extensive housing
allowance (although housing-specific assistance is also directed through the social
assistance system) and has a small owner occupied sector.
Overall, the country scores poorly on housing affordability (Table 5.8a). More than one-
fifth (22.7%) of people face net housing expenses in excess of 40 per cent of income,
which is the highest of any country. Overall Germany has low levels of overcrowding –
under five per cent (2.7%) on the objective measure and ten per cent (8.2%) on the
subjective measure and the failure rate on physical quality is similar to the Netherlands
and the UK. Problems with accessing neighbourhood services appear to be more
widespread than in any other country and dissatisfaction is notably higher than in the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.
Again ‘failure’ rates are consistently higher among poor households, but the order in
comparison to other countries does not change very much compared to the population
as a whole (Table 5.8b). The rise in failure of the 40 per cent affordability indicator is
worthy of some note. This is almost 70 per cent (68.1%) among the poor which is by far
the highest of any country. Given the structure of housing assistance, it is notable that
the rise in the poverty rate as a result of housing expenditure is 4.3 percentage points
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which is almost the same as in the UK (4.2 pp) and lower than in the Netherlands (5.4
pp). The 40 per cent indicator may therefore be somewhat misleading in the case of
Germany. On the other indicators the pattern among the poor reflects that of the
population as a whole: compared to the other countries, the performance on both
overcrowding measures is good, but the two neighbourhood-related indicators show a
relatively poorer performance. Dissatisfaction among the poor, as in the population as a
whole, is notably higher than among the other non-Mediterranean/ transition countries.
As in other countries, the relative measures are difficult to interpret (Table 5.8c). The
affordability indicator rises from being the worst to the second best while the country’s
quite high absolute dissatisfaction rate among the poor (21.8%) is the lowest in relation
to the non poor (1.3) in any of the countries (Table 5.8c). Conversely, a relatively low
absolute subjective overcrowding rate (12.9%) among the poor is the equal highest
when compared to the non poor (1.7). This reflects the tendency for low absolute
‘failure’ rates among the poor to translate into large arithmetic differentials when
compared to the non poor.
5.9 Conclusions
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of housing outcomes in six countries.
The principal aim has been to test whether housing policies and systems can disrupt the
link between income and housing outcomes. In particular we wished to establish
whether the income poor are also the housing poor.
In conducting the analysis we examined housing outcomes at a country level:
 Housing outcomes across the entire range of indicators are consistently worse
for poor people than for the population as a whole. This does not mean by any
means that the poor population will necessarily fail any indicator, or that no non
poor person will fail any indicator. It does mean that poor people are
systematically more likely to fail an indicator than are people who do not live in
poverty.
 Housing outcomes of the poor reflect the housing outcomes among the general
population. If housing outcomes are generally good, then absolutely the housing
outcomes of the poor will also be good. Conversely if housing outcomes are
generally poor, then the housing outcomes of the poor will also be worse than in
other countries.
 There is no systematic relationship between the housing outcomes of the poor
and the level of poverty in a country. The UK has relatively good housing
outcomes across the range of indicators among the poor, but high levels of
poverty; Hungary has relatively poor housing outcomes, but low levels of poverty.
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 Relative measures of housing outcomes suggest that the situation of the poor
compared to the non poor is often smallest when housing outcomes are generally
poor (among both the poor population and the population as a whole).
Conversely, they are often widest when housing outcomes are generally good
(among both the poor population and the population as a whole). Thus Portugal
has some of the worst housing outcomes for the poor, but some of the lowest
differential between poor and non poor, while the converse is true in the
Netherlands.
 The transition and Mediterranean countries that are characterised by large
outright ownership sectors perform very well on affordability both among the
general population as a whole and among the poor population, but poorly on
overcrowding and the physical quality of dwellings. This suggests that at a
country level there is a trade-off between housing affordability and housing
quality and indicates the limits of home-ownership as a counter-poverty policy.
 The range of policies (social rented housing and housing allowances) combined
with a significant outright ownership sector appear to limit the impact of very high
levels of poverty in the UK, the liberal regime. Affordability compares favourably
to the non-transition/ Mediterranean countries and generally well on physical
quality and overcrowding and satisfaction. But there does appear to be a general
problem with neighbourhood quality. The relative indicators generally show some
of the smallest gaps between the poor and non poor.
 The social democratic countries (the Netherlands and Sweden) across the range
of indicators produce high standards of housing outcomes, but the absolute
position of the poor appears to be less favourable in the Netherlands than in
Sweden, although it is notable that dissatisfaction levels are the lowest in these
countries both generally and among the poor. These countries record some of
the widest differentials between poor and non poor, although this does reflect
some of the problems with relative measurements when standards are generally
high.
 Despite the relative lack of identifiable interventions the corporatist country
(Germany) housing standards are generally similar to other non Mediterranean/
transition countries. The poor performance on the ratio affordability measure may
be attributable to the structure of housing assistance and this is supported by the
scale of poverty when measured after net housing costs.
The role of individual housing policies and features of housing systems are examined in
the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: The Impact of Housing Policy Instruments on Housing
Outcomes for the Poor
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 5 we examined the impact of poverty on housing outcomes at a country
level. In this Chapter we examine whether there is evidence that particular policy
instruments or features of housing systems have an impact on the housing outcomes of
the poor. The three policy instruments/ system features that were identified as
potentially weakening the link between income poverty and poor housing outcomes
were identified in Chapter 4 as:
 social rented and other below market rental (BMR) housing;
 outright home-ownership; and
 housing allowances (in relation to affordability only).
We employ a range of indicators that capture range of ‘housing outcomes’, which are
detailed in Chapter 3:
 Affordability (net and gross)
 Overcrowding (objective and subjective)
 Physical quality of housing
 Neighbourhood quality
 Neighbourhood services
 Dissatisfaction
The relationship between each housing outcome and social rented and other BMR
housing; and outright ownership is examined in turn. The housing outcomes of all
people living in these tenures are reported in relation to other tenures. A check to see
whether particular patterns are attributable to the household composition of the tenure is
then made. We then examine the housing outcomes of the poor within the tenure in
relation to the poor in other tenures. This allows us to take account of the influence that
the income composition of people living in a particular tenure might have on outcomes
independently of the tenure itself. A further check is made against household
composition, although this is often limited by inadequate sample sizes. The role of
housing allowances is confined to the examination of affordability.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we identify where the poor live with
particular regard to the ‘reach’ of the three policies/ system features that might be
expected to weaken the link between income poverty and poor housing outcomes. In
Section 6.3-6.8 we examine each housing outcome in turn. We then draw the findings
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together to make an assessment of the role of individual policies/ system features in
Section 6.9. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.10.
6.2. The Poor and the Housing system
In this section we identify the extent to which individuals living in income poor
households might benefit from the three policies/ system features that we have
identified.
Social and other below market rental housing
There are two countries where we can establish unambiguously what is predominantly
social rented housing and other rent controlled housing: the Netherlands and the UK.
These countries contain among the largest social rented sectors among our countries;
unfortunately it is not possible to identify the sector separately in Sweden and Germany.
This is especially important in Sweden where the municipal housing sector is still
significant (about one-fifth of housing), but less important in Germany where the ‘social’
sector has shrunk considerably to about five per cent of the stock. However, in Sweden
the ‘unitary’ element of the rental sector is emphasised in the way that mainstream
municipal housing is identified as ‘market rental’ housing in EU-SILC.
Some 27.7 per cent of individuals are housed in this sector in the Netherlands and 17.7
per cent in the UK. Moreover, more than 40 per cent (42.7%) of people living in poverty
in the UK and more than half (55.6%) of those in the Netherlands live in the sector
(Table AP2B). The size of the sectors identified as BMR in the other four countries is
always under 10 per cent, being largest in Portugal (7.6%), and smallest in Sweden
(2%) (Table A2B).
Outright home-ownership
Outright home-ownership is a very important sub-tenure in three of the countries. It
plays an important role in some transition countries where large-scale privatisation has
taken place, and this is the case in Hungary where it houses almost three-quarters of
people and 70 per cent of the poor (Table AP2B). Outright ownership is also a feature of
southern European welfare regimes, including Portugal where half the population live in
outright ownership and slightly more than half of the poor are housed in this way. It is
also significant in the UK, a liberal welfare regime where just over one-quarter of both
the general population and the poor live in the sector. The relatively high level of
outright ownership in the UK can be attributed to the relatively mature ownership sector
and the impact of discounted sales of social housing to tenants. In the five countries
where we are able to identify outright owners the sector is greatest among pensioners.
Unfortunately, outright owners are not identified separately from mortgaged owners in
Germany in EU-SILC.
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Housing allowances
Housing allowances are received by between 2.7 per cent (Germany) and 11.8 per cent
(UK) of people in the six countries, although the figure in Germany excludes housing-
related transfers paid through the social assistance system, and it is therefore difficult to
assess their importance (Table B3). They are most widespread in the northern
European countries in both social democratic (Sweden and the Netherlands) and liberal
(UK) welfare regimes, where more than 10 per cent of people live in households that
benefit from housing allowances. They are a less far-reaching policy instrument in the
southern and transition regimes of Hungary (8%) and Portugal (6.5%).
Housing allowances are also an instrument that is almost always targeted on poor
households. Between 40 and 45 per cent of the poor live in households in receipt of
housing allowances in Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK (Table BP3). Even in
Hungary, where only a small proportion of all households receive housing allowances, a
quarter of poor people benefit from them. Portugal is the exception as a smaller
proportion of poor people live in households receiving housing allowances (2.2%) than
the population as a whole (6.5%).
6.3 Affordability
In this section we examine affordability according to two concepts:
 Residual income approach: we examine the impact that gross and net housing
costs have on the level of poverty.
 Housing cost burden: we examine the proportion of individuals living in
households whose housing expenditure exceeds a threshold of 40 per cent of net
income.
The impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates
Table 6.1 details the impacts of housing costs on poverty rates in the six countries. In
the table poverty rates are presented in three stages:
 before housing costs;
 after gross housing costs; and
 after net housing costs.
The purpose of identifying poverty rates after gross housing costs separately from net
housing costs is so that the impact of housing allowances can be identified separately
from any effects arising from the different tenures. This is different from the other
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indicators as the findings cannot be presented in terms of a standard which is not met
by varying proportions of poor and non poor people.
Table 6.1 The impact of housing expenditure on poverty rates
MR BMR OO Ave. ORO MO
DE BHC 20.6 24.5 7.8 14.0 - -
AGHC 23.5 24.9 14.2 18.4 - -
ANHC 23.2 24.4 14.1 18.3
HU BHC 19.7 23.7 11.2 12.2 11.6 9.2
AGHC 20.9 25.1 15.6 16.3 15.4 16.4
ANHC 20.5 23.8 15.3 16.0 15.1 15.9
NL BHC 34.1 23.1 4.8 11.5 15.6 3.3
AGHC 58.9 34.6 8.3 18.4 12.8 7.7
ANHC 58.9 29.8 8.1 16.9 10.8 7.8
PT BHC 26.5 27.4 14.1 17.2 18.1 6.0
AGHC 36.9 28.2 16.8 20.1 19 12.2
ANHC 37.1 28.2 16.8 20.2 19.2 11.8
SE BHC 24.5 25.5 5.9 11.6 11.1 4.4
AGHC 41.3 39.2 7.0 17.5 12.7 5.4
ANHC 38.5 37.6 6.6 16.4 12.1 5.1
UK BHC 30.1 47.6 11.7 19.7 20.7 6.7
AGHC 43 58.8 14.8 25.0 19.8 12
ANHC 41 51.1 15.3 23.9 20.3 12.5
MR = market rental; BMR = below market rental; OO = owner occupied; Ave = average; ORO = outright owner; MO =
mortgaged owner
BHC = before housing costs; AGHC = after gross housing costs; ANHC = after net housing costs
Source: Derived from Tables A4A, A4B and A4C
Social rented and other below market rental housing
The role of social rented housing can be identified in the data for the Netherlands and
the UK. To examine its role in poverty we can examine poverty before and after gross
housing costs in order to separate the tenure affect from the impact of housing
allowances.
The poverty rate having taken into account gross housing costs rises substantially (by
more than 10 percentage points) among people living in the sector in both these
countries, substantially more than the general rise in poverty caused by gross housing
costs (Table 6.1). This holds across every household type in the UK although the rise is
smaller (2.7 pp) among Dutch social renters than the average (4.0 pp) and virtually the
same among lone parents (about 18 pp) (Tables A5A, A5B).
It is notable however that the general rise in poverty is greater still among Dutch market
renters (a rise of 24.8 percentage points), suggesting that social and other below market
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rental housing limits the impact of housing costs. This holds across every household
type (Tables A5A and A5B). The difference is notably more muted in the UK, although
the rise among social renters (11.2 pp) is still greater among market renters (12.9 pp)
(although the pattern is reversed among pensioners and the rise is almost the same
among singles).
In the other four countries the sectors identified as ‘below market rent’ in the data show
some different patterns. The poverty rate after gross housing costs rises by more than
10 per cent in the Swedish BMR sector (but it should be noted that this excludes the
mainstream municipal rented sector). In contrast very small rises (of between 0.4 and
1.4 pp) are shown in the German, Portuguese and Hungarian BMR sectors. The rise in
Hungary is actually greater than in the market rental sector, but in Portugal it is smaller.
Outright home ownership
As we might expect, in each of these five countries, outright owners experience better
than average impacts on poverty rates as a result of gross housing costs. Indeed in two
of the five countries (the Netherlands (-2.8 pp) and the UK (-0.9 pp)) the poverty rate
among outright owners actually falls after taking into account gross housing expenditure
(Table 5.1). The poverty rate rises most in Hungary (3.8 pp) and is also quite close to
the overall increase in poverty (4.1 pp); this may be attributed to the prevalence of the
tenure among non-poor households as well as among the poor. The increase in poverty
arising from gross housing costs is lower than average among outright owners in every
household type category in the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands; and also the case in
every household type category in Portugal other than singles (where the rates are
similar) (Tables A5A and A5B). Pensioner poverty falls in Sweden, Portugal and the
Netherlands on this basis and it falls among couples and couples with children in the
UK. Only in Hungary is the picture mixed at the household level, but the increase in
outright owner poverty is always similar to the average.
Housing allowances
We assess the impact of housing allowances on poverty rates by comparing poverty
rates after gross housing costs (AGHC) with poverty rates after net housing costs
(ANHC). Housing allowances have the effect of limiting the impact of housing
expenditure on general poverty rates in each of the six countries with the exception of
Portugal, where there is a very small (0.2 pp) increase in poverty when we compare
poverty rates after net housing costs with the poverty rate after gross housing costs. In
the other countries, housing allowances overall contribute to a small overall reduction in
poverty rates of between 0.1 percentage points (in Germany, where not all housing-
related assistance is measured by housing allowances) and 1.5 pp in the Netherlands.
These reductions are not sufficient to counteract the rise in poverty after gross housing
costs.
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The small reduction in poverty rates arising from housing allowances holds across
household types in the four of the five countries where such falls are registered with the
sole exception of couples with children in the Netherlands among whom the poverty rate
remains unchanged (Tables A5B and A5C). Of note are the larger reduction in poverty
rates among lone parents in the Netherlands (-7.5 pp) and Sweden (-6.5 pp). In
Germany the impacts at the level of every household type are very small. In Portugal
small increases in poverty are registered among every household type other than
couples with children.
In the social and other below market sector in the Netherlands and the UK the impact of
the housing allowance is much greater than in other tenures. The poverty rate after net
housing costs in this sector is almost five (4.8) percentage points lower than after gross
costs in the Dutch sector and nearly eight (7.7) percentage points lower in the UK
sector. The pattern holds at the level of the household type, with a 14 (13.6) percentage
point fall among UK pensioners in the social rented sector, and a 15 (14.8) percentage
point fall among Dutch lone parents in this sector (Tables A5B and A5C). Particularly in
the UK this implies that it is the combination of social rented housing and the housing
allowance that has an impact on affordability.
The burden of housing expenditure: the ratio approach
Social rented and other below market rental housing
To examine the effects of social rented housing on affordability we examine the
proportions of individuals whose gross housing expenditure exceeds the threshold of 40
per cent. This allows us to examine the role of the tenure separately from the housing
allowance.
As noted above, what is predominantly social rented housing can be identified clearly in
the data in the Netherlands and the UK and we examine the impact of this tenure in
these countries separately, and then proceed to examine the ‘below market rent’ sector
in the other countries.
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Figure 6.1 Percentage with gross housing costs > 40% income
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Source: Tables B5, BP5
We would expect to see higher levels of affordability in the social rented sector,
although we should also note that the ratio indicator is especially vulnerable to an
income effect: since the sector houses disproportionate numbers of people with lower
incomes lower rents may nonetheless result in a higher proportions of income being
taken in housing expenditure compared to tenures housing a higher proportion of higher
income groups.
Certainly a higher proportion of social renters as a whole fail the 40 per cent affordability
indicator in both the Netherlands and the UK, although the differential is much wider in
the UK (Figure 6.1). In the UK the failure rate is higher among social tenants than in any
other tenure, but in the Netherlands the failure rate is very substantially higher in the
market rental sector. This may be attributable to the high rental threshold at which rents
become decontrolled in the Netherlands. The higher than average failure rate among
social tenants might in part be explained by differences in household composition in the
tenure compared to other tenures. For example both Dutch and UK social rented
sectors house half of all lone parents (Table A2). Nonetheless the above average failure
rate among social tenants in the UK applies across all household types and in the
Netherlands across all apart from lone parents and ‘others’ (Table B5).
The impact of different income profiles in the different tenures on this indicator can be
much reduced by examining the poor population separately (Figure 6.1). This indicates
an above average failure of the 40 per cent affordability threshold in both countries, but
the difference in the Netherlands is small. In the UK this holds across all household
types, but in the Netherlands this does not always seem to be the case although sample
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sizes are often under 50 (Table BP5). This said it should be noted that the failure rate
on this indicator is 75 per cent among poor Dutch social renters and 85 per cent among
their British counterparts. Among the poor population, the failure rate in both countries is
lower than in the market rental sector, which might be regarded as a suitable
benchmark against which to compare the social rented sector. This appears to hold
between household types, although sample sizes in the market rental sector are all
below 50 (Table BP5).
In the other four countries ‘below market rental’ (BMR) housing produces some mixed
results. The proportion of BMR tenants with gross housing costs over 40 per cent of
income is below average in Hungary and Portugal and above average in Germany and
Sweden (where, it should be remembered, the mainstream municipal housing sector is
classified in the data as ‘market’ rental) (Table B5). There are some differences
between household types in Germany, but not in Hungary, while analysis at this level is
hindered by small sample sizes in Sweden and Portugal. When the poor are examined
separately the failure rate in the BMR sector remains the lowest of any tenure in
Hungary and below average in Portugal (where it is much lower than in the market
rental sector) (Table BP5). In Sweden, where the sample size is below 50, the failure
rate among poor BMR tenants is just below the average. Analysis between household
types is not possible due to inadequate sample sizes.
Outright ownership
To capture the impact of outright ownership on affordability, we again examine
affordability on the basis of gross housing costs, so that we can separate the tenure
effect from the impact of housing allowances. It should be noted that the data does not
identify outright owners separately in Germany.
In each of the five countries with data the proportion of outright owners facing gross
housing costs in excess of 40 per cent of their income is lower than the average, usually
substantially so (Figure 6.2). For example, in the Netherlands only 2.4 per cent of
outright owners pay more than 40 per cent of their net incomes in housing costs,
compared to an average of one-fifth (21.1%), almost a third (31.5%) of social renters
and more than 70 per cent of market renters (Table B5). The exception is Hungary
where the tenure is large the difference is negligible. In four of the five countries, a
smaller proportion of outright owners face gross housing costs in excess of 40 per cent
of income than any other tenure or sub-tenure. In Hungary the difference is marginal.
The pattern generally holds between household types.
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Figure 6.2 Percentage with gross housing costs > 40% income
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Source: Tables B5, BP5
The pattern remains clear when people living in poverty are examined separately and
therefore the compositional effects arising from income distributions between tenures is
reduced. In four of the five countries the proportion of poor outright owners facing gross
housing costs in excess of 40 per cent of income is substantially lower than their
counterparts in any other tenure. For example, in Portugal about 15 per cent (16.8%) of
poor outright owners have gross housing costs above the 40 per cent threshold,
compared to half (50.6%) of poor mortgaged owners and a quarter (24.6%) of all
tenures. In the Netherlands some 15 per cent (14.8%) of poor outright owners exceed
the 40 per cent threshold, compared to 70 per cent (71%) of the whole population in
poverty and two-thirds (66.5%) of mortgaged owners. This pattern is replicated in the
UK and Sweden (where it is less pronounced though still substantial). Only in Hungary
is the position of poor outright owners less clear: the proportions are almost identical to
all people living in poverty and five percentage points lower than among poor
mortgaged owners. This reflects the arithmetic consequence of the preponderance of
outright ownership in Hungary (75% of people live in outright ownership). Analysis
between household types is limited by small sample sizes, but where they are sufficient
these patterns remain consistent (Table BP5).
Housing allowances
The impact of housing allowances on affordability is demonstrated by comparing the
proportions whose net housing expenditure exceeds 40 per cent of income with the
proportions whose gross housing expenditure exceeds this threshold (Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2 Percentage with net housing costs >40% income
ALL MR BMR OO Ave. ORO MO
DE 40% GHC 26.4 27.1 21.2 23.1 - -
40% NHC 25.5 26.2 21.1 22.7 - -
Change -0.9 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 - -
HU 40% GHC 9.8 4.4 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.2
40% NHC 9.7 4.3 7.2 7.3 7.2 6.9
Change -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3
NL 40% GHC 72.3 31.5 13 21.1 2.4 14.6
40% NHC 71.7 20.7 13 18 2.4 14.5
Change -0.6 -10.8 0 -3.1 0 -0.1
PT 40% GHC 25.3 5.2 6.6 7.9 4.9 10.1
40% NHC 24.4 4.4 6.3 7.5 4.9 9
Change -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.4 0 -1.1
SE 40% GHC 30.5 26.7 2.5 12.1 4.2 2
40% NHC 21.2 17.5 1.9 8.5 3.3 1.6
Change -9.3 -9.2 -0.6 -3.6 -0.9 -0.4
UK 40% GHC 50.5 52.6 11.9 22 7.6 14.3
40% NHC 41.7 25.3 11.9 16.6 7.6 14.3
Change -8.8 -27.3 0 -5.4 0 0
GHC= gross housing costs; NHC = net housing costs
MR = market rental; BMR = below market rental; OO = owner occupied; Ave. = average; ORO = outright
owner; MO = mortgaged owner
Source: Tables B5, B6
In all of the countries the proportion of people in households whose housing costs
exceed 40 per cent of their incomes is reduced by housing allowances, but overall these
reductions are small. In Germany, Hungary and Portugal the reduction is less than one
percentage point, and this applies across all tenures. The reduction in the Netherlands
(3.1 pp), Sweden (3.6 pp) and the UK (5.4 pp) is larger. There is a distinct tenure
pattern to these impacts. In the Swedish rental sector the proportion exceeding the
threshold is reduced by around 9 pp (9.3 pp), similar to the reduction the Dutch social
rented sector (10.8 pp). There is an 8.8 pp reduction in the UK market rental sector, but
the largest reduction in any of the tenures in the countries is in the UK social rented
sector. The proportion of UK social tenants where housing costs exceed 40 per cent of
income is reduced from more than half (52.6%) to a quarter (25.3%). Reductions are
also seen using the 30 per cent threshold: a 10 pp (9.4 pp) reduction among Swedish
tenants and a 25 pp (24.8 pp) reduction among UK social tenants.
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Figure 6.3 Impact of housing allowances on affordability
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The potential for housing allowances to reduce the cost burden of poor households is
demonstrated when they are analysed separately in the three countries where they play
a major role. There is more than a 20 pp reduction in the proportions of individuals in
poor households with a housing cost burden in excess of 40 per cent in Sweden and the
UK, and a 14 pp (13.8 pp) reduction in the Netherlands. The reduction among UK social
tenants is almost 45 pp (44.9 pp), and among poor Swedish tenants 29 pp.
The evidence suggests a clear impact of housing allowances on affordability in
countries where they are a significant policy instrument. It is notable in the case of UK
and Dutch social tenants that the impact of housing allowances is much stronger than
among market renters, suggesting that the instruments together have a strong impact.
6.4 Overcrowding
Objective overcrowding
Social rented and other below market rental housing
We can best identify the effect of social rented housing in the Netherlands and the UK.
The ‘objective’ overcrowding rate is around 2.5 times as high as the average in both
countries. In the Netherlands the market rental sector’s overcrowding rate is the same
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as the average; in the UK the market rented sector’s overcrowding rate is only
marginally worse than in the social rented sector (Table C1).
Household composition does not seem to provide an obvious explanation for the
generally higher than average overcrowding rates in social rented housing. The
overcrowding rate is higher than average in the social rented sector in every household
category in both countries with the sole exception of childless couples in the UK. The
pattern is more various when the social rented sector is compared to the market rented
sector. In the Netherlands singles and couples with children have strikingly higher rates
of objective overcrowding in the social rented sector compared to the market rented
sector; while the overcrowding rates among childless couples and lone parents are
higher in the market rental sector. In the UK lone parents and couples with children
have higher overcrowding rates in the social rented sector than their counterparts in the
market rental sector, but singles and childless couples have higher overcrowding rates
in the market rental sector.
Figure 6.4 objective overcrowding rates
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If we examine poor households separately (Table CP1; Figure 6.4), the differential
between the overcrowding rate in the social rented sector and the average shrinks from
2.5 (in both countries) to 1.5 in the Netherlands and to 1.3 in the UK, suggesting that the
propensity of the sector to house an above average proportion of poor households
explains some of the higher than average overcrowding rate. Nonetheless the
overcrowding rate is still much higher among poor social renters in the Netherlands than
among the poor in any other tenure; and in the UK the overcrowding rate among the
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poor is only marginally lower in the social rented sector than among the poor market
renters. A further breakdown by household type is not possible due to sample sizes.
As a whole the below market rental (BMR) sector records above average overcrowding
rates in each of the other four countries. This is consistent across all household types
where sample sizes are 50 or larger in all countries (Table C1); it also has the highest
overcrowding rate of any tenure including market renting in each of these countries.
Among poor households only BMR housing records higher than average ‘objective’
overcrowding rates in all countries (apart from Sweden where the sample size in BMR is
inadequate) (Table CP1). It does have lower ‘objective’ overcrowding rates than market
rental housing in two of the countries, however (Germany and Portugal); and in two of
the other countries the sample size is below 50 (Hungary and Sweden).
Outright ownership
The ‘objective’ overcrowding rate among outright owners is lower than average in each
of the five countries where the tenure can be identified (Figure 6.5). The difference is
small in Hungary and Portugal where the tenure is largest, but quite large in the
Netherlands, but where general overcrowding is very low. Objective overcrowding
among outright owners is lower than in the rental tenures in each of the five countries
and lower than among mortgaged owners in two (the Netherlands and the UK) (Table
C1).
Figure 6.5 Objective overcrowding
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The household composition of individual tenures might be expected to exert a strong
effect to the extent that outright ownership is higher among pensioner households than
among any other household type in each of the five countries and pensioner
overcrowding is lowest of any household type in three of these countries. However,
there is a remarkable tendency for objective overcrowding among outright owners to be
below average at the level of the household type. In almost every household type in
every country outright owners have objective overcrowding rates below those of the
same household types in the population as a whole (Table C1). Where sample sizes
allow comparison, the overwhelming pattern is for objective overcrowding among
household types in outright ownership to be lower than their equivalents in the rental
tenures. Only mortgaged owners, who are generally better off, show a general tendency
to have lower overcrowding rates when household types are compared, but there are
exceptions. In four of the five household types in the UK where sample sizes exceed 50
the overcrowding rate is lower among outright owners than mortgaged owners (Table
C1).
When poor outright owners are examined separately, they exhibit lower objective
overcrowding than the poor population as a whole in each of the five countries (Figure
5.6; Table CP1). They also have lower overcrowding rates than their counterparts in any
of the other tenures in each of the countries with the sole exception of mortgaged
owners in Hungary. The examination of overcrowding across tenures among the poor
population is constrained by sample sizes, but there is a pattern of generally lower
overcrowding rates among poor outright owners regardless of household type.
Subjective overcrowding
Social rented and other below market rental housing
Social rented housing can be identified in the Netherlands and the UK, where the
‘subjective’ overcrowding rate is higher than the average (Figure 6.6). The ‘subjective’
overcrowding rate in both countries is also higher in the social rented sector than in the
market rental sector.
As with the ‘objective’ measure differences in household composition within tenures do
not provide a ready explanation for the higher than average rate of ‘subjective’
overcrowding in the social rented sector: on the ‘subjective’ measure this persists
across all household types (Table C3). In the Netherlands the social rented sector
records lower levels of ‘subjective’ overcrowding than among market renters amongst
single people and the same level among pensioners; in the UK there is a very slightly
lower rate among single social renters compared to single private renters.
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Figure 6.6 Subjective overcrowding rates
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Tables C3 and CP3
If we examine poor households separately (Table CP3; Figure 6.6), the differential
between the overcrowding rate in the social rented sector and the average almost
disappears in the Netherlands and shrinks from 2.0 to 1.6 in the UK. This implies that
the tendency for the social rented sector to house higher proportions of poor
households explains much of the higher than average ‘subjective’ overcrowding rate.
However, as a policy instrument intended to improve housing conditions we might hope
for lower overcrowding rates in the sector: it records a lower rate of ‘subjective’
overcrowding among poor social renters than poor market renters in the Netherlands,
but not in the UK (Figure 5.7). A further breakdown among different types of poor
households is not possible due to sample sizes.
As is the case with the ‘objective’ measure, the ‘below market rent’ (BMR) sector in
each of the four other countries as a whole records above average overcrowding rates.
This pattern holds across all household types where sample sizes are 50 or larger in all
countries (sample sizes in Sweden are too small) (Table C3). It also has the highest
‘subjective’ overcrowding rate of any tenure in all countries other than Sweden (where
the mainstream municipal housing sector is recorded as ‘market rental’ housing in EU-
SILC). Among poor households only BMR housing records higher than average
‘subjective’ overcrowding rates in all countries (apart from Sweden where the sample
size in the BMR is too small) (Table CP3). It does have lower ‘subjective’ overcrowding
rates among the poor than market rental housing in one country, however (Portugal);
and in two of the other countries the sample size is below 50 (Hungary and Sweden).
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Outright ownership
As with the ‘objective measure the ‘subjective’ overcrowding rate among outright
owners is lower than average in each of the five countries where the tenure can be
identified (Figure 6.7). The difference between the average and outright owners is more
narrowly dispersed on the ‘subjective’ measure being only 2.5 pp in Hungary (where
outright ownership is the dominant tenure type). Moreover, the subjective overcrowding
rate is the lowest of any tenure in each of the five countries (Table C3).
Figure 6.7 Subjective overcrowding
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There is a tendency for subjective overcrowding among outright owners to be below
average at the level of the household type. With the sole exception of members of
‘other’ households in the Netherlands, outright owners have below average ‘subjective’
overcrowding rates compared with equivalent household types in every category in
each of the five countries with data (Table C3).
Where sample sizes allow comparison, the overwhelming pattern is for ‘subjective’
overcrowding among household types in outright ownership to be lower than their
equivalents in the rental tenures. When members of particular household types are
compared, there is a mixed pattern of ‘subjective’ overcrowding rates between outright
owners and mortgaged owners. In Sweden the rate of subjective overcrowding is
consistently lower among mortgaged owners; in the UK among outright owners; and in
the other countries it is mixed (Table C3).
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When poor outright owners are examined separately, they exhibit lower ‘subjective’
overcrowding than the poor population as a whole in four of the five countries (Figure
6.7; Table CP3). The exception is the Netherlands where the subjective overcrowding
rate is higher among poor outright owners than the poor as a whole. The subjective
overcrowding rate is generally lower among poor outright owners than among the poor
in other tenures, with the exceptions of mortgaged owners in Hungary and the
Netherlands, and social renters in the Netherlands. The only country where a direct
comparison can be made between the poor in two separate tenures is in the UK where
in all three of the household types where there are more than 50 cases, overcrowding
among poor outright owners is lower than among poor social renters.
6.5 Physical Quality of Housing
Social rented and other below market rental housing
Social rented housing can be identified most clearly in the Netherlands and the UK. In
each of these countries, the failure rate (of one or more indicators of physical quality) is
higher among social tenants than among the population as a whole and indeed higher
than in any other tenure (Table D2B). Both countries have an overall failure rate of
around 40 per cent, but more than half (52.1%) of Dutch social tenants and six in ten
(62.2%) of UK social tenants live in dwellings that fail at least one indicator of physical
quality. The failure rate in the Dutch market rental sector (48.4%) is slightly below that of
the social rented sector, while the failure rate in the UK market rental sector (also
48.4%) is some 14 pp below that in the social rented sector. The failure rate in social
rented housing is the worst compared to any other tenure in both countries (Table D2B).
In the UK this pattern holds in every household type; in the Netherlands (where the
overall failure rate between market and social renting is smaller) the social rented sector
records a lower failure rate among couples, lone parents and pensioners. The failure
rate among poor social tenants is higher than among social tenants as a whole in both
countries (Figure 6.8); in the case of the Netherlands the rise is quite large – almost ten
pp (9.3 pp). This may be indicative of some polarisation within the Dutch social rented
sector.
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Figure 6.8 Percentage failing one or more indicators of physical quality (renters)
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Nonetheless the difference in the failure rate between social tenants and the population
as a whole shrinks when we restrict the comparison to poor social tenants and the poor
population as a whole. But it remains higher than in any other tenure: and this holds in
the UK (where the sample size is sufficient) across households types.
The tendency for higher failure rates among residents of below market rental sector in
comparison the population is found in each of the other four countries (Table D2B). The
failure rate is also higher than among market rental housing in all countries other than
Sweden (where the mainstream municipal sector is identified as ‘market’ housing).
There are some exceptions at the household level (compared to market renting), but the
differences are often small. When the analysis is restricted to poor households, we find
failure rates are higher among BMR tenants than in the population as a whole in all
countries other than Sweden where the BMR sample size is below 50. The failure rate
is higher among the poor in the BMR compared to market renters in Germany (but by
only 1 pp) and Portugal, but not in Hungary and Sweden where sample sizes in one of
the tenures is under 50. There are too few cases to make a comparison of different
household types between tenures.
Outright ownership
Outright ownership might be expected to deliver relatively cheap housing, but its
physical condition among poor owners might be expected to be neglected in relation to
the rental tenures.
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However, in four of the five countries where data are available, the failure rate is lower
among outright owners compared to the population as a whole (Figure 6.9). In Hungary
and Portugal where the tenure is the largest the difference is small; in Sweden and in
the UK it is rather larger (8.2 and 11.1 respectively). In the Netherlands the failure rate
among outright owners is 2.1 pp above the average, but between tenures is second
lowest (after mortgaged ownership). While lower than the average, the failure rate
among outright owners is also second after mortgaged owners in Hungary and Portugal.
Outright owners have the lowest failure rate of any tenure Sweden and the UK. Much
the same pattern remains intact when different household types are compared (Table
D2B).
Figure 6.9 Failure rate: one or more indicators of physical quality (outright owners)
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The pattern is generally the same when the analysis is limited to the poor population
(Figure 6.9; Table DP2B), but there are some striking features. In Sweden and the UK
the failure rate among poor outright owners is not only lower than the whole population
of poor people, but lower than the average for the whole population (including the non-
poor) (Figure 6.9). In Portugal and Hungary the failure rate among poor outright owners
is lower than among the poor population as a whole, but higher than among mortgaged
owners (Table DP2B). In the Netherlands the failure rate among poor outright owners is
almost exactly the same as the average for the poor population, but it is higher than
among mortgaged owners and market renters (Table DP2B). Analysis at household
level is hindered by small sample sizes.
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6.6 Neighbourhood Quality
Social rented and other below market rental housing
The social rented sector can be most clearly identified in the Netherlands and the UK.
Social rented housing might be expected to be associated with higher levels of
neighbourhood problems due to concentrations of poverty. The EU-SILC data suggest
that most social renters in the Netherlands and the UK do experience at least one of the
problems described in the three indicators of neighbourhood quality and these levels
are higher than the average and amongst all other tenures (Table E1A). In three of the
six household types this tendency is reversed in the Netherlands: among pensioners,
lone parents and couples there is a higher failure rate among market renters (Table
E1B); in the UK lone parents in the market rental sector also experience higher failure
rates on the neighbourhood indicator than among their counterparts in the social rented
sector. When poor households are analysed separately the pattern remains: a higher
proportion of poor social renters fail one or more of the neighbourhood indicators than
their counterparts in any other tenure (Figure 6.10). It is of note, however, that the
failure rate among poor social tenants in the UK is slightly lower than among social
tenants as a whole.
Figure 6.10 Failure rate: one or more indicators of neighbourhood quality (renters)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
NL UK
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Market rental (all)
Social rental (all)
All
Market rental (poor)
Social rental (poor)
All poor
Source: Tables E1B, EP1B
In each of the other four countries the proportions of failure on one or more
neighbourhood quality indicators is higher among BMR tenants than among the
population as a whole; and it is higher than in all other tenures in all countries other than
in Sweden where the market rented sector performs worse (Table E1B). However, it is
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difficult to interpret this data, especially in Sweden where the mainstream municipal
housing is recorded as being part of the market rental sector. Sweden aside this pattern
is fairly consistent at the household level; and entirely consistent when poor households
are examined separately (Table EP1B).
Outright ownership
It is not obvious why outright ownership in itself should be connected with
neighbourhood quality, but the evidence is considered briefly (Figure 6.11). Outright
owners record a lower propensity to fail one or more of the indicators of neighbourhood
quality than the average or indeed any other tenure in the five countries with data (Table
E1B). This may be in part driven by the tendency for pensioners to be overrepresented
in the tenure and as a group they record the lowest levels of neighbourhood problems in
all of these countries other than Hungary. The failure rate among poor outright owners
is actually lower than among outright owners as a whole in the Netherlands, Portugal
and the UK (Figure 6.11). Remarkably the failure rate is lower among poor outright
owners than among the population as a whole (i.e. including the non poor) in each of
these five countries (Figure 6.11). This may also be attributable in part to the
overrepresentation of pensioners in the sector: poor pensioners have the lowest overall
failure rate in all five countries other than Hungary (Table EP1B).
Figure 6.11 Failure rate: one or more indicators of neighbourhood quality (outright
owners)
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6.7 Neighbourhood Services
Social rented and other below market rental housing
The role of the social rented sector can be identified most clearly in the Netherlands and
the UK. If disadvantage arises from the concentrations of low income populations in
estates of social housing we might expect to see social renters disadvantaged on this
indicator.
The evidence varies between the two countries (Figure 6.12). In the UK social renters
as a whole record a higher failure rate than the average and indeed any other tenure
and this holds across four of the six household types (the exceptions being single
people and lone parents who record higher failure rates in the market rental sector)
(Table F1B). When poor people are examined separately the failure rate is still greatest
in social rented sector compared to any other tenure. The failure rate among poor social
tenants is greater than the average across every household type other than poor
couples with children who record a slightly lower (1.1 pp) failure rate in the social rented
sector.
In the Netherlands social tenants as a whole record a below average failure rate; indeed
social tenants record the lowest failure rate of any tenure (Table 6.12). This almost
always holds across household types (Table F1B). Poor social tenants in the
Netherlands also record a below average failure rate compared to the poor population
as a whole, although poor market renters record an even lower failure rate. It is difficult
to compare household types due to inadequate sample sizes.
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Figure 6.12 Percentage failing one or more indicators of access to neighbourhood
services
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Given the classification of ‘below market rent’ housing no particular pattern on this
indicator is anticipated and indeed the results are rather mixed. In three of the four other
countries people living in the ‘below market rent’ sector record a lower than average
failure rate. In Sweden it is the lowest of any tenure, although almost the same as in the
larger market rental sector where mainstream municipal housing is classified (Table
F1B). In Hungary it is also the lowest of all tenures; in Germany it is slightly higher than
among market renters. The better-than-average pattern holds across household types
in Hungary without exception; in Germany with the exception of single people and
pensioners in Sweden (though the sample size falls below 50 in the BMR sector at the
household level). In contrast the BMR sector in Portugal records the highest failure rate
of any tenure (though analysis is not possible at the household level). When poor
households are examined separately then the position is reversed in Sweden (where on
a sample of less than 50 the failure rate in the BMR is the highest) and Portugal where it
becomes the lowest (though on sample sizes under 50) (Table FP1B). In Germany the
failure rate among the poor is similar to the market rental sectors and below owner-
occupation.
Outright ownership
There is little reason to expect a clear pattern of failure in terms of outright owners’
access to neighbourhood services, and indeed the picture is mixed (Figure 6.13).
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Among the population as a whole outright owners have an above average failure rate
two of the five countries with data and a below average failure rate in three. Generally
the difference is small compared to the average, with the exception of the Netherlands
where it is almost ten percentage points (9 pp). Compared to other tenures, the failure
rate among outright owners is the highest of any tenure, but in the UK it is better than
any other than mortgaged owners. Otherwise the picture is mixed. With the exception of
the Netherlands at a household level the failure rate among outright owners is generally
close to the average (Table F1B). When the poor are examined separately poor outright
owners have a lower than average failure rate in Sweden and the UK and an above
average failure rate in Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal. As with the population as
a whole the largest difference between outright owners and the average is in the
Netherlands (Figure 6.13). It is not clear how to interpret these findings other than to
note that the advantages outright ownership appears to confer in relation to other
indicators is not present with neighbourhood services.
Figure 6.13 Percentage failing one or more indicators of access to neighbourhood
services (outright owners)
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6.8 Dissatisfaction
Social rented and other below market rental housing
Social rented housing can be identified most easily in the Netherlands and the UK. In
both these countries the dissatisfaction rate among the population as a whole is
greatest among social tenants. In both countries it is twice the average rate and the
highest of any tenure (Figure 6.14; Table G1A). This pattern is consistent across most
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household types with the exception of single people and lone parents in the UK (who
have higher dissatisfaction rates in the market rental sector) and pensioners in the
Netherlands (who have a marginally lower dissatisfaction rate in the market rental
sector) (Table G1A). So the high level of dissatisfaction does not appear to arise from
household composition within the social rented sector.
Figure 6.14 Dissatisfaction rates in rental housing
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When the dissatisfaction rates of poor people are examined separately the gap narrows:
whereas the dissatisfaction rate among all social renters is twice the general rate in both
countries; it is around 50 per cent higher among poor social tenants compared to all
poor people. This still means that dissatisfaction is highest among the poor in the social
rented sector, but it can also be noted that in the level is only slightly higher than among
market renters in both countries (Figure 6.14); and in the case of the Netherlands not far
from the average. The higher than average dissatisfaction rate among poor social
renters holds across all household types in the UK other than lone parents where it is
very slightly below the average (Table GP1A). Small sample sizes make the
comparison on a household type level problematic in the Netherlands but the figures are
suggestive of higher than average dissatisfaction rates among poor couples with
children and lone parents in the social rented sector and across most household types
(pensioners being an exception) (Table GP1A).
Dissatisfaction among BMR tenants in the other four countries is above the average and
is consistently so between household types (Table G1A). Dissatisfaction rates among
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BMR tenants as a whole in each of these countries is also the highest of any tenure.
This is usually but by no means always the case between household types although
there is no pattern between countries. When dissatisfaction rates among the poor are
examined separately, the difference between BMR tenants and the average reduces,
although it remains above average in each of the four countries (Table GP1A).
Dissatisfaction among the poor is not the highest among BMR tenants in Germany (it is
slightly lower than among market renters), Hungary and Sweden (although in both these
cases the comparison relies on some samples under 50). Only in Portugal does it
remain highest among the poor BMR tenants compared to those in other tenures. This
suggests that the overall dissatisfaction rates among BMR tenants reflect in part its
greater propensity to house poor people, but it nonetheless records above average
dissatisfaction rates among the poor.
Outright ownership
Outright owners express lower than average dissatisfaction rates in each of the five
countries with data (Figure 6.15). This is almost always the case at the household level
(Table G1A), although it should be noted that in Hungary such is the size of the outright
ownership sector dissatisfaction rates among outright owners tends to be close to the
average overall and this applies between household types. Outright owners also
express the lowest dissatisfaction of any tenure in Hungary (although the difference with
mortgaged owners is small), and in the UK where this pattern holds at the level of
household type. Mortgaged owners have the lowest dissatisfaction rates in the
Netherlands (just), Portugal and Sweden, but outright owners have consistently lower
dissatisfaction rates than tenants (Table G1A).
Figure 6.15 Dissatisfaction rates in outright ownership
Source: Tables G1A, GP1A
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Poor outright owners also express below average dissatisfaction rates in all five
countries. Poor mortgaged owners express the lowest dissatisfaction rates in Hungary,
the Netherlands and Portugal, but in each of the five countries poor outright owners
have lower dissatisfaction rates than tenants (Figure 6.15). The difference between
dissatisfaction rates between outright owners and the average and between poor
outright owners and the average rises very markedly in the Netherlands and somewhat
in the UK, but falls slightly in Portugal and Sweden. In the UK poor outright owners have
the lowest dissatisfaction rates of any tenure. Indeed in the Netherlands and the UK the
dissatisfaction rate among poor outright owners is lower than among the population as a
whole.
6.9. Analysis
We now examine the impact of the individual policies and features of housing systems
that might be expected to weaken the link between income poverty and housing
outcomes.
Social rented and other below market rental housing
Social rented housing can be best identified in the Netherlands and the UK. We would
expect it to improve affordability, but possibly to create ‘area effects’ from the
concentration of poorer households in particular neighbourhoods. The evidence
suggests that social rented housing does have an impact on improving housing
outcomes for poor people in relation to affordability, but on other indicators the
outcomes are consistently below average and often worse than in the market rental
sector.
In both the Netherlands and the UK the impact of gross housing costs raises the poverty
rate by substantially more than the average. However, increase in the Dutch social
rented sector is much smaller than among market renters and in the UK it is also lower,
albeit only marginally. A similar pattern emerges using the 40 per cent affordability
threshold: in both countries the proportion of social tenants above the threshold is
greater than the average. In the Netherlands it is smaller than in the market rented
sector, but in the UK slightly larger. When the poor are examined separately, a higher
than average proportion of social renters is above the threshold, but in both cases the
proportion is smaller than in the market rental sector.
The relatively poor performance of the sector on the objective overcrowding indicator is
at least partly explained by the concentration of poor households in the sector: when the
poor are examined separately they have lower overcrowding rates than in the market
sector in the UK, but in the Netherlands their overcrowding rates are still higher than
among poor households as a whole and among market renters. On the subjective
overcrowding indicator, among the poor the overcrowding rates are lower than the
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average of the poor and the poor in the market rental sector; but in the UK it is above
average and the market rental sector.
The proportions of social tenants failing one or more indicators of physical quality are
greater than the average and any other tenure; the difference shrinks when the poor are
examined separately, but it is still higher than any other tenure. There is some evidence
of an area effect arising from social rented housing on the neighbourhood quality
indicator, with higher proportions of social tenants ‘failing’ this indicator than any other
tenure (although there are exceptions between household types), but when the poor are
examined separately their failure rate is still higher than in any other tenure. The
proportion of social tenants expressing dissatisfaction with their housing in both
countries is twice the average; among the poor the gap narrows but remains above
other tenures.
The evidence on what is identified as BMR housing in the other four countries suggests
that the tenure performs well on affordability, but less well on other indicators.
In three of the four other countries what is identified as below market rental housing
exhibits a smaller than average increase in poverty rates as a result of gross housing
costs, and a consistently smaller increase in relation to the market rental sector. In three
of the four countries the proportions of poor paying more than 40 per cent of income in
gross housing costs is below average and smaller than in the market rental sector.
However, in Germany it is both above average and higher than the market rental sector.
The evidence on overcrowding is more mixed. Objective overcrowding is above average
in all four countries and is generally greater than in the market rental sector (where the
mainstream Swedish municipal sector is classified). Among the poor overcrowding
remains above average where sample sizes are over 50; but lower than the market
rental sector in Germany and Portugal. Subjective overcrowding is the highest of any
tenure in all four countries (except Sweden where there is a small sample); and among
the poor it is also above average (Sweden excepted). Further generalisations are
difficult due to small samples. On the physical quality indicator, BMR housing performs
better than average among the populations as a whole, but worse than average among
the poor (apart from Sweden where the sample is small); it is worse than the market
rented sector in Portugal, but not Sweden and Hungary (and is very similar in
Germany).
Neighbourhood quality is below average and worse than in other tenures, both among
all BMR tenants and when poor are examined separately in all four countries other than
Sweden. The proportions of BMR tenants experiencing difficulties accessing one or
more neighbourhood services is below average in three of four countries; there are
some differences when the poor are examined separately, but the sample sizes are
small.
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Strikingly general dissatisfaction in BMR housing is the highest of any tenure in all four
countries; among the poor it is above average, but only the highest of any tenure in
Portugal.
Outright ownership
Outright ownership was expected to score well on affordability, but this was expected to
come at the cost of a lower physical quality of housing as poor owners might be unable
to finance repairs and maintenance.
The evidence indicates that within countries outright ownership clearly confers
affordability advantages. Gross housing expenditure leads to below average rises in
poverty in three of the countries where data are available and actually falls in the
Netherlands and UK. Clear and often substantial affordability advantages are recorded
on the 40 per cent affordability threshold both among the general population and in four
out of five countries among the poor.
The tenure also records lower than average objective and subjective overcrowding in all
five countries. On the objective measure overcrowding among poor outright owners is
lower than the average in all five countries and on the subjective indicator lower than
average in four out of five (the Netherlands being the exception).
Contrary to expectations the proportions of outright owners living in housing with one or
more physical defects was lower than average in four out of five countries, and was the
lowest of any tenure in Sweden and the UK. When the poor are examined separately
the failure rate among poor outright owners in the UK and Sweden was actually lower
than the population as a whole. However, in countries where the sector is much larger
and therefore affects the average more, the failure rate among the poor outright owners
was above average. This does suggest that in these countries there is some trade-off
between affordability and quality.
The sector also performs well on neighbourhood quality, having below average failure
rates in all five countries; indeed among the poor the failure rate among outright owners
is below that of the population as a while in the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK; and
below average in all five countries. However, difficulties with accessing one or more
neighbourhood services was above average in two of the five countries among the
general population and when the poor are examined separately higher than average in
three (Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal) of the five countries.
Overall the sector records below average dissatisfaction rates in all five countries, both
among the general population and among the poor. In the UK and Netherlands the
dissatisfaction rate among poor outright owners is below that of the general population.
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Housing allowances
As expected housing allowances have a clear and direct impact on housing affordability.
They reduce poverty rates (after gross housing costs) in all countries other than
Portugal by between 1 and 1.5 percentage points. The impact is greatest in the social
rented housing in the Netherlands (4.8 pp) and the UK (7.7 pp). This suggests that
housing allowances are most effective when combined with social rented housing.
Housing allowances reduced the proportions with housing expenditure exceeding the 40
per cent affordability threshold by between 3-5.5 pp in Sweden, the Netherlands and the
UK. Again these reductions were larger in the (social) rental tenures with reductions of
between nine percentage points in Sweden and 27 pp in the UK.
Housing allowances are also clearly targeted on the poor in the Netherlands, Sweden
and the UK. In the Netherlands the proportion of the poor exceeding the 40 per cent
threshold fell by 14 pp and in the UK and Sweden by more than 20 pp. Among poor
social renters in the UK it falls by 45 pp. These are clear and demonstrable impacts.
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6.10. Conclusions
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of housing outcomes in six countries. The
principal aim has been to test whether housing policies and systems can disrupt the link
between income and housing outcomes.
The evidence presented in the chapter suggests that the individual policies and system
features impact on housing outcomes in the following ways:
 Social rented housing by itself produces only modest impacts in affordability
generally and among the poor, although the evidence suggests that it limits the
impacts compared to market renting, which might be expected to be the principal
alternative tenure for social tenants.
 However, social rented housing does produce powerful improvements in
affordability when combined with housing allowances.
 Social rented housing consistently produces poorer outcomes generally and
among the poor, including on neighbourhood quality which is supportive of some
area effect.
 As anticipated outright ownership generally performs well on affordability
generally and among the poor, but it also performs well on a range of other
indictors.
 Outright ownership is the only identifiable policy/ system feature where the
outcomes of the poor are sometimes better than those of the general population
– in a material sense breaking the link between income and housing outcomes.
 However, a trade-off between affordability and physical quality becomes
apparent where there are very high levels of outright ownership (notably in
Hungary and Portugal), suggesting that there is a limit to the extent to which
outright ownership can be used as an anti-poverty strategy.
 Housing allowances can produce clear and unambiguous improvements in
affordability. These improvements are clearly targeted on the poor and are also
most powerful in rental and in particular social rented sectors.
120
121
Chapter 7: The Impact of Employment Status on Housing Outcomes
7.1. Introduction
Welfare regimes produce different levels and patterns of employment and in this
chapter we examine the impact of employment status on housing outcomes.
The principal hypothesis being tested is that employment status has a strong impact on
housing outcomes, but that this may vary between housing systems. We expect people
who are not in employment to have a greater chance of ‘failing’ indicators of housing
outcomes compared to people who are in work. Moreover, we expect the housing
outcomes of people who have been out of work for a long period to be more likely to be
inferior to those who have been out of work for only a short time.
The logic underlying this hypothesis is that employment status and poverty are causally
connected: people in work are less likely to be poor than those who are out of work.
However, many governments have placed a greater emphasis on relatively low paid
employment in recent years and it is widely recognised that poverty occurs in
households that are in work as well as in households that are not in work. We therefore
also compare the housing outcomes of the in work poor with the out of work poor in
order to test whether the working poor have a greater chance of superior housing
outcomes to the workless poor. Again we distinguish between the length of time that a
household has been workless.
In this chapter we employ a range of eight indicators that capture a range of housing
outcomes:
 Affordability (net and gross)
 Overcrowding (objective and subjective)
 Physical quality of housing
 Neighbourhood quality
 Neighbourhood services
 Dissatisfaction
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 7.2 we identify the relationship between
employment status and poverty and patterns of employment status within the housing
system. In Section 7.3 we examine housing outcomes, based on each of the indicators,
according to employment status. This exercise is repeated in Section 7.4, but limited to
the population of people living in poverty: the working poor and the workless poor.
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We also recognise that the relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes cannot be identified fully by the statistical data. Other issues arising from
employment status, such as variability of income and the relationship between loss of
employment and immigration status can affect housing outcomes. These are explored
in Section 7.5 through vignettes conducted in the six countries included in this study.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.6.
7.2. Employment Status, Poverty and the Housing System
In this section we provide an overview of the relationship between employment status
and poverty and of the relationship between employment status and the housing
system.
The relationship between employment status and poverty
Levels of worklessness vary greatly between the countries in this study. The
employment status figures are on a self reported basis and they may reflect some
activity in the informal economy. On this basis, employment, among households with at
least one potential worker, the proportion of people living in households with no one in
work ranges from 4.2 per cent in Sweden to 14.3 per cent in the Netherlands. The
workless rate is 8.8 per cent in Hungary and around 11 per cent in Portugal (11.6%), the
UK (11.5%) and Germany (11.6%) (Table A7A1). Many governments have attempted to
reduce levels of worklessness and have promoted it as the most effective rate out of
poverty.
There is a clear relationship between employment status and poverty (Figure 7.1). At
least 40 per cent of all people living in poverty live in households where no potential
worker works (‘workless households’), although fewer than half of the poor live in such
workless households in Hungary (43.3%) and Portugal (39.7%). In the other four
countries more than half of the poor live in workless households, and in two (Germany
and the UK) more than 60 per cent of the poor live in workless households. As Figure
7.1 demonstrates, the proportion of the poor who live in workless households is much
greater than among the population as a whole. Clearly, the obverse is also true: people
living in households where some or all potential workers are in employment are less
likely to be poor; this is especially true of those living in households where all potential
workers are in work.
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Figure 7.1 Employment status of people living in poor households (all poor households)
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Source: Tables A7B1, AP7B1
However, if we limit the analysis to working age households the picture changes (Figure
7.2). Among working age households, more than half the poor live in households where
at least one person works in all six countries. The proportion exceeds 60 per cent in four
countries (Germany and the UK being the exceptions) and 70 per cent in two (Portugal
and Sweden). So while employment reduces the chances of poverty ‘in work’ poverty is
a widespread phenomenon.
Figure 7.2 Employment status of people living in poor households with at least one
potential worker
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The workless and the housing system
The tenure distribution of people living in working-age workless households shows a
mixed pattern in the six countries:
 The greatest proportion of the workless in Germany (49.2%) and Sweden
(55.0%) live in market rental housing. In Sweden this classification includes the
mainstream municipal housing sector.
 In Hungary (79.9%) and Portugal (66.8%) the greatest concentration of
worklessness is in the owner-occupied sector. Among owner occupiers the
greatest concentration is among outright owners who account for more than 70
per cent (71.4%) of the workless in Hungary and almost 60 per cent in Portugal
(58.1%).
 In the Netherlands and the UK the greatest concentration of worklessness is in
the social rented sector. Approaching half the workless live in the social rented
sector in these countries (46.2% in the Netherlands and 47.2% in the UK) (Table
A8A1)
Despite these differences there is a consistent pattern of where the workless are over
and under-represented. (Overrepresentation in a tenure is identified when the
proportion of the workless exceeds the proportion of the whole working age population
living in that tenure.) The pattern is as follows:
 In every country the workless are overrepresented in the market and below
market sectors, and under-represented among home owners. This is true even in
Hungary and Portugal where the majority of the workless are owner occupiers.
 In each of the five countries where data are available, worklessness is
overrepresented among outright owners, and under-represented among
mortgaged owners (Table A8A1).
There are also wide variations in the reach of housing allowances among individuals
living in workless households.
 In Germany and Portugal receipt of housing allowances is below 10 per cent
among the workless and those who are in work. Uniquely, the proportions of
living in working households receiving housing allowance in Portugal is greater
than among the workless. In Germany the lower proportion of the long-term
workless in receipt of the housing allowance may be attributable to the shift in
housing cost assistance from the housing allowance system to the social
assistance system among the longer term unemployed.
 In Hungary and the Netherlands approaching 30 per cent of the short and long-
term workless receive housing allowances.
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 In Sweden and the UK between 25 and 30 per cent of short-term workless
receive housing allowances, but this rises to 45 per cent (45.4%) among the
long-term workless in Sweden and approaching 60 per cent (59.0%) in the UK.
Figure 7.3 Employment status and receipt of housing allowance
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7.3. Employment Status and Housing Outcomes
In this section we examine the relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes using the indicators outlined in Section 7.1.
Affordability
There are large variations in the proportions of individuals living in households where
gross housing costs exceed the affordability threshold of 40 per cent. Among working
households and on the basis of gross housing expenditure the failure rate is lowest in
Hungary, Sweden and Portugal where it is between five and 7.5 per cent; it is much
higher at around 15 per cent in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (Figure 7.4).
The ‘failure’ rate is consistently higher among the short term workless and is, apart from
in Portugal, more than twice as high as those in work. There is an especially high
increase in the failure rate of more than 3.5 times in Sweden (Table BW5). There is a
further rise in the failure rate among the long term workless in all countries other than
the Netherlands. The failure rate among the long term workless remains lowest in
Portugal at under 15 per cent (13.9%) and just over 20 per cent (21.0%) in Hungary.
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Between 30 and 40 per cent of the long term workless fail the affordability threshold in
Sweden (32.7%) and the Netherlands (37.4%), rising to almost half (47.5%) in Germany
and more than 60 per cent (61.1%) in the UK.
Figure 7.4: Percentage exceeding 40% affordability threshold on (a) gross and (b) net
housing expenditure
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Source: Tables BW5, BW6
Housing allowances make very little difference to the ‘failure’ rate among the working
population – all percentage point reductions in the failure rate based on net expenditure
compared to gross expenditure are smaller than 1.5 (Figure 7.5). However they do
make a large impact on the failure rate of short term workless households in the
Netherlands (where the failure rate falls by 12.1 pp) and the UK (where it falls by 10.4
pp). They also reduce the failure rate among the long term workless in the Netherlands
(7.6 pp) and Sweden (12.3 pp), and especially in the UK where the failure rate halves
(falling by 32.2 pp) (Figure 7.5).
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Figure 7.5 Percentage point reductions in failure of 40% affordability threshold arising
from housing allowance
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Source: Derived from Tables BW5, BW6
Nonetheless, the overall picture is that:
 the ‘order’ of failure rates remains broadly similar between countries: those with
the lowest failure rates among those who are in work, also have the lowest failure
rates among those who are out of work.
 in every country the failure rates are higher among the short term workless
compared to the people who are employed; and (on the basis of net housing
expenditure) the failure rate among the long term workless is higher than among
the short term workless.
 housing allowances make little difference to the unaffordability rates for people in
work in all of the countries, but in the Netherlands and the UK they do make
substantial impacts on the failure rates of short term workless households; and in
Sweden and the UK on the failure rate of long term workless.
Objective overcrowding
There are very large variations in objective overcrowding among the workless between
countries (Figure 7.6). With exception of Hungary fewer than a quarter of workless
people are overcrowded (on the objective measure), and in four countries fewer than
one in ten is overcrowded. It is notable that the ‘order’ of overcrowding between
countries remains largely unchanged whichever employment category is considered.
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This suggests that the level of overcrowding in the country as a whole principally
influences the situation regardless of employment status.
There are very low levels of objective overcrowding among the short and long term
workless in the Netherlands, for example (1.5% and 1.6% respectively). Objective
overcrowding rates among short and the long term workless are under 10 per cent in
Germany and the UK, and just over 10 per cent in Portugal. In Sweden overcrowding
exceeds 20 per cent while Hungary registers very high levels – in excess of 60 per cent.
Figure 7.6 Levels of objective overcrowding
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Source: Table CW1
The objective overcrowding rate is higher among the short term workless compared to
those in work in four of the six countries. The increase (in percentage points) is
negligible in the Netherlands), but more than 15 pp higher in Hungary and Sweden. The
exceptions to this pattern are Portugal and the UK (Figure 7.5). The objective
overcrowding rate is higher among the long term workless than among those who are in
work in four of the six countries, the exceptions being Germany and Hungary. In one
country only (Portugal) the objective overcrowding rate among the long term workless is
lower than those in work. This evidence suggests that worklessness is generally but not
necessarily associated with higher overcrowding rates, and the situation is generally but
not always worse among the long term workless.
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Subjective overcrowding
There are large variations in subjective overcrowding among the workless between
countries (Figure 7.7), although these are more compressed compared to the objective
overcrowding measure (Figure 7.6). Fewer than 30 per cent of people are overcrowded
on this measure regardless of employment status in all of the countries and with the
exceptions of the short term workless in Portugal and the long term workless in the UK
fewer than one quarter are overcrowded.
It is notable that the ‘order’ of overcrowding between countries remains largely
unchanged whichever employment category is considered, but with the exception of the
long term workless in the UK and Portugal. In contrast to their objective overcrowding
rate, the subjective overcrowding rate of the long term workless in the UK is the highest
of any employment category in any of the six countries. Conversely the subjective
overcrowding rate among the long term workless in Portugal is much lower than the
general rate. Nonetheless, apart from these cases, the general picture it is that the level
of overcrowding in the country as a whole principally influences the situation regardless
of employment status.
Figure 7.7 Levels of subjective overcrowding
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Source: Table CW3
The subjective overcrowding rate is higher among the short term workless compared to
those in work in five of the six countries, the exception being the Netherlands (where it
falls by 1.9 pp). There is only a small increase in the UK (1.1 pp) while the increases in
Germany (4.6 pp), Hungary (5.4 pp) and Sweden (4.1 pp) lie in the range 4-5.5 pp. The
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subjective overcrowding rate among the long term workless is higher than among the
short term workless in only two countries – Sweden and the UK. The increase in the UK
is very large indeed (10.9 pp compared to the short term workless). In four of the six
countries the subjective overcrowding rate is lower among the long term workless
compared to the short term workless. The differences are small in Germany (1.5 pp)
and Hungary (1.2 pp), but very large in Portugal (9.1 pp). In Netherlands and Portugal
the subjective overcrowding rate is actually lower among the long term workless than
those in work, and the differences are not trivial (being 4.8 pp in the Netherlands and
5.6 pp in Portugal).
On this indicator it remains generally the case that the housing outcome is worse for the
short term workless compared to those in work, but it is not generally the case that the
position of the long term workless is worse than the short term workless. Indeed it is
sometimes better than among those who are in work.
Physical quality
In three of the countries fewer than half of people experience one or more physical
defects with their dwelling, regardless of employment status (Figure 7.8), although in
five the ‘failure’ rate among the working population is less than half. In the case of
Portugal more than half of the entire population experience at least one defect. The
‘order’ of the ‘failure’ rate between countries remains very similar whichever
employment status is examined.
The ‘failure’ rate is higher among the short term workless compared those living in
working households in four of the six countries, the exceptions being the Netherlands
(where there are 7.1 per cent fewer short term workless living in housing with at least
one defect) and Sweden (where there is a small (0.8 pp) difference). Among the short
term workless, the failure rate is around 10 pp (9.7 pp) higher in Germany and 20 pp
(20.1 pp) in Hungary.
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Figure 7.8 Percentage failing one or more indicators of physical quality
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Source: Derived from Table DW2
The failure rate among the long term workless is greater than among the short term
workless in four of the six countries, the exceptions being Germany (where the
difference is small) and Hungary (6.6 pp). The biggest increases in the failure rate
among the long term workless compared to the short term workless are in Sweden
(10.1 pp) and the UK (11.6 pp).
The failure rate among the long term workless is consistently higher than among those
who live in working households. The difference is very small in the Netherlands (1.3 pp).
The differential is by far the highest in the UK where the differential is more than 20
percentage points (20.2 pp).
Neighbourhood quality
Most people, regardless of employment status (with the sole exception of the long term
workless in the UK) do not report problems with neighbourhood quality (Figure 7.9).
However, there are large variations between countries within employment status
categories, with, for example a quarter of people in work reporting one or more
neighbourhood quality problems in Sweden, but 45 per cent (45.2%) doing so in the
Netherlands. More than one-third of short term workless people live in households
reporting neighbourhood quality problems in four countries (Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal and the UK) and more than 40 per cent of the long term workless do so in the
same four countries. The ‘order’ of failure rates is fairly consistent across employment
status categories.
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The failure rate among the short term workless is higher than among the working
population in four of the countries (Germany, Hungary, Portugal and the UK), but
always by less than five percentage points. There is no difference between the groups
in Sweden, but the Netherlands reports a surprising and large (11.4 pp) lower failure
rate among the short term workless compared to the working population.
Figure 7.9 Percentage failing one or more indicators of neighbourhood quality
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Source: Derived from Table EW1
In five of the six countries the failure rate among the long term workless is higher than
among the short term workless, the exception being Portugal (where the failure rate is
2.5 pp lower among the long term workless). The largest increases are in the
Netherlands (9.8 pp) and Sweden (9.9 pp) – the only two countries where there
difference between the short term workless and the working population was either zero
or negative. In all countries other than the Netherlands the failure rate among the long
term workless is higher than among the working population.
Neighbourhood services
Most people in all countries other than Hungary do not report problems with access to
neighbourhood services, regardless of employment status (Figure 7.10). There are
nonetheless large differences in failure rates within employment status categories
between countries. For example, the failure rate among those in work in Sweden is one-
quarter (25.5%) but in Germany it approaches one-half (47.1%). Similar differences
occur among the short term working population although the distribution is smaller
among the long term workless. The ‘order’ of failure rates remains the very similar
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between countries across employment status categories, although the UK performs
worse among the workless categories and Sweden among the long term workless.
There is no pattern of higher failure rates among the short term workless compared to
the in work population: in only two countries (Hungary and the UK) do the short term
workless have a higher failure rate; in the other four countries the in work population
have the higher failure rate. These differences are quite large – always more than five
percentage points and in the case of Portugal more than ten (10.5 pp).
The pattern is more consistent when the failure rate among the long term workless is
compared to the short term workless: the failure rate is higher among the long term
workless in four of the five countries. The difference is small in Germany (0.8 pp) and
the exception is Hungary. The greatest difference is in Sweden where the long term
workless have a failure rate 20 pp (19.5 pp) higher than the short term workless.
Figure 7.10 Percentage failing one or more indicators of access to neighbourhood
services
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Source: Derived from Table FW1
The failure rate among the long term workless is greater than among the working
population in four of the six countries, the exceptions being Portugal (-1 pp) and
Germany (-4.8 pp). The failure rates of the long term workless compared to the working
population are greatest in Sweden (11.9 pp) and the UK (14.9 pp).
The overall pattern is less clear on this indicator. Only in the UK do the short term
workless have a higher failure rate than the in work population and the long term
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workless population have in turn a higher failure rate than the short term workless. The
disadvantage of worklessness (compared to working) is apparent in the long term
workless category in only four of the six countries.
Dissatisfaction
Dissatisfaction levels among people in work show great variations between countries,
being under five per cent in the Netherlands and Sweden, more than 15 per cent in
Germany and Portugal and more than one-third in Hungary (Figure 7.11). The general
level of dissatisfaction among people who are workless reflects the general level in each
country. In five countries there is a higher level of dissatisfaction among the short term
workless than among those who are working, with an especially higher level among the
short term workless in Hungary (9.9 pp).
Figure 7.11 Percentage dissatisfied with housing
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
DE H NL PT SE UK
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge IW
OWS
OWL
IW= in work; OWS = out of work for less than one year; OWL out of work for more than one year
Source: Table GW1
In five of the countries the level of dissatisfaction among the long term workless is
greater than among the short term workless, although the difference varies and is
greatest in Germany (9.1 pp). In every country the rate of dissatisfaction among the long
term workless is higher than among those in work. The difference is over five
percentage points in Portugal and Germany, approaching 10 pp (9.3 pp) in the UK and
almost 15 pp (14.8 pp) in Hungary. The difference is negligible in the Netherlands (0.1
pp) where dissatisfaction rates are generally very low.
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Summary
Between indicators the analysis shows that:
 Overall there is a strong relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes.
 Across the eight indicators people who are out of work are almost always more
likely to have poorer housing outcomes than people who are in work.
 The tendency for workless people’s housing outcomes to be inferior to in work
housing outcomes is reflected among both short term workless and long term
workless. However, the tendency is greater among long term workless.
 The relationship between employment status and housing outcomes is strongest
in relation to affordability and dissatisfaction .
Between countries the analysis shows that:
 Workless people as a whole have a higher chance of poor housing outcomes
across all eight indicators in Hungary, Sweden and the UK; on seven of the eight
in Germany and six in the Netherlands and Portugal.
 The short term workless are more likely to have poorer housing outcomes on all
indicators in Hungary, on seven in the UK and six in Germany, Portugal and
Sweden.
 In the Netherlands the short term workless are more likely to have poorer
housing outcomes than those in work on only four of the eight indicators,
suggesting that that short term worklessness is less damaging than in the other
countries.
 Long term worklessness is most likely to increase the chances of poorer housing
outcomes compared to short term worklessness in Sweden and the UK where
this applies across all eight indicators. It is least likely to lead to poorer housing
outcomes in Hungary where the long term workless are less likely to have poorer
outcomes than the short term workless on half of the indicators.
 Hungary, Sweden and the UK exhibit a tendency for long term workless people
to have a greater chance of poorer housing outcomes than people in work on all
eight indicators; in Germany this applies on seven.
 The weakest link between long term worklessness and poorer housing outcomes
compared to the in work population occurs in Portugal, where the link applies to
only five of the eight indicators.
7.4. The Housing Outcomes of the Working Poor and the Workless Poor
In this section we examine the housing outcomes of the working poor and compare
them to the workless poor.
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Affordability
There are relatively small variations in the proportions of working poor and non working
poor people with gross housing expenditure in excess of 40 per cent of net income in
Hungary, Portugal and Sweden (Figure 7.12). Although very high proportions (60 per
cent and more) of the working poor exceed the 40 per cent affordability threshold on
gross expenditure in the Netherlands and the UK, much higher proportions of workless
poor do so: three-quarters of short term workless poor and 80 per cent of long term
workless in the UK, with respective figures of 85 per cent of short term poor workless
and three-quarters of long term workless poor in the Netherlands. In Germany the
proportions of short term poor workless exceeding the gross threshold are greater than
the working poor, and the proportions of long term workless poor greater still (9.6 pp).
Figure 7.12 Percentage of poor exceeding 40% affordability threshold on (a) gross and
(b) net housing expenditure (poor)
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(b) Net
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Housing allowances make a large impact on the proportions of working poor who
exceed the 40 per cent affordability threshold (Figure 7.13). The proportions fall by
around 10 percentage points in the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Even larger
reductions in the proportions of short term workless poor exceeding the threshold are
seen in the Netherlands and (18.0 pp) and the UK (27.3 pp), but the difference is less
than five percentage points (4.4 pp) in Sweden, suggesting that the short term workless
are not benefiting fully from housing allowances. The improvements among the poor
long term workless in the Netherlands are great but similar to those among the short
term workless (16.9 pp). In the UK they are huge – the proportion of long term workless
poor exceeding the 40 per cent threshold is more than 40 percentage points (42.7 pp)
lower after housing allowances than before. The difference among the long term
workless in Sweden is more than 20 percentage points (22.1 pp) suggesting that the
long term workless have better access to housing allowances than the short term
workless.
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Figure 7.13 Percentage point reductions in failure of 40% affordability threshold arising
from housing allowance (poor)
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Source: Derived from Tables BPW5, BPW6
The overall picture is that:
 In four of the six countries a higher proportion of non working poor (as a whole)
exceed the gross affordability threshold than do the working poor, and in three of
these countries the difference is large (more than 10 pp). In the countries where
the proportions of non working poor exceeding the gross threshold are smaller
than among the working population, the differences are small.
 In half of the countries the proportion of non working poor (as a whole) exceeding
the net affordability threshold is smaller than among the working poor. In two of
these countries (Sweden and the UK) these differences are large (more than 10
pp).
 In Sweden and the UK a smaller proportion of long term non working poor (as a
whole) exceed the net threshold than either short term non working poor or
working poor, suggesting that the housing allowance is especially important for
the long term working poor.
Objective overcrowding
Employment status among the poor population is not very clearly linked to objective
overcrowding. The overcrowding rate among the poor workless population as a whole is
higher than among the working poor in only two countries (Sweden and Hungary)
(Figure 7.14). In both of these countries the differences are large – almost 10
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percentage points in Hungary (9.4 pp) and almost 15 in Sweden (14.6 pp). There is
virtually no difference in objective overcrowding rates between in work and out of work
poor in Germany and the Netherlands. In Portugal (6.1 pp) and the UK (7.4 pp) the
objective overcrowding rate is lower among the out of work poor than among the in work
poor by more than five percentage points.
There is no discernable pattern according to whether people live in short or long term
workless households. In only two countries (the Netherlands and Portugal) is the
objective overcrowding rate higher among the long term workless poor higher than
among the short term workless poor, and these differences are not large (less than 4
pp). In Sweden the objective overcrowding rate among the long term workless poor is
much lower (by 21.4 pp) than among the short term workless poor. There is no obvious
explanation for this.
Figure 7.14 Levels of objective overcrowding (poor)
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Source: Table CPW1
Subjective overcrowding
There is consistent pattern between countries on the subjective overcrowding indicator.
Subjective overcrowding is higher among the in work poor in three countries and lower
in three. These differences are more than five percentage points in Sweden (6.2 pp)
and the UK (7.0 pp) (Figure 7.15). The short term workless poor have higher subjective
overcrowding rates than the in work poor in five of the six countries. This difference is
usually under five percentage points (Hungary, the Netherlands and Portugal), but in
Sweden it is almost 20 (19.3 pp). The tendency for the short term workless poor to have
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higher overcrowding rates than in work poor is counterbalanced by the tendency (in five
of the six countries) for the long term workless poor to have lower subjective
overcrowding rates than the short term workless poor. There is no obvious explanation
as to why overcrowding rates should follow this pattern.
Figure 7.15 Levels of subjective overcrowding (poor)
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Source: Table CPW3
Physical quality
The proportions of in work poor reporting one or more problems with the physical
condition of their housing is lower than among the out of work poor in four of the six
countries. In two of these countries the difference is more than 15 percentage points
(17.1 pp in Hungary and 17.4 pp in the UK). In contrast, in the two countries (Germany
and the Netherlands) where the proportion is lower among those out of work, the
differences are small (under 2.5 pp).
In four of the six countries the ‘failure’ rate is higher among the long term workless
compared to the short term workless, the difference being between five (4.9 pp in
Portugal) and 10 percentage points (10.0 pp in the Netherlands). In the two countries
(Hungary and the UK) where it is lower among the long term workless, the failure rates
among the short term workless are much higher than among the in work poor. However,
while the difference between the short term workless and the long term workless is
small in the UK (3 pp) it is large in Hungary (12.7 pp). In five of the six countries the long
term workless poor have a higher failure rate than the in work poor. The exception is
Germany where the difference is small.
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Figure 7.16 Percentage failing one or more indicators of physical quality
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Source: Table DPW2
Neighbourhood quality
The proportion of the out of work poor reporting one or more neighbourhood quality
problems is higher than the in work poor in four of the six countries (Figure 7.17). Some
of the differences are quite large (8.5 and 8.6 pp in the Netherlands and the UK), and in
Sweden the difference is 14 percentage points. In the two other countries (Germany
and Portugal) the differences are very small (no more than 1 pp).
The relationship between employment status and neighbourhood quality is much
stronger among the long term workless poor than among the short term workless. In
only three of the six countries is the ‘failure’ rate among the short term workless greater
than among the long term workless (although in two of the countries - Sweden and the
UK - where the rate is higher among the short term workless, the difference is more
than 10 pp). It is higher among the long term workless poor compared to the in work
poor in five of the six countries. The differences are largest in the UK (7.8 pp), the
Netherlands (9.2 pp) and Sweden (7.8 pp), but small (under 2 pp) in Hungary and
Portugal. The range of failure rates between the different groups is small in Germany.
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Figure 7.17 Percentage failing one or more indicators of neighbourhood quality (poor)
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Source: Table EPW1
Neighbourhood services
There is no consistent pattern concerning the relationship between employment status
and access to neighbourhood services (Figure 7.18). In half of the six countries the
‘failure’ rate is higher among the workless poor and in half it is higher among the
working poor. The differences in either case are not dramatic with the exception of
Sweden where the out of work poor failure rate is almost 20 percentage points higher
than among the in work poor.
There is no obvious explanation for the different relationships between the short and
long term workless poor. In Hungary and Portugal, for example, the ‘failure’ rate among
the short term workless poor is much higher than among the in work poor, but the failure
rate among long term workless poor is actually below the in work failure rate. In contrast
in Sweden the failure rate among the short term workless poor in Sweden is very similar
to the in work poor failure rate, but is much lower than among the long term workless
poor.
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Figure 7.18 Percentage failing one or more indicators of access to neighbourhood
services (poor)
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Source: Table FPW1
Dissatisfaction
Dissatisfaction levels among the poor reflect employment status more clearly. In all six
countries dissatisfaction levels are higher among the out of work poor than among the in
work poor (Figure 7.19). The differences are greatest in Hungary (7.7 pp) and the UK
(8.3 pp). Dissatisfaction is higher among the short term workless poor compared to the
in work workless poor in five of the six countries (the exception being Germany). The
biggest difference is in Sweden (11. 3 pp), while the differences are small in Hungary
(1.4 pp) and the Netherlands (2.6 pp). Dissatisfaction rates are higher among the long
term workless poor compared to the in work poor in all six countries. However, the
difference is small in the Netherlands (0.5 pp) and Sweden (1.7 pp); and it is greatest in
Hungary (11.2 pp).
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Figure 7.19 Percentage dissatisfied with housing (poor)
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Summary
Between indicators the analysis shows that amongst the population who live in poverty:
 There is a relationship between employment status and housing outcomes, but it
is a weak one.
 Across the eight indicators people who are out of work and living in poverty are
more likely to have poorer housing outcomes than poor people who are in work in
four or more countries on five of the eight indicators.
 On only one indicator – dissatisfaction – is the outcome worse among a higher
proportion of the out of work poor households than in the working poor.
 It is striking that net unaffordability rates are higher among the working poor in
three countries and the same in a fourth.
 There is no consistent pattern for the long term workless poor to have housing
outcomes that are inferior to the working poor.
Between countries the analysis shows that:
 Sweden appears to manifest the strongest link between employment status and
housing outcomes. Those out of work have a higher chance of poor housing
outcomes than those in work on six of the eight indicators. This is shared with
Hungary and the UK. Sweden is the only country where those who are short term
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workless poor have a higher chance of poor housing outcomes on all eight
indicators. The long term workless poor have a greater chance of poorer housing
outcomes than the in work poor on six of the eight indicators. This is shared with
the UK. Only in Sweden do the long term workless poor have a higher chance of
poorer housing outcomes than the short term workless poor on all eight
indicators.
 Germany appears to manifest the weakest link between employment status and
housing outcomes. On only three of the six indicators do those who are workless
poor have a higher chance of poor housing outcomes than those who are
working poor - fewer than in any other country. The same applies to both the
short term workless poor compared to the in work poor; and to the long term
workless poor compared to the in work poor. However, on seven of the eight
indicators, the long term workless poor have a higher chance of poor housing
outcomes than the short term workless poor.
 Portugal also has a rather weak relationship between employment status and
housing outcomes: like Germany on only three indicators are the out of work poor
as a whole more likely to have poor housing outcomes than the in work poor,
although among the long term workless poor this rises to five. In the Netherlands
the out of work poor have a higher chance of poor housing outcomes than the in
work poor on half of the indicators.
7.5 The Impact of Employment Status and on Housing Outcomes for
Particular Groups
The statistical data captures the relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes at the aggregate level. However, it cannot capture the impact of employment
status for particular groups, especially at the point of household formation or when
employment status changes. In this section we present new evidence collected in focus
groups and in interviews with experts in which so-called vignettes (or scenarios) were
discussed and in interviews with experts. These were intended to capture the interaction
between employment status, the social security system and the housing system. Two
scenarios are presented here:
 the impact of variable income on the chances of a young family forming their own
household; and
 the effect of unemployment on an immigrant’s housing status.
These are discussed in turn.
VIGNETTE: A young couple with a small child live with the woman’s parents.
They would like their own home. The man has a sales job. His total income is
usually quite good, but it varies. He has a basic salary, but most of his salary is
based on commission. (Prompt: explore obtaining a mortgage as well as renting)
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This first vignette deals with a young couple with a flexible income that wish to move
into their own home. The participants in the focus groups reflected on the impact of their
variable income; on their eligibility for a mortgage; and on whether it might be better for
them to aim for an alternative to home ownership i.e. to rent or stay at home.
House purchase
Some mortgage systems developed ways, for example self-certified mortgages, of
making it easier for self employed people and other people with variable incomes to
access mortgage finance. However, as with the rest of the mortgage market, the terms
of mortgages have become more restrictive following the credit crunch. ‘Buying is
harder in these times than before’ was reported in all of the six countries. Lenders are
more careful in providing mortgage loans; they require greater proof of stability of
income and require larger deposits. The insecure household income, due to the man’s
flexible income, was most commonly seen as the main barrier to their buying a home.
Lenders prefer a stable secure income over a flexible income.
Some focus groups participants considered buying a house in this case not possible or
not wise. In the Hungarian focus groups, for example, the participants commented that
the housing market and the mortgage market are under serious decline, so they would
not advise the family to buy a new home, unless they have already accumulated
substantial reserves.
The participants from Sweden and the Netherlands, however, did not consider the
flexible income based on commission to be a problem. In Sweden a job with a
commission is considered a well paid job. In the Netherlands access to mortgage
finance is enhanced because it is possible to get a mortgage guarantee with a flexible
income. This guarantee provides the lender with the security that the interest will be
paid. This guarantee is available for people who work partly for basic income and partly
on commission.
An income mostly based on commission should be fine. It says he generally has
a good income which tells me his yearly average should be fine. The banks and
landlords will focus on that. (Practitioner, Social Services, Sweden)
This mortgage guarantee is becoming more and more important for lenders in
this period of recession. (Policymaker, Guarantee Fund, Netherlands)
House prices are a second important issue. Clearly the level of borrowing required to
access home ownership is less in lower cost areas, and even if lenders are unwilling to
take into account the whole of a fluctuating income, it may be possible to purchase
housing in a low cost area. Moreover, whether the household has one or two incomes is
also important. In the UK, it was reported that the chances of attaining a mortgage
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would be enhanced if the couple lived in a low cost area, in which case the basic
income might be sufficient, especially if his partner has or takes a job.
Several options for low cost home ownership were mentioned like shared ownership
and shared equity in the UK, cooperatives in Sweden and Germany, Koopgarant (a low
income low risk type of home ownership, see Chapter 4) in the Netherlands and interest
free loans in Hungary. But all of these options are only available on a limited scale.
Moreover, even for these options the flexible income can be a problem:
Even if they consider low cost home ownership in terms of affordability they
would have significant difficulty in gaining a mortgage, so there are a whole load
of barriers. Those barriers have been drawn in acute profile recently. If we were
having this discussion a year ago we would not be talking about recession.
(Housing Options Local Authority Housing Department, UK)
Alternatives to buying
Many focus group participants would recommend to the couple that they should rent
rather than buy, with the private rental sector being seen as the most logical option.
I would advise them to rent a house –as if they were my children- and try to have
support of the Porta 65 [a housing allowance scheme] . I would tell them not to
buy. (Housing policy maker, Portugal)
According to my experience, I would advise home-seekers to rent rather than to
buy, if they are not in a very safe job position. Ten years ago a post office worker
had a safe job; now carrying letters is unsafe and low paid. (Manager, non profit
confessional company for employment promotion, Germany)
Social rented housing was hardly mentioned as a possibility. This is likely to be due to
long waiting lists, as the Netherlands participants observed. These long waits rule out
the sector as a short-term solution.
But even in the private rental sector a flexible income can be a problem for private
landlords, as well as for calculating housing allowances as became clear in Sweden:
We want our prospective tenants to have a fixed monthly income, preferably an
income that is three times the rent. But if a person with a commissioned-based
income applies for a flat we might do an individual assessment. (Private landlord,
Sweden)
In the UK, private renting would be an option, and depending on the salary, they would
be able to get Housing Benefit if he did not get commission some weeks. There was a
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discussion in the UK focus groups about the complications of the benefit system coping
with fluctuations in income, and it was noted that there are regulations that allow for
average income to be taken over a period of four weeks and used to calculate benefits.
The private rental sector is considered as very risky for both tenant and landlord in
Hungary. If a tenant does not have a contract they have no security of tenure and can
lose their home at any time, while the landlord has no legal redress should the tenant
fail to pay the rent or damage the property.
A final option, only mentioned in the German high pressure area, Munich, is staying at
home.
Talking about Munich and the growth region in the South, people often stay at
home with the parents much longer than a decade ago. This is contrary to what
society demands in individualization and mobility. But it is a fair model to follow.
(Representative of the Central Coordination Centre in South Bavaria, Germany)
To summarise, the main points on this vignette are as follows:
 Fluctuating incomes act as a barrier to accessing housing.
 The financial crisis has limited access to mortgage finance in many, but not all,
countries, but loan guarantees can reduce the risk for lenders.
 Intermediate tenures, such as shared ownership or co-operatives, can provide a
solution to households with limited or fluctuating incomes, but their availability is
restricted.
 Social renting is not generally a solution due to long waiting lists.
 Private renting is generally seen as being the most logical housing option for
people with fluctuating incomes, although these are sometimes a barrier to
access even in this sector.
 While housing allowances can help people in work to afford private rental
housing, they do not cope well with fluctuating incomes.
VIGNETTE: A single male migrant worker who lives in a private rental flat loses
his job (prompt to check if there is a difference between EU, new EU and old EU-
countries).
This second vignette deals with a migrant becoming unemployed. The discussion in the
focus groups concentrated on the questions as to whether the person would qualify for
social security benefits and on their ability to remain in their existing accommodation.
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Access to social security benefits
This vignette firstly raises the question if this person has access to social security
benefits. So the first important question to answer is with regards to their legal status,
the details and consequences of which varied widely across countries. Partly as a result
of this legal diversity, in different focus groups different aspects of this vignette were
highlighted, and therefore it is not possible to make a comparison on all aspects.
The Swedish participants concluded that this person must be ‘legal’ since he has been
working. In the Swedish case there was no reflection on whether social benefits may be
limited or not enough to cover the costs of the private rental flat.
The rules are no different for him than for you and me. Well, he must have a
residence permit. But since he has been working he must have one. In general,
you cannot work here legally without either a residence permit or a work permit.
(Practitioner, Social services, Sweden)
If he has worked here he is surely eligible for unemployment benefits…
(Practitioner, municipality, Sweden)
However being able to access social security benefits did not necessarily mean being
that they would be able to stay in their dwelling. This was emphasized in Germany and
UK. In Germany he may qualify for social security, but only for a certain period, for a
limited amount and it may depend on the local situation. This all depends on his exact
status and on the period for which he has been formally in work. In all cases the income
from social security will be considerably lower than currently and a precarious housing
situation is highly probable.
Trying to disassemble the facts, at least five issues need be taken into account.
On the one hand, there are those who have worked legally for over a year and
have thus paid into the system and subsequently have right to receive
‘unemployment benefit I’. For them the income is usually reduced by one third,
and they can claim additional social assistance until the end of the period of
eligibility. Then there is the question: Can they still keep their lodging on that
pay? Then there are those, who have not worked paying into the unemployment
system for a full year. If they have a work permit, independent of them being EU
citizens or not, - taking into account that EU citizens do normally not need a
permit – they have the right to claim ‘Unemployment benefit II’, and the
respective money and housing assistance. In those cases it can happen that the
financial income is halved. This then makes the housing situation precarious: if
the dwelling is too large or too expensive according to the municipally set
standards. And then there is the group … with an insecure legal status, who may
probably have no benefits to claim and for them things really get difficult as soon
150
as a formal or informal employment is lost. (Practitioner from employment
agency, Germany)
In the UK, the position would be dependent on his eligibility for benefits. If he is entitled
to benefits he would get Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. The amount of these
allowances would depend on where he is and the rate of Local Housing Allowance.
From the Portuguese case it became clear that qualifying for some protection is highly
dependent on legal status. Moreover, qualifying for social security is by no means a
guarantee for preventing social exclusion (regardless of the migration status of the
recipient).
He may find a higher difficulty in accessing support just because of being
foreigner. At this moment there is a policy of making it difficult for people to stay
here if, for example, they do not have enough income to be self-sufficient.
(Practitioner, Immigrants’ Association (NGO), Portugal)
If he is ‘legal’, the State ensures some protection in those situations and gives
some support, which does not mean necessarily that the person would not end
up in a housing exclusion situation. (Social Intervention NGO, Portugal)
In the Netherlands, there is a difference between migrants from CEE-countries and
persons of non-EU origin granted asylum. The latter have a much more secure position
than the former.
If the person comes from a CEE-country and has worked one year or more, he
will be entitled to an unemployment benefit for at least three months. It is not
clear if after that period, he may receive a social assistance benefit. His right to
social assistance is very difficult to assess and depends on three factors: length
of stay in the Netherlands, labour market perspectives in the Netherlands and the
possibilities for remigration. (Policy advisor, social affairs, Netherlands)
The situation is different for asylum seekers with a legal status (statushouders).
His right to unemployment benefits is also dependent on the period of time he
has worked. However, different from the CEE labour migrants, these people are
entitled to social assistance. They are also entitled to social housing. The
municipality of Rotterdam must reserve a certain percentage of the housing stock
for this group. (Policy advisor, social affairs, Netherlands)
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Migrants from CEE-countries: a special group
The position of people from the Central and East European (CEE) countries is often not
clear, not even with practitioners whose daily work is providing social benefits as
became clear in Sweden as well as in the Netherlands.
The legal framework for CEE citizens and the various ways you have of staying
in Sweden (temporary residence permit, residence permit, work permit, visitor,
etc), and how that affects your rights to benefits and general welfare, can be a
real jungle sometimes. (Practitioner, Housing Support, Sweden)
I am not sure whether [a person who is] Polish can apply for housing allowance,
but I know that such allowances are not available for people form Bulgaria and
Romania.” (Policy advisor social housing, Netherlands)
There is an awareness of the financial and other difficulties faced by some CEE-
migrants. This seems likely to be an issue of increasing importance. They were
attracted by work and now suffer from the economic recession, and will either return to
their home country, or try to survive by finding new work, gaining access to social
assistance, and/or relying on help from their social network.
The evidence from Germany suggested that there is an increasing tendency for
migrants to enter social assistance and ‘the system is usually overstressed by this
group’ (Practitioner, Welfare Organisation, Germany). At present migrants from new EU
Member States (such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) are congregating in
metropolitan areas. They have legal residency status, but no access to the social
security system until they have been in formal employment for a year. Unsurprisingly,
‘Robust figures for other (illegal) groups can hardly be made’ (Practitioner, Welfare
Organisation, Germany).
Migrants from the new Member States often find their way in the formal labour market,
where the can build up rights to gain access to social security, but sometimes they
participate in the informal economy and lack these kind of rights. In the UK it was
reported that if this person was a CEE migrant he would most likely have to enter the
workers’ registration scheme for 12 months, but typically:
…there are people who’ve been working for three years in the informal economy
without registering and now that work has dried up they’re destitute, they turn up
at day centres There may be mechanisms that if you can prove you’ve paid tax or
national insurance you may be able to get benefits but it is a lengthy process.
(NGO representative, UK)
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In the Netherlands, labour migrants from CEE-countries such as Poles are generally not
viewed as a vulnerable group, or targeted by homelessness prevention strategies for
example (see also Chapters 10 and 11). They are expected to fend for themselves or to
go back to their country of origin.
They have deliberately chosen to look for a job here, with all the risks that this
entails. (Policy advisor, social housing, Netherlands)
In practice, many immigrants with housing problems as a result of unemployment will
receive help from family and friends until they have found a new job. Moreover, their
housing aspirations are often very limited. In some cities landlords even rent out
mattresses.
For €2.50 they put down a mattress and the next morning buses are waiting to
bring the people to their work. (Policy advisor social housing, Netherlands)
Will the landlord the landlord help to bridge a period of insecurity?
The next issue is how the private landlord will deal with this insecure situation of this
migrant. Is he prepared to wait for the rent for some time and to make some kind of
arrangement with this tenant in financial insecurity? Is the landlord willing to help to
bridge the gap between work and either or not receiving social benefit? In Hungary and
Sweden it is not clear whether landlords are willing to help or not, it seems to depend on
the attitude of the individual landlord.
The unregulated nature of most of the Hungarian private rented sector creates
uncertainty for landlord and tenant. In this vignette it could mean that the tenant would
have to leave the flat as soon as he was unable to pay the rent, but it might also be the
case that the landlord would be tolerant and wait until he found a new job. In Hungary
social and family networks are far more important than social services, and a migrant
who lacks these connections has an increased chance of becoming homeless.
In Sweden forbearance by a private housing company is possible, but it is unlikely to
last long:
We can postpone the rent for a period of two or may be three weeks if he asks
for it…In cases where we have a long positive record on a tenant, and a
legislative reason, we might be able to postpone his rent for up to two months,
but that is not very common at all. (Practitioner, private housing company,
Sweden)
In Hungary, tenants who enter the private rental sector are obliged to pay a deposit. If a
migrant has a legal job and becomes unemployed they mat be eligible for social
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insurance benefits for six months. However, it commonly takes two months for the first
payment to be made in which case the deposit could be used to bridge a gap period
between income from work and income from benefit.
In UK there is a rule in Housing Benefit that can be used to bridge the gap. In Sweden
social services can help to bridge this transition period.
There is a little known rule that if you have been paying rent for 13 weeks and
can demonstrate you could afford it then full rent will be met (by Housing Benefit)
for 13 weeks. (Civil servant with responsibility for Housing Benefit, UK)
But right now the different unemployment insurance funds are experiencing
severe administrative delays which could mean that he has to wait one or two
months, or even more, before he receives his benefits. In those cases, where an
individual is expecting a future income (in the form of unemployment benefits for
example), then the social service office can step in and offer him temporary
social benefits on condition of repayment. Once his unemployment benefits come
through he simply transfers the money back to us (Local authority practitioner,
Sweden)
In the Netherlands there is a special centre for the prevention of eviction in the city of
Rotterdam. This initiative started in the social rental sector and currently attempts are
made to involve private landlords as well.
In Rotterdam, there is a centre for prevention of evictions. All housing
associations in Rotterdam have signed an agreement with this centre. They deal
with evictions as a result of rent arrears and not with evictions as a result of anti-
social behaviour. They try to mediate between people with rent arrears and
landlords. The social rental landlords in Rotterdam have committed themselves
to the centre. Currently, there are also discussions with private rental landlords
about joining the initiative. If there is a rent arrear of one month, the housing
associations are supposed to act themselves. If this does not result in a solution,
the case should be reported to the centre which then tries to find a solution.
About 1,000 of such cases are reported each year. (Policy advisor, social affairs,
Netherlands)
To summarise, the main points on this vignette are as follows:
 Access to social security benefits and housing allowances depend on the legal
status of the person.
 Particularly in the case of CEE migrants, practitioners are often unclear whether
migrants have entitlements to social security.
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 Entitlements are weakened or lost when CEE migrant enter employment in the
informal economy and/or without registering with the authorities.
 Access to benefits (regardless of migration status) does not guarantee that it is
possible to stay in the current flat. This was particularly clear in the Portuguese
and German contexts. The amount of benefit that can be received depends on
the period the person has been in work, on the legal status and on local situation.
 Bridging a period between work and social security can be achieved in different
ways. The landlord can play a role here, Housing Benefit can help and so too can
social benefit agencies.
7.6 Conclusions
The chapter has examined the impact of employment status on housing outcomes, on a
range of indicators.
 There is a clear and strong relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes. Across the range of indicators people who are out of work are almost
always more likely to have poorer housing outcomes than those who are in work.
 The Netherlands stands out as a country where the short term workless show
less housing disadvantage in relation to those in work compared to the other
countries.
 Those who are long term workless tend to have worse housing outcomes than
those who are short term workless, suggesting that the length of time spent out of
the labour market tends to compound housing disadvantage. This tendency is
strongest in Hungary, Sweden and the UK – countries with a very diverse set of
welfare regimes and housing systems. It is weakest in Portugal.
 The link between employment status and housing outcomes is much weaker
when the out of work poor are compared to the in work poor. Moreover, there is
no consistent pattern for the long term workless poor to have inferior outcomes to
the in work poor.
 The link between employment status and housing outcomes and employment
status among the poor is strongest in Sweden and weakest in Germany and
Portugal.
 Overall these indicators suggest that there is a strong link between employment
status and housing outcomes, but the advantages of low paid employment
compared to non employment (the poor populations) are not clear.
The chapter has also provided qualitative analysis of the impacts of variables incomes
and immigration status and housing outcomes. The qualitative analysis helps to explain
some of the findings from the indicators:
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 Fluctuating incomes, associated with many jobs with a strong commission
element, can have a strong effect on housing outcomes independently of their
level. They almost always inhibit access to mortgage finance and in some cases
to private rental housing because of the risk that is associated with them. People
in employment but with fluctuating incomes may find themselves unlikely to be
housed in the social rented sector or at least faced with long waiting lists.
Housing allowances can offer support but there are inherent trade-offs in dealing
with fluctuating incomes in an means-tested system, for example people may be
reluctant to claim for fear of having to repay overpayments.
 Some features of housing systems may assist people with fluctuating incomes,
such as mortgage guarantees and intermediate tenures although such measures
have limited reach and have not been designed explicitly for this group within the
workforce.
 The sometimes disjointed relationship between employment status, the social
security system and housing is highlighted in the case of immigrants.
Uncertainties concerning social security entitlement, which in the case of social
insurance needs to be built up through contributions, and access to social
housing are compounded where immigrants who can legally work in a country fail
to register and/or work in the informal economy and therefore fall outside the
welfare system.
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Chapter 8: The Impact of Housing on Employment Opportunities
8.1 Introduction
The existing evidence suggests that housing markets may impact on labour markets in
three principal ways: by inhibiting labour mobility; by creating financial incentives or
disincentives to work; and through neighbourhood effects. However, the evidence is
often contested and the relationship is clearly not straightforward. This chapter
examines the impact of housing on employment using new evidence drawn from focus
groups, interviews and models that use EU-SILC.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 8.2 employment patterns between
countries and their tenure pattern is presented. In Section 8.3 we examine the new
evidence from focus groups and interviews addressing each of the three pathways
through which housing may impact on employment in turn. Section 8.4 presents the
econometric evidence concerning the impacts of specific features of housing systems
that we hypothesised as weakening the link between incomes and housing outcomes,
but which may in turn affect employment levels: social rented and other below market
rental housing, housing allowances and outright home ownership on employment levels.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.5.
8.2 Employment, Worklessness and the Housing System
Employment patterns vary considerably between the countries (Figure 8.1).
Sweden, in the traditions of the social democratic welfare model, has the highest levels
of overall employment, with an especially high level of people living in households
where all potential workers are in employment. Sweden has a notably smaller share of
people in households where some people work, and the lowest level of worklessness at
under five per cent.
After Sweden the UK, a liberal welfare regime that has placed increasing emphasis on
employment in recent years, has the highest level of people living in households where
all potential workers are in employment, but nonetheless worklessness is over 10 per
cent.
Germany and the Netherlands have similar levels of people living in households where
everyone is in work, but compared to Sweden and the UK a greater proportion living in
households where some but not all potential workers are in employment. This
employment pattern is similar to Hungary, although Hungary has fewer workless people
than any of the countries other than Sweden.
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Portugal’s employment pattern is consistent with the Mediterranean regime. It has the
lowest proportion of people living in households with all potential workers are in
employment, but worklessness is the second lowest, so the country has the highest
proportion of people living in households where some but not all potential workers are in
employment.
Figure 8.1 Employment status (households with at least one potential worker)
Source: Table A7A1
Figure 8.2 Worklessness by tenure (households with at least one potential worker)
MR = Market rental; BMR = below market rental; ORO = outright ownership; MO = mortgaged ownership; OO =
owner occupation
Source: Table A7A1
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Employment has a distinct tenure pattern (Figure 8.2). Worklessness is highest in the
below market rental sectors, and is especially high in the UK where the worklessnes
rate exceeds one-third. The Netherlands is the only exception here; in this country
worklessness is highest in the market rental sector. Market renters exhibit a consistently
above average level of worklessness, although the position relative to other tenures
varies.
It is also notable that the lowest levels of worklessness are among mortgaged owners.
The proportion of mortgaged owners who are workless is quite clearly the lowest of any
tenure in all five countries with data. In contrast, outright owners have relatively high
levels of worklessness: it is above average in all of the five countries with data other
than in Hungary where the tenure is dominant so considerably influences the average.
In the Netherlands the workless rate among outright owners almost matches that of
social renters, although the level recorded among market renters is higher still.
8.3 Housing, Housing Policies and the Impacts on Employment
In this section we examine the new qualitative evidence relating to the impact of
housing on employment opportunities. Three possible impacts are examined in turn:
 creating barriers to inter-regional mobility;
 the creation of financial incentives or disincentives to work as a consequence of
the reduction or loss of housing-related assistance; and
 neighbourhood (or area) effects, whereby concentrations of poor people in
particular neighbourhoods creates higher worklessness rates than would be
expected given the other characteristics of the population (age, educational level,
etc.) through a variety of mechanisms.
Housing and labour mobility
It is frequently asserted that home-ownership inhibits inter-regional labour mobility,
partly through an attachment to ‘home’, high transaction costs and differential house
prices.
VIGNETTE: An owner occupier, who lives with his wife and two dependent
children in a small town with low house prices, is offered a better paid job in the
capital city. He is not sure whether it is worth moving. Commuting will take three
hours a day.
This vignette was used to explore the role that owner occupation plays in informing job
related mobility decisions.
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In all countries it was agreed that the scenario presented in the vignette presented
households with a very difficult decision to make. In a Portuguese focus group
difficulties in moving were attributed to home ownership, the mechanism identified being
the point in the housing market cycle where it is difficult to sell a property:
[To get a job] it is not easy to move a family from a place to another, this is an
empirical conclusion. If the person has a mortgage and there is rigidity on the
market [it may be] difficult to sell... There is a huge influence of the housing
market… People's mobility is weak for emotional reasons also regarding housing
and home owning… Over the last twenty years there has been an option for
homeownership and that makes mobility difficult. This has been pushing back
people's mobility. (Public employment agency, Portugal)
However, experts in all countries all stressed that beyond any attachment to ‘home’ ties
to the local community are especially important for families with children. In the following
quotes from Germany it is noted that these ties and mutual help from the family are in
particular important for lower income households. It is the family and the social ties in
the local community that prevent people from moving, rather than the housing tenure:
A change in the region does not only affect the sole male earner but also the
whole family finances, that is the income of the wife and the money that is
available for the children. Immobility can also be the consequence of a
precarious income situation, which does not allow the family to give up their
social environment, their neighbourhood networks and such… poor people need
this embedding more than other people, who can buy assistance. In that case,
moving on the hope of a better income can be threatening the existence and
even long distance commuting with negative effects on family life will be
accepted. (Practitioner from statutory employment agency, Germany)
The stories of homeless people are full of these cases under all labour market
situations. But things are structurally worse in the current crisis, where the rift
between low income and low housing-price regions has became even deeper.
And then the risk of abandoning ones roots and embedding environment proves
an even greater risk. (Academic expert, Institute for Employment Research,
Germany)
In many cases it seems impossible or at least extremely difficult to find an affordable
dwelling in the capital. In some countries (particularly, Hungary, Portugal and the UK)
the loss of ownership in the case of a move to the capital makes the move additionally
unattractive. However, the combination of higher housing costs (that are likely to apply
to the market rental sector as well as the ownership) and the difficulties in obtaining
rental accommodation are a widespread problem:
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The low cost of living that they have now will have to be considered if they want
to move. House prices are significantly higher in the capital and there are very
long queues to get a flat, especially in attractive locations. (Practitioner, social
services, Sweden)
Mobility in social rental housing
Social rental housing can also inhibit labour market mobility. When asked about housing
options for households in different situations, social housing is often mentioned as an
option that is hard to access, since there are long waiting lists. Even in the Netherlands
with a relatively large social rental sector a long waiting time is required to obtain a
social rental dwelling. Portuguese participants explain the situation in social housing in
their country and the role of security of tenure for social tenants:
I am a big defender of a functioning rental market. One of the reasons for that is
mobility because of new job opportunities… In different stages of a family's life
cycle they may have to move and they are tied up to a house. Many people are
losing job opportunities because they cannot move close to the job… For me
social housing is only a point of passage and not a point of fixation. (Cooperative
Housing Association, Portugal)
The idea that the security offered by social rented housing acts as a deterrent to
mobility has been a concern in other countries. In the UK a recent Housing Minister has
also flirted with the idea of removing security of tenure from new social tenants in order
to increase their incentives to work, mooting the possibility that social housing should
become a tenure of ‘transition’ rather than ‘destination’ as was reported in the UK
report.
Commuting as an alternative to moving
The new evidence demonstrates that the ties to the home and the neighbourhood as
well as the high house prices in the capital are very serious barriers for moving. An
alternative owner occupied dwelling is considered unaffordable and other tenures were
considered a more or less of a sacrifice. In all six countries the participants in the focus
groups considered long distance commuting as the most probable option in this case.
Spending three hours a day commuting is considered acceptable according to some or
even quite normal to others. In some cases reference is made to what is considered
acceptable for people on social security when considering whether or not to accept a
job.
For example, in the UK a three hour commute was widely considered acceptable. While
it was reported that many people are unwilling to travel, Job Centres consider an hour
and a half travel each way (as in example) to be fine: ‘it is what we would expect in
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terms of what is reasonable’ (Job Centre Plus representative, UK). They would take into
account individual circumstances such as whether person has to pick children up from
school, but commutes of this length are not considered to be a reason to turn down a
job and participants in London thought this pretty normal length of commute.
Similar views were expressed in Germany:
Three hours of commuting is acceptable, no discussion. People lose the benefit
(ALGII) if they do not commute. (Practitioner, statutory employment agency,
Germany)
In Sweden the tax system assists commuting and additional allowances exist for people
undertaking very long distance commuting that requires overnight accommodation:
Commuting to work has been discussed as an alternative when a move is not
possible. Swedish tax legislation also facilitate commuting through tax deduction.
Employees commuting more than two kilometres are compensated for travel
expenses exceeding around SEK 9,000 in 2009. Employees commuting to work
more than 50 kilometres are compensated for travel expenses and
accommodation that equals the employee’s actual costs. Compensation for
accommodation is possible for two years. (Labour market expert, Sweden)
Summary
Moving from areas with lower job opportunities to ones with higher opportunities is a
challenge in which the housing market can play a role. Different groups of arguments
play a role here. The social network of the family and the children is of greatest
importance. However, housing market conditions are also mentioned frequently. Finding
an affordable dwelling in the city centre is mostly considered not to be a practical option
and renting in the private rental sector might be expected to be the most probable
alternative. However, this option is considered not very attractive and not worth giving
up the old home and neighbourhood and the old family and social networks. Commuting
three hours a day is the most probable option. The literature suggests that two
characteristics of home ownership may inhibit mobility: transaction cost and attachment
to the home. Our focus groups emphasised that attachment to the tenure could act as a
barrier to moving and was more significant than transaction costs. The latter were
hardly mentioned in the discussions. However, a general attachment to or reliance on
local family and social networks was also a barrier to moving, and there are not specific
to any tenure. Finally, social housing also inhibits mobility due to long waiting lists that
are prevalent in high employment areas such as capital cities.
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Housing and work incentives
Housing allowance: unemployment trap and support
Housing allowances are generally available regardless of employment status, but they
are also usually means tested. These characteristics mean that their impact on
employment incentives can pull in opposite directions:
 they are an in-work as well as an out-of-work benefit so can provide an incentive
to work by helping to protect incomes when someone takes employment; this
may become more important if someone moves to a higher cost area to take
work;
 the means-tested element implies that someone who takes employment is likely
to be entitled to a lower level of housing allowance, so reducing the incentive to
work.
However, as was demonstrated in Chapter 7, in every country other than Portugal (see
Box 8.1), the rates of receipt of housing allowances are considerably higher among
people who are out of work compared to those who are in work. The proportion of
people in work in receipt of housing allowance ranges from 2.3 per cent in Germany to
eight per cent in Portugal (Table 7.3). The evidence in Chapter 7 also showed that
housing allowances have a much greater impact on improving affordability among the
out of work poor compared to the in work poor in five of the six countries, with Portugal
the exception (Figure 7.12). While housing allowances may provide some incentive for
those who do receive it, the proportions are rather low.
VIGNETTE: A single woman with one child (aged 7) is living in a private rented
flat. She has been out of work for some time but has been offered a temporary job
which may or may not become longer-term. She is concerned about paying the
rent if she comes off unemployment-related benefits
The responses to this vignette revealed two kinds of employment disincentive that might
arise:
 the loss of unemployment-related benefits (including housing allowances through
means testing); and
 the delays in reclaiming out-of-work benefits should the temporary job end and
the person return to unemployment.
In an effort to demonstrate the advantages of taking employment in the UK the Job
Centre Plus should provide a ‘better off’ calculation where they would estimate what she
would get financially if she accepts the job. They take into account her wage, Housing
Benefit, Working Tax Credit and child care costs. However, the loss of benefits
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(including housing allowance) and the expenses associated with working can make it
insufficiently attractive:
The issue with temporary employment for single parents is that a lot of the time
they’re not financially better off taking a temporary position as it does have that
impact on the housing and benefits. (Civil servant, Job Centre Plus, responsible
for rolling out programme of local centres working with social landlords and local
authorities on housing estates to find employment for people, UK).
[I’ve] seen similar situation and advised not to take work. The time it takes to
process benefits and how much will be lost. (Private company contracted to
JCP/DWP to find employment for unemployed, UK)
Similar considerations are present in the Netherlands:
… it is very important that the person in the vignette makes a good calculation
with her client manager at the social security office. (Policy maker,
welfare/social/employment issues, municipality, Netherlands)
In the official municipal policies, work comes above all other things. However, if
this would be a friend of mine, I would advise her to wait for a steadier job.
(Advisor, department of social affairs, municipality, Netherlands)
These quotes suggest that in the UK and the Netherlands when costs are higher than
benefits the advice would be to refuse the job. Moreover, the calculation of costs and
benefits takes the effect of housing allowances into account as the eligibility may
change due to the new work situation. In Hungary it was emphasised by the participants
in the focus group that that social allowances do not depend on employment status.
People do not lose their eligibility for social allowances because they return to work as
most of the benefits depend not on the employment status but on the income level. The
only type of income which relates to employment status is unemployment benefit, and
once this expires, the basic social allowance.
Benefit combined with working in the informal economy can be considered a more
attractive option, as was reported by the Hungarian team. The calculation whether it is
worth working or not heavily depends on the social background. If she is socialised to
claim social benefits at the same time as working in the informal economy, than legal
low paid employment would represent a loss both financially and in terms of leisure
time. Unfortunately, the problem of future pension and social care entitlement is not a
factor influencing the choice in most cases. If she is used to work in the legal sector,
than she would be eager to work again.
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Even if the person were to be financially better off in work, people are afraid to take the
job because if they lose it they will have to wait some time before they receive their
benefits:
People think: ‘If I lose my job, I have no welfare benefit for six weeks. In this time
I can not pay my rent and my debts will rise. Thus, there is no point in taking the
job.’(Policymaker centre for social development, Netherlands)
In some countries focus group participants were keen to stress moral considerations
above financial ones, emphasising that the person should accept the insecure job. In
Portugal, Germany and Sweden the focus groups suggested that there is a strong
emphasis on the importance of being in work and earning your own money. The risks of
the flexible job are considered to be manageable. But, of course there also is the threat
of losing the benefit. As mentioned before three hours of commuting is in Sweden and
Germany considered acceptable by benefit and employment authorities.
I believe it is important for her self esteem to take the job. What is she going to
do otherwise, turn the job down and continue to live on benefits? No person
wants to live like that. (Practitioner, psychiatric care/family unit, Sweden)
On the one hand there is a risk that the job does not become permanent, but on
the other hand she risks her unemployment benefits if she turns the job down.
(Practitioner, Unemployment agency, Sweden)
In Portugal all participants in the focus group agreed that this woman should accept the
job, since the risks are manageable. Refusal was regarded as not being an option.
VIGNETTE: A single unemployed woman who lives in a flat on a peripheral estate
in a large city is offered a low paid job with flexible hours in the city centre. She
has no car and is dependent on public transport
This vignette is designed identify whether public transport links to local labour markets
inhibit employment for people living in poor neighbourhoods. It also helps to explore
whether the housing system can support employment.
It is surprising that transport was not raised as an issue more often in the focus groups.
In Germany the work culture expected in welfare organisations is clear:
Just get into the municipal railway from Dortmund to Düsseldorf in the morning at
three o’clock. You’ll be astonished to see how many people are travelling to
work. (Practitioner from a confessional welfare organisation, Duisburg; North-
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany)
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The quality of public transport or the lack of public transport was hardly mentioned in the
focus groups except for Portugal. In particular the lack of public transport from places in
the surroundings of Lisbon to the city where the jobs are concentrated is considered a
problem:
Well, I have an example of a relative who some years ago had a job with such a
timetable that he would come out and since there was no transport he had to
sleep in a bench up to the first bus. This was horrible. Of course now it is
different. But there are areas where it is still difficult to find public transport.
(Trade Union Federation, Portugal)
This poor public transport, makes moving house more attractive. In this case moving to
the private rental sector with the help of the Porta 65 housing allowance scheme is
explicitly mentioned as an option.
I think she could try access to the NRAU social or depending on her age she
could try the Porta 65 Jovem. Although the rents inside Lisbon are very
expensive. She could try to apply for social housing in the municipality… (Policy
maker, housing sector, Portugal)
In contrast to public transport, the question of moving on and off benefits was raised in
all countries. The Job Centre Plus (in the UK) provides a better off calculation (which
shows the claimant how much money they would have in work compared to staying on
benefits), whereas in the Netherlands and Germany participants stress the role of the
client manager of the welfare office. They can help to inform the decision, in Germany
there were complaints that the service is over-stretched;
Everybody is overstressed and covered in the new regulations all the time. You
do not need research in order to find out that under constant reorganising and
legal changes no decent consultation is possible, especially as job cuts are as
present within the helping institutions as on the general labour market. And case
loads are mounting up. (Academic expert and practitioner of a religious social
service provider, Germany)
Housing allowance was also considered to be particularly important in the UK and the
Netherlands, especially when the person wants to move closer to the job. All agree that
a private rental dwelling is the only option in the short run and this option can be made
affordable by housing allowance. Therefore housing allowance can in particular in the
private rental sector support housing market mobility.
The Porta 65 example of Portugal (Box 8.1) shows how this housing subsidy scheme
supports young people to live independently and also to be mobile in the housing
market. Since home ownership became harder to access for young people, this scheme
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provides them an opportunity to live independently and allows them to be able to be
mobile in the housing market as well as in the labour market.
Box 8.1 Good Practice Example: Porta 65 Jovem, Portugal
Porta 65 Jovem is a national programme launched in 2006 which aims to support young
people – particularly those with lower incomes – by financially supporting their access to
rented housing.
Porta 65 Jovem focuses mainly on low income tenants (with a rental contract) aged from
18 to 30 years old. In order to apply for this allowance, young people must not be
benefiting from any other form of housing support, they may not be home owners or
landlords, and they must not be related to their landlord. Certain categories are
prioritised e.g. young lone parents and disabled young people. The allowance is granted
for at least one year and it can be extended up to a total of three years, with the value of
the allowance related to income levels and gradually decreasing over time.
An internal evaluation of Porta 65 Jovem was conducted by the government bodies
involved in delivering it. This evaluation provides only limited information and is mainly
focused on the operational aspects of its implementation (some though not all of its
detailed recommendations have already been acted upon). However, the key point is
that this initiative was an important step forward in the Portuguese context of a very
weak rental market and no general housing allowance scheme. It contains some
interesting elements which may be particularly useful in countries where the private
rental market is characterised by relative (or strong) rigidity, where the social housing
sector is weak, and where there are no large housing associations. In these
circumstances, it is important that the state plays a pro-active role in diversifying young
people’s opportunities for independent living. Such interventions can enhance young
people’s residential mobility in a social and cultural context where the lack of alternatives
to home ownership has created obstacles to such mobility, with obvious impacts on
labour market flexibility.
Moreover, in the case of unemployment and other problems decent housing that can be
called a ‘home’, seems an essential base from which to be able to participate in society
and in the labour market. An example of the housing market supporting the labour
market is Flexibel Wonen (Box 8.2) in the Netherlands. This special housing facility is
targeted at special groups that need some guidance in living independently, for example
people who have been released from prison, or who have recently overcome an
addiction problem. Without help in finding a house and a job they might fall back in old
habits and old cultures. Support in finding a house, a private place to feel at home, can
play an important role in the well being of people and support their search for a job.
Flexibel Wonen is a joint initiative of housing associations in the Netherlands that is
specialised in providing housing including guidance to independent living.
168
Box 8.2 Good Practice Example: Flexibel Wonen, Netherlands
The main aim of Flexibel Wonen is to provide a custom-made approach for vulnerable groups in
the housing market. Flexibel Wonen offers housing with supervision to various groups such as ex-
detainees, ex-addicts, people with mental health problems, teenage mothers and people who
have caused problems in a normal rental dwelling. Flexibel Wonen attempts to fill in the often
missing link between the intensive care and supervision that vulnerable people receive in
accommodation that is provided by care providers and living without support and supervision in a
normal social rental dwelling.
At the moment, Flexibel Wonen manages about 1,200 housing units and this number is still
growing. The organization offers employment to 14 people. The three housing associations that
participate in Flexibel Wonen are very important players in the housing market in the Rotterdam
region. Together, they manage about 100,000 dwellings. The participating housing associations
have to take care that sufficient dwellings are available for the clients of Flexibel Wonen. The
ownership of these dwellings remains with the housing associations but Flexibel Wonen takes
over the management and the client contacts.
An official evaluation of Flexibel Wonen is planned but has not been carried out yet. Nevertheless,
given the fact that the organization manages a still growing number of dwellings, they seem to
have filled a gap in the market. Flexibel Wonen enables the participating housing associations to
realize their ambitions with regard to housing vulnerable groups, whereas the concept of housing
supervision keeps the nuisances and annoyances that this might entail under control. Flexibel
Wonen shows that cooperation between housing associations can lead to a more integrated and
professional approach with regard to the so-called basement of the housing market. Because
Flexibel Wonen only houses vulnerable people, its employees are very well trained in dealing with
this group. Employees of ‘normal’ housing associations often lack such experience. Furthermore,
because of the small scale of the organization, the employees of Flexibel Wonen know their
tenants and their problems generally very well so that a custom-made approach can be offered.
Moreover, Flexibel Wonen makes the housing market for vulnerable groups more easily identified
for welfare providers because it concentrates the housing provision for the clients of these
providers in one single point. This practice shows that the concept of housing supervision and
specialization in vulnerable groups can work well.
Summary
There apparently is a difference between countries in the way they emphasise the
importance of being in work. It seems to be the ‘culture of work’ rather than the housing
system itself that influences whether it is regarded as being reasonable to take a job. In
Sweden, Portugal and Germany there is strongly expressed opinion that the person in
our vignette should of course accept the flexible job. While the practical considerations
are acknowledged the dominant opinion in the focus groups is that the job should be
accepted.
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In the Netherlands and the UK, the discourse among policy makers and practitioners is
quite different: financial benefits are considered to be more important than in Sweden,
Portugal and Germany. The implicit assumption here is that it is acceptable to refuse
the job if the costs are higher than the benefits. This is best illustrated by the ‘better off’
calculations as used in the UK, although it should be noted that these were introduced
partly to demonstrate to claimants that they would be better off in paid employment. In
these two countries the housing allowance is taken into account here and can thus play
a role in the decision whether to accept the job or not. This suggests that housing costs
and housing allowances do play a role in informing employment decisions in the
Netherlands and the UK.
In Portugal the housing allowance is mentioned as support for people to find an
affordable place to live in the private rental sector. This scheme is especially meant for
young people who experience problems in accessing home ownership. The good
practice of Portugal (Box 8.1) describes the success of this scheme and the way it
enables mobility in the housing market and therefore impacts on employment
opportunities.
Another way in which housing can support labour market opportunities is showed by the
initiative of Flexibel Wonen in the Netherlands. It supports independent living and
increases labour market opportunities by providing tailor made housing and guidance
options for people leaving problematic circumstances.
In Hungary there is a clear reference to the existence of two different worlds or labour
markets. In the first world of formal work, the person should of course accept the job.
There is however a thriving informal economy and people who are socialised in this
world will prefer to stay on social benefit and combine this with working in the informal
economy. No temporary job is considered competitive in this world. These
considerations have little or nothing to do with the housing system.
Neighbourhood effects
There are several reasons why concentrations of low income people in particular
neighborhoods might be expected to affect their chances of employment, but all of them
are hard to prove. We examine whether a ‘culture’ of worklessness whereby the
influence of (unemployed) neighbours itself discourages people from taking work plays
a role and whether people living in certain neighbourhoods suffer discrimination by
employers based on where they live. However, before we address these issues we
provide some contextual information on the link between employment status and
neighbourhood quality.
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Employment status and neighbourhood quality
There is some evidence of a relationship between employment status and
neighbourhood quality from the EU-SILC data (Figures 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6), which identify
problems with noise, pollution and crime/ vandalism respectively.
Figure 8.4 Percent reporting noise from neighbours or the street
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
DE HU NL PT SE UK
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge IW
OWS
OWL
IW= in work; OWS = out of work for less than one year; out of work for more than one year
Source: Table EX1
Figure 8.5 Percent reporting pollution, grime or other environmental problems
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Figure 8.6 Proportion reporting crime, violence or vandalism
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Although there is a clear tendency for short term workless people to report problems
with these indicators of neighbourhood quality more frequently than people in work, the
differences are usually no more than a few percentage points. However, a stronger
pattern emerges when the long term workless are compared to those people who are in
work. In Germany, Portugal and the UK people who are long term workless are more
likely to report neighbourhood problems across all three indicators than are people who
are in work. In the other countries the long term workless are more likely to report
problems across two of the three indicators and it is notable that where they are not the
differences a usually small. However, where the difficulties are more pronounced
among the long term workless population the differences are often quite large. So it
seems that there is a relationship between long term worklessness and neighbourhood
quality. However, this does not indicate that living in a poor quality neighbourhood
actually exerts an independent influence over employment outcomes.
Cultures of worklessness and illegal work
By area effects we mean the impact of concentrations of poor people living in a
particular neighbourhood have on their chances of employment independently of the
characteristics of the people themselves.
An interesting finding from the focus groups was that although alternative cultures exist
in poverty neighbourhoods, these were not necessarily inimitable to work. This is
especially the case when poverty neighbourhoods facilitate the development of social
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networks that in turn aid the development of informal labour markets, as is the case in
Hungary. The attraction of illegal work is that it can be combined with claiming social
security benefits and is therefore a partial solution to the problem of making work pay.
The black and grey labour markets are also considered to be an issue in the UK.
…one of the problems we have is that we are competing with the black market.
People are actually doing really well in the black market and grey market…but
we’ve got 27 people into employment this year, all of them are in [the] retail
sector, it’s low paid and, you know, crime pays! (Local authority housing
department representative, UK)
In Germany we also found evidence for the existence of poverty cultures that
discourage people from searching for or accepting a job in the formal labour market.
A segmented urban structure forces the poor into living within their own realm,
reinforcing exclusion and socio-economic and cultural disadvantages. This leads
to the development of a culture of poverty, which becomes sticky over time and
prevents people from ever trying other paths or regions. (Academic expert from
Institute of Employment Research, Germany)
In the Hungarian and German case the neighbourhood is central in the argument.
Housing tenures are not mentioned as key factor here. Housing tenure is however
mentioned as a factor that can contribute to reinforcing such cultures of poverty as the
example of social housing in the UK shows. The participants emphasise that it is not
social housing as such, but the allocation system that causes dependency:
Poor people themselves are not the problem… social housing is a race to the
bottom in terms of eligibility and we are putting people with mental health
problems, single people on estates… that is why there is no confidence, I get
angry with social services who demand a social housing tenancy for young
person leaving care but is it the best place for them on the estate or should they
explore PRS [private rented sector] tenancy, why do they need a tenancy for life,
why not have a more sophisticated response? (Assistant Director, Local Authority
Housing Department, Enhanced Housing Options Trailblazer, UK)
Approaches aiming to tackle the ‘culture of poverty’
A variety of approaches is used to tackle the problems associated with poverty
neighbourhoods.
One approach is to divert low income and vulnerable people away from such
neighbourhoods. The Protected Market Sector project in Germany is an example of this
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(Box 8.3). It specialises in providing support to a target group that needs help to get
access to mainstream housing. This includes the strategic aim of dispersing these
people in difficult situations in different parts of the housing stock and contributes with
that to social mix in housing and preventing poverty neighbourhoods.
Box 8.3 Good practice example: Protected Market Sector, Germany
Cooperation contract ‘Protected Market Sector’ (Kooperationsvertrag Geschütztes
Marktsegment), Berlin. A contract between the Berlin State Office for Health and Social
Affairs (Landesamt für Gesundheit und Soziales, LAGESO) and public and private
housing providers aiming at affordable housing provision for households in urgent need
of housing.
The three main objectives of the ‘Protected Market Sector’ are:
 housing allocation for homeless people or residents in a precarious housing
situation;
 protection of supply for the target group; and
 adjustment of claims arising out of rent arrears of the tenants contracted through
a guarantee fund.
The contract between the public administration and the housing companies aims at the
joint provision of permanent housing for homeless people and households in urgent
need of housing. Within this contract, the access to and protection of housing for
disadvantaged groups is guaranteed by binding agreements between the city of Berlin
and the providers. Its concept aims at a cross-departmental cooperation and comprises
all Berlin districts and the involved housing providers. The strategy considers the special
kind of support needed by the target group to get access to ‘normal’ housing. Also, it
takes into account the interest of the housing companies to minimize their risks, such as
rent arreas, anti-social behaviour and overuse of the premises by the prospective tenant.
Furthermore, there is a strategic aim, concerning integrated urban development:
dispersing people in socially difficult situations in very different parts of the stock is being
understood as a contribution to social mix in housing/urban development and the
prevention of poverty neighbourhoods.
Another approach is to supporting individual people to take up employment. Participants
in the focus groups emphasise that cultures of poverty can be very persistent. It is hard
to break with such a culture, though it is considered worth trying. Guiding people and
helping them to adjust to a normal working life is applied in many countries.
174
It’s about getting people used to going to work, the idea of having a 9-5 job, the
routine, a lot of people don’t have that. (Voluntary sector manager training long
term unemployed people, UK)
The individual approach does not always work well when the ‘poverty environment’
does not change. A Dutch project manager at an employment integration company
observes an effect of the neighbourhood when selecting people for a reintegration
process.
The atmosphere in such neighbourhoods is not pleasant. There are so many
unemployed people and only a few are selected to be dealt with. People see it
often as a punishment when they are selected for a reintegration project.
(Employment integration company, Netherlands)
This results in a recommendation to combine this individual level approach with a
neighbourhood approach:
Nowadays, only some people in a neighbourhood with high unemployment are
dealt with (e.g. they are activated), whereas it would probably be better to
activate all unemployed people in the area at the same time. The whole street
should go to work. (Employment integration company, Netherlands)
In the UK help from children’s centres is considered a way to change the culture and
create the norm of working among single mothers. In some areas in the UK advice is
available from children’s centres: they provide extended hours wrapped around care at
schools. In some municipalities Job Centres Plus has advisers who are working in
children’s centres where they are directly facilitating childcare and returns to work.
Joined-up working in this area is now seen as the norm and is getting better. This helps
to set the norm of ‘working’ among single mothers.
These examples show that a combination of an individual approach and additional
action to change the social environment is considered more promising than individual
help alone. A very clear practice of such a mix is described in an Hungarian good
practice. This practice concerns a regeneration project in Budapest (Box 8.4).
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Box 8..4 Good practice example: Socially sensitive regeneration programme in the
Magdolna Quarter, Budapest, Hungary
This pilot project in Hungary is a new neighbourhood oriented urban renewal scheme with
the strong participation of the local communities. The broader aim of the programme is to
stop the deprivation cycle in the neighbourhood by enhancing the quality of life and
reinforcing social cohesion in the neighbourhood. This project combines the aim of improving
the neighbourhood, the employment opportunities and the education level of people as well
as the quality of the dwellings.
Basic social and economic indicators in Magdolna Quarter
Indicators data
Population with no more than elementary school education completed 15-60 years old 35.0%
Economically active population (share of total population) 40.3%
Unemployment (share of economically active population) 12.6%
Households with at least one unemployed member (share of all households) 11.0%
Location indexes calculated from the regular local social subsidies 1.25-2.4
Rate of public rental flats 36.0%
Flats without basic amenities (no wc and/or bathroom) 21.0%
Rate of the overcrowded flats 1 (more than 1 person/room) 39.9%
Rate of the overcrowded flats 2 (more than 2 person/room) 13.8%
Rate of arrears 16.8%
Rate of the arrears (public tenants) 21.1%
Rate of the arrears (owners) 12.0%
Rate of households who became victim of crime in previous year 11.7%
Source: RÉV8
The programme has two important lessons:
First, an important lesson is that to implement an integrated regeneration programme an
independent organization must be set up that works on the spot closely with the local people.
The organization must have relevant competencies and has to enjoy the full support of the
local government. According to the Hungarian experience local governments usually prefer
not to delegate such a task to a more or less independent organization, but rather they keep
it in-house distributing the different related tasks among their departments and institutions.
However such an organizational scheme is unable to ensure the necessary high level
cooperation among the relevant stakeholders and the permanent relationship building with
the local people and other non-governmental players.
Second, an important condition of such programmes is the active involvement of the local people
through intensive partnership building and community development. The Magdolna case gives a
good example of the way in which the participation of local people c an be achieved.
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The case of Magdolna programme is most likely to be of interest to other former socialist
countries which have similar problems of deprived neighbourhoods with high proportion of
marginalised Roma communities.
Area based discrimination
The focus here is on the perception of the employer and the strategy to accept or not
accept employees from certain neighbourhoods. Participants in Portugal emphasise that
living in poverty neighbourhoods is a barrier when people are looking for a job.
I think when people go to the local employment centre it is always complicated to
say where you live. You can be a fantastic person, extremely competent but as
soon as you say for example that you live in Quinta do Mocho, my god… How
can we get out of this social stigma? And for women particularly this is very
difficult because she still has the responsibility for most homely things and feels
this stigma everyday. (Trade Union Federation, Portugal)
I went with a youngster to a job interview and they were all excited with his
application. They practically said the job was his. But when he said he was living
in Venda Nova, in the 6 de Maio quarter, they suddenly said that the vacancy
was already taken. (Local private entity, Portugal)
However, in the Netherlands people helping to integrate people who are unemployed for
a longer time report no experience with area based discrimination.
I have never heard that people are rejected on the basis of their postal code.
(Practitioner reintegration company, Netherlands)
The Dutch expert on neighbourhood research agrees with this. According to him, many
employers are not even aware of the reputation of a particular neighbourhood or postal
code area.
Summary
In the focus groups there were some examples of poverty cultures that inhibit labour
market participation, in particular in Hungary, Germany and the UK. Such cultures can
tie people to the neighbourhood and provide disincentives to work, but also, in the case
of Hungary at least to a vibrant black market culture. Here there is not so much a culture
of worklessness but of illegal working. In the UK we found indications that housing and
in particular the social rental sector, may contribute to poverty neighbourhoods through
the allocation of social rented housing to low income and in particular vulnerable people,
who seem unlikely to be reconnected with the labour market. In the Portuguese case we
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found evidence that area based discrimination takes places. Employers hesitate or
refuse to hire people from certain areas. All in all these small pieces of evidence add up
to suggest that in some countries neighbourhood effects exist, or more precisely there is
a strong belief among experts that neighbourhood effects exist.
In all countries different schemes to help specific groups of people to find their way into
the labour market have been developed. These often concern help targeted at
individuals which aims to assist the person to gain employment and adjust to a work
culture. We found indications in the UK and the Netherlands that help to change the
culture may support these individual approaches.
Another approach aims to prevent vulnerable groups entering poverty neighbourhoods,
as is the case with the protected market initiative in Germany. These people are
dispersed over different landlords in different areas. Another example of a partnership
approach to help people and to prevent concentration neighbourhoods is the urban
regeneration project in Budapest. We found indications that different ways to prevent or
change cultures of poverty, may support individual level employment schemes.
8.4 Housing Policy and Employment
Introduction
In this section we present econometric analysis of the impact of three elements of
housing policies or housing systems that might be expected to impact on employment.
These are:
 housing allowances;
 social and other below market rental housing; and
 outright or low debt home-ownership.
Two exercises are conducted. The first is a logit analysis using a discrete choice model
that estimates the links between the housing system and the chances of employment.
The second is a duration model that estimates the links between the housing system
and the duration of unemployment.
Both exercises are based on the EU-SILC dataset, described in Chapter 3. This dataset
contains both cross-sectional and longitudinal information on income, poverty, social
exclusion and living conditions within all EU Member States. It contains data both on the
household level and the individual level. Because labour supply and unemployment are
basically individual phenomena, we will focus on the information collected at the
individual level. The information on household level will be used as background
information, which may be used as explanatory variables in the analysis.
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A discrete choice model of employment and housing policy
In our discrete choice model of the relationship between employment and housing
policy, we will restrict our attention to potential workers. We will assume that they have
the choice between accepting and refusing employment. People who worked at least 6
months in 2007, either full time or part time, are considered to have accepted
employment. It is assumed that people who worked less have ‘chosen’ to remain
unemployed.11
EU-SILC contains much information on the amount of housing allowances that
households receive. Information in EU SILC on the provision of social rented housing is
less abundant, and the problems of the ‘below market rent’ category are discussed in
Chapter 3. We would also like to have additional knowledge, such as monetary
assessments of the advantage yielded by a social rented dwelling. Unfortunately, such
information is not available in EU-SILC, so we had to proceed without it.12 Indications
concerning low-debt owner-occupied housing are twofold: we know a household’s
mortgage repayments, and we know whether a household owns outright. The latter may
be used as a proxy of the size of a household’s mortgage. So, given the information
available in EU-SILC we have use the following indicators of housing policy as
explanatory variables: housing allowances, social renting, outright ownership, and
interest repayment. We adjusted housing allowances and interest repayment for
household size by dividing them by equivalized household size.13
As additional covariates we specified education, age, and household size. We expected
these variables to contribute additional explanatory power to the model, although they
are not the focus of this exercise. Education is expected to have a positive effect on
employment. The effect of age may be ambiguous: older people will in general have
had more time to generate human capital, which increases their employment
perspectives. On the other hand, once they are unemployed it may become harder for
11 Within a discrete choice framework it is a technical assumption that all cases can choose between a
fixed number of options. In practice some unemployed people may not have had a chance to accept work
at all. Ideally one would like to exclude such cases. However, because such information is unavailable it
is assumed here that all people who have not worked more than 6 months in 2007 have chosen to remain
unemployed. Note that such assumptions are not unusual in applied labour supply models.
12 This may give rise to a missing variable bias, so care is needed in the interpretation of results.
13 Define HM14plus as the number of household members aged 14 and over and define HM13minus as
the number of household members aged 13 or less Then the equivalised household size is defined as: 1+
0.5 * (HM14plus - 1) + 0.3 * HM13minus. It is not unusual to correct monetary amounts that households
receive for household size.
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older people to find work. This may be caused by their relatively high reservation wages
(that is the lowest wage that someone would work for), but also by age discrimination. A
larger household size may make it harder for individuals to move to distant locations
with better employment perspectives. So, we might expect household size to have a
negative impact – if any – on the probability of finding employment.
We thus specify the following logit model (see Chapter 3):
log(p /(1 – p)) = Intercept +
β1 · Equivalized hosuing allowance/1000 +
β2 · Social/ BMR tenant +
β3 · Outright owner +
β4 · Equivalized interest repayment/1000 +
β5 · Education +
β6 · Age +
β7 · Household size
We estimate this model for the six countries involved in this study. For this purpose we
divide the cross-sectional version of EU-SILC 2007 into six mutually exclusive subsets.
The estimates of the British, the Dutch, and the Swedish model parameters are
presented in Table 8.1.
180
Table 8.1 Parameters and significance levels of the logit model estimated for each of the
countries separately
UK NL SE
βj Sign. βj Sign. βj Sign.
Intercept 2.266 *** 1.625 *** -
0.778
***
Equivalized housing allowances -
0.649
*** -
0.810
*** -
0.982
***
Social tenant/ BMR -
0.780
*** -
0.136
* 0.034
Outright owner -
0.592
*** -
0.364
*** -
0.281
**
Equivalized interest repayment -
0.009
0.080 *** 0.256 *
Education 0.247 *** 0.330 *** 0.294 ***
Age 0.008 ** -
0.039
*** 0.056 ***
Household size -
0.329
*** 0.100 *** -
0.052
Base: all individuals with self-declared main activity. Significance levels: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Source: EU-SILC
For all these countries the impact of equivalised housing allowance is significant. This
suggests that among potential workers in United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Sweden housing allowances cause a decrease in the probability of accepting
employment. Living in the British – and to a lesser extent the Swedish – BMR sector
also seems to have detrimental effects on a person's probability of being employed. For
the Netherlands the parameter of social tenant is insignificant. This may be related to
the fact that the Dutch and Swedish BMR sectors are more targeted to medium-income
tenants than its British counterpart. However, since the mainstream municipal housing
sector in Sweden is classified as ‘market rental’ this explanation seems unlikely in this
case.
The sign and magnitude of the parameters of outright owner are clear. For the three
countries outright ownership tends to depress the probability of accepting employment.
A potential explanation is that having little to pay for housing makes it easier to live
without employment. This effect of equivalized interest repayments is only significant for
the Netherlands and Sweden. The Dutch and Swedish cases with larger mortgages
thus seem more willing to choose employment. This is in line with the argument that a
low level of housing expenditure makes it easier to live without employment.
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It should be stressed here that statistical significance does not necessarily imply a
causal relationship. For example, the above analysis does not show that housing
allowances are a cause of unemployment. They may cause unemployment, but the
causality may also be reverse: Incomes of the unemployed will be lower than the
incomes of those who work, and this will be a reason why the unemployed receive
housing allowances relatively more often. For similar reasons the analysis does not
support conclusions on the causal direction of the relationship between the other
indicators of housing policy and the probability of employment.14
In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden education provides a significant
contribution to the probability of finding employment. This is in line with the
expectations. Among the British and Swedish cases age tends to increase the
probability of employment. In these two countries human capital accumulation seems be
the dominant factor. However, the opposite seems true for the Netherlands. Higher
wages and/or age discrimination may be more important factors here. Finally, in the
United Kingdom and Sweden the impact of household size on one's probability to find
employment is negative. As explained above, a reason could be that individuals in
larger households are comparatively more attached to their current location. Again,
among Dutch cases the effect is the other way around.
Table 8.2 Parameters and significance levels of the logit model estimated for each of the
countries
DE HU PT
βj Sign. βj Sign. βj Sign.
Intercept 0.362 * -1.095 *** 0.863 ***
Equivalized housing allowances -0.757 *** -7.090 *** 0.462
Social tenant/ BMR -0.287 *** -0.080 -0.295 *
Outright owner NA 0.036 0.137
Equivalized interest repayment NA 0.311 * 0.528 ***
Education 0.427 *** 0.528 *** 1.007 ***
Age -0.015 *** 0.030 *** -0.005 *
Household size -0.048 -0.129 *** 0.014
Base: all individuals with self-declared main activity. Significance levels: *** = p < 0.001; ** = p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Source: EU-SILC
14Substantial statements on causality require the availability of independent variables. Note that education, age, and
household size can more easily be considered as potential independent variables.
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Table 8.2 presents the parameter estimates for the other three countries: Germany,
Hungary and Portugal. Due to the lacking information on mortgage interest repayments
the German results have to be interpreted with additional caution.15 For Germany the
variable equivalized housing allowances has a negative effect on the probability of work.
This is similar to what we have found so far. The parameter of social rental is also
negative in Germany, which coincides with what we found in the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands. Among the German cases the sign of education is also plausible and
significant. The variable age decreases the odds to find work. Like in the Dutch case,
this may be an indication of higher labour costs and/or age discrimination outweighing
the human capital effect.
The results for Hungary and Portugal are quite similar to the results for countries
analyzed thus far. In Hungary housing allowance has a highly significant negative
impact on employment. This coincides with what we observed for the other countries. In
Portugal this effect is insignificant, which may be related to the relative lack of income
targeting in the Portuguese system of housing allowance (see section 8.3). In Portugal
social tenancies seem to decrease the probability of working, but this is not the case in
Portugal. In both countries outright ownership does not have a significant impact.
However, this is compensated by the positive effect of equivalized interest repayments
on employment. It suggests that cases with larger mortgage loans are also more willing
to accept employment in these countries.
Unemployment duration and housing policy
In this section we examine the impact of the different aspects of housing policy/ housing
systems on the length of an individual’s unemployment spell. A proportional hazards
model of unemployment duration is employed.
For this purpose we construct unemployment spells on the basis of the longitudinal
version of EU-SILC. In each month the main activity of each individual in EU-SILC is
known. For most of the countries there are currently three annual waves of EU SILC
data.16 The cases in these waves can in principle be followed across waves. This
means that the information on unemployment spells in EU-SILC mostly spans 36
months. Germany is an exception, since the German waves lack the information that is
needed to follow individuals. For this reason we had to restrict our attention to five
countries. EU-SILC does not provide complete information on all the cases of these
15 The remaining parameters may pick up a part of the impact of the missing information. This may cause
biased results.
16Sweden was already included in EU SILC in 2004. So there are currently four Swedish waves.
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countries. Every year a number of cases are dropped from EU-SILC, whereas new
cases are added.
For the construction of our data set we selected all individuals who experienced a
transition from unemployment into employment. Those who after an unemployment
spell become unavailable for employment are also discarded. The same applies to
cases that were already unemployed when they entered EU-SILC. It turns out that some
of the remaining cases experience multiple unemployment spells. In such cases only
the first registered unemployment spell is retained in the duration analysis. The above
selection criteria enable us to construct a dataset with 1,758 unemployment spells (see
Table 8.4 at the end of this chapter for more information on the dataset.)
In our proportional hazards model we include the same explanatory variables that we
used in the discrete choice model. Table 8.3 summarizes the estimated parameters:
Table 8.3 Parameters and significance levels of the proportional hazards model
estimated for each of the countries separately
UK NL SE
βj Sign. βj Sign. βj Sign.
Equivalized housing allowances -0.096 0.796 -0.355
Social tenant/BMR -0.297 0.161 -0.310
Outright owner -0.181 NA NA NA NA
Equivalized interest repayment NA NA -0.137 NA NA
Education 0.025 0.084 0.086
Age -0.002 -0.046 *** -0.024 ***
Household size 0.002 0.228 ** -0.066
HU PT
βj Sign. βj Sign.
Equivalized housing allowances -2.120 0.291
Social tenant 0.020 -0.438
Outright owner 0.169 -0.891
Equivalized interest repayment -2.582 NA NA
Education 0.084 0.017
Age -0.022 *** -0.022 ***
Household size 0.028 0.065
Base: all individuals who experience a unemployment spell. Weights: none.
Source: EU-SILC
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It turns out that apart from age none of the estimates is highly significant. There is no
clear pattern in the signs and magnitudes of the indicators of housing policy. It might be
hypothesized that sign of the housing allowances parameter should be negative. This
would mean that individuals with housing allowances experience longer unemployment
spells. However, there is no evidence of such an effect. The parameter of social tenant
is not significant either. This could be related to the definition of this indicator in the data
set. Furthermore, there are so few owner-occupiers in the dataset, that the parameters
for equivalized mortgage repayments and outright ownership can hardly be estimated.
Those parameters of the indicators of owner-occupied housing policy that can be
estimated are all highly insignificant.
The sign of age parameter, the only significant effect, is plausible: it suggests that
among the unemployed cost considerations and/or the age discrimination dominate the
effect of human capital accumulation. The sign of the education parameter is negative in
all counties. This suggests that education decreases the expected length of
unemployment spell. Although the effect is insignificant, this would be plausible. In most
countries household size seems to contribute to the length unemployment spells,
although this effect is only significant in the Netherlands. A plausible reason for this
effect could be that individuals in larger households find it more difficult to move to
distant locations, where more employment opportunities may exist.
Summary
In all countries apart from Portugal we find a significant inverse relationship between
housing allowances and employment. In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Germany and Portugal a similar relationship exists between living in the social rented
sector and employment. Our analysis further suggests that low-debt housing has a
negative relationship on employment.
A reason for the first result may be that housing allowances cause employment
disincentives. However, another potential explanation is that the unemployed will have
lower incomes, which may make them eligible for housing allowances to a larger extent.
Therefore, the above analysis does not justify conclusions about the direction of the
causal relationship. A similar type of reasoning may be applied to the share of the
unemployed in the social rented/ BMR sector. Allocation policies may make it easier for
them to acquire social rented housing. So, the possibility of reverse causation once
more prevents us from drawing the conclusion that living in the social rented sector
causes unemployment. In the case of low-debt housing the reason may be that lower
housing expenditure makes it easier to live without employment. On the other hand, the
unemployed will be less inclined and able to get large mortgages. So again, there is
very little we can say about causation.
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The analysis of the model of unemployment duration does not support strong
conclusions either. None of the estimated parameters of the indicators of policy
instruments were significant. This is partially due to the much smaller samples that were
used to estimate this model. Owner-occupiers hardly experience unemployment spells,
but tenant behaviour is not easy to explain either.
All in all, it has turned out difficult to disentangle the relationship between the housing
market and employment. Within the limitations of the database and the used methods,
we found no evidence for a causal relation between housing subsidies and probability of
worklessness. More waves in EU-SILC, information on transaction costs, commuting
distances, implicit subsidies, and so on, may provide a more sophisticated picture.
8.5 Conclusions
Housing can influence labour market opportunities in different ways; housing can inhibit
and support getting people into (better) jobs. But the relation is never straightforward
since other factors play a role too. We have examined three relationships between
housing and labour market:
 inhibition of mobility;
 financial (dis)incentives in the labour market; and
 neighbourhood effects.
Labour mobility
The housing market can inhibit mobility and therefore finding a job or moving to a better
job. Housing tenure may prevent people from moving to a (better) job. While the
literature hypothesises that transaction costs and attachment to home may reduce
mobility of owner occupiers, our new evidence found little support for the role of
transaction costs, but did suggest that housing market downturns can inhibit mobility by
making it difficult to sell properties and that high house prices in growth areas can deter
owners from moving. Social rented housing is widely evidenced to inhibit mobility and
this was supported by statistical evidence where it could meaningfully identify the
tenure. Qualitative data indicated that attachment to (or reliance on) social and family
networks play a much more powerful role in inhibiting mobility than had previously been
thought and this sometimes results in long distance commuting as an alternative to
moving.
Housing policy and work incentives
Housing policies can hinder people to accept a job or to find a better job; in particular
losing housing allowance can play a role in not accepting a job. There is a strong
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statistical relationship between housing allowance receipt and unemployment, but the
direction of causality is not shown. However, the low level of receipt of housing
allowance among the working poor is notable. The qualitative analysis pointed to the
importance of housing allowances in employment decisions in the Netherlands and the
UK, with both the loss of benefit and the fear of benefit delays if a job were lost being
important. The qualitative evidence did not attach this importance to housing allowances
in Germany, Hungary and Portugal (but they are less extensive in these countries
anyway); and in Sweden a work ethic – at least among experts – appeared to override
financial considerations.
We did find an example of where housing allowances can also support entry into the
labour market (or job mobility within it). Where people need to move to a high cost area,
market rental housing is the most likely housing tenure and housing allowances can
help to make such housing more affordable. This was mentioned explicitly in the
Netherlands and UK.
In most countries there is a statistical relation between being unemployed on the one
hand and receiving housing allowances, living in the social rented sector on the other
hand. The relationship between low-debt home ownership and unemployment also
appears significant, and indeed even a simple analysis of the levels of worklessness
among outright owners confirms this tendency. However, we do not know the direction
of causality.
The quantitative modelling results of the duration analysis show that housing variables
that predict the probability of unemployed people entering employment are not
significant. Only the age variable appears significant. Of course we need to keep in
mind the limits of the data base and the methods here.
Neighbourhood effects
It seems that there is a relationship between long term worklessness and
neighbourhood quality. However, this does not indicate that living in a poor quality
neighbourhood actually exerts an independent influence over employment outcomes.
Experts state that poverty neighbourhoods can create cultures of worklessness, but
they can also create a culture of illegal working. Neighbourhoods can influence people’s
ambitions and activity in the labour market, but also provide the social networks that
underpin the informal economy. We found supportive evidence for such cultures in
Hungary, UK and Germany.
Area based discrimination by employers may prevent people in poverty neighbourhoods
from finding a job. Evidence for this was found in Portugal.
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We found indications that different ways to prevent or change cultures of poverty may
support individual level help schemes into work. In Germany we found a policy for
dispersing vulnerable groups in order to prevent their concentration in poverty
neighbourhoods. In the UK and the Netherlands interventions based on individuals
living in poverty neighbourhoods attempt to link people with the labour market and to
overcome cultures of worklessness.
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Chapter Appendix: Unemployment duration analysis
The following table provides some aggregate information on the dataset of
unemployment spells:
Table 8.4 : Employment spells
HU NL PT SE UK
Number of cases included 569 188 391 224 386
Length of unemployment spell (in months) 5.6 3.8 6.0 3.8 3.0
Share of the owner-occupied sector 5% 2% 10% 0% 1%
Equivalised housing benefits (euros per year) 13 13 27 65 485
Share of the social rented sector 4% 40% 8% 2% 17%
Equivalised mortgage repayments (euros per year) 1 49 0 0 0
Share of outright ownership 5% 0% 3% 0% 1%
Education (highest ISCED level attained) 3.0 3.5 1.8 3.4 3.3
Age 37 40 38 37 38
Household size 3.4 2.5 3.5 2.6 2.9
Base: all individuals who experience a period of unemployment
Source: EU-SILC
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PART III: HOMELESSNESS AND THE WELFARE REGIME
Chapter 9: Housing Exclusion and Homelessness: A Review of
Existing Evidence
9.1 Introduction
This part of the report focuses on homelessness, which can be viewed as an extreme
form of poor housing outcomes (housing exclusion), but one which cannot be
adequately captured using EU-SILC or other large-scale, trans-national datasets.
This first of three chapters on homelessness reviews the existing evidence pertaining to
one of the central hypotheses underpinning this study, which is that the scale and
nature of homelessness is linked to the interaction of welfare regimes (social security,
tax and labour market arrangements) and housing systems and policies (which are
hypothesised to have the potential to ameliorate, or exacerbate, housing exclusion and
other outcomes for low income households).
The chapter is structures as follows. In Section 9.2 we outline what is known about the
definitions of homelessness, scale of homelessness and profile of homeless people
across our six Member States. In Section 9.3 we assess the current state of knowledge
on the causation of homelessness in these countries. Section 9.4 summarises existing
evidence on responses to homelessness and their effectiveness. We then draw some
conclusions and present a set of more detailed hypotheses on homelessness in Section
9.5.
The chapter is ‘critical’, in that it evaluates and assesses the available evidence,
highlighting gaps and weaknesses where further work is required, and harnesses this
existing knowledge into the hypotheses which were explored in the empirical stages of
the project, reported on in the following two chapters. It is based primarily on the review
of evidence undertaken by the six national teams employed in this project. Each team
completed standardised pro-formas, to allow information to be presented comparatively.
This data was supplemented as appropriate by information collected by the European
Observatory on Homelessness (EOH) and from other aspects of the work of
FEANTSA17, as well as from other extant research literature.
17 It is important to bear in mind that, while the EOH produces research-based publications, FEANTSA’s broader
activities are not research-driven and therefore these outputs have a different status as, for example, expert opinions
or experiences.
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9.2 Existing Evidence on Definitions, Scale and Profile
Definitions
In order to ensure clarity in our cross-country comparisons of homelessness, we have
used the ETHOS typology developed under the auspices of FEANTSA/EOH, and
utilised in previous research funded by the EC on the Measurement of Homelessness
(Edgar et al, 2007; see also Edgar, 2009). Such a common definitional framework is
essential in order to understand the varying phenomena that countries refer to as
‘homelessness’.
Table 9.1 ETHOS - European typology on homelessness and housing exclusion
ROOFLESS
1 People living rough
2 People staying in a night shelter
HOUSELESS
3 People in accommodation for homeless people
4 People in women’s shelters
5 People in accommodation for immigrants
6 People due to be released from institutions
7 People receiving support (due to homelessness)
INSECURE
8 People living in insecure accommodation
9 People living under threat of eviction
10 People living under threat of violence
INADEQUATE
11 People living in temporary / non-standard structures
12 People living in unfit housing
13 People living in extreme overcrowding
Source: adapted from Edgar et al (2007a)
As Table 9.2 indicates, the definitions of homelessness used in different countries are
variously drawn from legal sources (UK, Hungary), national surveys (Sweden), policy
statements/strategies (Portugal) and common usage (Germany and Netherlands).
These definitions vary considerably in their breadth of coverage of the ETHOS typology
categories:
 Germany, the UK and Sweden employ the broadest definitions, encompassing
much but not all of ETHOS; and
 Hungary, Netherlands and Portugal have narrower recognised definitions which
comprise only some ETHOS categories.
Moreover, in the case of the latter three countries, while their accepted definitions are
said to extend beyond the ETHOS ‘roofless’ categories, in practice the data produced
and analysis made of homelessness in these countries often seems confined to ETHOS
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1 and 2 (or even just ETHOS 1 - rough sleepers). On the other hand, the other ETHOS
categories are increasingly recognised in all of these countries as relevant to
homelessness prevention at least.
While these points about variations across Europe in the breadth of definitions of
homelessness used are familiar from previous EC research (Edgar et al, 2007a; Edgar
et al, 2008), as well as other international comparative studies (Fitzpatrick and
Stephens, 2007), they are crucial in framing the discussion in the remainder of this
chapter.
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Table 9.2: Existing evidence on definition, scale and profile
Definition Scale Trends Profile
DE
No official
definition - but
most of ETHOS
acknowledged
(at least as
threatened
homelessness)
National estimate –
232,000 people
experienced
homelessness in 2008;
approximately 20,000
people had slept rough in
2008
Overall decline, but
increase in some
(prosperous) areas and
amongst some single
groups (such as young
people)
Single, middle aged
men predominate;
female lone parents
over-represented;
young people and
single women
increasing; immigrants
not over-represented
HU
Legal definition -
includes ETHOS
1-4, and some in
ETHOS 7, 11,
12
On average winter night
3,000 rough sleepers +
9,000 in shelters (point-in-
time); estimate of 20,000-
30,000 ‘literally homeless’
across Hungary
Unclear
No national overview -
data from Budapest
indicates middle-aged
men in poor health
predominate;
immigrants not over-
represented
NL
No official
definition – but
‘roofless and
homeless’
commonly used
(ETHOS 1-7)
No robust national figures
– estimate of 30,000-
50,000 roofless
Various indicators suggest
decline
No national overview –
in Rotterdam middle-
aged, immigrant men
predominate
PT
New National
Homelessness
Strategy -
defines as
ETHOS
1-3
National survey of rough
sleeping in 2005 identified
467 people (point-in-time)
Not available
Various local surveys of
roofless indicate -
middle aged men
predominate;
immigrants were over-
represented
SE
National survey
definition -
covers most of
ETHOS, but not
inadequate
housing
17,800 people identified
as homeless in April 2005
(week prevalence)
Increasing
National survey
indicates - most are
single men, with
addictions or psychiatric
problems; growing
numbers of women and
poor families;
immigrants
overrepresented
UK
(England)
Legal (statutory)
definition -
includes almost
all of ETHOS;
but statistics
relate only to
‘priority groups’
53,430 households
accepted as statutory
homeless over 2008/9
(annual in-flow); 56,320
households in temporary
accommodation at end
September 2009 (point-in-
time); 464 rough sleepers
in 2009 (point-in-time)
Statutory homelessness -
declining steeply
Rough sleeping - broadly
stable after significant
decline
Statutory homelessness
- lone parents
predominate; under 25s
over-represented; Black
British and ex-asylum
seekers over-
represented (in London)
Rough sleepers –
mainly middle aged,
white British men; but
also eastern European
migrants (especially
Polish) and destitute
asylum seekers
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Scale and trends
Table 9.2 also makes clear that there is no comparable data on the scale of
homelessness across these countries. The available data not only relates to different
definitions of homelessness (a problem that could potentially be overcome by confining
comparisons to specific commonly recognised ETHOS categories), but more
fundamentally constitutes an incommensurate mix of:
 point-in-time data (Hungary, Portugal, UK); inflow data (UK); annual prevalence
data (Germany); weekly prevalence data (Sweden); and estimates where this is
unspecified (Netherlands);
 data from different years; and
 data generated using different methods – including surveys of service
providers/local authorities (Sweden, Hungary, Germany), surveys of service
users (Germany, Hungary), street counts (UK, Portugal, Hungary), client
registers (UK, Netherlands, Germany), and census data (Hungary, Germany).
There is no legitimate means of comparing such disparate data across countries in
order to generate meaningful conclusions about their relative rates of homelessness.
While this finding may not come as a surprise, and indeed the recognition of the
patchwork nature of the available data on the scale of homelessness underpins the EC-
funded work of Edgar et al (2007, 2008) and Edgar (2009), it is disappointing that even
on the narrowest definitions of homelessness it is still not possible to make robust
cross-country comparisons.
Moreover, this position seems unlikely to improve in the near future, at least across
these six countries, notwithstanding the efforts to promote both improved and more
comparable data on homelessness undertaken under the auspices of the Mutual
Progress on Homelessness through Advancing and Strengthening Information Systems
project (MPHASIS) (Edgar et al, 2008). Portugal have said that they will be
implementing the MPHASIS recommendations to at least some extent by the end of this
year, while for the Netherlands it was also reported that there would be significantly
improved homelessness data in the future via a national monitoring system. In
Hungary, too, there are plans to improve homelessness data with an upgrade of the
unified register of social services (partly financed by EU). Sweden has recently
reviewed its data collection processes and proposals have been made for the
‘continuous monitoring and exclusion from the housing market’ (National Board of
Health and Welfare, 2007), though it is unclear what if any concrete changes will be
made to data collection on homelessness. There are no major changes/improvements
anticipated in UK (England) (though with respect to roofless people there are some
moves towards ‘street needs audits’ rather than simple counts and towards continuous
recording systems) or Germany (in fact the availability of regional data is tending to
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decline in the latter). This means that robust comparative research on the scale of
homelessness across the EU seems a long way off, unless there is some intervention at
EU level such as the addition of questions on homelessness to EU-SILC, especially as
the comparative possibilities offered by the 2011 census to be held in all EU Member
States seem very limited (see Edgar, 2009).
However, so long as countries collect data on homelessness in a relatively consistent
basis, we can in a broad sense compare trends across countries (albeit with respect to
differently defined groups of homeless people). There are encouraging signs of a
decline in homelessness in some countries:
 in Germany, both the (disputed) annual estimates provided by the national
umbrella organisation for service providers, and more reliable regional data,
indicate an overall decline in recent years (though there does appear to have
been a slight increase in some prosperous regions and amongst some single
groups, such as young people) (see also Busch-Geertsema and Fitzpatrick,
2008).
 in the UK (England), there has been an unprecedented decline in ‘statutory’
homelessness in recent years – with the annual number of homeless households
‘accepted’ by local authorities as entitled to accommodation declining by over 60
per cent since 2004. With respect to rough sleeping too, the recorded numbers
have fallen by two-thirds since 1998 (though they have stabilised over the past
few years) (see again Busch-Geertsema and Fitzpatrick, 2008, and Fitzpatrick et
al, 2009 for a broader analysis of these UK trends).
 in the Netherlands, the number of people using homeless facilities appears to
have dropped, and rough sleeping has declined significantly in major cities.
These apparently positive trends have been associated with targeted housing/social
policy interventions in all of these countries (see below and Chapter 10)18. In Sweden,
homelessness increased between 1999 and 2005, but there is no data on more recent
trends. In Portugal and Hungary there is no reliable trend data available.
Profile
The data available on the profile of the homeless population is often dated or confined
to specific cities. Nonetheless, the picture which emerges of homeless people within the
narrowest definition (‘rooflessness’) is remarkably similar across all countries. Most are:
18 It is also worth noting that FEANTSA has recorded diminishing numbers of homeless people in some other
European countries, such as Finland, through various of its EOH publications, as well as through its Flash Newsletter.
See also Tainio and Fredriksson (2009) for a detailed account of developments in Finland.
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 single men;
 in the middle age range;
 with addictions and other health problems.
To some extent this is a familiar profile from the work of FEANTSA/EOH, and also
matches the experiences in other OECD countries (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007).
That said, it is a point worth emphasising because it is one of the strongest comparative
findings on homelessness in Europe that exists – a key point that we can be confident
of, even given all of the data limitations.
However, there are other groups that are often thought to constitute a growing
proportion of the roofless population, albeit that this is usually from a very low base.
Thus, in most of the countries participating in this study, the numbers of young people
(variously defined) amongst the roofless population is thought to be growing (Germany,
Netherlands, Hungary and Portugal) although their presence amongst rough sleepers
seems to have declined in the UK. The numbers of single women amongst the roofless
population is also said to be rising in absolute and/or relative terms in some countries
(e.g. Hungary, Germany). This has been a trend that has been noted for some years
now (see Edgar and Doherty, 2001). However, there tended to be only small numbers
of families with children reported within the roofless population and very few, if any,
were said to sleep rough.
One area of variation in the existing literature relates to the presence of immigrants in
the roofless population; this group is reported as very prominent in some countries, but
not so in others. Thus, in both the UK and Netherlands, migrants from central and
eastern Europe (especially Poles) are identified as a key group of rough sleepers, many
of whom have alcohol problems. Rough sleeping amongst destitute asylum seekers and
illegal immigrants is also causing significant concern in the UK (McNaughton-Nicholls
and Quilgars, 2009). In Germany, while the statistics indicate that there is, if anything,
an under-representation of immigrants and ethnic minorities amongst the homeless
population, anecdotal evidence has emerged of a growing problem with destitute
migrants presenting to low threshold services in many large German cities. In Sweden,
there is reported to be some overrepresentation amongst homeless people of those
born in other countries, and the same is said of Portugal, though in the latter it is felt that
this problem has diminished in recent years. In Hungary, there are reported to be very
few homeless immigrants and instead the key concern with respect to housing
exclusion relates to Roma people who in the main are not immigrants but rather an
indigenous ethnic minority.
Only a minority of roofless people are in work in any country, though proportions seem
higher in those countries with more limited social protection. For example, in Hungary,
half of the roofless people surveyed in 2001 had some kind of income from work
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(though the proportion able to work seemed to be declining), and more recently, in
Portugal, in 2005, over half (58%) of rough sleepers surveyed had access to some
income from casual work.
Given the definitional limitations discussed above, the only countries in which there is
any data available on the profile of broader homeless groups are:
 the UK (England), where female lone parents predominate amongst those
accepted by local authorities as ‘statutory homeless’ (in part because the
legislative criteria prioritises families with dependent children) (Pleace et al,
2008). Most of these are young families (40 per cent of parents are under 25,
though few are under 20), with one or two young children. Most do not appear to
have complex personal problems. Ethnic minorities (especially Black British) and
former asylum seekers are heavily over-represented in London19.
 Germany, where single men predominate not only amongst the clients of NGOs,
but also now with respect to households in temporary accommodation provided
by municipalities and amongst the clients of municipalities’ homelessness
prevention services. Female lone parents are also over-represented in the
municipal statistics, though families with children as a whole constitute a
declining proportion of homeless households in Germany. Immigrants and ethnic
minorities are generally under-represented in homelessness services, but
undocumented migrants/those without recourse to public funds are increasingly
over-represented in low threshold services; and
 Sweden, where single men also predominate amongst homeless users of health
and social services, but both women and poor families are said to be a growing
group, and there has been an increase in homeless immigrants.
9.3 Existing Evidence on Causes of Homelessness
Analysis of the causation of homelessness often distinguishes between immediate
causes (or ‘triggers’) on the one hand, and longer-term or more underlying causes (both
‘individual’ and ‘structural’) on the other. This division is used in the discussion that
follows, and is consistent with a range of previous work undertaken by FEANTSA/EOH,
though more complex causal frameworks are also available (see Fitzpatrick, 2005;
Edgar, 2009).
19 Undocumented migrants and current asylum seekers do not feature in these statistics as they are not entitled to be
accommodated under the homelessness legislation, and this may be one reason why they are prominent amongst
rough sleepers. The same is true for some central and eastern European migrants.
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Immediate causes of homelessness
Previous research has indicated that the two most common immediate triggers to
homelessness in OECD countries are relationship breakdown and eviction (Fitzpatrick
and Stephens, 2007). That seems confirmed across these six EU countries (see Table
8.3).
Relationship breakdown is certainly the largest direct cause of homelessness in the UK
– usually relationship breakdown with either parents (especially for younger people) or
partners (it is reported that around half of relationship breakdowns with partners involve
violence) (Pleace et al, 2008). The ‘exhaustion’ of family relationships (sudden or
gradual) is similarly identified in Hungary, Portugal and Netherlands as a direct cause of
homelessness, and in Germany relationship breakdown is the single largest trigger
reported by NGO service users (with violence from partners particularly affecting
homeless women). For young homeless people in Germany, as in the UK, the main
reason for homelessness is the breakdown of relationships with parents.
Most national teams noted eviction as a result of rent arrears as a key direct cause of
homelessness in their country, with Germany placing a particularly strong emphasis on
this particular trigger. In the UK, in contrast, rent arrears is a very minor trigger for
statutory homelessness, with most eviction that leads to statutory homelessness in the
UK (England) attributed to the end of fixed-term private sector tenancies (though this is
likely to disguise some rent arrears-related evictions).
Homelessness is sometimes attributed directly to the loss of employment or other sharp
decreases in income, for example in the Netherlands, and in Portugal severe health
problems have been identified as a key trigger when they compromise earning potential
in the context of weak social protection. But in several countries the existing literature
suggests that persistent poverty or long-term labour market precariousness is more
strongly linked with homelessness than sudden labour market ‘shocks’ (see also
McCarthy and Hagan, 1991).
Interestingly, even in those countries with high rates of home ownership (UK, Portugal,
Hungary), mortgage arrears is not cited as a major trigger for homelessness. It must be
borne in mind that large proportions of home owners are in fact outright owners which
makes them as secure in their housing as it is possible to be. It is also worth bearing in
mind that in many countries the process from mortgage arrears to repossession is a
long one and can take many years (Neuteboom, 2008). But even in the UK where there
has been a particularly sharp upward trend in mortgage repossessions as a
consequence of the recession, ex-home owners still comprise a very small proportion of
homeless households accepted by local authorities as ‘statutorily homeless’ (less than
5%) and no upward trend is evident with respect to this homeless group (Wilcox and
Fitzpatrick, 2010). In Hungary mortgage arrears/repossessions related to foreign
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currency loans for house purchase have risen rapidly in the recession, which it is
thought may impact on future homelessness levels. More broadly, in central and
eastern Europe there are often severe difficulties faced by very poor home owners in
paying utility charges and housing maintenance costs (Edgar et al, 2007).
The information available on homelessness ‘triggers’ in the Netherlands and Hungary
also highlights leaving institutions, such as prison and hospital, and this is likewise
emphasised in Sweden20.
Uniquely in Germany, ‘moving city’ is a major trigger for homelessness amongst users
of NGO homelessness services. As it seems unlikely that this issue affects only people
in Germany, it is likely that these internal migration triggers are absorbed within other
categories elsewhere.
Underlying causes of homelessness
Looking now more broadly at the longer-term, more fundamental causes of
homelessness, we can see that in some countries the existing literature tends to
interpret homelessness as mainly an ‘individual’ problem (relating to personal problems
and support needs), whereas in other countries it is viewed as more of a ‘structural’
problem (with its roots in housing, labour market and welfare structures) (see Table
9.3).
Table 9.3: Existing evidence on causes of homelessness
Definition Triggers Mainly
‘individual’
or
‘structural’
problem?
Underlying
structural factors
Underlying
individual factors
DE Broad
Eviction (rent
arrears)
For NGO clients in
particular
- relationship
breakdown (inc. with
parents); moving
city; high rents
Broader forms
– ‘structural’
Rough
sleeping –
‘individual’
(Mainly relevant to
those experiencing
broader forms of
homelessness)
Access to housing for
those in need
Rising levels of
poverty/unemployment
Welfare benefit
changes (affecting
young people)
(Mainly relevant to
rough sleeping/ single
homelessness)
Addictions
Mental health
problems
Institutional living
(especially prison)
HU Narrow
Exhaustion of family
relationships Individual
Lack of affordable
accommodation
Combinations of
personal problems
20 FEANTSA have identified that this is a major trigger in a number of other European countries, such as Norway and
Finland.
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Eviction (rent
arrears)
Leaving institutions
Unemployment and low
wages
Social isolation
NL Narrow
Leaving institutions
Relationship
breakdown
Eviction
Loss of job
Individual
Seldom
structural/economic
factors alone
Addictions
Mental health
problems
Mental disability
Childhood trauma and
abuse
Crime
Debts
PT Narrow
Exhaustion of family
relationships
Loss of employment
Severe health
problems
Leaving institutions
Eviction
Individual
Inter-generational
poverty
Precarious labour
market trajectories
Lack of social
protection
Lack of access to
adequate and
affordable housing
Addictions
SE Broad Eviction (rentarrears) Individual
Access to regular
rental housing
Addictions (especially
drugs)
Mental health
Physical health
UK
(England) Broad
Relationship
breakdown (inc. with
parents)
Statutory
homelessness in
particular - eviction
(end of fixed term
tenancies)
Statutory
homelessness
– ‘structural’
Rough
sleeping/single
homelessness
– ‘individual’
Shortage of affordable
housing
High levels of
poverty/worklessness
High levels of lone
parenthood/relationship
breakdown
(Mainly relevant to
rough sleeping/ single
homelessness)
Addictions
Mental health
problems
Institutional living
(especially prison and
local authority care)
Childhood trauma and
abuse
The existing evidence in the UK and Germany seems to identify the broader forms of
homelessness as mainly a structural problem, with housing access and affordability the
key concerns, together with poverty and unemployment/worklessness. That said, in
both countries there is also an acknowledgement that the resolution of the more
extreme forms of homelessness often require ‘more than a roof’ solutions. In Germany,
for example, older male rough sleepers often report multiple longer-term causes of their
homelessness – family breakdown, loss of employment, health and addiction problems
– which lead them into prolonged homelessness
The Netherlands is probably at the opposite end of the spectrum, whereby the existing
evidence suggests that ‘economic problems’ alone are hardly ever a reason for
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homelessness. In Sweden, likewise, there is a strong official emphasis on ‘individual’
reasons for homelessness, such as drug addiction, other health problems, or an
institutional care background, though some commentators argue that restricted access
to regular rental housing is a key underlying cause (Sahlin, 2005a).
In Hungary, it is suggested that the causes of homelessness usually involve a
combination of ‘personal reasons’ and long-term social isolation, though ‘economic’
issues such as low pay, unemployment, the precariousness of the informal economy,
and unaffordable housing are also mentioned. In Portugal, the emphasis in the existing
data tends to be on only the most proximate causes given by homeless people
themselves, and these emphasise more individual reasons. However, there has been
some recent attention paid to more structural causes, including inter-generational
poverty/social exclusion, dependence on low paid/informal work, lack of social
protection, and inadequate access to affordable housing (Baptista, 2004; Castro and
Caeiro, 2004).
In all countries, there is a relatively consistent pattern with respect to the long-
term/underlying factors identified as associated with homelessness at individual level,
albeit that their perceived importance relative to structural factors varies:
 addictions (drug and alcohol);
 mental health problems;
 institutional living (especially prison); and
 traumatic experiences, especially childhood abuse.
9.4 Existing Evidence on Responses to Homelessness and Their
Effectiveness
In most countries there is a large quantity of descriptive detail on homelessness policies
and services. Such voluminous and diverse descriptive material is not a good basis for
rigorous comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of responses to
homelessness, particularly given that there is often little by way of scientific evaluation
of these policies and services (see further below). Hence, we have adopted a vignette
(‘typical cases’) methodology in generating our new evidence on responses to
homelessness which, rather than focussing on incommensurate institutional structures,
takes as its starting point a set of ‘typical cases’ of people who are homeless or
threatened with homelessness, selected to be recognisable across all countries. This
approach allows systematic and direct comparison of likely responses to key homeless
groups, throwing into sharp relief stronger and weaker safety nets. The results of this
analysis are presented in Chapter 11. In this present chapter we limit our attention to
those areas of policy that are relatively accessible to broad brush comparative analysis
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based on existing information – rights to housing, overall governance of homelessness
services, and evidence of successful broad-based policies targeted on homelessness.
FEANTSA has for many years been advocating a ‘rights-based’ approach as a key
element in addressing homelessness across the EU (Kenna, 2005). However,
‘enforceable’ legal rights to housing – i.e. rights which courts of law will enforce on
behalf of individuals – remain relatively unusual in the housing and homelessness field.
While in several European countries there is a ‘right’ to housing contained in the
national constitution, there are usually no legal mechanisms provided to enable
homeless individuals to enforce these rights (e.g. see, for example, Sahlin, 2005a, on
the ineffectiveness of these constitutional rights in Sweden). Moreover, attempts to
harness international law to establish a ‘right to housing’ for homeless people, whereby
they have a routinely available ‘remedy’ in their domestic courts with which to challenge
violations, have thus far had little practical effect (Kenna, 2005)21.
Amongst our six countries, the UK (England) was unique in having enforceable rights
for homeless people, the ultimate discharge of which involved making available ‘settled’
or ‘permanent’ housing to qualifying households22. In order to qualify for this ‘main
homelessness duty’, households must be ‘eligible’ for assistance (certain ‘persons from
abroad, including asylum seekers, are ineligible), ‘unintentionally homeless’ (i.e. have
not brought about their homelessness through their own actions or inaction), and in
‘priority need’ (the principal priority need groups are households which contain
dependent children, a pregnant woman or a ‘vulnerable’ adult). This duty is almost
always discharged via the offer of social housing, with statutorily homeless people
entitled to be given ‘reasonable preference’ in the allocation of such housing. Note that
in the UK (England) roofless people have no rights to accommodation unless they are in
a priority need group.
While there are no enforceable rights to permanent housing in any of the other countries
in our study, in Germany (under police laws) and in Hungary (under social welfare
laws), there is an enforceable right to emergency accommodation for roofless
households. Similarly, in Sweden there is a ‘roof over head guarantee’ under social
21 Although it should be noted that FEANTSA recently lodged a ‘collective complaint’ against France for non
compliance with Article 31 of the revised European Social Charter (2006), and a similar complaint against Slovenia.
Both have been upheld by the Committee of Ministers. The practical consequences at national level are as yet
unclear but it is possible that they may be significant.
22 France, though not included in our study, witnessed the passage of emergency legislation in 2007 which sought to
establish a legally-enforceable right to permanent housing. This legislation was passed quickly in response to media
pressure, and there are concerns that its vagueness in key areas, as well as the complexities of the politico-
administrative framework in France, will frustrate its implementation (Loisin, Leruste and Quilgars, 2009; see also
footnote above regarding the FEANTSA collective complaint against France).
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services legislation (which means in most municipalities basic accommodation is
provided by NGOs)23. In all of these countries there are concerns about the quality of
temporary/emergency accommodation provided to single people, which is usually in
hostels, shelters or other institutional settings (families are normally given self-contained
flats). There are also general concerns that ‘move-on’ from temporary accommodation
to settled/regular housing is often problematic (this is a common problem across
Europe, see Sahlin, 2005b; Busch-Geertsema and Sahlin, 2007; Fitzpatrick and
Wygnanska, 2007).
Table 9.4: Existing data on policies and effectiveness
Enforceable
right to settled
housing?
Enforceable right to
emergency
accommodation?
Governance Evidence of successfulpolicies?
DE No Yes – for rooflesspeople
*LAs + NGOs +
(very limited) for-
profit
Yes – on prevention
(especially with respect
to evictions for rent
arrears)
HU No Yes – for rooflesspeople
National + LAs +
NGOs No
NL No No National + LAs +NGOs
Yes – on rough sleeping
and evictions
PT No No National + LAs +NGOs No
SE No Yes – for rooflesspeople
National + LAs +
NGOs + (very
limited) for profit
No
UK
(England)
Yes - for priority
groups
Yes – but only for
priority groups; being
roofless is neither
necessary nor sufficient
National + LAs +
NGOs
Yes – on prevention,
rough sleeping, and
youth homelessness
* LA = local authorities/municipalities
Previous research (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007) indicated that the governance of
homelessness services tends to follow a similar pattern across OECD countries, and
this is largely confirmed by the current study:
 national/federal government establishes a national strategic and/or legal
framework, and provides financial subsidies for homelessness services;
 local authorities are the key strategic players and ‘enablers’ of homelessness
services; and
 direct provision is often undertaken by NGOs, particularly for single homeless
people, with municipalities more often directly providing services to families with
children.
23 Such enforceable rights to emergency accommodation are also available in other European countries not included
in this study, such as Poland.
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However, there are some variations on this: for example, in the strongly federal context
pertaining in Germany there is very little national government involvement in tackling
homelessness, and while there is significant NGO involvement in Sweden (particularly
from church-based organisations), much direct provision is still by municipalities. In
Germany and Sweden there is some limited involvement of for-profit organisations. In
Portugal the state was largely ‘absent’ until very recently, while in Hungary the
development of a homelessness system only really commenced in the early 1990s after
the fall of communism.
With respect to evidence of successful homelessness policies, probably the clearest
examples relate to preventative policies in Germany and the UK (England). In Germany,
these efforts have focused on preventing homelessness caused by rent arrears (as
noted above, this is a very prominent trigger for homelessness in Germany), and appear
to have been very effective, especially with respect to families with children (Busch-
Geertsema and Fitzpatrick, 2008). In UK (England) most prevention activity has
focused on those who would otherwise be likely to be accepted as statutory homeless.
Assisted access to the private rented sector is by far the most commonly used
preventative measure, although other interventions such as family mediation (to enable
young people to stay at home) and tenancy support for vulnerable groups have also
been employed (Pawson et al, 2007). There have been concerns that some of the
apparent success in reducing statutory homelessness in England is attributable to
increased local authority gatekeeping which denies people their legal rights (Pawson,
2009). In the Netherlands, while a focus on homelessness prevention has developed
only recently, they seem to have had some success already with reducing evictions.
Aside from prevention, another area where there appears to be evidence of successful
interventions is in tackling rough sleeping. The number of rough sleepers in both the UK
and Netherlands appears to have declined significantly (this is a longer-term fall in the
UK, more recent in the Netherlands), as a result of targeted programmes to help this
group in major cities/other areas of concentration.
In the UK only, there also appears to have been some substantial success with respect
to improved responses to youth homelessness, and certainly visible rough sleeping
amongst young people in cities has declined substantially since the early 1990s (though
robust trend data is unavailable for most young homeless groups) (Quilgars et al, 2008).
What is striking is that these apparently successful homelessness interventions have
been pursued in quite different welfare regime and housing market contexts. In most
cases, the ‘success’ of homelessness policies is evidenced mainly by aggregate
downward trends in the relevant forms of homelessness, though in Germany (via NGO
data) and UK (via ‘Supporting People’ data and statutory homelessness returns) there is
some nationally-collated evidence on outcomes of interventions. Improved outcomes
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data should be available in Netherlands in the future via its unified national monitoring
system (see also Edgar et al 2007, 2008; Edgar, 2009).
9.5 Conclusions from Existing Evidence and Hypotheses for Testing Using
New Evidence
As noted at the outset of this chapter, a central hypothesis underlying this study is that
the scale and nature of homelessness is linked to the interaction of welfare regimes
(social security, tax and labour market arrangements) and housing systems and policies
(which are hypothesised to have the potential to ameliorate, or exacerbate, housing
exclusion and other outcomes for low income households).
However, as the evidence review in this chapter has demonstrated, there is currently no
comparable data that will allow the scale of homelessness, according to even the
narrowest definition, to be compared across EU countries. That said, we can examine,
in at least some countries, changes in the scale of homelessness (or particular
homeless groups) over time. This enables exploration of the scope for changing
welfare, housing and policy contexts within countries to affect their total level of
homelessness, even if we cannot test the quantitative impact of differences in these
structural contexts across countries at the moment.
There is certainly indicative evidence from the UK (England) and Germany that
preventative, inter-agency interventions have reduced the total level of ‘broader’ forms
of homelessness over time. There is also evidence from the UK (England) and the
Netherlands that targeted measures on rough sleepers have significantly reduced the
incidence and prolonged nature of this most extreme form of homelessness. In the UK
only, there was reported to be some success in addressing youth homelessness. So
there is reason to think based on this existing evidence that targeted
housing/homelessness policy interventions can mitigate the impacts of disadvantage
faced by low income households.
While the comparative possibilities with respect to the scale of homelessness are
severely limited by data availability, we can hope to reveal more comparatively about
the differing nature of homelessness between countries in this study (i.e. its causes and
the profile of those affected), and its links with different welfare and housing systems.
So far, varying definitions of homelessness appear central to the patterns identified:
 where definitions are narrow, as in Portugal, Hungary and Netherlands, then
single, middle aged men dominate; causes are described as largely individual.
 where definitions are broader, as in UK and Germany, families with children
(especially female lone parents) are relatively more prominent; and the
interpretation of causes is more structural/housing-market focused.
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However, Sweden is an outlier as it uses a relatively broad definition of homelessness,
yet there are still relatively few families with children identified as homeless (though their
numbers are said to be growing), and a mainly individual explanation of homelessness
is dominant. Is Sweden indicative of a wider pattern whereby there are ‘real’ as well as
‘definitional’ differences between countries with respect to the nature of homelessness,
which may be linked to differing welfare and housing systems and specific policy
interventions?
Understanding these patterns with respect to the nature of homelessness was a key
objective in the qualitative data collection stage of our study. Prompted by this review of
existing knowledge, the specific research hypotheses that we tested were as follows:
 Homelessness is more of an ‘individual’ problem in those countries with strong
welfare states, and more of a ‘structural’ problem where there is a weaker welfare
state.
 Where homelessness is mainly an ‘individual’ problem, middle-aged men will
predominate, but where it is more of a ‘structural’ problem, other social groups
will be found in the homeless population in greater numbers (young people,
families, women, etc.).
 Labour market policies and conditions will impact on homelessness, but long-
term unemployment or marginality will play a bigger role than sudden loss of
employment/drops in income in some countries.
 Welfare policies which restrict entitlements or introduce increased conditionality
will tend to drive up homelessness.
 Immigrants will often, but not necessarily, face a heightened risk of
homelessness - experiences will vary both between immigrant groups and
between countries depending on legal, welfare, economic and cultural factors.
 The economic downturn/credit crunch will increase homelessness in some
countries and amongst some social groups but will not have a uniformly negative
effect
 Targeted homelessness interventions can have significant positive effects in a
wide variety of structural contexts.
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Chapter 10: Housing Exclusion and Homelessness: New Evidence on
Causes and Nature
10.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses our new evidence with respect to the causes and nature
homelessness, which was a key focus of the qualitative data collection stage of the
study. As outlined in Chapter 3, this qualitative data collection exercise comprised a
series of focus groups and in-depth interviews with policy makers, practitioners and
other stakeholders in each of our six Member States. This Chapter interrogates the
resultant data with respect to the following six hypotheses set out at the end of Chapter
9:
 Homelessness is more of an ‘individual’ problem in those countries with strong
welfare states, and more of a ‘structural’ problem where there is a weaker welfare
state (Section 10.2).
 Where homelessness is mainly an ‘individual’ problem, middle-aged men will
predominate, but where it is more of a ‘structural’ problem, other social groups
will be found in the homeless population in greater numbers (young people,
families, women, etc.) (Section 10.3).
 Labour market policies and conditions will impact on homelessness, but long-
term unemployment or marginality will play a bigger role than sudden loss of
employment/drops in income in some countries (Section 10.4).
 Welfare policies which restrict entitlements or introduce increased conditionality
will tend to drive up homelessness (Section 10.5).
 Immigrants will often, but not necessarily, face a heightened risk of
homelessness - experiences will vary both between immigrant groups and
between countries depending on legal, welfare, economic and cultural factors
(Section 10.6).
 The economic downturn/credit crunch will increase homelessness in some
countries and amongst some social groups but will not have a uniformly negative
effect (Section 10.7).
Conclusions are drawn in Section 10.8
10.2 ‘Individual’ or ‘Structural’ Problem?
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: Homelessness is
more of an ‘individual’ problem in those countries with strong welfare states, and more
of a ‘structural’ problem where there is a weaker welfare state.
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This hypothesis seemed supported by our new evidence in that there was a clear
consensus amongst those interviewed in both the Netherlands and Sweden (the social
democratic/hybrid welfare regimes included in this study) that: ‘there are no economic
homeless people in the Netherlands’ and ‘People who become homeless always have
more than only financial problems.’ In the Netherlands in particular it was consistently
reported that homelessness was always the result of an accumulation of personal or
social problems (except with respect to certain groups of new migrants, see below).
This can be contrasted with the position in Germany (with a corporatist welfare regime)
and the UK (with a liberal welfare regime) where a far more structural analysis of
homelessness was generally offered. However, it was notable that housing system
issues were given far greater prominence with respect to the causes of homelessness
than social security systems or labour market conditions in both of these welfare regime
contexts. Thus, in the German case, there has been a sharp reduction in homelessness
in recent years (estimated to be a drop of about 60 per cent). Reduced immigration,
especially by ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-1990s, is
seen as one of the major drivers for this positive trend, but even when one leaves this to
one side, there has still been a major decline attributed to:
…a mix of demographic factors and the development of the housing markets,
which… is expected to continue influencing the [reduced] number of the homeless
strongly… The housing markets in many regions are still very relaxed, so that in
these regions it has become easier to find a new home after the old home has
been lost for whatever reasons. Also for those working with the homeless, access
to housing has been much easier in these areas, as it is in the interest of landlords
to fill vacant homes. (NGO representative, Germany)
While there are housing markets under pressure in the growth areas of South West of
Germany, the overall picture at national level is of a slack housing market context which
has driven down overall levels of homelessness (although improved preventative
responses were given some credit too, see Chapter 11). While there have been
concerns about rising levels of poverty in Germany driving up homelessness, this has
not happened as yet, supporting the argument that housing market conditions are in fact
the more powerful determinant:
… the figures about poverty development and threatened tendencies indicate that
there might also be a rise in the number of the homeless. At this time, there is an
uncoupling of homelessness and poverty developments, but it is uncertain whether
this will continue on a national level. (NGO representative, Germany)
In the UK likewise, homelessness seems largely driven by structural housing system
issues. As noted in Chapter 9, aside from the ending of fixed-term tenancies, statutory
homelessness in the UK is seldom directly attributable to housing triggers, such as
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mortgage and rent arrears. Homelessness is also not strongly linked to physical housing
conditions or overcrowding in the UK. However, housing affordability factors are central
to the underlying causation of statutory homelessness, with trends in statutory
homelessness following the housing market cycle (at least until the recent emphasis on
prevention) (Pawson, 2007). It is important to be clear on what is meant by this: the
existence of the Housing Benefit system means that poorer households seldom lose
their existing accommodation in the UK – at least if it is social rented or at the bottom
end of the private rented sector - because of an inability to pay their rent (though
‘technical arrears’ due to slow processing of Housing Benefit claims can create
difficulties, see Chapter 7). Likewise, lower cost rented housing (where it is available) is
usually accessible to homeless and potentially homeless households because the
benefit system will cover all or most of the rental costs and social housing is allocated
largely on the basis of housing need. But the supply of affordable housing, particularly
social rented housing, is inadequate in the UK, especially in London and the South of
England. This means that, when households living in tight housing market areas lose
their existing accommodation (typically, through relationship breakdown), they can
struggle to secure alternative affordable housing without resorting to the statutory
homelessness system.
Thus, this evidence suggests that, in countries with relatively strong welfare safety nets,
homelessness is more closely linked with housing market conditions and systems than
with changes in labour market conditions or social security systems. This point is
explored further later in this chapter. It was also notable that even in countries with
strong welfare states and predominantly ‘individual’ forms of homelessness (and, we
would guess, relatively low levels of homelessness, though current data does not allow
us to conclude that) access to housing for vulnerable groups nonetheless remained a
key concern. Thus in both Netherlands and Sweden it was reported that access to
social housing was often problematic for homeless people and those threatened with
homelessness, with housing associations/municipal housing companies having a great
deal of discretion over the priority to be given to this group, and often using this
discretion to exclude them (further explored in Chapter 11).
In those Member States included in our study with weaker welfare protection - Portugal
(Mediterranean welfare regime) and Hungary (transition regime) – homelessness has
traditionally been interpreted as an ‘individual’ or personal issue (see Chapter 9). In both
cases this is in part linked to the narrow definitions of homelessness employed in these
national contexts, which tend to focus on the street homeless with the most complex
needs (see below). In Portugal’s case it was also attributed to the fact that the available
data on causation has tended to centre on the reasons for homelessness given by
homeless people themselves, which tend to focus on the most proximate causes,
tending to obscure more structural causes of the phenomenon.
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But there was now reported to be growing interest in the structural causes of
homelessness in Portuguese society, linked to the scale and nature of poverty and
social exclusion. Key concerns included: low levels of educational attainment; early
entrance into the labour market, unstable, precarious, low paid jobs; and lack of social
protection. All of this was very often linked to work in the informal market, with the
consequent poverty and labour market precariousness passed on from generation to
generation. It was also clear from the new data gathered on Hungary that economic
issues, particularly weak welfare protection and the precariousness associated with
working the informal economy, left large sections of the poorer population vulnerable to
homelessness and social exclusion. There can be little doubt, therefore, that ‘structural’
homelessness is a major concern in both of these countries (albeit that it is possible that
the generally strong family networks in both of them may protect some vulnerable
households from homelessness, or at least from rooflessness, see Chapter 11). But
unlike in the UK and Germany, labour market and social security systems seem at least
as important as housing access and affordability in generating homelessness (see
further below and Chapter 11).
10.3 Which Groups Predominate?
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: Where
homelessness is mainly an ‘individual’ problem, single, middle-aged men will be
predominant, but where it is more of a ‘structural’ problem, other groups will be found in
the homeless population in greater numbers (young people, families, women, etc.).
The new evidence we gathered provides partial support for this hypothesis. Certainly in
Sweden and the Netherlands – the countries where homelessness appears most often
associated with ‘individual’ problems - the typical homeless person was a single middle
aged man. Thus in Sweden, for example, it was said that most homeless people are
between the ages of 40-50 years and have a history of some kind of substance abuse.
But this group was also highly visible in all of the other Member States included in this
study, and as noted in Chapter 9, they appear to dominate the roofless population in all
economically developed countries (Fitzpatrick and Stephens, 2007). Moreover, even in
countries where structural homelessness is widely recognised (such as Germany and
the UK), it was acknowledged that the problems for this particular homeless group tend
to be overwhelmingly individual rather than structural in nature, and required complex
interventions (see Chapter 11):
… people's problems aren't because they've not got a roof over their heads, most
people, it goes beyond that…it’s worklessness, it’s support needs around alcohol
and drugs. If you constantly put things under 'homelessness' you think the solution
is to provide a home and its not. (Practitioner, UK)
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So the key issue is whether this group of homeless middle aged men with support
needs – found everywhere – is also joined by other homeless groups in large numbers.
Our evidence on this is mixed and patchy. Aside from the usual problems with the
unreliable and incomplete nature of the quantitative data on homelessness, another
concern is that the information received often focused on trends (e.g. a growing number
of young people), rather than on the absolute significance of groups. This means that
there is a danger that disproportionate stress can be put on particular groups because
their numbers appear to be climbing sharply from what might be a very low base (see
Chapter 9). All that said, some remarks can be made about other homeless groups
based on the new data collected.
With respect to female and family homelessness, women fleeing violence was, as one
would expect, a significant and well recognised group in every country. But as their
needs are often dealt with via specialist women’s services which are quite separate
from homelessness services (see Chapter 11), they were often not viewed as a
homeless group and trends on their numbers were not available.
With respect to families with children becoming homeless for other reasons – non-
violent relationship breakdown, and financial difficulties – there appeared to be a mixed
picture on trends with no particular association with the nature of the welfare regime.
Thus, in both Sweden (where there is strong welfare protection) and in Hungary (where
there is very weak welfare protection) there appeared to be a growing number of
‘homeless’ (broadly defined) families.
However, trends within countries do offer some support for the hypothesis as stated
above. Thus in both Sweden and Hungary the growing numbers of homeless families
has been attributed to the economic impacts of the recession – suggesting that this
group becomes more numerous within the homeless population when structural
conditions worsen. Moreover, this proposition is also supported by recent developments
in Germany. There, the slackening housing market (together with effective
implementation of preventative policies, see Chapter 11) has meant that family
homelessness has diminished not only in absolute but also in relative terms. This would
suggest that where structural conditions become more benign, families with children
who may otherwise be vulnerable to homelessness benefit disproportionately, with a
corresponding relative increase in the importance of single male homelessness.
With respect to youth homelessness, this was viewed as a growing problem in most
countries (see Chapter 9). In Germany, for example, the comment was made that:
The number of young people appearing at help points is rising dramatically. This is
related to the fact that increasingly young people who have had no contact with the
youth help system are becoming homeless after they turn 18 and have to turn to
the [adult] homeless system, because they do not have a history of contact with
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the help system for children and young people. Very often young women are
affected. (Practitioner, Germany)
However, no real relationship was apparent with respect to the scale of youth
homelessness and differing structural conditions within or across countries, though in
Germany there was some link made with the tightening of benefit entitlement (see
below). The one clear exception to the apparent growth in the number of youth
homelessness was in the UK, where there appeared to have been some significant
decline in homelessness (especially rooflessness) amongst young people, associated
with targeted interventions (see Chapter 11). This may imply that specialist programmes
to assist vulnerable young people may be more important than broader structural
conditions in the generation and management of youth homelessness (though see
comments below on economic pressures on family units potentially generating youth
homelessness in the longer-term).
A particular point made in Portugal was the profound impact that definitions of
homelessness have on the profile of the identified homeless population. Thus, the
available homelessness studies in Portugal highlight the prevalence of Portuguese
single males, aged between 30 and 59 years old, with weak social support, precarious
labour trajectories and health problems in the homeless population. But it was reported
that the narrow definition of homelessness employed in Portugal has ‘turned invisible’
some other homeless population which do exist in Portuguese society, namely women,
gypsy/Roma communities and African ethnic minorities (who often have serious
problems with inadequate housing but are not considered homeless). For women in
particular, the separate institutional organisation of responses to those fleeing domestic
violence and young mothers means that they are not considered to be homeless
services (the same is true in several other countries, see Chapter 11). But it was also
apparent that serious consideration had been given to these definitional issues in the
context of the recent development of the national strategy in Portugal (Baptista, 2009),
and that the narrow definitions were maintained on persuasive pragmatic grounds:
This was a discussion held for a long time and it ended up as being a decision of
all the entities represented in the Group: to have a more restricted definition
because it is also more practical. This does not mean that we should not
consider all the groups at risk of homelessness and that in other countries are
considered homeless. It was a more consensual definition and it would be more
complicated to have a broader definition. (Policy maker, Portugal)
If we deal with a definition that includes a very diverse range of situations we
could end up by having a strategy that would have a great dispersion of
measures. This does not mean that there should not have measures and
strategies, but the suffering and human dignity should be prioritised. (NGO
representative, Portugal)
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10.4 The Role of Labour Market Policies/Conditions
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: Labour market
policies and conditions will impact on homelessness, but long-term unemployment or
marginality will play a bigger role than sudden loss of employment/drops in income in
some countries.
The distinction drawn in this hypothesis – between loss of employment and long-term
labour market marginality – has received little attention in previous EOH research, or
indeed in other comparative research on homelessness (though FEANTSA has initiated
some relevant explorations through its Employment Working Group, see Paasche,
2009). There were, however, three clear qualitative findings on this point from across
the countries that participated in this present study.
First, in all countries with relatively strong welfare protection – the UK and Germany, as
well as in Sweden and the Netherlands – it was very rare for loss of employment or
sudden drops in income to lead directly to homelessness. In Sweden, it was stated quite
clearly by interviewees that unemployment is rarely the ‘deciding factor’ when losing a
flat. There are plenty of safety nets available (unemployment benefits, social and
housing benefits) that ensure that basic living arrangements can be sustained. Likewise
in the Netherlands, the strong consensus was:
Unemployment hardly ever results in homelessness because of the substantial
financial assistance through social security. (Practitioner, Netherlands)
Even in the UK, where welfare protection is obviously less strong for unemployed
people, homelessness appears rarely directly caused by loss of employment. Loss of a
job is seldom mentioned as even a contributory factor in statutory homelessness
applications (Pleace et al, 2008), and UK interviewees in this research working with
rough sleepers and single homeless people generally emphasised how far their clients
were from the labour market.
People… will have had a long history of unemployment or no history of
employment so when you first even enter [hostel] your key worker will be
encouraging you to take part in things that will increase your skills. (Practitioner,
UK)
Relationship breakdown and substance misuse were the key issues for this latter group,
and while it is possible that they had also lost job at some point, there was seldom a
clear link between their homelessness and cessation of employment.
There was, however, thought to be a longer-term and indirect connection between
labour market conditions and homelessness, certainly in the UK, in that persistent
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poverty and labour market marginality, especially when linked to low levels of income
maintenance benefits, can put pressure on family units that can lead to relationship
breakdown – sometimes via health or addictions problems - and then in turn to
homelessness. Thus some UK interviewees were predicting an increase in youth
homelessness in the coming years as a result of the economic pressures on poorer
families associated with the recession. Similar comments were made in Germany (see
further below).
Second, in those Member States with weaker welfare protection – Hungary and
Portugal – there was more of a direct relationship between loss of work and loss of
housing, as social security systems were insufficiently generous and/or comprehensive
to ‘break’ this link. In Portugal, for example, there was widespread agreement about the
prominence of unemployment amongst the factors causing homelessness:
Changes led people to ever more precarious jobs. They can be unstable but
managing. But just about anything makes them homeless. (Practitioner, Portugal)
But even here the emphasis was more on long-term, and even inter-generational,
labour market marginality rather than sudden labour market ‘shocks’. Those affected
tended to have been in various forms of precarious employment or under-employment
for very long periods, with unemployment representing the final step on a process of
increasing vulnerability:
Many of them do not work for many years or only had temporary, precarious
jobs… With all their handicaps, they can only get precarious jobs. (Practitioner,
Portugal)
In both Hungary and Portugal, issues surrounding the informal economy were central.
The informal economy was considered a key ‘option’ for poorer groups, and in fact
crucial for people’s survival:
What would this country do without the informal economy? (Policy maker,
Portugal)
But it has a serious downside in terms of their future prospects:
The informal economy is a ‘least bad’ solution, but it is a ‘forked stick’. Imagine a
person who does not have any resources. He worked in the informal economy
which was his only chance of survival but then he gets unemployed and he has no
access to the regular unemployment benefit. (Practitioner, Portugal)
In Hungary, a more extreme scenario was sketched with regards to certain segments of
the informal labour market, whereby vulnerable people can be exposed to a modern day
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form of slavery. In these cases, ‘helpful’ people provide them with very low quality
accommodation (for example in a hovel in the garden) and some basic food, and in
return make them work without any pay at all.
Third, in all countries, immigrants who lacked welfare protection were most vulnerable
to homelessness consequent on losing work, and also suffered most with respect to the
economic impacts of the recession and the drawbacks of involvement in the informal
economy (these issues are pursued further below).
10.5 The Role of Welfare Policies/Reform
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: Welfare policies
which restrict entitlements or introduce increased conditionality will tend to drive up
homelessness.
The social security system, and especially housing allowances, was what ‘broke the
link’ between losing work/sudden drops in income and homelessness in most of the
countries studied (excepting some categories of immigrants, see below). One would
therefore expect that restricting entitlements or increased conditionality in the benefits
system would lead to increased levels of homelessness. That certainly seemed to
happen in the UK in the late 1980s, when high levels of youth unemployment combined
with a sharp reductions in benefit entitlement (particularly for 16/17 year olds) quite
unambiguously contributed to a dramatic growth in homelessness (including
rooflessness) amongst young people (Fitzpatrick, 2000; Quilgars et al, 2008).
But in our present study there was an interesting debate about more recent changes in
the UK benefits system, which has seen many homeless people move from long- to
short-term sickness benefits, with expectations of engagement in work-focussed
interviews for those in the latter category, as part of a broader labour market ‘activation’
policy (see Chapter 2). As one might expect, some service providers voiced concerns
about the impact of these changes on their clients, who tend to enter at the margins of
the labour market if at all:
There are general issues around the lack of permanent or stable work where
people are being taking off, forced to take anything, they are encouraged to come
off benefits to take work that is not terribly well paid or stable and once you have a
group of people like that they are automatically more vulnerable to any tossing and
turning in the fluctuations in the economy...they are going to be more vulnerable.
(Practitioner, UK)
But on the other hand, a number of homelessness service providers felt that
unconditional, long-term sickness benefits did their clients a disservice:
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I’m not saying benefits should be taken away but there should be a way of
concentrating people’s minds to try and work towards doing something different
with their lives in stead of festering in a hostel and living a hand to mouth existence
until they die as it’s no life for anyone… we all know there are large repositories of
rough sleepers warehoused in hostels where, with the best will in the world,
nothing much is going to change for those people. The benefit system allows that
to happen. (Practitioner, UK)
…we have… continuing drug users and the idea of staying on those kind of
benefits [long-term sickness benefits] has been disabling. There are people who
won’t engage in doing other things as they feel they will lose those benefits. There
has been more change now that people are being pushed on to [short-term
sickness benefits], and that includes long term drug users. (Practitioner, UK)
The converse argument is that increased conditionality may push some people
completely out of the welfare system:
One of things that people do is disengage from system altogether. They end up on
the streets; they’re not interested in benefits. (Practitioner, UK)
Thus it seems that increased conditionality is not universally condemned by those who
work with homeless people in the UK, although it may be a ‘high risk’ strategy with
respect to the most vulnerable groups. That said, there was no suggestion by any
interviewees that these benefits changes had, certainly as yet, led to any increases in
the overall levels of homelessness in the UK.
The most dramatic changes in welfare policies in recent years amongst the countries
we have studied is the ‘Hartz IV’ reforms’ in Germany. Amongst other things, the
introduction of these reforms in 2005 meant that many more unemployed people
became subject to ceilings for ‘appropriate’ housing costs than had hitherto been the
case (see Chapter 4 for details of housing allowances in Germany). However, when the
rent exceeds levels accepted by the relevant municipality, it seems that many people
affected are making up the shortfall from their income maintenance benefits:
The problem then is that people pay part of their rent from their basic income and
consequently get into debt. We are seeing the tendency that people try to avoid
being shoved out of their flat, but paying towards rent from these low subsistence
funds often leads into catastrophe. (Practitioner, Germany)
Unemployed young people have been particularly affected by the Hartz reforms. They
are no longer supported to move out from the family home, and this was considered a
‘high risk’ strategy by some German interviewees (see also Benjaminsen and Busch-
Geertsema, 2009). Vulnerable young people who nonetheless leave home are said to
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be reduced to, sometimes highly risky, forms of self-help under the threat of benefits
sanctions. “And this then directly leads into prostitution, begging all forms of exploitation
and mattress hopping. These young people are then very difficult to access.” (Academic
expert, Germany). ‘Interface’ concerns about protection for young people at risks of
homelessness in Germany are discussed in Chapter 11.
However, as with the UK welfare reforms which have increased conditionality, there was
not said as yet to be any real evidence of the Hartz reforms driving up homelessness
(Benjaminsen and Busch-Geertsema (2009) argue that direct payment of rent may have
counterbalanced the increased risks associated with the Hartz reforms). Our
interviewees attributed this in part to the precarious forms of ‘self-help’ noted above,
and delays in the legal system, meaning that the full implications of the Hartz reforms
are yet to become apparent:
…the impact of sanctions is not yet predictable/visible. We do expect a big wave
of sanctions and unpredictable social consequences. (Practitioner, Germany).
But it seems fairest to conclude that, in both the UK and Germany, the ‘jury is out’ on
the extent to which these recent increases in conditionality within the social security
system will in fact feed through into higher levels of homelessness. The hypothesis
above thus remains unproven with respect to the new evidence generated in this study.
10.6 The Specific Position of Immigrants
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: Immigrants will
often, but not necessarily, face a heightened risk of homelessness - experiences will
vary both between immigrant groups and between countries depending on legal,
welfare, economic and cultural factors.
This hypothesis pays specific attention to the position of immigrants because much of
what has been discussed above, with respect to the interaction of welfare regimes and
housing systems in the generation of homelessness in a range of Member States, does
not apply in their particular case, as very often they do not have access to same welfare
protection as citizens of these countries. In fact, with respect to certain immigrants
groups in certain Member States, their access to welfare support is so limited that they
provide almost a ‘comparison group’ with respect to the implications for homelessness if
welfare protection for indigenous populations was to be completely removed24.
24 While we also explored the position of indigenous ethnic minorities in the qualitative stage of the study, the most
important points to emerge related to the legal status of immigrants, thus we have focused on these matters here (the
one exception is the Roma ethnic minority in Hungary which is also given specific attention below). For the sake of
brevity, we have not discussed the position of those granted asylum in this section, though it should be noted that in a
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The hypothesis above was strongly supported by the new evidence generated in this
study in that homelessness amongst immigrants was reported to be a major area of
concern in some countries (UK and Netherlands, Germany), but a modest problem
(Sweden), a declining problem (Portugal), or a non-issue (Hungary) in others. A range
of factors accounted for these patterns, including the scale and nature of immigration
flows in different countries, but welfare arrangements were also critical.
In the UK, for example, there has for some time been acute concern about the situation
of various immigrant groups which have ‘no recourse to public funds’ including social
security benefits, housing allowances or social housing of any kind25. This usually
means they cannot gain access to even emergency homeless shelters as these
normally require housing allowance to be claimed. Key ‘no recourse’ groups include
refused asylum seekers and undocumented migrants, many of whom are destitute
(McNaughton-Nicholls and Quilgars, 2009):
They tend to be sleeping on friends and families floors...as the traditional thing is
that the community will take you in and give support. (Practitioner, UK)
The other main ‘no recourse’ group in the UK is migrants from the CEE Member States,
whose access to welfare and social housing provision is highly conditional
(McNaughton-Nicholls and Quilgars, 2009). In London, despite some outflow of CEE
migrants consequent on the weakening of the UK economy, destitute CEE nationals
(particularly Poles) are still by far the largest group of immigrants in the rough sleeping
population (about one quarter of all ‘new’ rough sleepers are reported to be CEE
nationals):
… A8 and A2 nationals26 remain a significant minority of rough sleepers, and have
an increasing influence on the upward trend in people contacted rough sleeping.
(Broadway, 2009)
In terms of the causes of homelessness amongst this group, loss of precarious or
seasonal employment, or failure to gain such employment, is part of the problem, but
according to our UK interviewees is not the whole story:
range of countries there is evidence of their long-term disadvantage in both the housing and labour markets (for
example, Pleace et al, 2008).
25 The position is complicated for Scotland by the existence of separate housing and homelessness legislation, but
the restrictions on social security entitlements apply across the UK.
26 In the UK, the term ‘A8’ is used to denote those central and eastern European countries which joined the EU in
2004, and the ‘A2’ for those which joined in 2007.
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There are clearly a lot of motivated people working hard and making a go of it from
eastern Europe. But in any group you’re going to have a percentage who are
travelling away because they have problems, those problems they think will be
less if they make a fresh start… so you’re going to have a group… who are more
susceptible to drugs, alcohol, who have brought those problems with then, mental
ill health is quite significant. (Practitioner, UK)
While in principle unemployed CEE nationals can qualify for UK welfare benefits and
social housing if they have worked legally in the UK for 12 months and have fulfilled
certain other conditions, homelessness practitioners in London emphasised how
unusual this was amongst their CEE clients:
It’s very small numbers, they have to be pretty organised to get... you need a card,
you have to organise everything before you start working, most people come here
and work cash in hand. Even if they can work legally they work cash in hand. Have
to have 12 months worth of work. Don’t forget if someone is drinking heavily and
is quite chaotic you might miss a couple of months work and that takes over
everything. The chance for them to be at work 5/6 days a week is unrealistic.
(Practitioner, UK)
For many of those with more complex needs, while unemployment and lack of access to
social security benefits is important, the ‘usual’ issue that keeps people ‘in a bad place’
is drug or alcohol use:
A lot of them have never been able to work here…a lot of them worked
sporadically two or three years ago, sort of in line with when the recession
happened but when you talk to them about their work histories its been sporadic
anyway. (Practitioner, UK)
Very similar issues were reported with growing numbers of destitute EU migrants in the
Netherlands since its labour market was opened up to nationals of the new Member
States in November 2008. The regulations governing their access to welfare benefits in
the Netherlands is complex (see Chapter 7), but it is clear that they are discouraged
from applying for social assistance and very few receive it. Only if they have stayed in
the Netherlands for at least five years, do they have the same entitlements to social
assistance as Dutch citizens. As in the UK, they are also unlikely to gain access to
homeless shelters if they do not qualify for social security benefits. This situation is
reinforced by the adoption of a ‘own homeless people first’ policy in many Dutch
municipalities whereby access to homeless shelters as well as regular social housing is
prioritised for people with ties to the local area.
In Germany similar problems with respect to homelessness amongst EU migrants has
emerged just recently. As in the UK and Netherlands, these migrants seldom have
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entitlements to social security benefits. However, unlike in these other two Member
States, they do have access to homeless accommodation, so long as they have a
residence permit (according to police laws, all roofless people who are lawfully resident
in Germany have to be provided with temporary accommodation, even if they have no
income to pay for it). In fact it was reported by German interviewees that immigrant
groups - mainly CEE economic migrants, and Sinti and Roma people - now represent a
significant proportion of all residents in low threshold services and shelters in some
major cities. This is generating considerable conflict and demands for a ‘political
solution’:
Actually, we have reached our limits concerning this target group. They just arrive
and we have to deal with them whereas politically, nothing happens. (Practitioner,
Germany)
…we face a situation within which the ‘real’ homeless which should be integrated,
stay away because of the eastern Europeans which have taken their places and
the assistance on offer. (Policy maker, Germany)
In Sweden, there was far less emphasis placed on homelessness amongst immigrants
(though it was noted that people with a foreign nationality do form a disproportionate
share of the homeless population there). This seems likely to be explained in part by the
greater generosity of the Swedish safety net for EU migrants; so long as EU migrants
are lawfully in the country, and have a residence permit, they have the same social
security entitlements as Swedish citizens. Another point stressed in Sweden was the
self-reliance and informal support networks of many immigrants, which is likely to
minimise the levels of literal homelessness at least:
Many members of ethnic minorities here in Sweden are very resourceful and
independent. I doubt that they would look to state or municipality first and foremost
for help. There are many cases where [their] situation would be resolved with
informal labour opportunities that may be unique to his specific ethnic group
through network connections of varying kinds. (Practitioner, Sweden)
Well, there are certainly examples of homeless immigrants. But generally they find
a place to stay, maybe in their relative’s flat or something. (Practitioner, Sweden)
A similar point was made in Germany, where people ‘with a migration
background/experiences’ are generally under-represented in homelessness services,
aside from specific pressures on low threshold services from undocumented migrants
and others with no recourse to public funds (see above). Likewise in Portugal, there was
a consensus that immigrants are not particularly significant among the homeless
population as it is (narrowly) defined there (but bear in mind points above about this
narrow definition rendering some homeless groups ‘invisible’). Informal networks,
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particularly kinship networks, were thought to protect most immigrants from
homelessness:
People come from their country of origin with a very strong background. That
allows them to organise much better. Those who become homeless either have a
psychiatric pathology or strong addictions. (Practitioner, Portugal)
The only exception to this generally low representation of immigrants amongst the
homeless population in Portugal was in the early 2000s, when there were reported to be
many unemployed homeless immigrants, mostly from eastern Europe, who often had
alcohol problems and weak social networks. This situation seems to now have changed
for the better.
Some years ago, with the coming of population from Eastern Europe, there was
a lot of people in situation of homelessness. Now it is not very significant. I think
they managed to organise themselves. (Practitioner, Portugal)
Another key factor was thought to be improved living conditions in some immigrants’
countries of origin have encouraged them to return, and there has also been an
increase in the support offered to EU and other (legal) immigrants in recent years,
including integration measures for those who are homeless, and specific support aimed
at younger immigrants. For undocumented migrants in Portugal, support is very limited
but not completely non-existent:
...even in irregular situations… occasional support can be given until the person
manages to get legal or until entering the Voluntary Repatriation Programme.
Support for rent is not usually provided but it can be given on an exceptional
basis… But there are events in the lives of people where it may make sense for
that support to happen in order to avoid, for example, that the person loses the
house, but that has to be evaluated case by case. (Policy maker, Portugal)
Across all of these countries, it was acknowledged that discrimination in the housing
market can exacerbate the disadvantage faced by immigrants, and also that they were
the group for whom unemployment was most likely to lead to homelessness, although
even here this relationship was seldom a direct and mono-causal one:
In the case of immigrants the issue of unemployment is fundamental.
Unemployment is one of the major reasons which trigger homeless situations
among these individuals. (Policy maker, Portugal)
Even in this situation there are always a conjunction of factors that trigger
homelessness apart from unemployment. (Practitioner, Portugal)
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It was also notable that the whole issue of homeless migrants was fairly ‘politicised’ one
in some countries. For example, several German interviewees made the point that it is
the EU enlargement process, coupled with free movement of workers, that has
generated the problem of homeless EU migrants. Given the very different levels of
wealth between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States, it was entirely to be expected that there
would be high levels of mobility. The result is a group of people in the host country
lawfully (so they cannot be deported) but at the same time the social system provides
little help for them. Their resulting destitution, it is argued, is a matter to be dealt with by
political action at EU and national levels rather than be left to local municipalities and
service providers to cope with. Likewise, with respect to undocumented migrants, it was
also felt in some countries that this was not really a matter that it was appropriate for
local homelessness agencies to be expected to deal with, as these were really issues
that derived from the activities of human traffickers:
People came, sent by the mafia and resorting to the shelters for the homeless.
They paid a ticket and the criminal got them that solution. (Practitioner, Portugal)
The problem of illegal immigrants is not an issue for the homelessness help-
system. (Policy maker, Germany)
As noted above, homeless migrants were not a significant concern in Hungary. The
overall percentage of immigrants is low in Hungarian society and this is true in the
homeless population as well. There are some people who come from neighbouring
countries such as Romania and Ukraine to work in Hungary (usually in the informal
economy, especially construction), but they often commute back and forth from their
own countries. There are also some immigrants form China and the Middle East, but
they usually run some kind of small business and are not vulnerable to homelessness.
Roma people are the key concern in Hungary who are in the main an indigenous ethnic
minority, although there are also reports of Roma from Romania begging in Hungary.
Roma people suffer severe discrimination and disadvantage in the Hungarian labour
market (only around one in eight adults of working age has permanent employment),
and are heavily represented amongst those in public employment programmes. They
also often live in extremely poor housing conditions and in some cases occupy
segregated ‘Roma settlements’.
10.7 Impact of the Recession
This section considers our new evidence on the following hypothesis: The economic
downturn/credit crunch will increase homelessness in some countries and amongst
some social groups but will not have a uniformly negative effect
Our new evidence supports this hypothesis in that ‘the crisis’ had certainly had some
profoundly negative impacts on some groups at risk of homelessness, but this was far
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from a consistent story. Again, the level of welfare protection was critical. In those
countries, and for those groups, with high levels of protection the impact of the
recession with respect to their propensity to become homeless seemed to be very
modest, at least in the short-term:
…we do not see in increase of the number of people visiting our night shelters as
result of the recession. (Practitioner, Netherlands)
Also in the UK, welfare protection was thought to mean that rising unemployment was
unlikely to lead to any immediate rise in homelessness. While mortgage repossessions
have risen sharply in the recession, with safety nets for struggling home owners in the
UK, these are a very minor cause of (statutory) homelessness (see Chapter 11). It is in
fact conceivable, though far from certain, that the housing market slump may actually
improve housing affordability for some poorer households, and thus help to bring
homelessness down. However, UK interviewees suggested that the ‘social dislocations’
associated with long-term poverty and unemployment – such as relationship breakdown
and substance misuse – could be expected to worsen in a recession. This may then
drive up youth, street and single homelessness as additional pressure is put on family
units, and it is also likely to lead to larger numbers of lone parent households, a group
which is especially vulnerable to statutory homelessness.
Likewise in Germany and the Netherlands, there were concerns about the longer-term
impacts of the recession on family relationships and homelessness, should the
economy not recover extremely successfully. In Germany this was also linked to the
increased the risk of rent arrears:
…and many people try to prevent as long as possible the demand for state
transfer. Despite the fact, that these cases will not emerge in large numbers, we
need to be aware that this is a target group, which might risk homelessness.
(Practitioner, Germany)
In Hungary there had been some very obvious deleterious impacts of the recession,
with mortgage repossessions associated with foreign currency loans and rising
unemployment a very serious problem likely to increase homelessness (broadly
defined) (see Chapter 11). Another negative effect of the recession in Hungary has
been that the number of jobs at the bottom end of the labour market has declined
substantially, which again is likely to drive up homelessness amongst some groups,
given the context of weak welfare protection. In Portugal, too, the increased risk of
homelessness associated with the deterioration in families’ economic circumstances
was highlighted, but there was also a positive dimension to this associated with the
improvement in targeted interventions discussed in the next chapter:
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This crisis has shown the importance of providing social support to families
affected by unemployment and who are coming to the end of their unemployment
benefit after which no more support is available. In this case, there is now scope to
prevent risk situations of homelessness which did not exist before because we
only talked about the emergency side of homelessness and not the prevention
aspects and therefore employment seemed to be far away from that reality…this is
one of the things we want to do in the Strategy by focusing on the risk situations
and by involving the employment sector. (Policy maker, Portugal)
One point affecting all countries was that the recession has diminished the opportunities
of those with low qualifications and skills. This is particularly problematic for homeless
people who can find themselves ever ‘further’ from the mainstream labour market. Thus,
while the recession and growing unemployment has not necessarily increased the risks
of homelessness in all countries and amongst all groups, at least in the short-term, it
does make reintegration of those who are homeless and marginalised much more
difficult.
Finally, the particular impact of the recession on immigrants was stressed, linked with
their disproportionate reliance on the more marginal and informal sectors of the
economy:
…temporary jobs are often the first to go during a recession. If all else fails we
might ask [them] what the situation is like in [their] country of origin, if [they] have
ever thought about moving back home. Of course we would never suggest that
[they] have to move back. It’s just that it could be something [they] haven’t
considered. (Practitioner, Sweden)
10.8 Conclusions
The new evidence presented in this chapter has indicated that welfare regimes impact
profoundly on the causes and nature of homelessness (and probably also on its scale,
though the current data does not allow us to conclude this) (see also Benjaminsen et al,
2009). This is demonstrated not only by the relative lack of ‘structural’ homelessness in
Sweden and the Netherlands, where mainstream welfare safety nets are exceptionally
strong, but also by the very great exposure to homelessness (especially in the
economic downturn) of those immigrants who lack access to social security benefits in a
number of the countries studied. That said, there seems little evidence thus far that
recent restrictions in social security entitlements in countries like Germany and the UK
have led directly to increases homelessness.
The relationship between homelessness and labour market change is also complex,
and seems direct only in those countries (Hungary and Portugal) and amongst those
groups (immigrants) which have the least welfare protection. Even in these cases, it is
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more often long-term labour market marginality and precariousness rather than sudden
labour market shocks which are most important. In those countries, and for those
groups, with better welfare protection, it seems likely that sustained poverty and/or
unemployment contribute to homelessness not so much in direct, material ways, but
rather in longer-term, more indirect ways via exerting negative social pressures on
family units.
The evidence presented in this chapter also indicates that ‘housing matters’ too, in that
housing conditions and systems can have an independent effect on the nature and
scale homelessness, for good or ill. This is most obviously demonstrated in Germany
where a slackening housing market in many parts of the country has driven down
homelessness. Likewise in the UK, statutory homelessness is closely associated with
the housing market cycle, rising as the market tightens and falling as it slackens, and is
consistently highest in London where there is the most acute shortage of affordable
housing. ‘Structural’ homelessness in both of these countries thus seems far more
closely linked to housing conditions than to labour market or social security factors.
Moreover, across all of the countries studied, access to affordable, mainstream housing
for vulnerable groups is a key concern in resolving their homelessness or threatened
status (see Chapter 11), and this includes those countries with the strongest welfare
protection (Sweden and the Netherlands).
Another way in which housing may ‘matter’ is with respect to targeted interventions
aimed at tackling homelessness amongst particular high risk groups. It is to this topic
that we turn in the next chapter.
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Chapter 11: Housing Exclusion and Homelessness: New Evidence on
Responses
11.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the new evidence generated by the study on responses to
homeless people or those at risk of homelessness across the six Member States. Its
underlying purpose is to investigate whether this particular form of housing system
intervention – targeted interventions aimed at preventing or addressing homelessness –
can effectively ameliorate the impact of wider welfare and housing market forces. In
other words, it will address the hypothesis: Targeted homelessness interventions can
have significantly positive effects in a wide variety of structural contexts.
We begin in Section 11.2 with some general overview remarks on responses to
homelessness in our six Member States. We then use a series of vignettes
(standardised ‘typical cases’) to explore what is likely to be the response to the housing,
support, income and employment needs of the following key groups at risk of
homelessness:
 single men with support needs (Section 11.3)
 young people asked to leave the family home (Section 11.4)
 women fleeing domestic violence (Section 11.5)
 families with mortgage arrears (Section 11.6)
 immigrants (Section 11.7)
We draw conclusions in Section 11.8. We also include in this chapter various examples
of good practice that may be of interest to other countries.
11.2 General Remarks
It was clear from the new evidence gathered that the protection offered to homeless
people and those at risk of homelessness was much stronger in some countries than in
others, reflecting both broader housing and welfare structures and also the availability of
specialist interventions. Thus in Sweden, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, while
there were concerns and gaps with respect to particular groups (see below), the overall
safety net was generally well developed once one took account of both mainstream
welfare and housing systems and targeted interventions. In Hungary and Portugal
protection (both mainstream safety nets and targeted interventions) were far weaker,
albeit that there have been improvements in recent years, particularly in the latter.
Some overview points on each country are offered below.
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Mainstream welfare protection for those at risk of homelessness, particularly families
with children and/or those in purely financial difficulties, is on the whole most robust in
Sweden and the Netherlands, and in both countries there are also now extensive
targeted programmes aimed at homeless people. In the Netherlands there have been
significant recent improvements in targeted homelessness policies as a result of The
Homelessness Action Plan in the four major cities, which will eventually be rolled out
across all Dutch local authorities responsible for homelessness services and women’s
shelter services. The Action Plan has two central premises: a client-centred approach
using individually planned service pathways and client managers; and collaboration
between all the parties involved, at both the administrative and operational levels. There
is a particular focus on preventing homelessness as a result of evictions and following
discharge from prison or care institutions. This means that in many areas there is now a
“chain of organisations” working to address homeless people’s needs, and
homelessness seems to have declined as a result. This ‘chain’ often works well,
although individuals can slip through the net, and it was reported that an effective chain
of organisations is not yet in place for young people at risk of homelessness, and that
the other vulnerable group is CEE migrants.
In Sweden there is also a national strategy on homelessness – Homelessness: Multiple
Faces, Multiple Responsibilities - which focuses on preventing homelessness arising
from evictions (particularly for families with children), and from discharge from prison,
treatment units or care homes. There is also a specific focus on securing access to
ordinary housing for those on ‘housing ladders’ within the ‘secondary housing market’
(see Chapter 4). This is linked to the strident criticism made of this dominant ‘staircase’
(or ‘step-by-step’) approach in Sweden, whereby traditionally a high degree of social
control is exerted over homeless people via stringent behavioural conditions that make
it difficult for them to reach the ‘top step’ in this staircase and move into regular housing
(Sahlin, 2005b; Benjaminsen et al, 2009).
Germany and the UK have somewhat less robust social security (or at least social
insurance) protection for people at risk of homelessness, but our evidence indicates that
their targeted programmes are, if anything, more extensive and sophisticated than those
in Sweden and the Netherlands, particularly with respect to homelessness prevention
and, in the case of the UK only, rough sleeping and youth homelessness (see also
Chapter 9). In both countries it was reported that targeted efforts to address
homelessness have succeeded even where broader structural trends are very
challenging:
Germany has been characterised by a growth in unemployment and the size of the
poor population, while at the same time the number of homeless people has been
reduced dramatically. Even if this trend was supported by market developments in
the housing sector, it still shows that the activities of the welfare state as well as
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civic activities are able to make the equation untrue, that being poor means very
often being homeless. (Academic expert, Germany)
Likewise, targeted homelessness interventions were reported to have had very positive
effects in the UK, even in the ‘malign’ structural context of the very tight housing market
in London:
…across all the different scenarios [vignettes] there's some really positive
responses and some very successful responses. Yes it’s patchy, it’s very possible
to fall through gaps, but there are opportunities for people to come forward and
move on. (Practitioner, UK).
There was a general sense in the UK that targeted services for many groups of
homeless people are now very good and quite plentiful, at least in London where most
of the interviewees were located. However, such ‘service rich’ environments can
generate their own challenges: one striking thing was that the degree of specialism in
the homelessness field in the UK means that interviewees there often knew little about
responses to at risk groups beyond their own immediate ‘clients’. Likewise, it was
reported that the ‘rich landscape’ of services in Germany was not even easily
understood by the experts working with the homeless population there. Such
differentiation and specialisation can create ‘interface’ problems because of institutional
and departmental segmentation.
In Hungary the problems are very different. The ‘synergy’ of welfare, employment and
housing policies was reported to be very weak, especially with respect to vulnerable
groups threatened by homelessness, and the level of social security benefits is very
low. Moreover, specialist homelessness provision only really started to develop post
transition in 1990. While a fairly developed homelessness system has since been
created, it still tends to concentrate on crisis provision such as night shelters, temporary
hostels and day centres, with the capacity of homelessness institutions to deal with
people with a need for permanent care because of old age or health problems reported
to be very limited. Another important gap identified relates to reintegration: Hungarian
services were felt to operate in such a way as to keep people in homelessness instead
of helping them to get back into the mainstream of society, although various NGOs have
initiated innovative programmes over the past ten years.
In Portugal, too, mainstream welfare safety nets are relatively weak, and specialist
targeted provision is also relatively underdeveloped. Tackling homelessness in Portugal
has traditionally been ‘the task’ of NGOs because of the late development of the welfare
state, a long tradition of religious organisations in providing services for the poorest, and
a dominant understanding of homelessness as an ‘individual’ rather than a structural
problem. In more recent years, local authorities have started to play an important role in
the enhancement of local networks to address homelessness. But the emergency and
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provisional nature of many institutional responses, the lack of support aimed at
resettlement, and the absence of prevention-oriented interventions, were all said to
contribute directly to the persistence of homelessness. A new cross-sectoral National
Strategy for the Integration of Homeless People (launched in March 2009) is expected
to improve this situation, and has been hailed as a pioneering approach amongst
southern European countries (Baptista, 2009). One important legacy of the traditional
lack of response from public services has been the creation of “total” responses in some
organisations, which can create a ‘closed environment’ for some clients and a
resistance to inter-agency working:
Given the lack of adequate and timely responses from the different services,
namely public services, some organisations start to grow in order to concentrate
the whole range of responses needed (health, housing, job integration…) There
are many organisations doing almost everything and being financed by almost
entirely by social security. I understand why this happened, but I don’t think this is
positive. It ends up by creating resistances to partnership working because people
do not understand why there is a need for change since for their clients they
provide all the answers. To reverse this process is very difficult. (Policy maker,
Portugal)
The comparative level of protection offered to people threatened with homelessness via
these mainstream and targeted safety nets in our six Member States is summarised in
Table 11.1
Table 11.1 Summary of protection offered to homeless people/those at risk of
homelessness
Mainstream welfare
safety net
Targeted
interventions
Overall protection
DE Strong Strong Strong
HU Weak Weak Weak
NE Strong Reasonably strong Strong
PT Weak Weak but improving Weak
SE Strong Reasonably strong Strong
UK Reasonably strong Strong Strong
11.3 Single Men
VIGNETTE: A middle aged man (50 years old) is due to leave prison after 5 years.
At present, he has no housing or job organised for when he leaves and no family
to turn to. He has a history of homelessness and alcohol abuse.
This vignette captures a very typical homeless ‘case’ across all of the Member States
that participated in the study (see Chapter 10), and in most countries a range of
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targeted interventions should prevent homelessness. However, it was often remarked
that, while policy frameworks could be well thought through, turning them into practice is
difficult.
In the Netherlands for example, there are special schemes to help ex-prisoners find
work and accommodation, and the social worker in prison should prepare this man’s
return to society, including any the necessary support or supervision. This is called the
“warm transfer” from prison to local authorities and is meant to prevent homelessness:
But it happens that we have to pick up people from the gate of prison with only a
plastic bag full of clothes. (NGO Representative, Netherlands)
Likewise in the UK, there are joint working protocols and specialist resettlement
programmes for ex-offenders that should operate to prevent homelessness in cases
such as this. However, the transition from services within prison to those outside can be
problematic:
What you're relying on is inter agency working and there are examples where it
works very well and examples where it doesn't. The transition from prison to
probation ... it relies on all that information being passed over. We have benefits
teams within prisons but it relies on them being integrated with the resettlement
teams. The whole joined up approach... where there is communication it works
very well. (Practitioner, UK)
In Germany interviewees felt that ex-prisoners were seldom simply released ‘on to the
road’. However, while some form of accommodation is usually assured, there is often an
problem with securing the required support from health, psychiatric and social work
services. It was also noted that even if this man is ‘dry’ on leaving prison, if he ends up
in homeless accommodation he may start to drink again.
In Portugal it was reported that a significant number of people still leave prison without
their accommodation and other needs being met, but it is hoped that the new National
Homelessness Strategy will help to change this:
When the National Strategy is internalised ‘perfectly’ by all the services, this
situation would be signalled one year before release, or at least six months before,
in order to find accommodation for this person, identifying any existing social
networks... But this is still in ideal form, how it is foreseen in the Strategy. What is
still happening at the moment is that people go off to the street from prison
because the situation was not signalled in a timely manner and no accommodation
was found and no work was done. (Policy maker, Portugal)
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In several countries it was noted that resettlement measures are more effective with
long-term than short-term prisoners as there is time to prepare for their release: “this
person spent five years in prison and is therefore an easy case” (NGO Representative,
Netherlands). However, it was frequently noted that, while an ex-prisoner’s ‘home’
municipality was usually responsible for his resettlement, very often they tried to ‘wriggle
out’ of their responsibilities in this type of case:
Formal administrative delimitations and areas of responsibility are easy to identify,
but pushing and pulling responsibility back and forth between different authorities
and administrative levels occurs frequently nonetheless. The real conundrum lies
in finding ways for different authorities and administrative levels to work together,
to find ways of maximising efficiency, instead of working towards solely minimising
losses. (Policy maker, Sweden)
The consequences of agencies not working well together to meet this man’s immediate
accommodation and support needs was said to include reoffending as well as
homelessness. This person would likely ‘sofa surf’ if they had ‘quality networks’, but if
they had no family to turn to the chances are that they would end up at a street
homelessness agency. The problem of ‘nimbyism’ in developing services for homeless
people and/or those with substance misuse problems was particularly emphasized in
the Netherlands, though in Rotterdam at least there appears to have been a partial
solution found in an approach which employs a very intensive communication strategy
with the local community and follows this up with strict management of projects and
prevention of nuisance.
In a number of countries it was reported that, even if specialist temporary
accommodation and support could be sourced for this individual, move-on access to
mainstream housing is often highly problematic:
The whole assistance system only works with regards to providing housing, when
an appropriate market segment is available. And this has really become much
more difficult, because many municipalities have sold their social housing and
other rent-controlled dwellings. Now they have no right of access, and where they
have a right, nobody wants to go. (NGO representative, Germany)
If he’s got a [verified] history of homelessness then he’ll be able to access
accommodation, certainly in London… If he’s not been seen on the streets and he
doesn’t present with a [statutory] priority need for social housing then they’re kind
of stuck to be perfectly honest. (Practitioner, UK)
Barriers to access seemed particularly high in Sweden. Practitioners there explained
that assistance with accommodation from municipal social services via the secondary
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housing market is dependent on the client being able to show that they have been clear
of their addiction for at least six months:
Everything depends on his ability to shake off his substance abuse problem. The
Swedish welfare system is in these cases oriented towards drug-free individuals
primarily. (Practitioner, Sweden)
Move-on to regular housing from the secondary housing market remains problematic,
despite the emphasis on this in Sweden’s national homelessness strategy (see above):
Housing companies and landlords in general have raised the requirements for
people applying for a flat. Social assistance benefits are rarely accepted as a
source of income, and one landlord I know of refused to accept prospective
tenants with any kind of debt record. This makes it difficult for us to find a place for
our clients to live after they have successfully made it through temporary
accommodation and step-by-step housing programmes. (Practitioner, Sweden)
More broadly, there was strong emphasis placed on the personal responsibility of such
an individual to change in Sweden, with a more obviously judgemental attitude taken by
interviewees there than elsewhere:
He needs to be given a purpose. Obviously he has lost his way down the years.
Treatment centres with a wider approach, like those established by [Christian faith-
based organisation that provides treatment programmes for addicts]… would
probably be the best place for someone like this... Otherwise any further help or
municipal support would be money thrown down the drain. (Practitioner, Sweden)
Access to social security benefits was a concern in several countries, including Sweden:
…people fall between the cracks when they are deemed too sick to participate in
the labour market, in which case the unemployment agency pushes responsibility
over to us [social insurance agency]. But at the same time we may find that he is
not sick enough to warrant health-related benefits such as disability pension. In
these cases, finding a way for him to sustain himself can be problematic… (Policy
maker, Sweden)
In Portugal it was noted that incarcerated individuals cannot obtain an identification card
until they leave prison and this can slow their access to social security on release. In
Germany, too, some interviewees noted that a considerable number of prisoners are
released without the necessary documentation to access social security payments.
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In all countries there was a great deal of scepticism about the chances of moving this
man into work in the short-term, or at all, even if his accommodation and alcohol
problems could be sorted out:
At this stage, any help from us at the unemployment agency in getting active in the
labour market will have to wait. This individual clearly needs to deal with more
pressing issues first. (Practitioner, Sweden)
It was widely reported that there was significant prejudice directed at ex-prisoners (and
homeless people) who would therefore find it very difficult to get a job in the mainstream
labour market. The fact that this ex-prisoner is aged 50 was viewed as making it even
less likely that they would gain employment. They may also have substantial difficulties
in adopting the regular daily routine required to sustain employment (some interviewees
suggested that a having a new partner was often the strongest motivation for someone
to develop a new lifestyle.) In the UK, ‘stop start’ benefits were identified as a significant
disincentive to labour market engagement for a man in this position, especially given
frequent delays in processing claims and repeatedly having to supply the same
documents:
… [combined with] the insecurity [of what] we are asking people to take on is a
problem... We’re not setting them up with job for life but something they can lose
tomorrow. (Practitioner, UK)
The country where this man would seem to be least well protected is Hungary. While
their job, housing and family situation should be checked before they leave prison, and
they should be provided with information about the organisations which can help them,
coordination amongst the relevant sectors was said to be poor. Released prisoners
often turn to the social services departments of their ‘home’ municipalities for
assistance, but the most the municipality can do is give them one-off financial support
and direct them to a local homelessness institution. According to some Hungarian
interviewees, finding accommodation is not the biggest problem this man would face, as
the night shelters have enough capacity (except in winter time). The real problem is
acquiring enough food - soup-kitchens provide only one hot meal (usually soup) per
day. There are some NGO schemes in Hungary to help ex-prisoners and/or homeless
people find employment and deal with substance misuse problems but:
The problem is that the existing good practice examples cannot be built into the
homeless provision system, so they remain isolated programmes run by a few
NGOs. (Practitioner, Hungary)
It was also noted that ex-prisoners in Hungary may have access to jobs in the informal
economy, and that their employers may provide them with accommodation and meals,
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deducting the alleged ‘costs’ from their wages. At the extreme end of this spectrum,
there is the ‘modern day slavery’ scenario described in Chapter 10.
Box 11.1 Good Practice Example: The Lönngården Apartment Complex, Sweden
The aim of the project is to provide a safe and dignified existence for people with alcohol
problems aged 50 and over that are considered homeless or are highly likely to become
homeless in the near future. The project does not aim to treat their tenants’ alcohol problem
and it is not part of the step-by-step (or ‘staircase’) housing programmes that are common in
Swedish municipalities. Instead its primary aim is to provide a safe haven where in the longer-
term the hope is that the tenants will overcome their alcohol abuse on their own initiative,
facilitated by the positive changes in their life situation that living in the community of
Lönngården aims to achieve.
The apartment complex is located in a central part of the city of Malmö, Sweden’s third largest
city. The complex consists of 44 apartments, each equipped with a kitchen and bathroom. The
tenants pay their own rent, usually through the assistance of social assistance benefits and
housing allowances or through retirement benefits, and they are each responsible for their own
apartment and for maintaining it, although laundry and housecleaning is included in the rent.
During office hours the complex is staffed by staff with a background in sociology and physical
as well as psychiatric health care. At night and on weekends specially selected security guards
do regular rounds on the premises. Also present are NGOs which organise community projects
and aim to engage the tenants in purposeful activities.
Lönngården has has adopted a very “un-Swedish” approach by not including actual treatment
for their addiction, and by not compelling the tenants to abstain from alcohol. The idea is to put
as much responsibility into the hands of the tenants, and make them realise that the decision
to abstain or to change their lifestyle has to come from within. An independent evaluation of
Lönngården concluded:
“The lenient approach to the abuse of alcohol within the premises may be highly controversial
in Sweden since it opposes the national policy towards alcohol abuse. But despite this fact, the
evaluation has found that this approach has clearly benefited the tenants who live there… the
abuse of alcohol is regarded by the majority of tenants as a secondary problem, as an effect of
their general life situation. This statement is strengthened by the fact that when their situation
changes [i.e. by living at Lönngården], the amount of alcohol consumed also changes for the
better. A more dignified existence creates new priorities and values.”
They also concluded that the costs associated with accommodating someone at Lönngården
amount to about half the public expenditure associated with a person with alcohol problems
who continues to live on the streets.
However, one possible concern about this practice example is the relatively large number of
apartments contained in the one project; this runs counter to the general trend in Europe away
from larger-scale more institutional forms of accommodation for vulnerable groups, towards
238
smaller, more highly supported units (Busch-Geertsema and Sahlin, 2007). It should also be
noted that this project is limited in its ambitions: the main purpose is to provide a safe and
meaningful existence for troubled individuals, rather than to reintegrate them into mainstream
society, far less into the labour market. However, given the pessimism expressed by most
interviewees in all countries about the prospects for the man described in the above vignette,
such projects with humane and realistic ambitions – and a smaller number of apartments per
project - may well represent a sensible approach.
11.4 Young People
VIGNETTE: A 17 year old young man is living at home but his mother and step-
father have asked him to leave. He is not in work, education or training and has a
low level of educational qualifications.
In most countries there was a very strong emphasis on the responsibilities of this young
man’s parents, who would have a clear obligation to support him until he was at least 18
years old or till he finished high school, regardless of whether or not he had left home.
…think this is really a family issue that should be dealt with by them. (Practitioner,
Sweden)
In the Netherlands, for example, it was reported that if he qualifies for social assistance
benefits (which he is entitled to if he goes to school or has a traineeship), the cost
should be recouped from his parents, though it was acknowledged that “..in practice this
appears to be pulling on a dead horse”. The UK was the clear exception on this issue,
where no interviewees mentioned parental obligations, certainly not in legal terms,
though workers would sometimes attempt to persuade parents to keep young people in
the family home:
Do you realise how much better it is for a young person to grow up in a family?
The reality is if they’re getting kicked out and going into B&B or young people’s
hostels they’ll be surrounded by other young people with difficult behaviours and in
B&Bs there’ll be older people some of whom have criminal backgrounds.
(Practitioner, UK)
In most Member States the young man’s accommodation and welfare needs would be
the responsibility of child welfare/youth services rather than housing or homelessness
services until he was age 18, with foster care or similar arrangements offered if attempts
to deal with the family conflict failed:
This is officially quite another area… providing a home be it a … flat or a
supervised flat with the assistance of youth aid: thousands of places are available
for this group and very often the support is very good and successful, but by
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German law help for a 17 year old is not a case of help for homeless people.
(Academic, Germany)
However, it was also acknowledged in Germany, for example, that in fact there are quite
a lot of ‘street children’, because ‘besides the hustle about responsibility ([between
administrative departments], there is a relatively large group of young people who will
not or are not able to accept help.’ (Policy maker, Germany). There appear to be
particular dangers of ‘falling between stools’ for young people as they reach 18 in
Germany (see also Benjaminsen and Busch-Geertsema, 2009):
Pretty problematic is the situation of young people at the threshold to be coming
off age. They are in danger that they are lost in the Bermuda Triangle between
SGB II (long term unemployed), SGB XII (basic security) und SGB VIII (children
and youth assistance) (Academic, Germany)
In Portugal, too, interviewees considered the situation of this young person a very tricky
one to respond to because the expectation would be that the ‘Minors’ Court’ would deal
with the case, and they would not be included in the commonly used definition of
homelessness. However, if he became roofless accommodation would be secured:
For any situation we come up with in the street, we need to provide an answer.
We have to make a bridge. (Practitioner, Portugal)
Again the one exception to this general pattern was the UK where the main
responsibility for homeless or potentially homeless 16 and 17 year olds lies with local
housing rather than social services authorities. While technically young people are
defined as children until age 18 in the UK, they are only the responsibility of social
services authorities if they are designated a child ‘in need’, which in practice is usually
limited to those young people who have been ‘looked after’ or received a social services
intervention as a child aged under 16 (although a recent court case has indicated that
all homeless under 18s approaching a local housing authority for assistance should also
have a social services assessment).
The UK also provided the key example of apparent success in tackling youth
homelessness, with a major review concluding that there had been considerable
improvements in responses to this group over the past decade (Quilgars et al., 2008).
The statutory homelessness safety net was strengthened in the early 2000s via the
expansion of ‘priority need’ categories to include 16 and 17 year olds, care leavers and
other young people at risk, and the homelessness prevention agenda has had a
particularly strong focus on young people. The UK interviewees reported that this
means that this young man should not find it difficult to access some sort of
accommodation, though a social tenancy is a less likely outcome of this process than
previously. A ‘problem-solving’ approach is now often taken by local housing authorities,
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which may have as its outcome the young person remaining in the family home with
support, or moving into various forms of ‘transitional’ accommodation, including foyers,
supported hostels/housing, and supported lodging schemes. These positive policy
developments were reflected in the comments of our interviewees:
“I think [they] are less likely to end up as street homeless in central London and if
you do it will be for a very short time.” (Practitioner, UK)
In a number of other countries, by contrast, there were growing concerns about youth
homelessness (see Chapters 9 and 10), and provision for young people like the young
man in this vignette was reported to be weak in several countries, including the
Netherlands. While there are schemes for early school leavers in the Netherlands, there
is not a clear picture of the problem of young people dropping out of school and living
without an adequate home. The network of specialist youth homelessness organisations
is underdeveloped, and there are not enough specialist accommodation places for
young people, so they can end up in adult night shelters. Similarly, in Sweden, a young
man like this without an income would find it difficult to access housing, and as he is
under 18 he couldn’t sign a rental contract. But he would be entitled to a housing
allowance if he found somewhere to stay, possibly via the ‘secondary housing market’
sublet schemes ran by municipal social services.
Respondents in all countries agreed that if this young man fell through the available
accommodation and care safety nets, the most likely outcome was that he would end up
‘sofa-surfing’ rather than sleeping rough “He will sit at the couch in the house of a friend,
you do not see them.” (Policy maker, Netherlands). This was not always seen as
necessarily problematic, though as a German practitioner commented:
This may be ok, but there are enough examples where this was the starting point
of a problematic housing career and where we met the youngster next at a street
work team, after a lot of difficulties have happened.
In most countries the young man would have no access to social security benefits or
only restricted access, and there was a heavy emphasis on trying to retain him in
school, or alternatively getting him into a training scheme (though in some countries he
would not be able to access employment training until he was 18). Education and/or
work was usually given a higher priority than his housing situation:
The most important is that he finds a job or education. Housing is not a priority, he
needs to build on his future. (Practitioner, Netherlands)
But see the Work-Wise good practice example from the Netherlands (below) where the
importance of a stable home is emphasised as a precondition to young people’s ability
to concentrate on education or work.
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In the UK, it was reported that the young man in this vignette would be encouraged to
access education, training or employment, especially if they were in a dedicated young
person’s hostel/supported accommodation. If they accessed a foyer then their
accommodation would be conditional on their engagement with employment or training:
If they're really lucky they'll get into a foyer and they'll get their education,
employment and training needs met as well and have much more support to move
forward. (NGO Representative, UK)
While none of the UK interviewees identified the benefits system as a major barrier to
accessing accommodation or employment for this young man, the national review of
responses to youth homelessness noted discord between employability initiatives and
the social security system (Quilgars et al, 2008). Most notably, the rule which excludes
full-time students (defined as studying for over 16 hours per week) from accessing
Housing Benefit acts to limit young people’s access to higher and further education, and
high rents in temporary and transitional accommodation (and sometimes also in private
rented sector accommodation) act as a serious disincentive for young people to
(re)enter employment. Young people’s restricted access to housing allowances is a
problem in a number of other countries, including Portugal where a national programme
- Porta 65 Jovem – attempts to address this for tenants aged under 30 (see Chapter 9).
In Germany, it was felt that, in addition to the risks inherent in the growing conditionality
of welfare benefits for young people and other groups under the Hartz VI reforms (see
Chapter 9), and especially the sharpened sanction regime since 2007, there were also
some perverse incentives within the German social security system affecting young
adults:
Youngsters quit their apprenticeships because their experience was: somebody
without work, without education and school leaving certificate has an immediate
right on help through SGB XII (basic security). Once one has an education, it is
very difficult to receive state transfer according to SGB II (long-term unemployed).
So, somebody doing an apprenticeship, who gets up in the morning, who needs
space for retreat and recreation, gets only a very small room in a four room shared
flat in assisted housing… compared to another youngster without education who
gets through SBG II (basic security) a room of the double size and everything is
well regulated. (Practitioner, Germany)
In Hungary this young person would seem to be at particularly serious risk. Schooling is
compulsory till 18, and if a young person drops out at 16 or 17 both the parents and the
child protection authorities have clear responsibilities (parents can be warned and then
fined). But some Hungarian interviewees said that the childcare authorities were in
practice unlikely to find out about this young person, and in any case did not generally
intervene in cases of young people aged over 17. Intensive family help/mediation
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services are available to only a few families in regeneration areas, and the adult
homelessness system also does not appear geared up to assist these young people
(though they may now appear in hostels/night shelters as the regulation which
prohibited accommodation of minors has been abolished). It was said that young people
in these circumstances often came under the influence of ‘supporters’ in local gangs
who encourage the young men to become involved in crime and the young girls to
become involved in prostitution (as with the single vulnerable man above, ‘modern
slavery’ can be a possibility after they leave home).
Box 11.2 Good Practice Example: Work-Wise, Netherlands
The goal of Work-Wise is to promote the social inclusion of young people leaving
institutions. A closely related goal is the prevention of recidivism among young people
with a criminal past. The young people concerned receive custom-made support and
coaching with regard to their work and/or educational plans, their leisure time/social
networks, and their housing situation. After they have finished the Work-Wise trajectory,
participants in the programme should have work or an educational place, a safe place to
live, and be working on the construction of a positive social network.
The Work-Wise initiative started in 1998 when an institution working with young people
with a criminal record adopted this new approach. A Work-Wise handbook was
published in 2001, in which the approach was described and underpinned by a
theoretical framework. Nowadays, the method is available in all young offenders’
institutions in the Netherlands and also in six institutions for young people with social
and/or behavioural problems. Each year about 2,500 to 3,000 young people start a
Work-Wise trajectory in the Netherlands.
The underlying premise of the Work-Wise approach is that young people with little social
capital have nothing to lose and are therefore likely to engage in risky behaviour.
Furthermore, it is assumed that young people have a hierarchy of needs (based on the
‘Maslow’ pyramid). Following this hierarchy of needs, it is not very useful to prepare
young people for work or education (higher level needs) when they still have problems
with regard to their social support networks or housing situation (basic level needs).
Another core principle of the Work-Wise method is its comprehensive client-centred
approach in which the intrinsic motivation of the young people serves as a starting point
for treatment and intervention. Each person is supervised and coached by an individual
trajectory supervisor (ITB), who acts as the contact point for all other relevant
stakeholders.
Employers appear quite willing to employ young people from these Work-Wise projects,
even if they have a criminal past. The general feeling is that these young people deserve
a (second) chance. The employers very much appreciate the role of the ITB as they find
it reassuring to have a clear contact person to whom they can turn if there are problems
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with the young people they have recruited.
In 2008, about 200 young people that followed the Work-Wise programme were
interviewed three to six months after they had left the relevant institution. It was found
that 86 per cent were engaged in daily activities like studying, working or a combination
of both. Almost all had a safe place to live.
11.5 Women Fleeing Domestic Violence
VIGNETTE: A woman with two children (aged 2 and 4) is fleeing domestic
violence. She is currently living in a refuge/temporary relief centre. She was
financially dependent on her partner and has no independent income.
This was a familiar scenario in all countries and was generally viewed as the most
straightforward case and best protected group of all those discussed. Very often this
protection was offered via specialist women’s services that emerged from the feminist
movement, rather than being seen as primarily a homelessness or housing issue. In
Germany, for example, women’s shelters either run by municipalities or by self-help
organisations with municipal funds, form a strictly separate system from the
homelessness system. Generally this type of case would not be treated as a case of
homelessness in Germany:
… even though some would argue that women in shelters are also homeless and
should be able to claim the assistance available for the homeless. However, the
organisers of the shelters usually do not want to be put into the same part as the
homelessness agencies. (Practitioner, Germany)
In most countries this family would stay in refuge/protected form of accommodation until
housing became available:
I do not know any situation in my organisation where a woman was told that she
could only stay, imagine, just for two months. She leaves only if she runs away or
because the situation is under control. (Practitioner, Portugal)
However, shelter/refuge capacity was reported as insufficient in most countries, and in
Germany it was reported that if this woman had additional social problems such as a
drug addiction, she wouldn’t be accommodated in a women’s shelter. In these cases
she may end up in mainstream homeless accommodation where the problem of
domestic violence is “neglected“, with both anonymity and protection against further
violence not guaranteed, though in a number of German cities there is now some
gender-specific provision for homeless women with additional social problems.
In most countries this woman would get priority access to social housing, but there was
often reported to be difficulties in securing suitable follow-on accommodation for those
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leaving women’s shelters/refuges. In the UK, for example, while the local authority has
responsibility to secure suitable settled accommodation for her and her children, the
nature of the local housing market is crucial. While she would be allocated social
housing quite quickly in some parts of the country (and the below market rents would
make it easier to get back into work), in London it is most likely that she will end up in
the private rented sector as waits for social housing are extremely long, even for priority
cases:
…well in the past [accessed social housing], but now the waiting lists are so long…
rehousing in social housing may take two or three years and no hostel is going to
let her stay that long and no-one is likely to want to stay in a refuge that long
either. (NGO representative, UK)
The woman would in most countries be eligible in her own right for social security
benefits without reference to, or requiring the cooperation of, the abuser:
In cases of domestic violence the normal rules surrounding alimony are overruled
by the need for the abused partner to get out of the relationship and thereby
minimize any dependence. Instead of going through the legal procedures
surrounding alimony disputes she will receive social benefits. (Practitioner,
Sweden)
One country where the protection seemed weaker than one might have expected was
the Netherlands. Dutch interviewees appeared to feel that the protection afforded to this
group was good, and noted that it had improved in recent years, with the network of
organizations to help victims of domestic violence well organized. The shortcomings
they identified were similar to those in several other countries: low outflow from crisis
shelters into the regular housing market; low quality of some crisis shelters (particularly
facilities for children); and inadequate shelter capacity - facilities are usually full and
women in need do sometimes end up with family or friends. But from a comparative
perspective three additional points of weakness stood out:
 Independent access to benefits is not automatic until the victim divorces the
perpetrator. If she is no longer married, she will receive social assistance within
six weeks. If she is still married she will have to apply for “borrow social
assistance” from the municipality. The money has to be paid back after the
divorce.
 Only short-term (maximum of 10 days) exclusion of the perpetrator from the
family/marital home is allowed for (unlike in Germany and the UK, for example,
where longer-term or permanent exclusion of violent partners is allowed for in
certain circumstances).
 In order for an ‘urgency license’ to be given in housing allocations, police reports
of violence are required.
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As with other groups threatened with homelessness, the protection for this type of
household seemed weakest in Hungary. Specialist ‘crisis’ accommodation for those
fleeing domestic violence is rare and is reserved for the most ‘serious’ cases. Another
option is ‘temporary family homes’, which should be available for such households in all
cities with more than 30,000 residents – these are not aimed specifically at victims of
domestic violence, but rather for ‘troubled families’ more broadly. Capacity seems very
limited in all of this temporary provision, there is little scope for ‘emergency’ admissions,
and there are very few social housing rentals for them to move onto after they leave
such temporary homes. In the temporary homes they may be offered help with finding a
job or training as well as other forms of support, but women with small children often
fear using the childcare services as this may enable their partner to find them.
Moreover, it of often very difficult for them to find a job if they have a low level of
qualification as the training offered is very minimal.
Elsewhere, there were also concerns raised regarding labour market prospects for this
woman. In the UK, for example, this woman would not be obliged to be available for
work for the purposes of social assistance benefits as her children are so young.
Service providers nonetheless recognised the value of a woman in this position
engaging in paid work if possible:
The thing is though is not to write that person off from the aspiration of
employment and giving that person all the information about how much better off
they would be in work or showing them the calculations and that sort of thing.
Don't have the attitude “…and they're in that situation and work is a long way
away” as it can be different for every individual. (Practitioner, UK)
But there are considerable barriers: private rented sector housing (of a reasonable
quality) is very expensive in areas like London and, combined with the steep withdrawal
of Housing Benefit, this acts as a strong work disincentive. The same is true in high cost
types of accommodation like refuges:
The number of women in employment and in a refuge is miniscule. (Practitioner,
UK)
Moves into work also have to be able to cover childcare costs, transport and other
incidental costs of working, making low paid work unattractive. There are also the
familiar problems with moving between insecure employment and benefits (see Chapter
8).
Another potential labour market dimension in this case is that women fleeing violence
who are in employment often give it up. In high risk cases this break in employment may
be necessary so that they cannot be found by their former partner. But in other cases
the break in employment may be caused largely or entirely by the upheaval associated
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with having to move home. In this instance an innovative model developed in England –
Sanctuary Schemes – may be helpful in enabling women at risk of domestic violence to
avoid such disruption by remaining safely in their own homes through exclusion of the
perpetrator and the provision of enhanced security (see below).
Some interviewees noted that, in addition to the material needs of women fleeing
violence, the social and psychological complexities of cases such as this had to be
acknowledged. Again in Sweden this was accompanied by a hint at the importance of
personal responsibility:
To provide support and assistance of different kinds is easy, but to motivate the
individual, and to put her situation in a context where she can visualise what she
needs to do for herself to feel better, to go further and become independent… now
that is much harder, and that’s what our welfare system is not so good at today.
(Policy maker, Sweden)
Box 11.3 Good Practice Example: Sanctuary Schemes, UK
The origins of Sanctuary Schemes lie in the London Borough of Harrow which launched a local
‘Sanctuary Project’ in 2002. The aim of this project was to help households at risk of domestic
violence to remain safely in their own homes by providing enhanced security. The Sanctuary
model has now been promoted in England by central government as one option for households
at risk of domestic violence, and a survey in 2007 found that about half of England’s 354
councils were operating such schemes.
Sanctuaries are created through ‘target hardening’ of the property and the provision of safety
equipment such as: reinforced doors and locks; reinforced double glazed windows and/or
window grilles; fire retardant letter boxes; smoke detectors and fire safety equipment; window
alarms; alarm systems that connect directly to the police or care control systems; intercom
systems; a ‘sanctuary room’ (a secured room fitted with a phone or alarm); video entry
systems; and external measures such as security lighting, closed circuit television cameras,
cutting back hedges and branches, and erecting fences and gates. Sanctuary Scheme
‘packages’ should also address any wider needs of service users, which might include
emotional or practical needs, mental health, drug or alcohol needs or problems with children.
An independent evaluation found that Sanctuaries are potentially appropriate for all groups at
risk of domestic violence as long they choose to have Sanctuary installed and the perpetrator
is not living in the property. Across eight case study areas, over 1,000 Sanctuaries had been
installed at an average cost of approximately £500 (this average ranged from £100 in one case
study area to an average of £2,720 in another case study area). Service providers and service
users interviewed felt that Sanctuaries had a range of benefits:
 widening choice – many service users wished to remain in their own homes and did not
want to move to refuges and to be rehoused in unfamiliar, and possibly less desirable,
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areas or properties;
 minimising disruption (avoiding the need to move, leave their current employment,
change doctors, schools, etc.);
 allowing people to stay close to formal and informal support networks;
 a reduction in homelessness and temporary accommodation use;
 cost savings; and,
 a reduction in repeat incidents of domestic violence.
There had been attempted breaches of Sanctuaries in the case study areas, but in the vast
majority of incidents the security measures had deterred or prevented perpetrators from forcing
their way into the property. However, it was emphasised that the suitability of Sanctuary would
always depend on a full risk assessment of the case and the needs and preferences of the
household.
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11.6 Families With Mortgage Arrears
VIGNETTE: A couple with two children (aged 10 and 12) are living in an owner
occupied dwelling. The man has lost his job in the economic downturn and they
are struggling to pay the mortgage.
This group was viewed as quite uncommon in most countries - “doesn’t happen with us”
(Practitioner, Germany). In Germany, this was in part because there are relatively few
home owners, but also because safety nets are strong. While forced sales have
increased in the recession, they are seldom a direct consequence of unemployment, but
rather arise from a general over-indebtedness of the household. Debt advice centres
should be able to help them avoid the loss of their home and homelessness in the vast
majority of cases, and there is financial assistance with paying mortgages available
under the social security system (mortgage interest is paid as a contribution to averting
homelessness, but only very occasionally is assistance is provided with the capital
element as a loan to be paid back if the person gets back into work). If the mortgage
interest is too high to be paid out of social security benefits, they would have to move
into a rental flat. Whether this is an easy or difficult option depends on the state of the
local housing market.
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In Portugal, this case was also not particularly common. Where it should arise, it was
felt that with the implementation of the new National Homelessness Strategy, and the
increased importance given to prevention strategies, positive developments in terms of
the effectiveness of responses may occur in the medium term. It was also apparent that,
at the local level, there was a high degree of flexibility in the potential responses:
If they come to the right place – and that is here (Social Security Centre) – the
situation is analysed. It may involve a cash benefit; it may involve negotiation with
the bank… As a last resort, if they lose their home, they will be helped to rent a
place. There was the case of a couple that was waiting to receive inheritance. In
that case it was necessary to help them till that happened. (Practitioner, Portugal)
In the Netherlands, despite very high levels of mortgage debt (see Chapter 4), the
overall level of repossession was reported to be low, and has risen only slightly in the
recession. It was reported that most banks accept will accept a renegotiation of the
mortgage in these circumstances, and in any case the benefits system is sufficiently
generous to stop unemployment leading directly to homelessness in most cases
(though people may sometimes have to move to a cheaper dwelling). Likewise, this was
an uncommon case in Sweden because safety nets are so strong. Social insurance or
unemployment assistance benefits should cover them financially, and it was also
assumed that in most cases the woman would be in work, so that it was not an urgent
situation requiring welfare interventions. Social assistance benefits and housing
allowances can also be an option, but in this case they may be required to sell their
house as a ‘realisable asset’:
Well, you have to use common sense in such a situation. We will never, in general,
help to pay off a mortgage for instance. But if we find that it would be more costly
for social services to force them to sell their house and then provide them with
emergency, temporary accommodation, then maybe some kind of financial support
can be worked out for a shorter time-period if their situation is temporary. In the
long run they will have to adapt to the situation and find a cheaper place to live like
a flat or a smaller house/condo. (Practitioner, Sweden)
The problems associated with treating the family home as a realisable asset in these
circumstances was recognised by another practitioner in Sweden:
If he loses his job and they apply for social assistance benefits for some reason,
and they have to sell their house to be eligible for benefits, then they will find
themselves in a homeless situation all of a sudden. (Practitioner, Sweden)
This seems a very different approach to the UK where, though far from comprehensive,
all of the available safety nets for struggling owner occupiers are premised on keeping
them in their current homes if possible. As noted in Chapter 4, social insurance
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protection for those who lose their job is relatively weak in the UK (with far less
generous replacement rates than elsewhere), and owner-occupiers are excluded from
the housing allowance scheme. There is provision for support with mortgage interest
payments via the social assistance scheme, but this is subject to a waiting period and
upper limit (both of which have been eased in the current recession). Repossessions
have risen sharply in the UK during the recession (though not as sharply as first
forecast) and have been a major political issue. The Government has introduced a
range of fairly modest special measures (such as ‘mortgage rescue’ schemes) to
minimise repossessions in the current crisis, but there is evidence that lender
forbearance prompted by the desire to avoid losses arising from negative equity has
been of greater import, and this may change as the market picks ups (Ford and
Wallace, 2009). Some UK interviewees highlighted the gaps in the welfare safety net for
vulnerable homeowners, such as arrears accruing during the waiting period for support
with mortgage interest payments, and there were also concerns about irresponsible
lending practices:
Some people fall into homeownership and have done so without all the information
communicated to them that should have been through no fault of their own.
They've taken on too much of a risk and it never was going to be sustainable but
the lenders have to bear some responsibility for that allowing people to get into
those situations and at worst encouraged them. (NGO representative, UK)
Nonetheless, amongst our interviewees there were mixed views on how far the state
should go in protecting struggling homeowners, and certainly making capital rather than
just interest payments was viewed by some as a step too far:
It’s going to sound very harsh, and I say this as a homeowner, but it is a privilege
not a right to own a house. (Practitioner, UK)
Even if repossessed, it seems that most ex-home owners in the UK find ways to avoid
statutory homelessness (see Chapter 9), most probably by drawing on their social
support networks or by accessing the private rented sector (Fitzpatrick et al, 2009).
However, if these solutions were unavailable to this particular family they would be
entitled to priority need for social housing under the homelessness legislation because
of the presence of children in the household (unless they could be shown to be
‘intentionally homeless’, which is unlikely in cases of ‘genuine economic hardship’).
It was in Hungary that this problem seemed most serious by far. In a context of weak
social protection and high exposure to foreign currency loans, it was reported that the
scale of the problem with default on housing loans is now so large that local authorities
do not have the financial capacity to cope with it. The government has introduced a
support package so that those who have lost their job or have suffered a serious
decrease in income because of the recession can ask for a one-year moratorium on
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their mortgage payments. But one year is probably not long enough for such
households to recover when the labour market is depressed as well. Another potential
remedy is that local authorities have a pre-emptive right to purchase the debtor’s home
from the bank before auction and rent it to debtor for an indefinite period. However it
was reported that banks often fail to cooperate with this scheme, and local governments
have also shown little interest. While local authorities can take up subsidised loans to
buy such houses as rental units, they are already heavily indebted and many
municipalities do not think that it is their job to solve the problem of the families who
often took up loans in an ‘irresponsible’ way (to fund general expenditure). Another key
factor is that public housing is a residual sector that is difficult to operate efficiently and
local authorities do not want to add further dispersed units to their stock. Interviewees in
Hungary felt that banks should be obliged to reschedule these loans rather than all of
the responsibility lying with local authorities.
The very limited supply of ‘normal social rental units’ means it would be very unlikely
that this family would be able to move into social housing in Hungary. They may gain
access to special low rent social rental units or ‘transit apartments’, but this would be on
a short-term basis. In most such cases the households would move back to their
families (parents, grandparents etc) or rent an apartment on the private market. In some
cities they may gain access to a special housing allowance for a time-limited period to
enable them to access a private rented flat. There is also an innovative scheme in
Hungary – ‘Village of Inclusion’ which enables families at risk of homelessness, with
roots in rural areas, to be settled back into these areas (see below). An important part of
the context for this scheme is that legally it is prohibited for children to be homeless in
Hungary: if a family becomes homeless, the children are taken away from their parents.
A further specific point made in the Hungarian context was the “feudal circumstances” in
which people have lost their homes in some rural areas, whereby “private bankers”, who
are often the leaders of these local communities, provide loans with incredibly high
interest rates. They encourage poor people to take such mortgage loans to cover
everyday expenses and when they are unable to pay the instalments, the “private
banker” buys their homes from them at a low price in order to avoid foreclosure.
Box 11.4 Good Practice Example: ‘Village of Inclusion’, Hungary
The main aims of this model programmes were twofold:
 To provide integrative circumstances for urban homeless families – that have rural roots –
to resettle in a village.
 To work out a feasible model of rural regeneration in remote regions to make them
prosperous and ready for the integration of homeless families
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The programme started in autumn 2004 with the cooperation of the Hungarian Maltese Charity
Service, the Tutor Foundation, the Ministry for Youth, Families, Social Affairs and Equal
Opportunities, and the Foundation for Homeless People. It aimed to integrate homeless families
from some big cities (Budapest, Miskolc) - that had some kind of rural roots - to villages where
housing and basic maintenance is cheaper. The families chosen were under threat of losing their
children only because of their financial/housing situation rather than because they had any health
or other support needs. Altogether about 35-40 families have taken part in the programme over
the last 5 years. The first model programme was implemented in Tarnabod (Northern-Hungarian
Region), while the second programme has just started in Erk (Northern-Hungarian Region).
Tarnabod is a village of about 900 inhabitants, the majority of whom are Roma. Tarnabod is
located in the most remote region of Hungary, and the unemployment rate was nearly 100 per
cent in the beginning of the 2000s. That is why the programme was not only a homelessness
programme, but also a rural revitalisation programme, that was intended to demonstrate that
remote small communities can turn into prosperous ones even in unfavourable circumstances,
and also that they can provide an integrative background for homeless families that are able to
change their lives. The method of the programme was to proceed step by step, always with the
agreement of the majority of the inhabitants.
The first housing units were purchased in autumn 2004. They were chosen to be in good
condition, dispersed throughout the village, and had large enough gardens that the families could
grow their own food. They were let on a rent-free basis but participating families had to meet
certain other requirements, such as looking after the garden, children attending school etc.
A special transportation service was organised as the regular bus lines did not provide proper
services. The organisers bought a small bus (with 17 places) for the village, which carried people
to work to the neighbouring cities and also let them reach public services in bigger cities. This
measure alone resulted in 33 inhabitants of the village moving into work.
There were also well-designed community development programmes, such as training on how to
garden, grow food and take care of domestic animals. The programme paid particular attention to
the youngest generation, with an expanded kindergarten and school improvements. The local pub
was also bought by the Maltese Service and was turned into a community centre and day care
centre for children, employing local women trained for this purpose. The Maltese Service also
bought a disused building and created a new working space for over 30 people to recycle
electronic waste. The factory opened in 2006, and there is a high demand for jobs there even
though it pays only the minimum wage. The factory was intended to be self-sustaining after three
years, but due to the economic crisis it nearly went bankrupt and could survive with the prompt
help of the social ministry.
There has been no overall evaluation carried out yet, but there have been monitoring reports
prepared for the relevant funders and there has been a lot of scientific debate about this model
programme which suggests that it may be interesting for two target groups:
 For policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe, where the deepest poverty can be
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experienced in rural areas, and where the problems can include: lack of proper
infrastructure, inadequate transport links, poor quality of housing, low education levels,
and collapse of the socialist agricultural systems.
 Some elements of the programme may be of interest to a wider range of organisations
dealing with problems of integration and homelessness:
o The step-by step consensus method, involving the local community
o The contact between the homeless families and the organisers which laid down
precise rules of cooperation
o The concentration on children’s needs and futures
o The training programme on the essentials of living in the countryside
o The provision of low-skilled work as the most relevant tool for rehabilitation and
integration
However, it is a very resource-intensive model which may limit its transferability. The model also
needs a lot of flexibility, to take into account local circumstances, meaning that it is not easy to
standardise.
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11.7 Immigrants
VIGNETTE: A 35 year old single male immigrant has been undertaking casual
work but this has declined with the economic downturn. He can no longer afford
to pay the rent in his flat from his earnings and has accumulated rent arrears.
This was the most complex group, as each country had its own specific set of
homelessness issues with respect to immigrants, and diverse rules and systems with
respect to their welfare and accommodation entitlements. As one element in a much
larger research project, this section can only really scratch the surface of this
complexity. However there was consensus on one point: legal status was all important.
Sweden has the most generous safety net in place for immigrants faced with potential
homelessness (see Chapter 10). On the assumption that he has a residence permit, but
does not qualify for social insurance benefits because of the informal nature of his
employment, the man in this vignette would receive housing allowance and social
assistance benefits. The landlord and social services would then work with him to come
up with a repayment plan to avoid eviction (the landlord is legally required to notify local
social services if a tenant has accumulated rent arrears, and then the office of social
services is supposed to contact the tenant and initiate an investigation). If his housing
costs were considered excessive, he may have to move to a cheaper flat via an internal
exchange system. As with other homeless cases, there was a strong emphasis placed
on individual responsibility in some of the Swedish responses to this vignette:
253
I think, personally, that he should have contacted his landlord the moment he knew
he would not be able to pay his rent to ask for a possible rent delay. It is a bit late
for him to go to social services and ask for help when the debt collector is knocking
on his door… (Practitioner, Sweden)
In Germany, as in Sweden, there is also a strong emphasis on integrated solutions for
people facing eviction and homelessness due to rent arrears (see the ‘City Without
Homeless Hostels’ good practice example below). However, unlike in Sweden, if he is a
relatively new immigrant to Germany, he is unlikely to be eligible for social assistance or
housing allowance benefits (see Chapter 10). It is therefore probable that he will lose
the flat. But so long as he has a residence permit he will at least be able to gain access
to emergency shelter in Germany. If on the other hand he is an undocumented migrant
or lacks a residence permit, then in most cases he cannot access even these
emergency shelters. With the exception of some large cities, illegal migrants are not
allowed to claim any help and are simply referred to churches etc: “People with an
unclear residency status just do not turn up in the system. They really don't exist.“
(Practitoner, Germany). They can gain access to emergency health services:
But nobody talks a lot about this help, which is simply given. This is a highly
complex matter; the helpers do not want to get those helped to get into even
deeper problems if their situation is made public. (Practitioner, Germany)
The position is even more difficult in the Netherlands and the UK (see Chapter 10).
When presented with this vignette, all UK interviewees agreed that it entirely dependent
on ‘whether or not he has recourse to public funds’. If ‘has recourse’ (e.g. is a refugee or
is a migrant from the CEE countries who has worked at least 12 months in the UK) then
he can claim housing allowance and social assistance benefits. However, the position
for those ‘without recourse’ (e.g. undocumented migrants, refused asylum seekers,
most CEE migrants) is quite desperate, as access to even homeless hostels and
emergency shelters is usually dependent on receipt of housing allowance:
It’s a massive, massive problem, people without public funds, now Eastern
European or traditionally failed asylum seekers. If people don’t have recourse to
public funds there is nowhere for them to go in this country. Very, very limited
support and that comes from charities. (Practitioner, UK)
In the Netherlands the position is similar: in practice very few CEE migrants are entitled
to receive housing allowances or social assistance, and cannot gain access to
homeless shelters (though they may get some help from soup kitchens). For such
migrants in both countries the choices are stark: “get work or go home”. In the UK, for
those migrants who are ‘job ready’, there are schemes to help them get back to work,
focusing on the lower end of the job market, such as cleaning, catering and warehouses
(also construction, but this work has now dried up):
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If someone is keen to work and will accept any sort of work then we put them in
touch with the accommodation based service. Helps them get work and they
generally do get work. But those who do not have recourse and are drinking
heavily...we have some who are possibly not going to make it through the winter
as they are that unwell, but they won’t go home... (Practitioner, UK)
But even for those who can get work, it can be extremely difficult to gain access to
accommodation in the private rented sector in London:
…it’s no good to get somewhere to live, it’s hard to generate a deposit at the lower
end of the job market. (Practitioner, UK).
The other option – to go home – was viewed as the preferable option by some of our
UK and Dutch interviewees:
Because he is not entitled to support in [Netherlands], he is probably better off at
home. There it is easier to go around with little money than here. (Practitioner,
Netherlands)
In the UK, there are a number of reconnection schemes to help out of work CEE
nationals to return to their country of origin, but not everyone wants to use these
services:
Those that had alcohol misuse or drug misuse are reluctant to go back. It’s simple
though, why would you want to go back to Poland in winter. It’s minus 30C…the
actual community attitude to people with problems is different too. There isn’t a
plethora of handouts or people willing do things for you. I sometimes think, hang
on we’re not offering an awful lot for these people but they think they’re better off
here than they are in Poland so you have to question what they actually get when
they go home. (Practitioner, UK)
Also, some simply want to ‘make a go of it’ in the UK:
The majority of people refuse to go, there’s a lot of shame about returning home,
cultural expectations of coming to UK. (Practitioner, UK)
The point was also made in the UK that the impact of the recession on homelessness
amongst the ‘no recourse’ group is complicated, and seldom as simple as the ‘story’
implied in this vignette. For a start, it is not often the case that they were tenants before
finding themselves on the street. More commonly, they were in a hostel, B&B hotel or
were sofa surfing when they first arrived and have not found work so have lost their
foothold in this tenuous accommodation. Likewise, it is unusual for them to have
actually lost a job – rather, they have generally been squeezed out of the job market as
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casual work has dried up or has been taken by others who have lost permanent
employment:
It was easier in the past for people to get casual labour. (NGO representative, UK)
In Portugal, as discussed in Chapter 9, immigrants were no longer thought to be a
significant group in the homeless population. Nonetheless, with respect to the scenario
represented in this vignette, interviewees reported that the legal status of the person is
decisive, particularly with respect to support for labour market reintegration:
There is a temporary shelter where we receive these people. It is difficult
because if they are not in legal or if they don’t have a residence permit they
cannot get enrolled in… employment support [programme]. And then they cannot
get legal if they don’t have a labour contract. It is a difficult situation.” (Policy
maker, Portugal)
One problem identified across a range of countries with respect to responding
appropriately to the needs of migrants threatened with homelessness was the
heterogeneity of the group, and the lack of intercultural competence amongst
homelessness workers. Given that homeless and destitute migrants are a growing
group in many countries, it was suggested that it is ever more important:
…to look at the system of assistance in the municipality to find out how access to
those with a migration background can be organised. If there's nobody with a
Russian or Turkish or other background in the service, how should they approach
these people? (Academic expert, Germany)
This vignette was less relevant in Hungary than elsewhere because homeless
immigrants are very few in number (see Chapter 10). With respect to indigenous ethnic
minorities, it is Roma people who appear in the social support systems in large
numbers, but few of them are single (usually they live in large families, especially the
poorer ones). Regardless of immigration status/ethnicity, a person who works in the
informal economy in Hungary will not have access to social insurance benefits, and if he
rents his apartment privately, especially at the bottom end of the market, then it is very
probable that he will not have a legal rental contract, which means that he cannot gain
access to housing allowance either. The man portrayed in this vignette is therefore very
vulnerable to eviction. Evictions from social housing are difficult to secure (can take up
to two years), but immigrants, especially single ones, usually do not have access to
social housing.
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Box 11.5 Good Practice Example: ‘City without Homeless Hostels’ – Integrated
Management / Access Points for Homeless People, Germany
Between December 2004 and June 2007, this local project was implemented to replace the
traditional method of dealing with homelessness in the city of Herford in Germany. The aim
was to develop an integrated and cross-sectoral system of help for those who are homeless,
threatened by homelessness or living in a precarious housing situation, most of whom face
these sorts of difficulties because of rent arrears. The objective was to provide them with
appropriate housing and to abolish all four of Herford’s homeless hostels. A number of key
principles were agreed including the following:
 complete coverage: housing was to be provided for all housing emergency cases,
combining statutory help from public bodies and social work actors as well as self-help
organisations.
 an emphasis on prevention: the threat of homelessness was to be met by a joint effort
of all actors, through individually targeted prevention, and material and social
assistance, in all cases regardless of the reasons for the threat of homelessness.
 the provision of normal housing: homeless households were to be provided with normal
housing with municipal and private landlords, avoiding clusters of homeless people.
 minimising temporary provision: should the loss of the present home be unavoidable,
any interim housing was to be limited to as short a period as possible, and in
decentralised accommodation of reasonable quality, connected to a high standard
system of assistance.
 re-integration: every homeless person was to receive the personal and social
assistance as well as material help that they needed.
Four levels of action were implemented:
1. A central steering group was established and joint tasks were agreed between the
municipality and participating NGOs
2. Two ‘one stop’ access points were established for homeless people in the city
3. Decentralised and mobile help was made available to homeless people
4. Assistance was provided that went beyond the statutory requirements for homeless
people
An independent evaluation found that this integrated approach on homelessness and
minimising the use of institutional accommodation was judged highly effective by both clients
and stakeholders, and had also led to cost savings. The approach adopted by this project has
been widely debated and adopted by many other municipalities in Germany, albeit that its
concrete forms vary. In particular, the underlying concept of a ‘one stop agency’ has been a
clear success.
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11.8 Conclusion
Welfare regimes were clearly relevant to outcomes for homeless people – the strongest
mainstream protection to those at risk of homelessness was offered in the social
democratic/hybrid regimes we studied (Sweden and Netherlands), and the weakest
protection was to be found in the Mediterranean regime (Portugal) and, even more so,
in the transition regime (Hungary) (although it is possible that extended families may
play a stronger safety net role in these welfare contexts than in north western Europe).
One might expect the UK, as a liberal welfare regime, to offer weak protection to
homeless people. However, along with Germany, the UK probably has the most
sophisticated targeted interventions on homelessness, especially with respect to
homelessness prevention. These targeted interventions seem capable of ‘overriding’
difficult structural contexts to deliver reasonably good outcomes for homeless people,
albeit that the supply of affordable housing accessible to vulnerable groups seems a
consistent constraint across all of the countries studied, particularly in pressurised
regions and where social housing providers are not obliged to prioritise homeless
people and others in the most acute need.
Thus the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this chapter - targeted homelessness
interventions can have significantly positive effects in a wide variety of structural
contexts - is supported by our new evidence. And indeed all of the countries studied,
with their widely varying welfare and housing system contexts, were able to provide
examples of effective targeted interventions on homelessness. But it was also clear that
the combination of mainstream safety nets and targeted interventions responded to
some groups far more effectively than to others across these countries, with women
with children fleeing violence usually best protected in most countries, and various
immigrant groups (especially those who lacked recourse to state-funded assistance in
their host country) usually the least well protected. Some of the key groups focused
upon in the vignettes – young people under 18, former prisoners, or women affected by
domestic violence – were not necessarily viewed as being within the realm of
institutions dealing with homelessness in every country, but were rather responded to
by other ‘arms’ of the welfare state. This institutional and definitional divergence
demonstrates the efficacy of the vignette approach in drawing comprehensive and fair
conclusions about the relative degree of protection in different national contexts.
Even in those countries with the strongest safety nets, there were areas of weakness
where lessons could be learned from other countries. Thus in Sweden, the serious
barriers to assistance that exist with respect to single people with ongoing alcohol or
drug problems (associated with the overwhelming policy emphasis on abstention and
conformity to certain standards of behaviour) is an obvious example, whereby the more
tolerant approach of other countries offers helpful lessons (as do some innovative
projects in Sweden itself). In the Netherlands, much could be learned about protection
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of women fleeing violence from other western European countries such as UK, Sweden
and Germany. In the UK’s case, the safety nets for families with mortgage arrears are
clearly much weaker than elsewhere in western Europe, and for immigrants without
recourse to public funds, support is very weak indeed (as it also is in the Netherlands).
In Portugal and, even more so in Hungary, protection lags well behind the support given
to homeless groups in the other countries studies, but it is encouraging to see that
progress is being made in some areas, particularly with respect to targeted interventions
in Portugal. These comparative strengths and weakness are summarised in Table 11.2
below.
Table 11.2: Safety net protection for particular groups at risk of homelessness
DE HU NE PT SE UK
Single man Reasonably
strong
Very weak Relatively
strong
Weak but
improving
Weak
(unless
conform)
Relatively
strong
Young
people
Relatively
weak
Very weak Weak Weak Relatively
weak
Strong
Women
fleeing
violence
Strong Weak Strengths
and
weaknesses
Reasonable Strong Strong
Families
with
mortgage
arrears
Strong Weak Strong Weak but
improving
Strong Weak
Immigrants Relatively
weak
Not
applicable
Weak Relatively
weak
Strong Weak
Another interesting theme to emerge was the weight attached to individual/ family
responsibility in each of the specified situations, particularly with respect to the vignettes
featuring a single man with support needs and a young person asked to leave the family
home. The emphasis on individual motivation and responsibility was constantly
emphasised in Sweden, in keeping with the traditional emphasis on social control and
behavioural conformity in homelessness services, but was barely mentioned in the UK
where there was a much more structural analysis of problems by practitioners and
policy makers. Another general point was that in many homelessness and welfare
systems there seemed to be quite a high level of discretion to act in creative/pragmatic
ways that departed from the normal rules where that seemed sensible/humane,
particularly with respect to families with children in temporary crises, but the UK seemed
unusually rule-bound and could benefit from some of the flexibility exhibited elsewhere.
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PART IV – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 12: Summary and Conclusions
12.1 Introduction
Across the European Union different Member States operate characteristic ‘welfare
regimes’ – ways of organising labour markets and tax and social security systems.
These influence levels of employment and distribution of incomes. In recent years many
countries have reformed their welfare regimes as part of employment and inclusion
strategies.
Although housing is widely accepted as being a fundamental determinant of people’s
welfare and a platform for participation in communities and labour markets, little
attention has been paid to the relationship between welfare regimes and housing
systems.
This study examines the relationship between welfare regimes and housing systems in
six countries, which were selected to provide a range of welfare regime types: Germany
(corporatist), Hungary (transitional), the Netherlands (corporatist/ social democratic
hybrid), Portugal (Mediterranean), Sweden (social democratic) and the UK (liberal).
The theoretical framework adopted is illustrated in Figure 12.1. This hypothesises a
number of key relationships between the welfare regime, housing system and housing
outcomes, including homelessness:
 Welfare regimes (A) impact on levels of poverty (B) and employment (C) which in
turn influence housing outcomes (D), which are defined by a number of indicators
of housing deprivation (F) and homelessness (G).
 The housing system may contain a number of policies or other features (E) that
can help to weaken the link between poverty and employment status on one
hand and on housing outcomes (F, G) on the other.
 Further individual factors (H) and targeted interventions (I) can impact on the
levels of homelessness (G).
 The housing system (E) and indeed some housing outcomes (F) can feedback
and affect the level of employment (C).
The study used quantitative and qualitative methods (including analysis of EU-SILC,
focus groups and individual interviews) to address the following research questions:
 What is the impact of poverty on housing outcomes?
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 What is the impact of housing policy interventions on housing outcomes (for poor
households)?
 What is the impact of employment status on housing outcomes (for poor
households)?
 What is the impact of housing on employment outcomes?
 What is the impact of the welfare regime and housing system on the nature and
causes of homelessness, and how effective are targeted responses?
12.2 Welfare Regimes and Housing Systems
Even though social security and labour market reforms have been important in recent
years, the traditional welfare regimes still define the character of individual countries,
and this is reflected in the range of relative poverty rates in the six countries selected for
inclusion in this study. These are lowest in the Netherlands and Sweden and highest in
the UK. The study also shows that the nature of the welfare regimes is reflected to
some extent in the housing systems. The social democratic and corporatist regimes
(Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany) each have large ‘unitary’ rental systems
(whereby social rented housing exerts a moderating influence on private rents and blurs
the distinction between the two tenures). They also tend to have smaller home-
ownership sectors. The transition (Hungary) and Mediterranean (Portugal) countries
have small social rental sectors, large outright home-ownership sectors and limited
housing allowance systems. The liberal regime (UK) has a significant and targeted
social rented sector, an extensive and targeted housing allowance system and an
important outright-ownership sector.
However, the study confirms that these links are contingent rather than essential. There
are important differences within regime types: corporatist Germany now has only a
small social rented sector in contrast to its hybrid corporatist/ social democratic
neighbour the Netherlands which has the largest social rented sector in Europe. Policy
choices have been made in the UK to build up the range of housing interventions. But
the relatively high levels of outright ownership and the still significant social rented
sector are the result of policy decisions that in turn were possible because of the legacy
of the mass social housing programmes of past decades. Hungary made the decision to
privatise its state housing, while other transition countries did not to the same extent.
Governments therefore have the ability to shape their housing systems within the
context of the welfare regime. Neither wholly dependent nor wholly independent, it is a
symbiotic relationship, and one that we show to have important impacts on people’s
lives.
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12.3 The Impact of Poverty and Housing Policy on Housing Outcomes
The study demonstrates that housing policy (including housing allowances) can help to
weaken, but not remove, the links between income poverty and poor housing outcomes.
This does not mean that every poor person experiences poor housing outcomes. It does
mean that people living in poverty are systematically more likely to have poor housing
outcomes than those who are not poor. But experiences vary greatly between countries.
A key finding of the study is that the housing outcomes of the poor are driven by the
housing outcomes in the country as a whole. Where housing outcomes are generally of
a high level in a country the housing outcomes of the poor will also be good; where
general standards are poor then this will be reflected among the population who live in
income poverty. This is attributable to general income levels in each country and
housing market pressures, as well as housing policy interventions.
A second key finding is that high absolute housing standards for the poor do not
necessarily translate into equality between the income poor and the non poor. Some of
the widest differentials in housing outcomes are experienced in countries with high
absolute standards for the poor (but higher standards again for the rest of the
population); and some of the smallest differentials occur where the absolute standards
of the poor are low (but so too are standards for many other people). This is partially
attributable to the way in which relative housing outcomes are measured, but it is not
always the case.
The transition (Hungary) and Mediterranean (Portugal) countries studied have high
levels of outright ownership generally and among the population living in poverty. At a
country level they experience a trade-off between affordability on the one hand (where
they score well) and overcrowding and the physical quality of housing on the other
(where they score poorly).
In the other countries studied ‘bundles’ of policy interventions are important in
influencing the housing outcomes of the poor. Germany is notable for the difficulty in
identifying the impact of individual housing policies, but the housing outcomes of the
poor are generally similar to those enjoyed in the other non Mediterranean/ transition
countries where individual policies are more easily identified. The UK has a range of
individual housing policies that appear to provide some compensation for the high levels
of income poverty: absolute housing standards for poor households that are comparable
with corporatist and social democratic regimes combine with relatively small differentials
in housing outcomes between the poor and non poor.
The study established that targeted housing allowances are the individual policy
instrument that produces the most clearly demonstrable improvement to housing
outcomes for the poor. These improvements are most pronounced among social
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tenants and less clear among market tenants (and amongst home owners are often
negligible).
However, the stand-alone impacts of social rented housing are more difficult to
demonstrate. This partly arises from problems in identifying the sector in some countries
and some concerns about data reliability in others. Nonetheless the sector appears to
produce outcomes that are not as favourable as one might expect: it only weakly
reduces the relationship between income poverty and poor housing outcomes. The data
did not, however, indicate the poor outcomes with respect to neighbourhood quality that
many national surveys suggest is a consequence of geographical concentrations of low
income households in social housing.
Although high levels of home ownership among people who are income poor can
evidently be problematic, the study found that within all countries, outright ownership
does produce favourable housing outcomes across nearly all of the indicators, for the
poor as well as the non poor. It is not surprising that outright ownership scores well on
affordability outcomes (even when housing expenditure is broadly defined as it has
been in this study). But the trade off between affordability and the physical quality of
housing (which might be anticipated if poor owners cannot afford repairs) is not
apparent within countries (even though there is evidence of this trade-off at country
level, as noted above). Indeed on some indicators in some countries the housing
outcomes of poor outright owners are actually superior to the population as a whole.
The analysis has some important policy implications:
 Absolute housing standards for people living in income poverty are driven by
housing standards in the population as a whole. Particularly in the lower income
countries within the European Union, there is a need for policies that aim to
improve housing standards generally.
 When we compare housing outcomes between countries high levels of outright
ownership appear to produce trade-offs between affordability and quality.
Outright ownership does not appear to provide a general housing solution to
income poverty. It seems an inappropriate tenure for people who are likely to be
income poor for the whole or a large part of their lives.
 But within countries, outright ownership does produce remarkably good housing
outcomes for people living in poverty, and this is clearest in the countries with
more modest levels of outright ownership. This suggests that the acquisition of
housing assets can be a valuable means of distributing resources over the life
cycle, in other words when people are income poor for only part of their lives.
 Bundles of housing policy interventions appear to produce the most powerful
improvements in housing outcomes. A mix of housing specific demand-side
subsidies (housing allowances) and supply-side subsidies (social or other forms
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of below market rental housing) improve housing outcomes for the poor, while
reliance on one or the other is less effective.
 That said, housing allowances do perform a powerful role in assisting people
living in income poverty. It is the intervention that can be most clearly targeted,
and improves the affordability of market rental housing without necessarily taking
people below the affordability threshold that was adopted (whereby housing
expenditure represents no more than 40% of their incomes).
 Social or other form of below market rental housing can improve the housing
outcomes of the poor only if they are able to access it: a commitment to ‘social
mix’ should not be used as an excuse to exclude the poor and vulnerable from
the tenure.
12.4 The Impact of Employment Status on Housing Outcomes
Employment reduces the chances of poverty, but most poor people (of working age) live
in households where someone is in paid employment.
This study demonstrates a clear relationship between employment status and housing
outcomes. We show that across a range of indicators people who are out of work are
almost always more likely to have poorer housing outcomes than those who are in
employment. Moreover, people who live in long term workless households tend to have
worse housing outcomes than people who live in short term workless households. This
suggests that the duration of worklessness has an impact on housing outcomes
independently of income itself. We cannot be sure of the reasons for this, but they are
likely to include the ability of the short term workless to maintain current housing
conditions due to social security and housing allowances as well as the use of savings
or family help.
While this evidence suggests that ‘work pays’, when we compare the housing outcomes
of the workless poor with the working poor the impact of employment status is far less
clear. While there is some evidence to suggest that the housing outcomes of the
working poor are superior to those of the workless poor, this evidence is weak. This is
especially true of the affordability indicator where it is clear that housing allowances are
of much more help to the workless poor compared to the working poor. Our qualitative
evidence suggests that the housing system generally, and housing allowances in
particular, are insensitive to people who experience fluctuating incomes. Such
fluctuating incomes are likely to be a characteristic of people who move in and out of
employment or whose employment contains a substantial variability due to changeable
hours or a significant commission element.
The policy implications of these findings are clear:
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 Social security systems and housing allowances play a crucial role in limiting the
impact of worklessness on housing outcomes in the short term but this protective
impact weakens the longer a household is workless.
 Housing systems need to be adapted to meet the needs of the working poor.
Social rented housing is inflexible to labour mobility, whereas market renting
assisted by housing allowances combines flexibility with in-work housing
assistance.
 However, housing allowances themselves need to be more responsive to the
working poor, especially those who are on fluctuating incomes or insecure
contracts. Improved administration to cut delays and an ‘asymmetric’ approach to
changing incomes from employment would help to ensure that ‘work pays’ by
protecting people from loss of income while not penalising modest increases in
earned income.
12.5 The Impact of Housing on Employment Outcomes
The study shows that housing systems do impact on employment, but in ways that are
more complex than is often assumed in previous studies.
The housing system can inhibit labour mobility between regions. Our evidence supports
the well-known phenomenon that waiting lists associated with social rented housing in
high demand areas create one barrier. The market rented sector is seen as the tenure
that most easily facilitates mobility, and it is clear that housing allowances can play a
role in helping people to move to high cost areas. However, it should be noted that there
are low levels of housing allowance receipt among the working poor.
Our evidence also suggests that the role of home ownership is rather different than had
previously been thought. Transaction costs did not appear to be important, but the
difficulty in selling property at the bottom of the housing market cycle and the prospects
of having to give up the tenure for renting if moving to a high cost area were important.
An especially interesting finding was the importance attached to local family and social
networks in inhibiting mobility. These networks not only improve people’s quality of life,
they often provide essential support networks for people when working and this is
especially important for low income households who cannot afford to purchase services
such as childcare.
Our study provided evidence of the well-known tendency for unemployment to be higher
in the social rented sector. However, we also found an association between high
unemployment and both housing allowance receipt and outright home-ownership.
These findings are consistent with the general proposition that if people who are
unemployed are protected then there is a reduced incentive to work. (In the case of
outright owners the effect is much the same as a housing allowance: loss of earned
267
income does not generate pressure to economise on housing.) However, we stress that
no causality was established.
The qualitative evidence did suggest that housing allowance administration could
produce a disincentive to work, with the fear of losing employment and having to wait to
reclaim benefits being the key factor (rather than the operation of the conventional
unemployment trap).
We did find evidence of a connection between worklessness and low quality
neighbourhoods, and there is a widespread perception of a persistent culture of poverty
in these neighbourhoods. In one country (Hungary) this culture pointed to employment
in the informal economy; in others to long term worklessness. There was some
suggestion of stigmatisation of people living in poverty neighbourhoods, but the role of
public transport in connecting people with local labour markets did not seem to be an
important factor.
A number of policy implications arise from these findings:
 Promoting geographical labour mobility implies a greater use of market rental
housing which appears to be the most flexible tenure.
 Housing has an important part to play in ‘flexicurity’ strategies, but better income-
related assistance (especially housing allowances) for the working poor is
required, especially in the context of fostering mobility and movement into
relatively low paid and insecure work.
 Greater labour market mobility also implies replacing the support provided by
local family and social networks with professional assistance. Employers and
governments seeking to encourage mobility may need to place greater attention
on these supportive services.
 Different strategies may be applied to encouraging employment in poverty
neighbourhoods: while providing supported and/ or subsidised housing
throughout the wider stock can help to prevent their creation, individualised
support packages for people living in poverty neighbourhoods may lead to
successful reintegration into the labour market and the gradual breakdown of
‘cultures of poverty’.
12.6 Homelessness and the Welfare Regime
One of the central hypotheses underpinning the study was that the scale and nature of
homelessness is linked to the interaction of welfare regimes (social security, tax and
labour market arrangements) and housing systems and policies (which are
hypothesised to have the potential to ameliorate, or exacerbate, housing exclusion and
other outcomes for low income households). While we found that poor data availability
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severely inhibits comparisons of the scale of homelessness, we were able to draw
important conclusions about the differing causes and nature of homelessness between
countries, and the robustness of responses to key at-risk groups.
Our new evidence indicated that welfare regimes impact profoundly on the causes and
nature of homelessness. This was demonstrated not only by the relative lack of
‘structural’ homelessness in Sweden and the Netherlands, where mainstream welfare
safety nets are exceptionally strong, but also by the very great exposure to
homelessness (especially in the economic downturn) of those immigrants who lack
access to social security benefits.
However, the relationship between homelessness and labour market change is
complex, and seems direct only in those countries (Hungary and Portugal) and amongst
those groups (immigrants) which have the least welfare protection. Even in these cases,
it is long-term labour market marginality and precariousness, very often associated with
reliance on the informal economy, which is generally more important rather than sudden
labour market shocks. In those countries, and for those groups, with better welfare
protection, it seems that sustained poverty and/or unemployment contribute to
homelessness not so much in direct, material ways, but rather in longer-term, more
indirect ways via exerting negative social pressures on family units.
Given that social security systems, and especially housing allowances, are what usually
‘breaks the link’ between losing work/sudden drops in income and homelessness, one
would expect that restricting entitlements or increased conditionality would tend to drive
up homelessness. But there seems little evidence thus far that recent restrictions in
social security entitlements in countries like Germany and the UK have led directly to
increases homelessness. Moreover, in the UK at least, there was some support from
experts for increased conditionality associated with efforts to reconnect homeless
people with the labour market, albeit that both here and in Germany increased
sanctions were considered by experts to be a ‘high risk’ strategy with respect to the
most vulnerable groups such as young people.
Our evidence provided strong support for the proposition that housing market conditions
and systems have an effect independent of welfare regimes on the nature and scale
homelessness, for both good and ill. This was most obviously demonstrated in Germany
where a slackening housing market in many parts of the country has driven down
homelessness. Likewise in the UK, statutory homelessness is closely associated with
the housing market cycle. ‘Structural’ homelessness in both of these countries thus
seems far more closely linked to housing conditions than to labour market or social
security factors. Moreover, across all of the countries studied, access to affordable,
mainstream housing for vulnerable groups was a key matter of concern, including in
those countries with the strongest welfare protection (Sweden and the Netherlands).
This was especially the case in pressurised regions and in contexts where social
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housing providers were not obliged to prioritise homeless households and others in the
most acute need.
Another way in which housing ‘matters’ is with respect to targeted interventions aimed
at tackling homelessness amongst particular high risk groups. Along with Germany, the
UK appeared to have the most sophisticated targeted interventions on homelessness,
especially with respect to homelessness prevention and youth homelessness. However,
all of the countries studied, with their widely varying welfare and housing system
contexts, were able to provide examples of effective targeted interventions on
homelessness. These targeted interventions seem capable of ‘overriding’ difficult
structural contexts to deliver reasonably good outcomes for homeless people. But it was
also clear that some groups were far more effectively responded to than others, with
women with children fleeing violence best protected in most countries, and various
immigrant groups (especially those which lack recourse to public funds) usually the
least well protected.
Even in those countries with the strongest safety nets, there were areas of weakness
where lessons could be learned from other countries. Thus in Sweden, there were
serious barriers to assistance with respect to homeless people with ongoing alcohol or
drug problems, and in the Netherlands much could be learned about protection of
women fleeing violence from other western European countries such as the UK,
Sweden and Germany. In the UK’s case, the safety nets for families with mortgage
arrears were clearly much weaker than elsewhere in western Europe, and very weak
indeed for immigrants without recourse to support from public funds (as is also the case
in the Netherlands). In Portugal and, even more so in Hungary, protection lags well
behind the support given to homeless groups in the other countries studied, doubtless in
part reflecting the fact that these Member States are less wealthy than the other
countries studied (and it is also possible that the extended family plays a stronger safety
net role in these countries than elsewhere). But it was encouraging to see that progress
is being made in some areas, particularly with respect to strategic and targeted
interventions in Portugal.
The main policy implications are:
 Housing systems/interventions, including housing allowances, are more
important in the generation and management of homelessness than labour
market/social security change, except in those countries with weak welfare
protection and high reliance on the informal economy.
 Targeted homelessness interventions can be highly effective and worthwhile in a
wide variety of structural contexts.
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 Even countries with the strongest welfare states have gaps in their safety nets for
some specific groups at risk of homelessness, indicating significant scope for
policy transfer and learning across European Union Member States.
 There is an urgent need to address the issue of roofless and destitute migrants –
particularly CEE migrants, refused asylum seekers and undocumented migrants
– at national and supra-national (European Union) levels.
12.7 Conclusion
This report was predicated on the hypothesis that housing policies can weaken the link
between income poverty and poor housing outcomes. This study provides a mass of
evidence that supports this contention. While no system removes the link between
poverty and housing outcomes, it can be weakened by a variety of policies. Of these the
housing allowance has the most clearly demonstrable impact.
While poverty and employment status are closely related, the housing outcomes of the
working poor are not systematically better than those of the workless poor. There is
much scope for enhancing the role that housing plays in strategies that seek to
demonstrate that ‘work pays’. We identified a number of features of housing systems
that can inhibit employment, but also a number of approaches that can help to break
down ‘cultures of poverty.’ Nonetheless, we also found that housing systems are not
very responsive to the needs of people in low paid and precarious employment. If
governments wish to demonstrate that ‘work pays’ and is the best route out of poverty,
housing systems and policies need to be better adapted to meeting their needs. In
short, greater attention should be paid to housing in ‘active inclusion’ strategies.
With respect to the most marginalised – those at risk of homelessness – it was apparent
that housing market conditions and housing systems are also critical. Even in the most
difficult structural contexts, targeted interventions can protect at-risk groups from
homelessness. Priority should be given to improved safety nets for vulnerable migrants
and others dependent on the informal economy.
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Figure 12.1 The relationship between welfare regimes and housing
(A) WELFARE REGIME
(tax, social security, labour
market)
(E) HOUSING SYSTEM
a) Housing market
b) Key housing policy interventions and system
features:
1. social rented and other below market rental
housing
2. housing allowances
3. outright home-ownership
(B) SCALE &
DISTRIBUTION
OF POVERTY &
INEQUALITY
(C) LABOUR
MARKET
OUTCOMES
(D) HOUSING OUTCOMES
(F) HOUSING DEPRIVATION
1. Cost of housing
2. Quantity of housing
3. Physical quality of housing
4. Quality of neighbourhood
(G) HOUSING EXCLUSION /
HOMELESSNESS
1. Level of homelessness
2. Nature/causes of
homelessness
(H) INDIVIDUAL CAUSES/FACTORS
(I) TARGETED INTERVENTIONS ON
HOMELESSNESS
Causal relationship
Necessary relationship
Contingent relationship
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Table A2A/A: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 67.2 7.9 2.5 22.4 100.0 22.4 0.0 77.6
Childless couple 46.7 5.0 2.1 46.2 100.0 46.2 0.0 53.8
Couple with children 28.6 4.3 2.0 65.1 100.0 65.1 0.0 34.9
Lone parent 59.5 12.1 2.6 25.8 100.0 25.8 0.0 74.2
Pensionerb 41.3 5.3 4.2 49.2 100.0 49.2 0.0 50.8
Other household 21.0 4.2 2.0 72.9 100.0 72.9 0.0 27.1
Average household 45.5 5.9 2.8 45.7 100.0 45.7 0.0 54.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2A/B: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 5.5 4.1 8.3 82.2 100.0 71.5 10.7 17.8
Childless couple 4.2 5.0 5.3 85.5 100.0 74.6 10.8 14.5
Couple with children 3.2 3.7 5.3 87.8 100.0 65.9 21.9 12.2
Lone parent 5.5 7.1 9.1 78.3 100.0 62.3 16.0 21.7
Pensionerb 0.7 2.7 9.2 87.3 100.0 85.4 1.9 12.7
Other household 1.4 2.5 2.9 93.1 100.0 80.1 13.1 6.9
Average household 2.8 3.7 6.3 87.2 100.0 75.2 12.0 12.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2A/C: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 8.5 59.8 0.9 30.8 100.0 4.4 26.4 69.2
Childless couple 3.3 24.8 0.1 71.8 100.0 6.7 65.1 28.2
Couple with children 2.2 15.4 0.1 82.4 100.0 5.5 76.9 17.6
Lone parent 20.4 51.6 0.1 27.9 100.0 3.5 24.4 72.1
Pensionerb 13.8 43.8 0.5 41.9 100.0 18.8 23.1 58.1
Other household 3.8 24.2 1.0 70.9 100.0 11.6 59.3 29.1
Average household 7.3 36.0 0.4 56.3 100.0 8.8 47.4 43.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2A/D: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 18.5 8.5 13.7 59.3 100.0 41.0 18.4 40.7
Childless couple 14.4 5.7 7.6 72.2 100.0 46.9 25.3 27.8
Couple with children 9.6 4.6 10.8 74.9 100.0 34.4 40.5 25.1
Lone parent 24.8 15.1 6.8 53.3 100.0 29.4 23.9 46.7
Pensionerb 10.0 12.2 8.3 69.6 100.0 67.1 2.5 30.4
Other household 6.9 7.9 5.6 79.7 100.0 62.1 17.6 20.3
Average household 10.6 8.1 8.6 72.7 100.0 51.3 21.4 27.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2A/E: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 58.7 4.1 0.0 37.2 100.0 8.4 28.8 62.8
Childless couple 26.3 2.0 0.0 71.7 100.0 11.8 59.9 28.3
Couple with children 18.7 1.1 0.0 80.2 100.0 10.2 70.0 19.8
Lone parent 50.6 3.4 0.0 46.0 100.0 10.7 35.4 54.0
Pensionerb 33.1 2.5 0.0 64.4 100.0 29.8 34.6 35.6
Other household 25.6 1.2 0.0 73.2 100.0 26.5 46.7 26.8
Average household 35.5 2.5 0.0 62.0 100.0 16.0 45.9 38.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2A/F: Household type by tenure: row percentages — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 13.6 24.7 1.5 60.1 100.0 21.7 38.4 39.9
Childless couple 11.5 9.7 0.8 78.0 100.0 24.8 53.1 22.0
Couple with children 6.8 13.9 0.8 78.5 100.0 10.6 67.9 21.5
Lone parent 16.8 49.3 0.4 33.5 100.0 3.5 30.0 66.5
Pensionerb 2.5 22.7 1.9 72.9 100.0 67.9 5.0 27.1
Other household 8.0 15.3 0.6 76.1 100.0 28.3 47.9 23.9
Average household 8.4 19.4 1.2 71.0 100.0 31.7 39.3 29.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/A: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 67.2 7.9 2.5 22.4 100.0 NA NA 77.6
Childless couple 46.7 5.0 2.1 46.2 100.0 NA NA 53.8
Couple with children 27.4 4.2 2.0 66.3 100.0 NA NA 33.7
Lone parent 59.0 12.1 2.5 26.5 100.0 NA NA 73.5
Pensionerb 37.7 4.6 4.1 53.6 100.0 NA NA 46.4
Other household 20.2 4.2 2.1 73.4 100.0 NA NA 26.6
Average household 38.2 5.3 2.5 54.0 100.0 NA NA 46.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/B: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 5.5 4.1 8.3 82.2 100.0 71.5 10.7 17.8
Childless couple 4.2 5.0 5.3 85.5 100.0 74.6 10.8 14.5
Couple with children 3.1 4.0 5.1 87.7 100.0 65.6 22.1 12.3
Lone parent 5.7 7.2 8.0 79.0 100.0 63.3 15.7 21.0
Pensionerb 0.6 2.5 7.6 89.3 100.0 87.0 2.3 10.7
Other household 1.5 2.4 3.2 92.9 100.0 79.0 13.9 7.1
Average household 2.7 3.6 5.2 88.5 100.0 73.6 14.9 11.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/C: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 8.5 59.8 0.9 30.8 100.0 4.4 26.4 69.2
Childless couple 3.3 24.8 0.1 71.8 100.0 6.7 65.1 28.2
Couple with children 2.1 14.8 0.1 83.0 100.0 5.8 77.3 17.0
Lone parent 21.6 50.6 0.1 27.7 100.0 3.5 24.2 72.3
Pensionerb 11.9 41.6 0.4 46.0 100.0 19.6 26.5 54.0
Other household 4.0 22.9 1.1 72.1 100.0 11.6 60.5 27.9
Average household 5.5 27.7 0.3 66.6 100.0 8.4 58.1 33.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/D: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 18.5 8.5 13.7 59.3 100.0 41.0 18.4 40.7
Childless couple 14.4 5.7 7.6 72.2 100.0 46.9 25.3 27.8
Couple with children 9.7 4.7 10.7 74.9 100.0 34.4 40.5 25.1
Lone parent 27.1 15.5 7.4 50.0 100.0 27.8 22.2 50.0
Pensionerb 8.9 12.1 7.5 71.5 100.0 68.8 2.7 28.5
Other household 6.7 8.4 6.0 78.8 100.0 61.6 17.2 21.2
Average household 9.6 7.6 8.3 74.5 100.0 50.0 24.4 25.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/E: Household type by tenure: row percentages — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 58.7 4.1 0.0 37.2 100.0 8.4 28.8 62.8
Childless couple 26.3 2.0 0.0 71.7 100.0 11.8 59.9 28.3
Couple with children 18.2 1.1 0.0 80.7 100.0 10.1 70.5 19.3
Lone parent 50.3 3.9 0.0 45.8 100.0 9.7 36.1 54.2
Pensionerb 28.6 2.2 0.0 69.3 100.0 30.7 38.6 30.7
Other household 22.5 1.6 0.0 75.9 100.0 27.5 48.3 24.1
Average household 28.5 2.0 0.0 69.5 100.0 15.2 54.3 30.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A2B/F: Household type by tenure: row percentages — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 13.6 24.7 1.5 60.1 100.0 21.7 38.4 39.9
Childless couple 11.5 9.7 0.8 78.0 100.0 24.8 53.1 22.0
Couple with children 6.6 14.6 0.8 78.0 100.0 10.4 67.6 22.0
Lone parent 16.3 50.9 0.5 32.3 100.0 3.2 29.1 67.7
Pensionerb 2.2 19.1 1.6 77.1 100.0 71.4 5.7 22.9
Other household 8.6 14.9 0.6 76.0 100.0 27.1 48.9 24.0
Average household 8.2 17.7 0.9 73.1 100.0 26.4 46.8 26.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/A: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 75.2 11.4 4.2 9.2 100.0 NA NA 90.8
Childless couple 67.5 7.1 2.2 23.2 100.0 NA NA 76.8
Couple with children 49.0 7.4 3.5 40.0 100.0 NA NA 60.0
Lone parent 65.5 14.4 1.8 18.3 100.0 NA NA 81.7
Pensionerb 39.7 7.9 8.5 44.0 100.0 NA NA 56.0
Other household 30.6 6.5 5.1 57.8 100.0 NA NA 42.2
Average household 56.3 9.2 4.5 30.0 100.0 NA NA 70.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/B: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 5.5 5.6 9.6 79.3 100.0 72.9 6.4 20.7
Childless couple 5.1 3.9 8.5 82.5 100.0 75.3 7.2 17.5
Couple with children 4.5 7.8 7.0 80.7 100.0 65.2 15.5 19.3
Lone parent 10.0 10.9 10.0 69.0 100.0 59.9 9.1 31.0
Pensionerb 0.7 2.8 5.0 91.6 100.0 88.3 3.4 8.4
Other household 0.4 6.2 9.0 84.4 100.0 77.9 6.4 15.6
Average household 4.3 7.1 7.8 80.9 100.0 69.7 11.2 19.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/C: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 20.6 72.0 0.5 6.9 100.0 2.7 4.2 93.1
Childless couple 6.4 70.3 0.0 23.3 100.0 7.8 15.5 76.7
Couple with children 4.1 50.1 0.0 45.9 100.0 13.7 32.2 54.1
Lone parent 41.6 53.3 0.3 4.9 100.0 1.7 3.2 95.1
Pensionerb 17.8 48.5 0.9 32.8 100.0 19.9 12.9 67.2
Other household 15.8 22.1 0.0 62.0 100.0 39.6 22.4 38.0
Average household 16.2 55.6 0.3 27.9 100.0 11.4 16.5 72.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/D: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.5 10.8 20.4 57.3 100.0 55.6 1.7 42.7
Childless couple 11.2 14.7 9.9 64.3 100.0 58.3 6.0 35.7
Couple with children 19.2 8.5 16.7 55.6 100.0 39.1 16.5 44.4
Lone parent 39.7 28.2 6.6 25.5 100.0 21.1 4.4 74.5
Pensionerb 9.6 8.7 8.9 72.8 100.0 71.4 1.4 27.2
Other household 10.1 16.8 8.1 65.0 100.0 58.9 6.1 35.0
Average household 14.9 12.1 11.9 61.2 100.0 52.7 8.5 38.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/E: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 73.4 5.8 0.0 20.8 100.0 5.9 14.9 79.2
Childless couple 68.6 2.5 0.0 28.8 100.0 11.3 17.6 71.2
Couple with children 52.2 2.8 0.0 45.0 100.0 9.0 36.1 55.0
Lone parent 66.1 7.3 0.0 26.6 100.0 8.9 17.8 73.4
Pensionerb 47.8 3.9 0.0 48.3 100.0 30.2 18.0 51.7
Other household 68.4 3.9 0.0 27.8 100.0 23.3 4.5 72.2
Average household 60.2 4.5 0.0 35.4 100.0 14.5 20.8 64.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4A/F: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (BHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 13.0 54.1 1.1 31.7 100.0 23.5 8.2 68.3
Childless couple 16.5 33.7 0.7 49.0 100.0 30.7 18.3 51.0
Couple with children 10.7 44.7 1.5 43.1 100.0 9.8 33.2 56.9
Lone parent 18.9 66.2 1.0 14.0 100.0 1.3 12.8 86.0
Pensionerb 3.7 29.6 1.8 64.9 100.0 61.4 3.5 35.1
Other household 22.3 35.5 0.5 41.7 100.0 27.8 13.8 58.3
Average household 12.6 42.7 1.3 43.4 100.0 27.6 15.8 56.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/A: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 70.8 9.0 3.1 17.0 100.0 NA NA 83.0
Childless couple 56.0 5.3 1.3 37.3 100.0 NA NA 62.7
Couple with children 34.3 5.2 1.8 58.7 100.0 NA NA 41.3
Lone parent 60.8 12.9 1.5 24.8 100.0 NA NA 75.2
Pensionerb 40.5 6.5 4.3 48.7 100.0 NA NA 51.3
Other household 29.3 4.9 4.3 61.5 100.0 NA NA 38.5
Average household 48.5 7.1 2.8 41.5 100.0 NA NA 58.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/B: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 4.3 5.3 9.4 81.0 100.0 73.7 7.3 19.0
Childless couple 3.5 3.4 6.7 86.4 100.0 76.0 10.4 13.6
Couple with children 3.3 6.4 4.6 85.7 100.0 63.8 21.9 14.3
Lone parent 8.0 9.4 11.6 71.0 100.0 58.2 12.8 29.0
Pensionerb 0.7 1.6 9.5 88.3 100.0 86.1 2.1 11.7
Other household 2.0 5.0 5.4 87.6 100.0 75.1 12.5 12.4
Average household 3.4 5.6 6.6 84.4 100.0 69.3 15.0 15.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/C: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 17.6 69.7 0.3 12.4 100.0 1.5 10.9 87.6
Childless couple 10.5 59.1 0.0 30.4 100.0 4.5 25.9 69.6
Couple with children 4.4 37.5 0.0 58.1 100.0 8.0 50.1 41.9
Lone parent 35.9 52.0 0.2 11.8 100.0 1.2 10.7 88.2
Pensionerb 27.5 56.6 0.4 15.4 100.0 6.7 8.8 84.6
Other household 14.9 19.1 0.0 66.0 100.0 28.3 37.7 34.0
Average household 17.6 52.1 0.2 30.2 100.0 5.9 24.3 69.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/D: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 27.1 8.9 14.2 49.7 100.0 42.6 7.1 50.3
Childless couple 15.9 14.1 8.5 61.5 100.0 54.4 7.1 38.5
Couple with children 20.3 6.4 13.2 60.1 100.0 34.8 25.4 39.9
Lone parent 34.9 22.4 4.8 37.9 100.0 18.2 19.7 62.1
Pensionerb 12.7 9.9 6.5 70.9 100.0 69.6 1.2 29.1
Other household 11.5 14.8 6.2 67.5 100.0 56.9 10.6 32.5
Average household 17.7 10.6 9.5 62.2 100.0 47.3 14.9 37.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/E: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 79.2 6.5 0.0 14.4 100.0 4.2 10.2 85.6
Childless couple 68.2 4.1 0.0 27.7 100.0 9.2 18.5 72.3
Couple with children 59.4 2.9 0.0 37.8 100.0 7.7 30.1 62.2
Lone parent 75.2 5.9 0.0 18.9 100.0 5.3 13.5 81.1
Pensionerb 60.1 3.7 0.0 36.2 100.0 21.7 14.4 63.8
Other household 68.8 5.0 0.0 26.2 100.0 16.5 9.7 73.8
Average household 67.5 4.6 0.0 28.0 100.0 11.1 16.9 72.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4B/F: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (AGHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 16.8 50.7 0.7 31.8 100.0 16.8 14.9 68.2
Childless couple 23.9 31.0 0.0 45.2 100.0 20.5 24.6 54.8
Couple with children 11.6 37.5 1.1 49.7 100.0 6.4 43.3 50.3
Lone parent 20.1 61.3 0.4 18.1 100.0 1.3 16.8 81.9
Pensionerb 3.9 35.2 1.5 59.4 100.0 55.1 4.3 40.6
Other household 22.3 37.9 0.5 39.3 100.0 16.5 22.8 60.7
Average household 14.1 41.6 0.9 43.4 100.0 20.9 22.5 56.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/A: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 70.9 8.9 3.2 17.0 100.0 NA NA 83.0
Childless couple 55.5 5.2 1.4 37.9 100.0 NA NA 62.1
Couple with children 34.1 4.9 1.9 59.1 100.0 NA NA 40.9
Lone parent 60.0 13.1 1.5 25.4 100.0 NA NA 74.6
Pensionerb 40.6 6.4 4.3 48.6 100.0 NA NA 51.4
Other household 29.3 4.9 4.3 61.5 100.0 NA NA 38.5
Average household 48.4 7.1 2.8 41.7 100.0 NA NA 58.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/B: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 4.2 5.0 9.6 81.3 100.0 74.5 6.7 18.7
Childless couple 3.5 3.4 6.3 86.7 100.0 76.2 10.5 13.3
Couple with children 3.4 6.0 4.7 85.9 100.0 64.0 21.9 14.1
Lone parent 7.7 9.8 12.1 70.4 100.0 59.1 11.3 29.6
Pensionerb 0.7 1.6 9.3 88.5 100.0 86.4 2.1 11.5
Other household 2.0 5.1 5.5 87.4 100.0 74.4 13.0 12.6
Average household 3.4 5.4 6.7 84.5 100.0 69.7 14.8 15.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/C: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 19.5 66.4 0.4 13.7 100.0 1.7 12.0 86.3
Childless couple 10.8 57.4 0.0 31.8 100.0 4.6 27.2 68.2
Couple with children 4.4 36.7 0.0 58.9 100.0 8.0 50.9 41.1
Lone parent 41.3 44.8 0.2 13.6 100.0 1.3 12.3 86.4
Pensionerb 31.5 50.4 0.5 17.6 100.0 7.6 10.0 82.4
Other household 19.6 25.3 0.0 55.1 100.0 5.4 49.7 44.9
Average household 19.0 48.7 0.2 32.0 100.0 5.4 26.7 68.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/D: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 26.0 8.6 16.4 49.1 100.0 42.2 6.8 50.9
Childless couple 16.7 13.9 8.4 60.9 100.0 53.9 7.0 39.1
Couple with children 20.6 6.5 13.4 59.5 100.0 35.4 24.1 40.5
Lone parent 34.9 22.4 4.8 37.9 100.0 18.2 19.7 62.1
Pensionerb 12.5 9.8 6.5 71.2 100.0 69.6 1.6 28.8
Other household 11.3 14.6 6.1 67.9 100.0 57.5 10.4 32.1
Average household 17.7 10.6 9.6 62.0 100.0 47.8 14.3 38.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/E: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 80.5 6.3 0.0 13.2 100.0 3.3 9.8 86.8
Childless couple 67.3 4.2 0.0 28.5 100.0 9.5 19.0 71.5
Couple with children 56.9 2.7 0.0 40.4 100.0 8.2 32.2 59.6
Lone parent 73.8 6.5 0.0 19.7 100.0 6.2 13.5 80.3
Pensionerb 61.3 3.9 0.0 34.8 100.0 21.4 13.4 65.2
Other household 67.3 5.5 0.0 27.2 100.0 16.4 10.7 72.8
Average household 67.1 4.7 0.0 28.2 100.0 11.2 17.0 71.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A4C/F: Household type by tenure among individuals in poor households (ANHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 17.2 47.7 0.8 34.3 100.0 18.0 16.3 65.7
Childless couple 24.1 28.0 0.0 47.9 100.0 21.9 26.0 52.1
Couple with children 11.2 35.0 1.1 52.7 100.0 6.5 46.2 47.3
Lone parent 19.8 59.8 0.4 20.0 100.0 1.4 18.6 80.0
Pensionerb 3.7 29.9 1.8 64.6 100.0 60.0 4.6 35.4
Other household 23.9 31.9 0.5 43.7 100.0 17.9 25.8 56.3
Average household 14.1 37.9 1.0 47.0 100.0 22.5 24.5 53.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/A: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 30.6 39.5 45.9 11.2 27.4 NA NA 32.0
Childless couple 16.9 16.6 [11.8] 5.9 11.7 NA NA 16.7
Couple with children 15.2 14.8 15.2 5.1 8.5 NA NA 15.2
Lone parent 37.9 40.6 [24.7] 23.7 34.1 NA NA 37.9
Pensionerb 15.8 25.9 31.6 12.4 15.1 NA NA 18.2
Other household 13.1 [13.2] [-] 6.8 8.7 NA NA 13.7
Average household 20.6 24.5 24.7 7.8 14.0 NA NA 21.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50
observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/B: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 20.6 [28.2] 23.6 19.7 20.4 20.8 12.3 23.7
Childless couple [9.9] 6.5 13.2 8.0 8.3 8.3 5.5 9.9
Couple with children 24.2 32.4 22.7 15.4 16.7 16.6 11.7 26.3
Lone parent [51.6] [44.8] [37.2] 25.9 29.7 28.1 17.1 43.8
Pensionerb [-] 7.0 4.1 6.5 6.3 6.4 [9.4] 4.9
Other household [1.9] [17.4] [19.0] 6.2 6.8 6.7 3.2 14.9
Average household 19.7 23.7 18.2 11.2 12.2 11.6 9.2 20.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/C: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 61.3 30.4 [-] 5.7 25.3 15.4 4.1 34.0
Childless couple 11.6 17.0 [-] 1.9 6.0 7.0 1.4 16.3
Couple with children 17.0 29.7 [-] 4.8 8.8 20.8 3.7 28.0
Lone parent 73.6 40.2 [-] 6.8 38.2 [-] 5.0 50.3
Pensionerb 19.6 15.3 [-] 9.3 13.1 13.3 6.4 16.3
Other household [-] 5.2 [-] 4.6 5.4 18.2 2.0 7.3
Average household 34.1 23.1 [11.3] 4.8 11.5 15.6 3.3 24.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/D: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [15.9] [32.4] [38.4] 24.8 25.7 34.9 [2.4] 26.9
Childless couple 13.3 [43.9] [22.3] 15.3 17.2 21.4 4.1 22.1
Couple with children 33.2 [30.3] 26.1 12.5 16.8 19.1 6.8 29.6
Lone parent [47.1] [-] [-] 16.4 32.1 [24.3] [6.4] [47.9]
Pensionerb 29.2 19.6 32.5 27.8 27.3 28.3 [14.2] 26.0
Other household 17.3 23.1 15.6 9.6 11.6 11.1 4.1 19.1
Average household 26.5 27.4 24.5 14.1 17.2 18.1 6.0 26.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/E: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 27.5 [31.2] [-] 12.3 22.0 15.5 11.4 27.8
Childless couple 15.2 [7.4] [-] 2.3 5.8 5.6 1.7 14.7
Couple with children 19.9 [16.9] [-] 3.9 6.9 6.1 3.5 19.7
Lone parent 36.9 [-] [-] 16.3 28.1 [25.7] 13.8 38.0
Pensionerb 26.8 [28.7] [-] 11.2 16.0 15.8 7.5 26.9
Other household 25.2 [-] [-] 3.0 8.3 7.0 0.8 24.9
Average household 24.5 25.5 [-] 5.9 11.6 11.1 4.4 24.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5A/F: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (BHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 22.1 50.6 [17.2] 12.2 23.1 25.0 5.0 39.6
Childless couple 15.1 36.2 [-] 6.6 10.4 12.9 3.6 24.2
Couple with children 25.0 47.2 [-] 8.5 15.4 14.6 7.6 39.9
Lone parent 56.8 63.9 [-] 21.4 49.2 [19.4] 21.6 62.4
Pensionerb 54.5 50.8 [37.7] 27.5 32.7 28.1 20.1 50.2
Other household 34.6 31.8 [-] 7.3 13.3 13.7 3.8 32.4
Average household 30.1 47.6 27.7 11.7 19.7 20.7 6.7 41.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. BHC = poverty based on income before housing expenditure.
Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/A: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 33.1 36.0 39.3 23.8 31.4 NA NA 33.6
Childless couple 17.5 15.5 [9.1] 11.8 14.6 NA NA 17.0
Couple with children 16.4 16.2 12.2 11.7 13.2 NA NA 16.2
Lone parent 39.1 40.6 [22.4] 35.5 37.9 NA NA 38.8
Pensionerb 24.0 31.5 23.7 20.3 22.3 NA NA 24.7
Other household 15.0 [12.1] [-] 8.7 10.4 NA NA 15.0
Average household 23.5 24.9 20.1 14.2 18.4 NA NA 23.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on
less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/B: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 24.2 [40.1] 35.2 30.5 30.9 31.9 21.2 32.9
Childless couple [9.9] 8.2 15.3 12.2 12.1 12.3 11.6 11.3
Couple with children 21.6 31.8 18.1 19.6 20.1 19.6 19.9 23.5
Lone parent [55.1] [51.8] [57.8] 35.7 39.7 36.5 32.2 55.0
Pensionerb [-] 8.6 17.0 13.5 13.6 13.5 [12.7] 14.9
Other household [11.5] [17.4] [14.0] 8.0 8.4 8.0 7.6 14.7
Average household 20.9 25.1 20.7 15.6 16.3 15.4 16.4 22.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/C: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 79.2 44.4 [-] 15.3 38.1 13.4 15.7 48.3
Childless couple 33.0 24.8 [-] 4.4 10.4 7.0 4.1 25.7
Couple with children 27.1 32.4 [-] 9.0 12.8 17.8 8.3 31.7
Lone parent 94.2 58.2 [-] 24.1 56.5 [-] 24.9 69.0
Pensionerb 64.1 37.8 [-] 9.3 27.8 9.5 9.2 43.6
Other household [-] 5.2 [-] 5.7 6.2 15.1 3.9 7.5
Average household 58.9 34.6 [11.3] 8.3 18.4 12.8 7.7 38.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/D: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [54.3] [38.6] [38.4] 31.0 37.0 38.4 [14.4] 45.7
Childless couple 21.0 [46.9] [21.3] 16.3 19.1 22.2 5.4 26.5
Couple with children 46.3 [30.3] 27.2 17.8 22.2 22.4 13.9 35.2
Lone parent [57.3] [-] [-] 33.6 44.4 [29.0] [39.3] [55.1]
Pensionerb 36.8 21.1 22.6 25.6 25.9 26.2 [11.6] 26.4
Other household 21.7 22.4 13.1 10.9 12.8 11.8 7.8 19.6
Average household 36.9 28.2 23.0 16.8 20.1 19.0 12.2 29.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/E: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 42.9 [50.7] [-] 12.3 31.9 15.7 11.3 43.4
Childless couple 20.2 [15.9] [-] 3.0 7.8 6.1 2.4 19.9
Couple with children 31.1 [23.8] [-] 4.5 9.5 7.2 4.1 30.7
Lone parent 67.6 [-] [-] 18.6 45.2 [24.8] 16.9 67.6
Pensionerb 58.7 [47.5] [-] 14.6 27.9 19.8 10.4 57.9
Other household 29.0 [-] [-] 3.3 9.5 5.7 1.9 29.0
Average household 41.3 39.2 [-] 7.0 17.5 12.7 5.4 41.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5B/F: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (AGHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 43.6 72.4 [17.2] 18.7 35.3 27.3 13.8 60.4
Childless couple 29.5 45.2 [-] 8.2 14.2 11.7 6.6 35.3
Couple with children 37.0 54.3 [-] 13.4 21.1 13.0 13.5 48.2
Lone parent 75.8 74.0 [-] 34.5 61.4 [25.2] 35.6 74.3
Pensionerb 67.1 69.3 [34.9] 28.9 37.6 29.0 28.0 66.7
Other household 39.1 38.3 [-] 7.8 15.0 9.1 7.0 38.0
Average household 43.0 58.8 23.9 14.8 25.0 19.8 12.0 52.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. AGHC = poverty based on income after gross housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/A: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 33.1 35.5 39.3 23.8 31.4 NA NA 33.5
Childless couple 17.1 14.9 [9.1] 11.8 14.4 NA NA 16.6
Couple with children 16.0 15.0 12.2 11.5 12.9 NA NA 15.6
Lone parent 38.2 40.6 [22.4] 36.0 37.5 NA NA 38.1
Pensionerb 24.1 31.5 23.7 20.3 22.4 NA NA 24.8
Other household 15.0 [12.1] [-] 8.7 10.4 NA NA 15.0
Average household 23.2 24.4 20.1 14.1 18.3 NA NA 23.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on
less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/B: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 23.1 [37.7] 35.2 30.1 30.5 31.8 19.3 32.0
Childless couple [9.9] 8.2 14.3 12.1 12.0 12.2 11.6 10.9
Couple with children 21.6 29.0 18.1 19.2 19.6 19.1 19.4 22.5
Lone parent [51.6] [51.8] [57.8] 34.1 38.3 35.8 27.4 54.0
Pensionerb [-] 8.6 16.6 13.5 13.6 13.5 [12.7] 14.6
Other household [11.5] [17.4] [14.0] 7.8 8.3 7.8 7.7 14.7
Average household 20.5 23.8 20.5 15.3 16.0 15.1 15.9 21.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/C: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 79.2 38.2 [-] 15.3 34.4 13.4 15.7 42.9
Childless couple 33.0 23.5 [-] 4.5 10.1 7.0 4.2 24.5
Couple with children 27.1 31.7 [-] 9.1 12.8 17.8 8.4 31.0
Lone parent 93.9 43.4 [-] 24.1 49.0 [-] 24.9 58.6
Pensionerb 64.1 29.5 [-] 9.3 24.3 9.5 9.2 37.1
Other household [-] 5.2 [-] 3.6 4.7 2.2 3.9 7.5
Average household 58.9 29.8 [11.3] 8.1 16.9 10.8 7.8 34.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/D: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [54.3] [38.6] [46.4] 31.9 38.6 39.8 [14.4] 48.4
Childless couple 22.4 [46.9] [21.3] 16.3 19.3 22.2 5.4 27.1
Couple with children 46.3 [30.3] 27.2 17.3 21.8 22.4 13.0 35.2
Lone parent [57.3] [-] [-] 33.6 44.4 [29.0] [39.3] [55.1]
Pensionerb 36.8 21.1 22.6 26.1 26.2 26.5 [15.9] 26.4
Other household 21.7 22.4 13.1 11.2 12.9 12.1 7.8 19.6
Average household 37.1 28.2 23.3 16.8 20.2 19.2 11.8 30.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/E: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 42.4 [48.3] [-] 11.0 30.9 12.2 10.6 42.8
Childless couple 19.4 [15.9] [-] 3.0 7.6 6.1 2.4 19.2
Couple with children 27.9 [21.2] [-] 4.5 8.9 7.2 4.1 27.5
Lone parent 56.8 [-] [-] 16.7 38.7 [24.8] 14.5 57.3
Pensionerb 57.5 [47.5] [-] 13.4 26.8 18.7 9.3 56.8
Other household 25.6 [-] [-] 3.1 8.6 5.1 1.9 25.9
Average household 38.5 37.6 [-] 6.6 16.4 12.1 5.1 38.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A5C/F: Household type by tenure: at-risk-of-poverty rates (ANHC) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 41.6 63.5 [17.2] 18.8 32.9 27.3 14.0 54.2
Childless couple 28.8 39.6 [-] 8.4 13.7 12.1 6.7 32.4
Couple with children 34.9 49.6 [-] 13.9 20.6 13.0 14.1 44.5
Lone parent 70.0 67.7 [-] 35.7 57.7 [25.2] 36.8 68.2
Pensionerb 60.3 55.7 [39.9] 29.8 35.6 29.9 28.9 55.1
Other household 39.1 30.2 [-] 8.1 14.1 9.3 7.4 33.0
Average household 41.0 51.1 25.3 15.3 23.9 20.3 12.5 47.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. ANHC = poverty based on income after net housing
expenditure. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table A7A1/A: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 65.7 52.2 68.7 65.7 65.1 NA NA 64.2
Some work 18.8 23.4 19.4 26.5 23.3 NA NA 19.4
None works 15.5 24.4 12.0 7.8 11.6 NA NA 16.4
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 NA NA 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table A7A1/B: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 59.4 56.7 53.4 66.1 64.9 66.3 65.2 56.0
Some work 27.7 26.9 31.5 26.0 26.3 24.8 30.6 29.0
None works 12.9 16.3 15.1 7.9 8.8 8.8 4.2 14.9
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A7A1/C: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 46.7 54.7 45.3 70.8 65.6 52.9 73.1 53.4
Some work 13.5 18.9 39.9 20.8 20.0 21.8 20.7 18.2
None works 39.8 26.5 14.9 8.4 14.3 25.3 6.2 28.4
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A7A1/D: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 56.6 44.8 53.5 60.4 58.4 54.1 71.7 52.3
Some work 30.5 31.0 37.4 29.7 30.5 32.5 24.7 32.9
None works 12.9 24.2 9.1 9.9 11.1 13.4 3.6 14.8
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A7A1/E: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 81.6 78.6 NA 89.5 87.2 84.7 90.4 81.4
Some work 9.4 11.6 NA 8.2 8.5 10.0 7.8 9.6
None works 8.9 9.8 NA 2.4 4.2 5.3 1.8 9.0
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table A7A1/F: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (HOPW) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 69.4 47.9 77.4 76.7 71.5 66.1 80.1 56.3
Some work 18.1 17.7 4.4 16.8 17.0 19.0 16.1 17.5
None works 12.5 34.3 18.2 6.5 11.5 14.9 3.7 26.2
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A7B1/A: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 25.0 15.2 19.1 14.8 18.8 NA NA 23.5
Some work 38.8 43.0 40.3 60.0 50.5 NA NA 39.4
None works 36.2 41.8 40.6 25.1 30.6 NA NA 37.1
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 NA NA 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany.
Table A7B1/B: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 22.9 15.8 11.2 10.5 11.1 10.3 11.3 15.3
Some work 58.3 56.3 54.4 64.8 63.8 61.6 80.6 55.9
None works 18.8 27.9 34.5 24.7 25.2 28.1 8.0 28.8
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table A7B1/C: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 11.9 21.7 21.7 18.4 19.0 15.8 18.8 20.1
Some work 32.8 37.6 43.0 67.5 57.3 45.7 70.7 36.9
None works 55.3 40.7 35.4 14.1 23.8 38.5 10.5 43.0
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table A7B1/D: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 12.8 8.2 6.8 8.5 8.8 7.2 11.2 9.5
Some work 64.8 54.7 74.4 72.7 70.7 67.2 84.0 64.9
None works 22.3 37.1 18.9 18.8 20.5 25.6 4.8 25.6
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table A7B1/E: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 25.1 23.7 NA 18.2 20.3 15.2 19.1 25.0
Some work 40.5 38.4 NA 62.0 55.4 44.9 66.8 40.3
None works 34.5 38.0 NA 19.8 24.3 39.9 14.2 34.7
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany.
Table A7B1/F: Employment status by tenure: column percentages — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 25.8 9.1 15.1 18.6 17.5 12.4 22.1 14.4
Some work 52.3 38.9 41.5 58.7 54.5 35.5 71.8 43.1
None works 22.0 52.0 43.4 22.6 28.0 52.0 6.0 42.5
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some
potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table A8A1/A: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 37.1 4.2 2.3 56.4 100.0 NA NA 43.6
Some work 29.6 5.2 1.8 63.4 100.0 NA NA 36.6
None works 49.2 10.9 2.3 37.6 100.0 NA NA 62.4
Average household 36.7 5.2 2.2 55.9 100.0 NA NA 44.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table A8A1/B: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 2.8 3.3 4.1 89.8 100.0 72.3 17.5 10.2
Some work 3.2 3.9 5.9 87.0 100.0 66.8 20.3 13.0
None works 4.5 7.1 8.5 79.9 100.0 71.4 8.5 20.1
Average household 3.0 3.8 4.9 88.2 100.0 70.8 17.4 11.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A8A1/C: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 3.2 20.9 0.2 75.7 100.0 6.3 69.4 24.3
Some work 3.1 23.6 0.5 72.8 100.0 8.5 64.3 27.2
None works 12.7 46.2 0.3 40.8 100.0 13.7 27.1 59.2
Average household 4.6 25.1 0.3 70.1 100.0 7.8 62.3 29.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A8A1/D: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 9.3 5.4 7.6 77.7 100.0 44.5 33.2 22.3
Some work 9.6 7.2 10.2 73.1 100.0 51.2 21.8 26.9
None works 11.2 15.3 6.8 66.8 100.0 58.1 8.7 33.2
Average household 9.6 7.0 8.3 75.1 100.0 48.1 27.0 24.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A8A1/E: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 24.3 1.6 0.0 74.1 100.0 11.8 62.3 25.9
Some work 28.7 2.4 0.0 68.9 100.0 14.3 54.7 31.1
None works 55.0 4.1 0.0 40.9 100.0 15.3 25.5 59.1
Average household 26.0 1.8 0.0 72.2 100.0 12.2 60.1 27.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table A8A1/F: Employment status by tenure: row percentages (HOPW) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 8.8 10.7 0.8 79.8 100.0 16.9 62.9 20.2
Some work 9.6 16.6 0.2 73.6 100.0 20.4 53.2 26.4
None works 9.8 47.2 1.2 41.8 100.0 23.6 18.2 58.2
Average household 9.0 15.9 0.8 74.3 100.0 18.2 56.1 25.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential
worker works.
Table AP2A/A: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 75.2 11.4 4.2 9.2 100.0 9.2 0.0 90.8
Childless couple 67.5 7.1 2.2 23.2 100.0 23.2 0.0 76.8
Couple with children 49.1 7.5 3.5 39.9 100.0 39.9 0.0 60.1
Lone parent 67.2 14.6 2.0 16.1 100.0 16.1 0.0 83.9
Pensionerb 44.1 9.3 7.9 38.6 100.0 38.6 0.0 61.4
Other household 34.3 7.6 4.6 53.4 100.0 53.4 0.0 46.6
Average household 61.1 10.1 4.8 24.0 100.0 24.0 0.0 76.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2A/B: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 5.5 5.6 9.6 79.3 100.0 72.9 6.4 20.7
Childless couple 5.1 3.9 8.5 82.5 100.0 75.3 7.2 17.5
Couple with children 4.5 6.9 7.7 80.9 100.0 64.6 16.3 19.1
Lone parent 10.1 9.7 11.7 68.6 100.0 61.1 7.5 31.4
Pensionerb 0.8 3.0 6.2 89.9 100.0 87.8 2.1 10.1
Other household 0.4 6.1 10.0 83.4 100.0 77.2 6.3 16.6
Average household 4.5 5.9 8.6 81.0 100.0 71.8 9.2 19.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2A/C: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 20.6 72.0 0.5 6.9 100.0 2.7 4.2 93.1
Childless couple 6.4 70.3 0.0 23.3 100.0 7.8 15.5 76.7
Couple with children 3.5 54.4 0.0 42.1 100.0 13.5 28.6 57.9
Lone parent 40.9 53.2 0.4 5.6 100.0 2.6 3.0 94.4
Pensionerb 20.3 47.8 1.3 30.7 100.0 18.2 12.5 69.3
Other household 20.1 28.1 0.0 51.9 100.0 26.2 25.7 48.1
Average household 18.7 61.2 0.5 19.6 100.0 8.7 10.9 80.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2A/D: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.5 10.8 20.4 57.3 100.0 55.6 1.7 42.7
Childless couple 11.2 14.7 9.9 64.3 100.0 58.3 6.0 35.7
Couple with children 17.7 8.6 17.1 56.6 100.0 40.7 15.8 43.4
Lone parent 30.8 28.3 8.2 32.7 100.0 27.8 4.9 67.3
Pensionerb 10.1 9.5 10.3 70.1 100.0 69.1 1.1 29.9
Other household 9.3 14.9 8.4 67.4 100.0 61.1 6.3 32.6
Average household 12.9 11.5 12.4 63.2 100.0 57.3 6.0 36.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2A/E: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 73.4 5.8 0.0 20.8 100.0 5.9 14.9 79.2
Childless couple 68.6 2.5 0.0 28.8 100.0 11.3 17.6 71.2
Couple with children 52.3 2.6 0.0 45.1 100.0 8.2 37.0 54.9
Lone parent 68.1 5.3 0.0 26.6 100.0 8.4 18.2 73.4
Pensionerb 50.4 4.1 0.0 45.5 100.0 28.9 16.6 54.5
Other household 82.0 1.8 0.0 16.2 100.0 13.1 3.1 83.8
Average household 62.4 4.5 0.0 33.1 100.0 15.5 17.6 66.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2A/F: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 13.0 54.1 1.1 31.7 100.0 23.5 8.2 68.3
Childless couple 16.5 33.7 0.7 49.0 100.0 30.7 18.3 51.0
Couple with children 11.5 45.1 1.6 41.9 100.0 9.2 32.7 58.1
Lone parent 19.7 66.2 0.9 13.2 100.0 1.4 11.7 86.8
Pensionerb 3.8 33.0 2.1 61.1 100.0 57.9 3.3 38.9
Other household 21.0 36.7 0.6 41.7 100.0 27.5 14.3 58.3
Average household 10.6 42.4 1.5 45.5 100.0 34.5 11.0 54.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional household weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/A: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 75.2 11.4 4.2 9.2 100.0 NA NA 90.8
Childless couple 67.5 7.1 2.2 23.2 100.0 NA NA 76.8
Couple with children 49.0 7.4 3.5 40.0 100.0 NA NA 60.0
Lone parent 65.5 14.4 1.8 18.3 100.0 NA NA 81.7
Pensionerb 39.7 7.9 8.5 44.0 100.0 NA NA 56.0
Other household 30.6 6.5 5.1 57.8 100.0 NA NA 42.2
Average household 56.3 9.2 4.5 30.0 100.0 NA NA 70.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/B: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 5.5 5.6 9.6 79.3 100.0 72.9 6.4 20.7
Childless couple 5.1 3.9 8.5 82.5 100.0 75.3 7.2 17.5
Couple with children 4.5 7.8 7.0 80.7 100.0 65.2 15.5 19.3
Lone parent 10.0 10.9 10.0 69.0 100.0 59.9 9.1 31.0
Pensionerb 0.7 2.8 5.0 91.6 100.0 88.3 3.4 8.4
Other household 0.4 6.2 9.0 84.4 100.0 77.9 6.4 15.6
Average household 4.3 7.1 7.8 80.9 100.0 69.7 11.2 19.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/C: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 20.6 72.0 0.5 6.9 100.0 2.7 4.2 93.1
Childless couple 6.4 70.3 0.0 23.3 100.0 7.8 15.5 76.7
Couple with children 4.1 50.1 0.0 45.9 100.0 13.7 32.2 54.1
Lone parent 41.6 53.3 0.3 4.9 100.0 1.7 3.2 95.1
Pensionerb 17.8 48.5 0.9 32.8 100.0 19.9 12.9 67.2
Other household 15.8 22.1 0.0 62.0 100.0 39.6 22.4 38.0
Average household 16.2 55.6 0.3 27.9 100.0 11.4 16.5 72.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/D: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.5 10.8 20.4 57.3 100.0 55.6 1.7 42.7
Childless couple 11.2 14.7 9.9 64.3 100.0 58.3 6.0 35.7
Couple with children 19.2 8.5 16.7 55.6 100.0 39.1 16.5 44.4
Lone parent 39.7 28.2 6.6 25.5 100.0 21.1 4.4 74.5
Pensionerb 9.6 8.7 8.9 72.8 100.0 71.4 1.4 27.2
Other household 10.1 16.8 8.1 65.0 100.0 58.9 6.1 35.0
Average household 14.9 12.1 11.9 61.2 100.0 52.7 8.5 38.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/E: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 73.4 5.8 0.0 20.8 100.0 5.9 14.9 79.2
Childless couple 68.6 2.5 0.0 28.8 100.0 11.3 17.6 71.2
Couple with children 52.2 2.8 0.0 45.0 100.0 9.0 36.1 55.0
Lone parent 66.1 7.3 0.0 26.6 100.0 8.9 17.8 73.4
Pensionerb 47.8 3.9 0.0 48.3 100.0 30.2 18.0 51.7
Other household 68.4 3.9 0.0 27.8 100.0 23.3 4.5 72.2
Average household 60.2 4.5 0.0 35.4 100.0 14.5 20.8 64.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP2B/F: Household type by tenure: row percentages (PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 13.0 54.1 1.1 31.7 100.0 23.5 8.2 68.3
Childless couple 16.5 33.7 0.7 49.0 100.0 30.7 18.3 51.0
Couple with children 10.7 44.7 1.5 43.1 100.0 9.8 33.2 56.9
Lone parent 18.9 66.2 1.0 14.0 100.0 1.3 12.8 86.0
Pensionerb 3.7 29.6 1.8 64.9 100.0 61.4 3.5 35.1
Other household 22.3 35.5 0.5 41.7 100.0 27.8 13.8 58.3
Average household 12.6 42.7 1.3 43.4 100.0 27.6 15.8 56.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table AP7A1/A: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 39.8 27.0 57.2 34.7 37.8 NA NA 39.1
Some work 16.8 12.8 11.5 27.6 19.6 NA NA 16.0
None works 43.4 60.2 31.2 37.7 42.7 NA NA 44.9
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 NA NA 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table AP7A1/B: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 29.1 24.4 20.1 31.5 30.0 29.0 45.2 23.8
Some work 22.0 36.9 32.8 34.7 34.1 34.8 34.0 31.7
None works 49.0 38.7 47.1 33.8 35.9 36.2 20.7 44.5
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works.
Table AP7A1/C: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 22.9 35.1 24.4 47.0 36.9 40.5 51.4 32.3
Some work 11.2 23.0 0.0 34.6 24.7 38.0 32.3 20.3
None works 65.9 41.9 75.6 18.4 38.4 21.5 16.4 47.5
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works.
Table AP7A1/D: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 41.1 19.6 13.5 30.1 28.6 28.2 39.5 26.4
Some work 38.0 30.7 70.7 40.6 42.4 40.8 39.3 45.1
None works 20.9 49.7 15.8 29.4 29.0 30.9 21.2 28.6
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works.
Table AP7A1/E: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 60.5 36.4 NA 74.8 65.0 73.1 75.5 59.1
Some work 14.0 27.7 NA 14.9 14.9 10.0 17.1 14.8
None works 25.5 35.8 NA 10.3 20.1 16.9 7.4 26.1
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table AP7A1/F: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PHOPW) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 37.9 21.8 24.1 37.7 30.2 29.4 43.4 25.8
Some work 25.1 18.6 7.9 35.1 25.6 38.4 32.9 20.0
None works 37.0 59.6 68.0 27.2 44.2 32.2 23.8 54.2
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHOPW = based exclusively on poor households with at
least one potential worker. All work = all potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no
potential worker works.
Table AP7B1/A: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 12.1 4.9 9.0 6.1 9.5 NA NA 11.0
Some work 27.1 21.7 30.9 37.6 29.9 NA NA 26.6
None works 60.8 73.4 60.1 56.3 60.6 NA NA 62.4
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 NA NA 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works. NA = Not
available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table AP7B1/B: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 4.2 5.1 3.4 2.8 3.1 2.6 4.1 4.2
Some work 41.8 47.2 42.6 53.8 52.0 51.3 69.7 44.1
None works 54.0 47.8 54.0 43.3 44.9 46.1 26.2 51.7
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table AP7B1/C: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 4.8 8.0 12.7 7.7 7.4 7.8 7.5 7.3
Some work 20.2 35.2 11.6 63.6 40.6 59.3 66.6 31.7
None works 75.0 56.8 75.6 28.7 52.0 32.9 25.8 61.0
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table AP7B1/D: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 4.5 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.9 3.9 2.0 4.4
Some work 67.6 40.6 65.8 55.0 56.4 51.9 74.3 58.6
None works 27.9 54.8 30.2 41.3 39.7 44.2 23.7 37.0
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table AP7B1/E: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 12.1 10.4 NA 12.3 12.1 9.5 14.3 12.0
Some work 29.1 18.8 NA 42.4 33.4 27.5 52.8 28.4
None works 58.7 70.8 NA 45.3 54.5 63.0 32.9 59.6
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works. NA = Not
available because data on mortgages were not collected in Germany.
Table AP7B1/F: Employment status by tenure: column percentages (PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
All work 5.7 2.2 3.3 3.9 3.4 2.9 5.5 3.0
Some work 43.7 25.3 13.6 35.3 31.8 20.4 61.2 29.1
None works 50.6 72.4 83.1 60.9 64.8 76.7 33.3 67.8
Average household 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on all poor households. All work = all
potential workers work, Some work = some potential workers work, None work = no potential worker works.
Table B3/A: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 4.7 4.6 2.3 0.1 3.6 NA NA 4.7
Childless couple 2.8 2.9 [0.0] 0.0 1.5 NA NA 2.7
Couple with children 6.0 7.9 0.0 1.4 2.9 NA NA 5.9
Lone parent 13.8 9.5 [0.0] 5.6 10.8 NA NA 12.6
Pensionerb 2.8 8.7 0.0 0.2 1.5 NA NA 3.2
Other household 2.4 [0.7] [-] 0.6 1.0 NA NA 2.0
Average household 4.9 6.2 0.3 0.9 2.7 NA NA 4.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B3/B: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 8.3 [9.1] 0.9 6.4 6.2 6.8 3.5 5.0
Childless couple [0.0] 2.8 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.8 2.6
Couple with children 9.3 15.2 4.7 9.8 9.7 9.9 9.5 9.3
Lone parent [33.6] [28.9] [8.9] 22.7 22.7 24.6 15.0 22.6
Pensionerb [-] 13.5 8.7 4.2 4.8 4.2 [2.5] 10.1
Other household [0.0] [18.3] [5.3] 6.8 6.9 6.1 10.3 8.6
Average household 8.4 14.4 5.6 7.8 8.0 7.6 9.2 9.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B3/C: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 76.2 30.2 [-] 1.1 24.9 4.7 0.5 35.4
Childless couple 15.8 17.6 [-] 0.7 5.4 2.4 0.5 17.4
Couple with children 25.8 18.3 [-] 0.6 3.7 1.3 0.5 19.1
Lone parent 85.4 65.9 [-] 0.3 51.8 [-] 0.0 71.6
Pensionerb 62.5 31.0 [-] 0.4 20.6 1.0 0.0 37.8
Other household [-] 2.6 [-] 2.8 3.8 12.9 0.9 6.4
Average household 55.0 25.9 [0.0] 0.9 10.7 3.4 0.5 30.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B3/D: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [10.1] [0.0] [0.0] 14.4 10.4 0.0 [46.6] 4.6
Childless couple 10.7 [12.7] [0.0] 7.3 7.5 0.0 20.8 8.2
Couple with children 0.0 [0.0] 0.0 16.1 12.0 0.4 29.4 0.0
Lone parent [2.3] [-] [-] 8.5 4.9 [0.0] [19.1] [1.2]
Pensionerb 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 [0.5] 0.4
Other household 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.0 0.7 14.8 0.0
Average household 2.2 0.8 0.0 8.3 6.5 0.4 24.6 1.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B3/E: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.8 [9.9] [-] 3.6 8.7 3.5 3.6 11.7
Childless couple 9.7 [5.2] [-] 1.5 3.7 3.4 1.1 9.4
Couple with children 21.6 [31.1] [-] 2.8 6.6 4.4 2.6 22.2
Lone parent 59.5 [-] [-] 15.3 39.3 [23.0] 13.2 59.6
Pensionerb 35.3 [18.4] [-] 6.5 14.9 6.4 6.5 34.1
Other household 21.0 [-] [-] 5.4 9.7 5.4 5.4 23.2
Average household 24.3 24.4 [-] 4.0 10.2 5.9 3.5 24.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B3/F: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 18.4 62.7 [0.0] 0.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 45.2
Childless couple 4.3 39.8 [-] 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 19.7
Couple with children 19.8 45.5 [-] 0.0 7.9 0.0 0.0 36.2
Lone parent 71.6 69.3 [-] 0.0 47.0 [0.0] 0.0 69.4
Pensionerb 45.2 68.5 [0.0] 0.0 14.1 0.0 0.0 61.5
Other household 9.9 51.6 [-] 0.0 8.5 0.0 0.0 35.5
Average household 21.9 56.3 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 43.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/A: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 41.1 40.8 [21.8] 36.1 39.4 NA NA 40.5
Childless couple 18.4 18.3 [5.1] 22.2 20.0 NA NA 17.9
Couple with children 13.9 16.0 [6.4] 19.3 17.5 NA NA 13.7
Lone parent 35.6 37.2 [-] 42.4 37.3 NA NA 35.1
Pensionerb 35.5 39.0 13.3 25.2 29.0 NA NA 34.1
Other household 13.6 [12.8] [-] 12.2 12.9 NA NA 14.9
Average household 26.4 27.1 12.6 21.2 23.1 NA NA 25.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected
in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/B: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 12.7 [12.7] 30.1 22.5 22.1 22.9 19.3 20.5
Childless couple [6.8] 2.5 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.3 11.6 6.0
Couple with children 4.1 3.6 5.1 7.3 6.9 7.5 6.5 4.3
Lone parent [29.0] [11.0] [31.1] 15.8 17.4 16.0 14.8 23.4
Pensionerb [-] 9.4 11.7 9.8 9.9 9.6 [15.6] 10.7
Other household [17.2] [0.0] [2.5] 2.6 2.8 2.4 3.7 4.6
Average household 9.8 4.4 9.9 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.2 8.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/C: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 92.3 49.5 [-] 30.8 46.7 3.2 35.3 53.8
Childless couple 38.7 21.9 [-] 11.0 14.6 1.6 11.9 23.7
Couple with children [34.9] 16.4 [-] 14.9 15.5 2.2 15.8 18.4
Lone parent 97.8 49.5 [-] 28.1 53.9 [-] 29.9 63.8
Pensionerb 85.4 42.3 [-] 5.8 29.6 2.1 8.5 50.6
Other household [-] 0.0 [-] 5.4 4.9 2.2 6.0 3.6
Average household 72.3 31.5 [1.4] 13.0 21.1 2.4 14.6 37.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/D: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [64.2] [8.7] [13.6] 16.4 24.4 13.6 [22.7] 36.5
Childless couple 24.6 [19.6] [2.7] 5.4 8.8 5.1 6.1 17.6
Couple with children 29.4 [6.4] 2.3 10.5 11.2 9.6 11.2 13.6
Lone parent [49.5] [-] [-] 24.5 28.3 [14.1] [37.6] [32.1]
Pensionerb 20.4 5.4 2.1 4.3 5.7 4.1 [11.6] 9.3
Other household 7.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 1.8 5.1 2.4
Average household 25.3 5.2 2.0 6.6 7.9 4.9 10.1 11.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/E: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 37.8 [58.2] [-] 11.7 33.4 [11.5] 11.8 39.1
Childless couple 13.4 [2.5] [-] 1.3 5.1 2.9 1.0 12.6
Couple with children 12.5 [3.6] [-] 0.9 3.2 0.5 1.0 11.9
Lone parent 44.6 [-] [-] 5.8 28.2 [11.3] 4.1 43.5
Pensionerb 56.6 [44.7] [-] 7.0 25.5 8.5 6.0 55.7
Other household 16.4 [-] [-] 0.5 4.3 0.6 0.4 15.3
Average household 30.5 26.7 [-] 2.5 12.1 4.2 2.0 30.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B5/F: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — United
Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 62.2 81.7 [-] 28.6 45.9 20.9 33.0 72.5
Childless couple 42.9 43.1 [-] 9.8 16.6 5.1 12.0 41.3
Couple with children 36.9 39.0 [-] 12.6 18.0 2.2 14.3 37.1
Lone parent 82.3 65.3 [-] 36.9 58.5 [9.1] 39.9 69.0
Pensionerb 71.8 68.3 [10.9] 11.5 23.2 11.0 17.5 64.6
Other household 46.1 34.0 [-] 4.8 12.6 2.1 6.3 37.5
Average household 50.5 52.6 6.0 11.9 22.0 7.6 14.3 50.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/A: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 40.0 38.2 [21.8] 36.1 38.6 NA NA 39.3
Childless couple 17.5 18.3 [5.1] 22.2 19.7 NA NA 17.2
Couple with children 13.2 16.0 [6.4] 19.2 17.3 NA NA 13.1
Lone parent 32.7 34.6 [-] 40.8 34.8 NA NA 32.3
Pensionerb 35.3 38.5 13.3 25.2 28.9 NA NA 33.9
Other household 13.6 [12.8] [-] 12.2 12.9 NA NA 14.9
Average household 25.5 26.2 12.6 21.1 22.7 NA NA 24.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not collected
in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20
observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/B: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.3 [12.7] 30.1 21.9 21.6 22.3 19.3 20.1
Childless couple [6.8] 2.5 8.6 8.4 8.0 8.0 10.7 6.0
Couple with children 4.1 3.6 4.5 7.0 6.7 7.2 6.3 4.1
Lone parent [29.0] [9.7] [31.1] 15.5 17.1 15.7 14.8 23.1
Pensionerb [-] 9.4 11.4 9.6 9.7 9.5 [15.6] 10.5
Other household [17.2] [0.0] [2.5] 2.6 2.7 2.4 3.3 4.6
Average household 9.7 4.3 9.6 7.2 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/C: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 92.3 35.3 [-] 30.8 38.1 3.2 35.3 41.4
Childless couple 38.7 15.7 [-] 10.9 12.9 1.6 11.8 18.2
Couple with children [34.9] 11.5 [-] 14.9 14.7 2.2 15.8 14.0
Lone parent 95.5 18.4 [-] 28.1 37.6 [-] 29.9 41.3
Pensionerb 84.7 28.1 [-] 5.8 23.6 2.1 8.5 39.2
Other household [-] 0.0 [-] 5.4 4.9 2.2 6.0 3.6
Average household 71.7 20.7 [1.4] 13.0 18.0 2.4 14.5 28.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/D: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [64.2] [8.7] [13.6] 15.9 24.1 13.6 [21.0] 36.5
Childless couple 18.2 [7.0] [2.7] 5.4 7.2 5.1 6.1 11.6
Couple with children 29.4 [6.4] 2.3 9.6 10.6 9.6 9.5 13.6
Lone parent [49.5] [-] [-] 24.5 28.3 [14.1] [37.6] [32.1]
Pensionerb 20.4 5.4 2.1 4.3 5.7 4.1 [11.6] 9.3
Other household 7.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 1.8 4.9 2.4
Average household 24.4 4.4 2.0 6.3 7.5 4.9 9.0 11.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/E: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 33.8 [50.9] [-] 10.8 30.0 [11.5] 10.7 34.9
Childless couple 11.9 [2.5] [-] 1.3 4.6 2.9 1.0 11.2
Couple with children 9.2 [0.0] [-] 0.8 2.4 0.5 0.8 8.6
Lone parent 22.3 [-] [-] 5.8 14.8 [11.3] 4.1 21.0
Pensionerb 32.4 [26.3] [-] 4.3 14.8 5.6 3.4 32.0
Other household 11.3 [-] [-] 0.5 3.1 0.6 0.5 10.5
Average household 21.2 17.5 [-] 1.9 8.5 3.3 1.6 21.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table B6/F: Household type by tenure: percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA) — United
Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 60.4 56.7 [-] 28.6 39.5 20.9 33.0 56.3
Childless couple 41.0 22.2 [-] 9.8 14.4 5.1 12.0 31.2
Couple with children 27.1 20.8 [-] 12.6 14.7 2.2 14.3 22.1
Lone parent 51.2 24.3 [-] 36.9 32.7 [9.1] 39.9 30.7
Pensionerb 50.4 30.4 [10.9] 11.5 15.8 11.0 17.5 31.0
Other household 43.5 12.4 [-] 4.8 9.2 2.1 6.3 23.4
Average household 41.7 25.3 6.0 11.9 16.6 7.6 14.3 29.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/A: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 11.1 9.2 [5.1] 1.2 9.8 NA NA 10.6
Childless couple 10.8 [-] [-] 0.0 7.7 NA NA 10.0
Couple with children 9.7 [-] [-] 11.2 10.1 NA NA 9.4
Lone parent 21.4 [16.0] [-] [19.2] 19.9 NA NA 20.0
Pensionerb 15.4 31.4 [0.0] 1.0 9.0 NA NA 15.3
Other household [3.8] [-] [-] [3.9] 3.7 NA NA [3.6]
Average household 12.8 14.6 1.1 5.6 10.3 NA NA 12.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens
indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/B: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [3.6] 21.1 18.0 22.3 [-] [6.0]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 29.5 25.6 30.6 [-] [7.3]
Couple with children [-] [29.6] [4.4] 28.2 26.2 26.4 [35.5] 17.8
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 48.1 36.7 48.1 [-] [11.2]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 11.5 12.6 12.0 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 28.0 27.9 29.3 [-] [-]
Average household [15.4] 29.2 5.0 28.2 25.9 27.7 31.6 16.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/C: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [97.7] 47.0 [-] [9.0] 54.6 [-] [-] 58.0
Childless couple [-] [46.1] [-] [0.0] 37.9 [-] [0.0] [49.4]
Couple with children [-] [44.6] [-] 1.4 27.0 [-] [0.0] 48.7
Lone parent [86.3] [77.7] [-] [-] 77.3 [-] [-] 81.3
Pensionerb [83.9] 52.2 [-] 3.7 41.5 [6.1] [0.0] 59.9
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 90.9 50.1 [-] 7.3 44.6 17.8 0.0 59.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/D: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [3.0] 3.8 [0.0] [-] [4.8]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 2.0 5.5 0.0 [-] [11.8]
Couple with children [0.0] [-] [0.0] 6.8 3.8 0.0 [22.8] 0.0
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [1.2] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [4.8] [0.0] [0.0] 0.0 0.5 0.0 [-] 1.7
Other household [-] [-] [-] 0.5 0.3 0.0 [-] [0.0]
Average household 1.2 3.0 0.0 2.7 2.2 0.0 19.4 1.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/E: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 28.4 [-] [-] [20.5] 26.9 [-] [19.7] 28.6
Childless couple 16.2 [-] [-] [4.5] 12.4 [-] [-] 15.6
Couple with children 60.3 [-] [-] 22.1 44.2 [-] [20.6] 62.3
Lone parent 78.7 [-] [-] [38.8] 69.0 [-] [-] 80.0
Pensionerb 83.5 [-] [-] 34.3 58.7 28.9 [43.3] 81.5
Other household [42.2] [-] [-] [-] [41.5] [-] [-] [45.3]
Average household 54.3 [64.4] [-] 27.2 45.2 29.3 25.7 55.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP3/F: Household type by tenure: percentage receiving housing allowance (PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [62.2] 88.5 [-] 0.0 56.0 0.0 [0.0] 82.0
Childless couple [23.0] 74.1 [-] 0.0 28.8 0.0 [0.0] 56.5
Couple with children [59.5] 73.6 [-] 0.0 39.3 [0.0] 0.0 69.0
Lone parent [90.2] 88.7 [-] [0.0] 75.7 [-] [0.0] 88.1
Pensionerb [58.8] 72.7 [-] 0.0 23.7 0.0 [0.0] 67.5
Other household [23.0] [84.2] [-] [0.0] 35.0 [0.0] [-] 60.0
Average household 53.8 80.2 [0.0] 0.0 41.0 0.0 0.0 72.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/A: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 86.0 80.4 [-] 79.0 83.2 NA NA 83.7
Childless couple 73.4 [-] [-] 68.4 72.5 NA NA 74.0
Couple with children 58.6 [-] [-] 66.0 61.0 NA NA 57.4
Lone parent 71.0 [72.5] [-] [68.5] 70.1 NA NA 70.5
Pensionerb 85.6 [76.3] [30.9] 61.4 69.9 NA NA 77.8
Other household [57.8] [-] [-] [51.7] 58.0 NA NA [66.6]
Average household 75.3 78.0 34.9 64.0 70.4 NA NA 73.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate
values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/B: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [78.1] 60.4 59.6 58.3 [-] [56.6]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 54.0 54.9 51.6 [-] [59.4]
Couple with children [-] [11.1] [26.0] 30.7 28.2 30.4 [32.1] 16.9
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 41.4 43.0 41.9 [-] [46.7]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 42.0 43.9 39.8 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 16.7 15.1 15.5 [-] [-]
Average household [34.2] 16.3 38.9 34.4 33.4 33.7 38.7 29.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are based
on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/C: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [100.0] 87.5 [-] [65.6] 88.2 [-] [-] 89.9
Childless couple [-] [89.5] [-] [41.6] 79.0 [-] [51.2] [90.4]
Couple with children [-] [52.3] [-] 48.6 52.5 [-] [65.1] 55.8
Lone parent [100.0] [84.2] [-] [-] 90.7 [-] [-] 90.9
Pensionerb [100.0] 91.7 [-] 34.2 72.9 [16.1] [62.1] 92.5
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 100.0 75.9 [-] 45.4 71.0 14.8 66.5 80.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/D: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [34.1] 39.9 [32.0] [-] [48.5]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 20.4 26.2 17.9 [-] [36.7]
Couple with children [56.0] [-] [9.1] 34.9 33.7 28.7 [49.7] 32.2
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [44.5] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [54.7] [20.6] [6.5] 14.1 17.9 13.0 [-] 28.0
Other household [-] [-] [-] 9.9 10.4 6.1 [-] [11.3]
Average household 55.9 17.7 7.6 21.4 24.6 16.8 50.6 29.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/E: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 92.5 [-] [-] [62.6] 89.1 [-] [60.2] 93.1
Childless couple 68.2 [-] [-] [-] 65.4 [-] [-] 67.0
Couple with children 51.2 [-] [-] 23.4 38.7 [-] [28.2] 49.6
Lone parent 80.0 [-] [-] [-] 68.1 [-] [-] 77.5
Pensionerb 97.8 [-] [-] 53.7 81.1 [47.2] [61.8] 97.2
Other household [64.9] [-] [-] [-] [47.8] [-] [-] [61.4]
Average household 78.9 [66.7] [-] 39.4 67.0 35.3 41.8 78.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BP5/F: Household type by tenure: percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PH) —
United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [100.0] 99.6 [-] 74.1 91.2 68.1 [91.4] 99.3
Childless couple [100.0] 95.9 [-] 49.9 73.0 35.0 [75.0] 95.8
Couple with children [87.0] 75.3 [-] 52.1 65.6 [12.9] 63.7 75.9
Lone parent [100.0] 86.9 [-] [72.2] 86.4 [-] [74.7] 88.8
Pensionerb [94.2] 90.3 [-] 32.0 50.6 31.3 [43.8] 86.8
Other household [93.7] [83.3] [-] [22.8] 59.7 [15.4] [-] 86.4
Average household 95.0 85.8 [17.9] 42.2 66.9 30.4 62.9 86.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are based
on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table BPW5/A: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 36.1 26.5 32.2 25.6 31.8 0.7 0.9 0.7
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 63.9 73.5 67.8 74.4 68.2 1.1 1.1 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW5/B: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 69.0 70.5 70.7 70.3 69.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 31.0 29.5 29.3 29.7 30.4 1.0 0.9 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW5/C: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 39.9 21.3 14.4 22.5 31.8 0.5 0.4 0.6
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 60.1 78.7 85.6 77.5 68.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW5/D: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 75.3 74.2 76.5 73.7 75.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 24.7 25.8 23.5 26.3 25.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW5/E: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 44.5 47.4 43.4 48.5 45.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 55.5 52.6 56.6 51.5 54.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW5/F: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 36.3 20.3 24.9 19.4 29.1 0.6 0.7 0.5
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 63.7 79.7 75.1 80.6 70.9 1.2 1.2 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/A: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 38.5 29.2 36.1 28.1 34.3 0.8 0.9 0.7
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 61.5 70.8 63.9 71.9 65.7 1.2 1.0 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/B: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 69.8 73.3 73.9 73.0 71.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 30.2 26.7 26.1 27.0 28.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/C: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 50.3 38.3 32.4 39.4 45.0 0.8 0.6 0.8
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 49.7 61.7 67.6 60.6 55.0 1.2 1.4 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/D: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 75.6 75.6 76.5 75.4 75.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 24.4 24.4 23.5 24.6 24.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/E: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 53.8 65.5 47.8 70.6 56.4 1.2 0.9 1.3
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 46.2 34.5 52.2 29.4 43.6 0.7 1.1 0.6
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BPW6/F: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 45.7 60.4 52.2 62.1 52.2 1.3 1.1 1.4
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 54.3 39.6 47.8 37.9 47.8 0.7 0.9 0.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BX1: Poverty and employment status by country: gross housing burden (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 61.9 34.6 38.5 0.6 35.0 44.4 50.6 1.3 1.4
HU 38.3 18.8 21.2 0.5 19.2 26.0 32.7 1.4 1.7
NL 57.9 28.4 31.8 0.5 28.6 36.5 41.0 1.3 1.4
PT 29.5 14.9 17.4 0.5 17.1 18.4 22.7 1.1 1.3
SE 50.1 15.9 19.9 0.3 16.3 28.4 35.6 1.7 2.2
UK 59.3 23.4 30.5 0.4 26.3 37.8 54.1 1.4 2.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX2: Poverty and employment status by country: net housing burden (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 60.9 34.6 38.3 0.6 34.9 43.7 49.9 1.3 1.4
HU 36.7 18.7 20.9 0.5 19.0 24.8 31.0 1.3 1.6
NL 53.5 27.9 30.9 0.5 28.2 33.0 38.2 1.2 1.4
PT 29.3 14.7 17.2 0.5 16.8 18.3 22.6 1.1 1.3
SE 41.8 15.5 18.5 0.4 15.9 25.9 28.1 1.6 1.8
UK 46.4 22.6 27.3 0.5 25.5 31.0 36.4 1.2 1.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX3: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage receiving housing allowancea
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 10.3 1.5 2.7 0.1 2.3 6.5 4.4 2.8 1.9
HU 25.9 5.5 8.0 0.2 6.1 27.6 30.5 4.5 5.0
NL 44.6 6.3 10.7 0.1 4.7 30.1 28.9 6.4 6.2
PT 2.2 7.4 6.5 3.4 7.9 2.3 2.7 0.3 0.3
SE 45.2 5.7 10.2 0.1 6.2 29.2 45.4 4.7 7.3
UK 41.0 4.6 11.8 0.1 4.2 26.5 59.0 6.3 14.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX4: Poverty and employment status by country: housing allowance divided by gross
housing expenditurea
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 1.9 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.3 3.8 3.6
HU 5.9 0.9 1.5 0.2 1.1 5.3 6.5 4.7 5.7
NL 10.2 1.3 2.3 0.1 1.0 7.1 6.6 7.2 6.7
PT 0.3 1.6 1.4 5.4 1.8 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2
SE 20.0 1.4 3.5 0.1 1.6 10.2 17.5 6.5 11.2
UK 21.5 2.1 5.9 0.1 1.7 14.8 31.8 8.7 18.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All =
average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL
= households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX5: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with gross housing burden larger
than 40% (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 70.4 15.9 23.1 0.2 16.6 34.5 47.5 2.1 2.9
HU 33.4 3.9 7.5 0.1 5.2 14.3 21.0 2.7 4.0
NL 71.0 14.6 21.1 0.2 14.8 38.3 37.4 2.6 2.5
PT 24.6 4.5 7.9 0.2 7.4 9.5 13.9 1.3 1.9
SE 67.0 4.7 12.1 0.1 5.7 21.1 32.7 3.7 5.8
UK 66.9 11.1 22.0 0.2 15.5 34.5 61.1 2.2 4.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX8: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with gross housing burden larger
than 30% (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 87.5 32.9 40.1 0.4 32.9 56.3 66.2 1.7 2.0
HU 52.6 10.4 15.5 0.2 11.5 24.2 40.8 2.1 3.5
NL 87.5 37.1 42.9 0.4 37.0 53.3 58.5 1.4 1.6
PT 34.9 9.7 14.0 0.3 13.9 15.4 21.1 1.1 1.5
SE 85.2 12.6 21.2 0.1 12.6 38.6 60.7 3.1 4.8
UK 81.5 24.5 35.7 0.3 29.8 43.9 73.5 1.5 2.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX6: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with net housing burden larger
than 40% (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 68.1 15.8 22.7 0.2 16.3 33.2 46.3 2.0 2.8
HU 31.7 3.9 7.3 0.1 5.2 12.9 19.2 2.5 3.7
NL 57.2 12.9 18.0 0.2 13.5 26.2 29.8 1.9 2.2
PT 24.0 4.1 7.5 0.2 7.0 9.5 13.1 1.4 1.9
SE 44.0 3.8 8.5 0.1 4.6 18.4 20.4 4.0 4.4
UK 45.2 9.6 16.6 0.2 14.2 24.1 28.8 1.7 2.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX9: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with net housing burden larger
than 30% (XHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 85.6 32.6 39.6 0.4 32.5 55.4 64.4 1.7 2.0
HU 48.0 10.2 14.8 0.2 11.2 22.0 35.7 2.0 3.2
NL 83.1 35.4 40.9 0.4 35.7 47.8 54.3 1.3 1.5
PT 34.9 8.9 13.4 0.3 13.1 15.4 21.1 1.2 1.6
SE 64.4 11.3 17.5 0.2 10.7 32.8 41.5 3.1 3.9
UK 65.1 22.5 30.9 0.3 28.5 35.7 44.9 1.3 1.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BW5/A: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 83.4 54.9 65.5 52.5 80.1 0.7 0.8 0.6
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 16.6 45.1 34.5 47.5 19.9 2.7 2.1 2.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW5/B: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 94.8 82.0 85.7 79.0 93.6 0.9 0.9 0.8
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 5.2 18.0 14.3 21.0 6.4 3.4 2.7 4.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW5/C: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 85.2 62.5 61.7 62.6 81.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 14.8 37.5 38.3 37.4 18.3 2.5 2.6 2.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW5/D: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 92.6 87.4 90.5 86.1 92.0 0.9 1.0 0.9
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 7.4 12.6 9.5 13.9 8.0 1.7 1.3 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW5/E: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 94.3 71.9 78.9 67.3 93.4 0.8 0.8 0.7
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 5.7 28.1 21.1 32.7 6.6 5.0 3.7 5.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW5/F: Percentage with gross housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Gross housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 84.5 46.0 65.5 38.9 80.1 0.5 0.8 0.5
Gross housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 15.5 54.0 34.5 61.1 19.9 3.5 2.2 4.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/A: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 83.7 56.2 66.8 53.7 80.5 0.7 0.8 0.6
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 16.3 43.8 33.2 46.3 19.5 2.7 2.0 2.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/B: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 94.8 83.6 87.1 80.8 93.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 5.2 16.4 12.9 19.2 6.2 3.2 2.5 3.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/C: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 86.5 70.7 73.8 70.2 84.1 0.8 0.9 0.8
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 13.5 29.3 26.2 29.8 15.9 2.2 1.9 2.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/D: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 93.0 88.0 90.5 86.9 92.4 0.9 1.0 0.9
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 7.0 12.0 9.5 13.1 7.6 1.7 1.4 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/E: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 95.4 80.4 81.6 79.6 94.7 0.8 0.9 0.8
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 4.6 19.6 18.4 20.4 5.3 4.2 4.0 4.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BW6/F: Percentage with net housing burden larger than 40% (XHA/HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Net housing burden (XHA) < 0.4 85.8 72.4 75.9 71.2 84.3 0.8 0.9 0.8
Net housing burden (XHA) ≥ 0.4 14.2 27.6 24.1 28.8 15.7 1.9 1.7 2.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Net housing burden = net housing expenditure-to-income
ratio, XHA = based on net income excluding housing allowance, HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table C1/A: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 8.8 7.1 5.8 1.0 6.8 NA NA 8.5
Childless couple 2.0 5.3 [0.0] 0.0 1.2 NA NA 2.2
Couple with children 4.0 2.8 7.7 0.8 1.9 NA NA 4.0
Lone parent 11.4 12.8 [22.4] 0.7 9.0 NA NA 12.0
Pensionerb 1.7 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 NA NA 1.7
Other household 7.5 [7.3] [-] 1.4 3.2 NA NA 8.1
Average household 5.0 5.7 5.5 0.6 2.7 NA NA 5.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C1/B: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 29.1 [54.2] 31.2 16.8 20.2 16.5 18.4 35.8
Childless couple [48.4] 46.9 32.7 15.4 19.3 15.2 16.8 42.2
Couple with children 82.8 92.7 61.3 46.0 49.8 48.2 39.3 77.0
Lone parent [100.0] [80.3] [82.2] 54.0 60.8 58.0 38.0 86.4
Pensionerb [-] 60.1 22.9 17.6 19.3 17.7 [13.4] 33.2
Other household [90.3] [86.1] [84.5] 59.5 61.4 59.9 57.0 86.2
Average household 72.9 77.6 53.2 41.4 44.2 41.6 40.6 65.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C1/C: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 2.5 6.8 [-] 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 6.2
Childless couple 1.7 0.9 [-] 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.2 1.0
Couple with children 0.0 6.0 [-] 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.6 5.2
Lone parent 1.4 1.0 [-] 0.0 0.8 [-] 0.0 1.1
Pensionerb 0.0 0.3 [-] 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other household [-] 5.4 [-] 1.6 3.1 0.0 1.9 6.9
Average household 1.5 3.7 [15.8] 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.6 3.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C1/D: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [3.1] [11.0] [6.5] 0.9 2.9 1.3 [0.0] 5.9
Childless couple 9.4 [0.0] [5.1] 0.3 2.0 0.4 0.2 6.3
Couple with children 18.7 [28.5] 12.4 6.6 9.5 6.4 6.8 17.9
Lone parent [39.2] [-] [-] 7.7 20.3 [3.1] [13.5] [32.8]
Pensionerb 3.5 2.1 5.0 1.4 1.9 1.3 [4.3] 3.3
Other household 43.7 52.8 44.5 19.8 25.7 21.2 15.0 47.6
Average household 22.4 29.0 19.1 10.1 13.5 11.0 8.2 23.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C1/E: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 36.7 [32.5] [-] 14.8 28.4 12.5 15.4 36.4
Childless couple 8.7 [4.9] [-] 2.0 3.8 5.7 1.2 8.5
Couple with children 17.5 [25.9] [-] 2.6 5.6 4.7 2.3 18.0
Lone parent 28.6 [-] [-] 9.2 20.9 [14.7] 7.7 30.8
Pensionerb 6.3 [2.2] [-] 1.4 2.8 0.9 1.7 6.0
Other household 46.6 [-] [-] 3.8 14.0 5.1 3.0 46.3
Average household 21.5 24.3 [-] 3.4 9.0 4.4 3.1 21.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C1/F: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure) — United
Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 9.6 4.7 [17.4] 0.3 2.9 0.0 0.5 6.9
Childless couple 3.8 0.0 [-] 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.8 2.0
Couple with children 5.1 14.6 [-] 0.9 3.2 0.4 0.9 11.2
Lone parent 2.6 10.1 [-] 4.0 6.9 [0.0] 4.4 8.2
Pensionerb 1.7 1.5 [0.0] 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 1.4
Other household 31.3 19.9 [-] 7.0 11.0 6.4 7.3 23.8
Average household 10.8 10.2 3.8 2.1 4.3 1.5 2.4 10.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/A: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 9.6 9.6 4.5 2.2 7.8 NA NA 9.4
Childless couple 11.1 15.9 [8.7] 1.9 7.1 NA NA 11.5
Couple with children 22.6 25.3 27.4 6.4 12.1 NA NA 23.2
Lone parent 22.8 26.8 [-] 3.6 18.2 NA NA 23.5
Pensionerb 2.1 5.8 0.0 0.5 1.3 NA NA 2.3
Other household 12.4 [23.7] [-] 3.4 6.4 NA NA 14.6
Average household 12.9 17.7 11.9 3.8 8.2 NA NA 13.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/B: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 21.6 [20.5] 15.7 6.6 8.8 7.1 3.4 18.7
Childless couple [30.7] 25.9 16.3 7.3 9.7 7.3 7.7 23.8
Couple with children 42.7 56.7 32.8 18.4 21.5 18.4 18.5 43.2
Lone parent [32.6] [25.9] [42.7] 12.2 16.8 12.6 10.3 34.1
Pensionerb [-] 11.5 2.0 2.3 2.7 2.2 [3.9] 6.2
Other household [36.4] [27.1] [32.2] 16.2 17.3 16.3 15.7 31.3
Average household 36.3 37.2 23.9 13.5 15.5 13.0 15.7 31.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/C: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 17.9 19.2 [-] 11.2 16.6 12.0 11.1 19.0
Childless couple 11.1 15.1 [-] 8.1 9.9 4.4 8.5 14.6
Couple with children 24.2 32.1 [-] 15.2 17.9 12.7 15.4 31.0
Lone parent 34.3 37.5 [-] 13.2 30.0 [-] 15.1 36.5
Pensionerb 8.3 8.3 [-] 2.8 5.8 2.8 2.8 8.3
Other household [-] 14.9 [-] 9.9 10.5 27.9 6.4 12.2
Average household 16.3 20.0 [4.3] 11.7 14.2 10.3 11.9 19.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/D: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [23.2] [13.0] [6.7] 5.8 9.7 6.1 [5.2] 15.5
Childless couple 16.5 [21.0] [16.0] 10.2 12.2 8.6 13.1 17.3
Couple with children 40.3 [52.1] 27.3 21.1 25.1 21.0 21.1 37.0
Lone parent [37.4] [-] [-] 12.9 25.9 [10.5] [16.0] [38.8]
Pensionerb 19.2 20.1 10.8 8.8 11.2 8.5 [15.1] 17.4
Other household 58.5 48.6 36.3 18.1 24.5 18.3 17.6 48.2
Average household 37.8 38.9 26.4 16.9 21.4 15.8 19.1 34.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/E: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 21.6 [21.9] [-] 13.2 18.5 13.9 13.0 21.6
Childless couple 19.4 [7.6] [-] 6.4 9.9 8.5 6.0 18.6
Couple with children 33.3 [17.0] [-] 17.5 20.4 19.3 17.3 32.3
Lone parent 27.5 [-] [-] 12.2 21.5 [12.9] 12.0 29.3
Pensionerb 6.3 [2.2] [-] 3.0 3.9 2.5 3.5 6.0
Other household 18.7 [-] [-] 5.2 8.3 3.9 6.0 18.2
Average household 21.9 17.9 [-] 11.5 14.6 9.0 12.1 21.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table C3/F: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure) — United
Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 15.9 15.3 [-] 5.1 9.1 3.5 6.0 15.2
Childless couple 16.7 24.2 [-] 8.1 10.7 4.1 10.0 19.8
Couple with children 18.2 45.0 [-] 16.1 20.5 12.7 16.7 35.8
Lone parent 22.5 35.8 [-] 17.7 27.7 [15.0] 18.0 32.5
Pensionerb 1.2 11.4 [5.5] 3.7 5.1 3.4 7.0 10.0
Other household 15.8 40.9 [-] 14.7 18.9 11.4 16.5 32.1
Average household 16.9 32.0 13.3 11.8 15.8 6.6 14.7 26.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/A: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 16.4 6.1 [8.1] 3.8 13.7 NA NA 14.7
Childless couple 5.2 [-] [-] 0.0 4.9 NA NA 6.4
Couple with children 6.4 [-] [-] 1.9 5.1 NA NA 7.2
Lone parent 15.8 [11.0] [-] [1.6] 12.6 NA NA 15.1
Pensionerb 3.5 3.5 [0.0] 0.0 1.7 NA NA 3.0
Other household [4.4] [-] [-] [0.0] 1.3 NA NA [3.2]
Average household 10.2 7.2 7.5 0.9 7.0 NA NA 9.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens
indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/B: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [48.7] 27.6 31.5 27.7 [-] [46.5]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 30.7 35.0 33.4 [-] [55.2]
Couple with children [-] [97.4] [77.0] 63.8 68.9 68.3 [45.2] 90.2
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 66.3 73.9 64.4 [-] [90.8]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 19.8 21.0 20.6 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 79.9 82.9 78.8 [-] [-]
Average household [87.1] 90.0 75.6 57.6 62.6 59.1 48.4 83.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/C: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [4.1] 12.9 [-] [0.0] 10.3 [-] [-] 11.1
Childless couple [-] [0.0] [-] [0.0] 0.0 [-] [0.0] [0.0]
Couple with children [-] [11.1] [-] 3.3 7.1 [-] [4.7] 10.3
Lone parent [1.9] [1.7] [-] [-] 1.7 [-] [-] 1.8
Pensionerb [0.0] 0.0 [-] 0.0 0.0 [0.0] [0.0] 0.0
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 1.9 7.2 [-] 1.7 4.9 0.0 3.0 6.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/D: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [0.8] 6.8 [0.9] [-] [14.9]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 1.3 2.5 1.4 [-] [4.8]
Couple with children [35.9] [-] [19.2] 8.9 16.4 8.3 [10.3] 25.9
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [34.6] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [0.0] [0.0] [15.3] 2.5 3.2 2.0 [-] 5.0
Other household [-] [-] [-] 23.1 32.8 24.5 [-] [50.8]
Average household 34.5 20.5 23.9 9.9 16.5 9.7 11.5 26.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/E: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 48.4 [-] [-] [27.2] 43.8 [-] [25.4] 48.2
Childless couple 19.9 [-] [-] [4.5] 16.6 [-] [-] 21.5
Couple with children 37.2 [-] [-] 11.3 25.1 [-] [8.8] 36.4
Lone parent 27.9 [-] [-] [10.5] 28.5 [-] [-] 35.0
Pensionerb 10.9 [-] [-] 2.7 6.5 2.9 [2.3] 10.0
Other household [74.2] [-] [-] [-] [58.6] [-] [-] [75.6]
Average household 33.7 [49.9] [-] 9.9 26.0 9.3 10.3 34.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP1/F: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PH) —
United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [14.1] 1.8 [-] 0.0 2.8 0.0 [0.0] 4.1
Childless couple [0.0] 0.0 [-] 0.0 0.0 0.0 [0.0] 0.0
Couple with children [9.9] 21.5 [-] 3.5 12.2 [0.0] 4.6 18.7
Lone parent [1.6] 11.1 [-] [6.2] 8.5 [-] [6.8] 8.9
Pensionerb [0.0] 1.9 [-] 0.0 0.6 0.0 [0.0] 1.6
Other household [33.9] [19.8] [-] [26.4] 26.2 [31.6] [-] 26.0
Average household 12.6 11.5 [6.2] 4.9 8.7 4.6 5.4 11.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/A: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 12.7 11.2 [0.0] 1.3 11.0 NA NA 11.9
Childless couple 11.4 [-] [-] 0.0 10.0 NA NA 12.9
Couple with children 27.2 [-] [-] 18.6 25.2 NA NA 29.6
Lone parent 23.7 [30.2] [-] [8.9] 21.6 NA NA 24.4
Pensionerb 2.6 [10.2] [0.0] 0.0 1.8 NA NA 3.3
Other household [13.1] [-] [-] [3.7] 6.1 NA NA [9.4]
Average household 15.3 21.5 6.7 6.6 12.9 NA NA 15.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens
indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/B: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [4.9] 7.8 7.8 8.4 [-] [8.2]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 12.0 12.3 11.8 [-] [13.5]
Couple with children [-] [79.8] [56.3] 20.6 27.9 22.1 [14.4] 58.2
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 9.5 18.3 10.9 [-] [37.8]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 1.0 2.0 1.0 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 30.1 30.5 29.6 [-] [-]
Average household [25.7] 56.8 39.2 17.9 22.6 18.5 14.1 42.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/C: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [15.3] 19.6 [-] [0.0] 17.2 [-] [-] 18.5
Childless couple [-] [0.0] [-] [7.9] 1.8 [-] [7.1] [0.0]
Couple with children [-] [36.3] [-] 20.9 30.9 [-] [20.4] 39.4
Lone parent [40.9] [38.9] [-] [-] 37.7 [-] [-] 39.7
Pensionerb [1.9] 8.4 [-] 0.9 4.7 [0.0] [2.4] 6.5
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 25.5 22.6 [-] 18.4 21.8 25.2 13.6 23.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/D: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [2.0] 5.9 [2.0] [-] [11.3]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 9.2 11.1 10.2 [-] [14.5]
Couple with children [49.0] [-] [29.5] 23.8 32.8 20.5 [31.7] 44.0
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [36.0] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [12.8] [20.2] [21.8] 10.4 12.5 10.0 [-] 18.1
Other household [-] [-] [-] 32.9 41.1 34.3 [-] [56.3]
Average household 44.1 40.1 29.4 20.3 27.3 19.0 28.4 38.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/E: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 23.5 [-] [-] [4.3] 19.0 [-] [6.1] 22.8
Childless couple 26.4 [-] [-] [4.7] 21.1 [-] [-] 27.8
Couple with children 31.5 [-] [-] 34.9 32.2 [-] [31.2] 29.9
Lone parent 18.6 [-] [-] [12.1] 22.7 [-] [-] 26.6
Pensionerb 8.0 [-] [-] 3.2 5.4 5.1 [0.0] 7.4
Other household [26.7] [-] [-] [-] [21.3] [-] [-] [25.2]
Average household 21.6 [33.7] [-] 14.4 19.6 12.9 15.4 22.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CP3/F: Household type by tenure: percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PH) —
United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [20.1] 15.9 [-] 6.4 13.3 6.9 [5.1] 16.5
Childless couple [10.9] 22.8 [-] 3.2 11.0 5.2 [0.0] 18.6
Couple with children [5.8] 49.8 [-] 23.1 33.0 [13.4] 25.8 40.4
Lone parent [14.6] 33.8 [-] [20.2] 28.2 [-] [22.5] 29.4
Pensionerb [0.0] 7.8 [-] 2.9 4.4 2.6 [8.5] 7.1
Other household [7.8] [44.8] [-] [15.8] 25.0 [14.0] [-] 31.3
Average household 9.8 31.9 [10.0] 10.9 19.9 5.7 20.1 26.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table CPW1/A: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 7.2 7.2 9.9 6.8 7.2 1.0 1.4 0.9
Not in overcrowded accommodation 92.8 92.8 90.1 93.2 92.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW1/B: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 64.6 74.5 75.2 74.0 68.5 1.2 1.2 1.1
Not in overcrowded accommodation 35.4 25.5 24.8 26.0 31.5 0.7 0.7 0.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW1/C: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 3.7 3.1 0.0 3.6 3.4 0.8 0.0 1.0
Not in overcrowded accommodation 96.3 96.9 100.0 96.4 96.6 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW1/D: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 20.1 14.0 11.3 14.7 18.2 0.7 0.6 0.7
Not in overcrowded accommodation 79.9 86.0 88.7 85.3 81.8 1.1 1.1 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW1/E: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 24.4 39.0 55.7 34.3 27.4 1.6 2.3 1.4
Not in overcrowded accommodation 75.6 61.0 44.3 65.7 72.6 0.8 0.6 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW1/F: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 16.6 9.2 9.5 9.1 13.3 0.6 0.6 0.5
Not in overcrowded accommodation 83.4 90.8 90.5 90.9 86.7 1.1 1.1 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/A: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 17.1 15.9 15.7 16.0 16.6 0.9 0.9 0.9
Not in overcrowded accommodation 82.9 84.1 84.3 84.0 83.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/B: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 24.1 27.7 28.6 27.2 25.5 1.1 1.2 1.1
Not in overcrowded accommodation 75.9 72.3 71.4 72.8 74.5 1.0 0.9 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/C: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 26.8 21.4 30.0 20.0 24.4 0.8 1.1 0.7
Not in overcrowded accommodation 73.2 78.6 70.0 80.0 75.6 1.1 1.0 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/D: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 32.7 24.5 36.0 21.5 30.1 0.7 1.1 0.7
Not in overcrowded accommodation 67.3 75.5 64.0 78.5 69.9 1.1 1.0 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/E: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 24.7 30.9 44.0 27.2 26.0 1.3 1.8 1.1
Not in overcrowded accommodation 75.3 69.1 56.0 72.8 74.0 0.9 0.7 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CPW3/F: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 23.7 30.7 30.9 30.6 26.8 1.3 1.3 1.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 76.3 69.3 69.1 69.4 73.2 0.9 0.9 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor households with at least
one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a
year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/A: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 2.3 5.9 7.8 5.5 2.8 2.5 3.3 2.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 97.7 94.1 92.2 94.5 97.2 1.0 0.9 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/B: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 48.4 64.9 65.9 64.1 50.0 1.3 1.4 1.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 51.6 35.1 34.1 35.9 50.0 0.7 0.7 0.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/C: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 98.8 98.4 98.5 98.4 98.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/D: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 15.1 11.3 10.4 11.8 14.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
Not in overcrowded accommodation 84.9 88.7 89.6 88.2 85.3 1.0 1.1 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/E: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 7.9 24.1 23.0 24.9 8.6 3.0 2.9 3.1
Not in overcrowded accommodation 92.1 75.9 77.0 75.1 91.4 0.8 0.8 0.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW1/F: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (objective measure/HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 4.8 6.4 3.8 7.4 5.0 1.3 0.8 1.5
Not in overcrowded accommodation 95.2 93.6 96.2 92.6 95.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/A: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 9.3 12.7 13.9 12.4 9.7 1.4 1.5 1.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 90.7 87.3 86.1 87.6 90.3 1.0 0.9 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/B: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 17.7 22.4 23.1 21.9 18.2 1.3 1.3 1.2
Not in overcrowded accommodation 82.3 77.6 76.9 78.1 81.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/C: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 15.6 11.2 13.7 10.8 15.0 0.7 0.9 0.7
Not in overcrowded accommodation 84.4 88.8 86.3 89.2 85.0 1.1 1.0 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/D: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 23.0 20.2 26.5 17.4 22.6 0.9 1.2 0.8
Not in overcrowded accommodation 77.0 79.8 73.5 82.6 77.4 1.0 1.0 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/E: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 16.4 21.2 20.5 21.6 16.6 1.3 1.2 1.3
Not in overcrowded accommodation 83.6 78.8 79.5 78.4 83.4 0.9 1.0 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table CW3/F: Percentage in overcrowded accommodation (subjective measure/HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
In overcrowded accommodation 16.8 25.9 17.9 28.8 17.9 1.5 1.1 1.7
Not in overcrowded accommodation 83.2 74.1 82.1 71.2 82.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on households with at least one
potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table BX7: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with gross housing burden larger
than 40% (IHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 69.4 15.8 22.9 0.2 16.3 34.5 46.8 2.1 2.9
HU 32.4 3.9 7.3 0.1 5.2 13.3 19.6 2.6 3.8
NL 67.7 13.8 20.0 0.2 14.2 33.5 35.3 2.4 2.5
PT 24.2 4.3 7.7 0.2 7.2 9.5 13.1 1.3 1.8
SE 59.1 4.2 10.8 0.1 5.0 20.0 29.2 4.0 5.9
UK 62.0 10.4 20.6 0.2 15.1 32.6 51.9 2.2 3.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, IHA = based on net income including housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table BX10: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage with gross housing burden
larger than 30% (IHA)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 87.2 32.8 40.0 0.4 32.8 56.1 65.6 1.7 2.0
HU 51.4 10.4 15.3 0.2 11.4 23.4 38.9 2.0 3.4
NL 87.4 36.7 42.6 0.4 36.8 53.0 57.7 1.4 1.6
PT 34.9 9.6 13.9 0.3 13.8 15.4 21.1 1.1 1.5
SE 82.6 12.1 20.4 0.1 11.9 33.8 57.7 2.8 4.9
UK 80.4 24.1 35.2 0.3 29.6 42.9 70.4 1.4 2.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Gross housing burden = gross housing
expenditure-to-income ratio, IHA = based on net income including housing allowance. P = poor, NP =
non-poor, All = average households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a
year, OWL = households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL =
Netherlands, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table CX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage in overcrowded accommodation
(objective measure)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 7.0 2.0 2.7 0.3 2.3 7.8 5.5 3.3 2.3
HU 62.6 41.6 44.2 0.7 48.4 65.9 64.1 1.4 1.3
NL 4.9 1.0 1.5 0.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.3
PT 16.5 12.8 13.5 0.8 15.1 10.4 11.8 0.7 0.8
SE 26.0 6.7 9.0 0.3 7.9 23.0 24.9 2.9 3.1
UK 8.7 3.2 4.3 0.4 4.8 3.8 7.4 0.8 1.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table CX2: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage in overcrowded accommodation
(objective measure/NSPH)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 5.2 1.7 2.1 0.3 2.1 7.1 4.2 3.5 2.1
HU 67.3 44.0 46.8 0.7 49.3 66.4 66.2 1.3 1.3
NL 3.5 1.0 1.2 0.3 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4
PT 18.1 13.5 14.2 0.7 15.4 10.9 13.1 0.7 0.9
SE 25.5 4.8 6.5 0.2 6.1 15.9 25.7 2.6 4.2
UK 10.7 3.3 4.6 0.3 4.9 3.9 7.5 0.8 1.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table CX3: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage in overcrowded accommodation
(subjective measure)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 12.9 7.5 8.2 0.6 9.3 13.9 12.4 1.5 1.3
HU 22.6 14.5 15.5 0.6 17.7 23.1 21.9 1.3 1.2
NL 21.8 13.2 14.2 0.6 15.6 13.7 10.8 0.9 0.7
PT 27.3 20.1 21.4 0.7 23.0 26.5 17.4 1.2 0.8
SE 19.6 13.9 14.6 0.7 16.4 20.5 21.6 1.2 1.3
UK 19.9 14.8 15.8 0.7 16.8 17.9 28.8 1.1 1.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table GX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage not satisfied with housing
conditionsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 21.8 16.0 16.8 0.7 16.8 13.8 22.9 0.8 1.4
HU 50.9 36.6 38.3 0.7 37.8 47.7 52.6 1.3 1.4
NL 7.1 2.7 3.2 0.4 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.4 1.0
PT 25.9 16.3 17.9 0.6 17.2 22.6 23.1 1.3 1.3
SE 9.6 4.2 4.8 0.4 4.5 7.8 8.4 1.8 1.9
UK 10.2 5.4 6.3 0.5 6.0 7.9 15.3 1.3 2.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table DX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting leaking roof, damp
walls, floors, foundation, or rot in window frames or floora
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 20.2 12.0 13.1 0.6 13.5 18.1 18.9 1.3 1.4
HU 32.0 17.5 19.2 0.5 17.2 41.4 30.6 2.4 1.8
NL 28.3 17.0 18.3 0.6 18.5 12.2 18.3 0.7 1.0
PT 31.0 17.1 19.4 0.6 18.4 18.5 26.1 1.0 1.4
SE 10.2 5.8 6.3 0.6 6.6 4.6 9.8 0.7 1.5
UK 21.2 13.1 14.7 0.6 13.9 20.2 29.5 1.5 2.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table DX2: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting dwelling too dark or
not enough lighta
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 8.3 3.8 4.4 0.5 4.4 4.5 7.8 1.0 1.8
HU 16.9 9.6 10.5 0.6 10.1 17.8 15.6 1.8 1.5
NL 7.8 4.9 5.2 0.6 4.6 3.7 7.9 0.8 1.7
PT 24.9 15.5 17.1 0.6 16.8 14.0 21.0 0.8 1.2
SE 6.2 6.7 6.7 1.1 6.7 10.9 5.2 1.6 0.8
UK 14.7 10.3 11.2 0.7 10.6 9.7 18.3 0.9 1.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table D2A/A: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — Germanya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 45.1 63.8 61.2 0.7 60.5 50.8 51.8 0.8 0.9
1 32.5 25.3 26.3 1.3 26.9 34.1 27.7 1.3 1.0
2 15.0 8.0 8.9 1.9 9.1 10.3 13.1 1.1 1.4
3 6.1 2.6 3.1 2.4 3.0 4.8 5.8 1.6 1.9
4 1.3 0.4 0.5 3.7 0.5 0.0 1.6 0.0 3.4
5 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2A/B: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — Hungarya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 37.5 51.4 49.7 0.7 51.4 31.3 37.9 0.6 0.7
1 29.3 33.4 32.9 0.9 33.2 32.0 28.0 1.0 0.8
2 17.3 11.1 11.9 1.6 11.2 18.1 15.7 1.6 1.4
3 9.1 3.0 3.8 3.0 3.1 12.9 9.0 4.2 2.9
4 4.5 0.8 1.3 5.4 0.9 1.8 7.1 2.1 8.3
5 2.2 0.2 0.5 9.9 0.3 3.9 2.2 13.9 7.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2A/C: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — Netherlandsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 44.3 63.6 61.4 0.7 61.5 68.6 60.2 1.1 1.0
1 35.7 26.9 27.9 1.3 28.4 24.4 26.5 0.9 0.9
2 13.7 7.6 8.3 1.8 8.1 3.8 9.4 0.5 1.2
3 5.2 1.6 2.0 3.3 1.5 3.1 3.8 2.0 2.5
4 0.8 0.3 0.4 2.7 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4
5 0.3 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2A/D: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — Portugala
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 16.8 27.5 25.7 0.6 27.0 24.8 18.9 0.9 0.7
1 37.2 43.5 42.4 0.9 43.0 42.4 37.1 1.0 0.9
2 25.6 19.6 20.6 1.3 20.1 17.6 28.1 0.9 1.4
3 12.2 7.1 8.0 1.7 7.3 10.8 10.0 1.5 1.4
4 6.4 1.8 2.5 3.6 2.1 1.7 3.9 0.8 1.9
5 1.8 0.5 0.7 3.5 0.5 2.7 1.9 5.7 4.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2A/E: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — Swedena
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 66.2 73.2 72.4 0.9 72.5 73.3 63.2 1.0 0.9
1 23.6 21.3 21.5 1.1 21.5 16.1 28.4 0.7 1.3
2 7.6 4.2 4.6 1.8 4.6 6.6 6.1 1.4 1.3
3 2.4 1.0 1.2 2.3 1.1 4.1 1.8 3.8 1.7
4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.5
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2A/F: Poverty and employment status by indicators of deprivation: column
percentages (alternative indicator) — United Kingdoma
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 52.0 61.4 59.6 0.8 60.2 51.6 40.0 0.9 0.7
1 27.4 27.2 27.2 1.0 27.2 32.7 32.1 1.2 1.2
2 13.4 8.4 9.4 1.6 9.1 10.0 17.8 1.1 1.9
3 5.7 2.5 3.2 2.2 2.8 4.8 7.9 1.7 2.8
4 1.5 0.5 0.7 3.0 0.6 0.9 2.2 1.4 3.5
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table D2B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 61.4 66.9 52.3 34.9 55.6 NA NA 61.6
Childless couple 56.0 58.1 [36.9] 24.6 41.2 NA NA 55.5
Couple with children 61.4 59.4 68.2 26.6 38.4 NA NA 61.6
Lone parent 67.1 63.2 [52.2] 37.5 58.4 NA NA 65.9
Pensionerb 37.9 46.5 15.3 17.8 26.5 NA NA 36.7
Other household 58.4 [62.2] [-] 22.5 32.5 NA NA 60.5
Average household 55.9 59.0 44.7 24.6 38.8 NA NA 55.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table D2B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 65.7 [92.5] 65.2 56.4 59.1 56.8 53.5 71.6
Childless couple [60.2] 77.0 61.7 50.9 53.2 51.9 44.4 66.6
Couple with children 76.1 84.1 68.8 46.0 49.6 46.2 45.4 75.7
Lone parent [88.1] [86.1] [63.9] 58.4 62.5 57.7 61.3 78.2
Pensionerb [-] 69.8 57.0 50.6 51.8 50.2 [65.2] 61.6
Other household [88.3] [82.6] [63.3] 43.7 46.0 43.8 43.1 75.1
Average household 75.4 81.9 64.0 47.5 50.3 47.7 46.2 72.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table D2B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 56.9 58.1 [-] 40.9 52.6 47.1 39.9 57.8
Childless couple 57.7 54.2 [-] 31.5 38.0 35.2 31.1 54.5
Couple with children 32.5 57.7 [-] 32.7 36.4 50.3 31.4 54.5
Lone parent 65.9 61.1 [-] 39.1 56.0 [-] 31.2 62.5
Pensionerb 41.6 38.9 [-] 22.5 31.6 25.7 20.2 39.5
Other household [-] 45.5 [-] 35.0 37.6 53.2 31.5 44.1
Average household 48.4 52.1 [33.5] 32.2 38.6 40.7 31.0 51.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table D2B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [83.4] [93.4] [88.2] 73.3 78.9 72.6 [74.9] 87.1
Childless couple 76.9 [90.3] [79.5] 72.2 74.5 75.3 66.4 80.4
Couple with children 88.9 [86.9] 70.7 64.0 68.2 66.2 62.2 80.7
Lone parent [86.0] [-] [-] 74.9 80.8 [63.0] [89.8] [86.8]
Pensionerb 77.0 88.3 77.6 80.0 80.6 80.2 [75.6] 82.0
Other household 84.8 88.9 88.7 74.5 77.3 75.7 70.4 87.5
Average household 84.2 89.1 77.3 71.2 74.3 73.9 65.7 83.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table D2B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 41.0 [41.1] [-] 23.6 34.6 21.0 24.4 41.0
Childless couple 36.4 [41.1] [-] 20.6 25.2 16.8 21.4 36.8
Couple with children 41.6 [18.3] [-] 24.0 27.1 16.5 25.0 40.2
Lone parent 44.0 [-] [-] 26.8 35.6 [21.0] 28.3 43.1
Pensionerb 33.3 [23.5] [-] 19.1 23.2 22.0 16.7 32.6
Other household 38.9 [-] [-] 25.1 28.3 20.3 27.8 38.4
Average household 39.3 30.7 [-] 22.7 27.6 19.5 23.5 38.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table D2B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 52.0 58.0 [51.0] 34.1 42.7 28.8 37.1 55.7
Childless couple 49.9 58.7 [-] 34.1 38.4 29.8 36.1 53.6
Couple with children 41.3 71.7 [-] 35.5 41.4 35.8 35.5 62.5
Lone parent 49.6 69.0 [-] 42.3 57.0 [37.0] 42.9 64.0
Pensionerb 25.5 37.0 [39.9] 27.1 29.2 26.5 35.4 36.1
Other household 57.0 68.9 [-] 36.1 43.0 30.5 39.2 64.8
Average household 48.4 62.2 54.5 34.1 40.4 29.3 36.8 57.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2A/A: Employment status by indicators of depri-
vation: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) —
Germanya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 40.6 49.6 41.7 41.6 122.0 102.6
1 34.6 34.7 32.7 33.9 100.4 94.4
2 15.8 11.5 16.0 15.6 72.7 101.3
3 7.7 4.2 6.9 7.2 54.4 89.7
4 1.1 0.0 2.7 1.6 0.0 254.1
5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2A/B: Employment status by indicators of depri-
vation: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) —
Hungarya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 43.4 22.2 34.9 38.3 51.1 80.4
1 30.6 31.7 23.4 28.9 103.3 76.2
2 14.4 23.9 18.3 16.7 166.0 127.0
3 7.1 15.6 10.9 9.3 218.6 153.7
4 3.2 1.1 9.0 4.4 35.0 282.1
5 1.3 5.6 3.6 2.5 430.0 275.6
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2A/C: Employment status by indicators of depri-
vation: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) —
Netherlandsa
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 44.0 52.9 42.9 44.2 120.1 97.4
1 41.0 36.5 32.2 37.4 89.0 78.6
2 10.4 0.0 15.4 11.6 0.0 147.3
3 2.6 10.6 9.5 5.7 414.4 371.1
4 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2A/D: Employment status by indicators of depri-
vation: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) —
Portugala
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 18.7 17.5 12.6 17.1 93.9 67.3
1 38.7 29.0 35.2 37.2 75.0 91.0
2 24.8 22.8 30.9 26.2 91.8 124.5
3 11.2 15.0 13.5 12.0 133.5 120.6
4 5.5 5.9 5.7 5.6 107.5 103.1
5 1.1 9.8 2.1 1.9 884.2 191.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2A/E: Employment status by indicators of depri-
vation: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) —
Swedena
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 65.9 62.6 57.0 64.3 95.0 86.4
1 22.9 15.7 31.2 23.9 68.5 136.4
2 8.5 17.8 8.6 9.0 208.3 100.3
3 2.3 3.9 2.3 2.4 168.0 99.9
4 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.0 281.4
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2A/F: Employment status by indicators of depriva-
tion: column percentages (alternative indicator/PH) — United
Kingdoma
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 53.4 33.5 36.5 45.6 62.7 68.3
1 29.0 36.5 29.2 29.7 125.9 100.8
2 11.5 14.8 23.0 16.0 128.8 199.8
3 4.0 12.9 9.5 6.7 323.2 239.9
4 2.1 2.3 1.8 2.0 112.0 85.1
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DP2B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 66.0 72.3 [54.4] 37.7 63.5 NA NA 66.2
Childless couple 63.7 [-] [-] 33.6 56.8 NA NA 63.8
Couple with children 72.7 [-] [-] 40.9 59.2 NA NA 71.4
Lone parent 76.8 [74.3] [-] [46.0] 69.9 NA NA 75.5
Pensionerb 42.7 [41.6] [12.1] 25.9 32.6 NA NA 37.8
Other household [69.5] [-] [-] [37.6] 52.3 NA NA [72.7]
Average household 65.0 66.0 39.3 35.1 54.9 NA NA 63.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate
values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [78.8] 65.9 69.0 65.8 [-] [80.9]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 67.7 67.9 67.9 [-] [68.8]
Couple with children [-] [79.1] [79.7] 54.4 60.2 58.9 [35.6] 84.2
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 63.6 72.5 61.3 [-] [92.3]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 58.9 59.0 57.3 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 56.5 58.7 54.8 [-] [-]
Average household [90.8] 80.5 77.6 57.9 62.5 59.6 47.3 81.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [51.9] 66.7 [-] [61.3] 63.2 [-] [-] 63.3
Childless couple [-] [62.2] [-] [31.5] 55.9 [-] [23.3] [63.3]
Couple with children [-] [69.0] [-] 50.6 57.8 [-] [46.8] 63.8
Lone parent [67.7] [57.7] [-] [-] 61.5 [-] [-] 61.9
Pensionerb [54.1] 47.8 [-] 18.5 39.8 [22.6] [12.0] 50.2
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 51.9 61.4 [-] 46.3 55.7 55.2 40.1 59.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [70.0] 74.0 [69.0] [-] [79.4]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 79.5 82.7 83.1 [-] [88.5]
Couple with children [84.2] [-] [69.5] 73.1 76.2 72.9 [73.6] 80.1
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [95.1] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [88.6] [82.7] [86.1] 89.5 88.5 89.3 [-] 85.9
Other household [-] [-] [-] 81.3 87.3 82.1 [-] [98.5]
Average household 87.9 93.9 80.4 80.4 83.2 81.5 73.7 87.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 39.8 [-] [-] [32.3] 37.4 [-] [30.6] 38.7
Childless couple 46.3 [-] [-] [16.9] 36.7 [-] [-] 44.6
Couple with children 39.4 [-] [-] 22.0 31.1 [-] [25.3] 38.4
Lone parent 46.2 [-] [-] [33.0] 40.9 [-] [-] 43.8
Pensionerb 31.2 [-] [-] 23.5 26.8 24.6 [21.5] 29.9
Other household [40.5] [-] [-] [-] [38.5] [-] [-] [38.4]
Average household 39.8 [18.8] [-] 25.4 33.8 24.2 26.3 38.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DP2B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of deprivation (alternative
indicator/PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [70.7] 59.0 [-] 34.6 52.4 30.2 [47.1] 60.8
Childless couple [40.6] 58.7 [-] 37.9 45.8 40.4 [33.7] 53.5
Couple with children [61.1] 73.7 [-] 34.7 55.6 [39.4] 33.3 71.6
Lone parent [60.3] 73.6 [-] [47.4] 66.9 [-] [50.3] 70.1
Pensionerb [20.6] 36.4 [-] 26.2 29.3 25.9 [32.4] 34.9
Other household [41.2] [80.5] [-] [20.0] 46.4 [13.0] [-] 65.5
Average household 51.2 65.0 [56.9] 30.3 48.0 26.8 36.2 61.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table DPW2/A: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 40.6 42.8 49.6 41.7 41.6 1.1 1.2 1.0
1 34.6 33.0 34.7 32.7 33.9 1.0 1.0 0.9
2 15.8 15.4 11.5 16.0 15.6 1.0 0.7 1.0
3 7.7 6.5 4.2 6.9 7.2 0.8 0.5 0.9
4 1.1 2.3 0.0 2.7 1.6 2.2 0.0 2.5
5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DPW2/B: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 43.4 30.4 22.2 34.9 38.3 0.7 0.5 0.8
1 30.6 26.3 31.7 23.4 28.9 0.9 1.0 0.8
2 14.4 20.2 23.9 18.3 16.7 1.4 1.7 1.3
3 7.1 12.6 15.6 10.9 9.3 1.8 2.2 1.5
4 3.2 6.2 1.1 9.0 4.4 2.0 0.3 2.8
5 1.3 4.3 5.6 3.6 2.5 3.3 4.3 2.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DPW2/C: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 44.0 44.3 52.9 42.9 44.2 1.0 1.2 1.0
1 41.0 32.8 36.5 32.2 37.4 0.8 0.9 0.8
2 10.4 13.2 0.0 15.4 11.6 1.3 0.0 1.5
3 2.6 9.7 10.6 9.5 5.7 3.8 4.1 3.7
4 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DPW2/D: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 18.7 13.6 17.5 12.6 17.1 0.7 0.9 0.7
1 38.7 33.9 29.0 35.2 37.2 0.9 0.8 0.9
2 24.8 29.3 22.8 30.9 26.2 1.2 0.9 1.2
3 11.2 13.8 15.0 13.5 12.0 1.2 1.3 1.2
4 5.5 5.7 5.9 5.7 5.6 1.0 1.1 1.0
5 1.1 3.7 9.8 2.1 1.9 3.3 8.8 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DPW2/E: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 65.9 58.2 62.6 57.0 64.3 0.9 1.0 0.9
1 22.9 27.8 15.7 31.2 23.9 1.2 0.7 1.4
2 8.5 10.6 17.8 8.6 9.0 1.2 2.1 1.0
3 2.3 2.6 3.9 2.3 2.4 1.1 1.7 1.0
4 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.4 2.2 0.0 2.8
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DPW2/F: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 53.4 36.0 33.5 36.5 45.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
1 29.0 30.5 36.5 29.2 29.7 1.1 1.3 1.0
2 11.5 21.6 14.8 23.0 16.0 1.9 1.3 2.0
3 4.0 10.1 12.9 9.5 6.7 2.5 3.2 2.4
4 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.8 2.0 0.9 1.1 0.9
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/A: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 60.5 51.6 50.8 51.8 59.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
1 26.9 28.9 34.1 27.7 27.1 1.1 1.3 1.0
2 9.1 12.6 10.3 13.1 9.5 1.4 1.1 1.4
3 3.0 5.6 4.8 5.8 3.3 1.9 1.6 1.9
4 0.5 1.3 0.0 1.6 0.5 2.8 0.0 3.4
5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/B: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 51.4 35.0 31.3 37.9 49.9 0.7 0.6 0.7
1 33.2 29.8 32.0 28.0 32.8 0.9 1.0 0.8
2 11.2 16.7 18.1 15.7 11.7 1.5 1.6 1.4
3 3.1 10.7 12.9 9.0 3.8 3.5 4.2 2.9
4 0.9 4.8 1.8 7.1 1.2 5.6 2.1 8.3
5 0.3 3.0 3.9 2.2 0.5 10.5 13.9 7.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/C: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 61.5 61.3 68.6 60.2 61.5 1.0 1.1 1.0
1 28.4 26.2 24.4 26.5 28.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
2 8.1 8.6 3.8 9.4 8.2 1.1 0.5 1.2
3 1.5 3.7 3.1 3.8 1.9 2.4 2.0 2.5
4 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.4
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/D: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 27.0 20.8 24.8 18.9 26.3 0.8 0.9 0.7
1 43.0 38.7 42.4 37.1 42.5 0.9 1.0 0.9
2 20.1 24.9 17.6 28.1 20.7 1.2 0.9 1.4
3 7.3 10.3 10.8 10.0 7.7 1.4 1.5 1.4
4 2.1 3.2 1.7 3.9 2.2 1.5 0.8 1.9
5 0.5 2.2 2.7 1.9 0.7 4.6 5.7 4.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/E: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 72.5 67.2 73.3 63.2 72.3 0.9 1.0 0.9
1 21.5 23.6 16.1 28.4 21.6 1.1 0.7 1.3
2 4.6 6.3 6.6 6.1 4.7 1.4 1.4 1.3
3 1.1 2.7 4.1 1.8 1.2 2.5 3.8 1.7
4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 1.5
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table DW2/F: Number of indicators of deprivation reported: column percentages
(alternative indicator/HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 60.2 43.2 51.6 40.0 58.2 0.7 0.9 0.7
1 27.2 32.2 32.7 32.1 27.8 1.2 1.2 1.2
2 9.1 15.7 10.0 17.8 9.9 1.7 1.1 1.9
3 2.8 7.1 4.8 7.9 3.3 2.5 1.7 2.8
4 0.6 1.8 0.9 2.2 0.8 2.9 1.4 3.5
5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/A: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — Germanya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 55.2 65.6 64.2 0.8 64.9 61.0 58.7 0.9 0.9
1 19.2 16.1 16.5 1.2 16.4 19.9 17.4 1.2 1.1
2 18.4 14.0 14.6 1.3 14.4 14.0 16.6 1.0 1.2
3 7.3 4.2 4.6 1.7 4.3 5.1 7.3 1.2 1.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/B: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — Hungarya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 69.4 73.1 72.6 0.9 73.7 68.9 67.5 0.9 0.9
1 16.3 16.4 16.4 1.0 15.9 15.3 18.0 1.0 1.1
2 10.0 7.9 8.1 1.3 7.9 12.0 8.9 1.5 1.1
3 4.3 2.6 2.8 1.6 2.5 3.7 5.7 1.5 2.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/C: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — Netherlandsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 53.8 55.5 55.3 1.0 54.8 66.2 56.4 1.2 1.0
1 29.0 28.9 28.9 1.0 29.3 19.9 27.9 0.7 1.0
2 12.4 13.0 12.9 1.0 13.1 10.5 12.4 0.8 0.9
3 4.9 2.7 3.0 1.8 2.8 3.4 3.2 1.2 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/D: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — Portugala
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 61.4 58.7 59.1 1.0 59.4 53.6 56.1 0.9 0.9
1 20.7 24.4 23.8 0.9 24.3 23.8 22.9 1.0 0.9
2 12.4 13.0 12.9 1.0 12.4 17.1 13.6 1.4 1.1
3 5.5 3.9 4.2 1.4 3.9 5.5 7.4 1.4 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/E: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — Swedena
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 69.9 75.6 74.9 0.9 75.0 75.0 65.1 1.0 0.9
1 20.9 18.2 18.6 1.1 18.6 15.7 26.6 0.8 1.4
2 7.2 5.1 5.3 1.4 5.0 8.6 7.5 1.7 1.5
3 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.8 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1A/F: Poverty and employment status by indicators of neighbourhood problems:
column percentages — United Kingdoma
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.0 58.3 58.0 1.0 57.7 54.2 48.6 0.9 0.8
1 26.8 27.8 27.6 1.0 28.2 31.4 27.8 1.1 1.0
2 12.4 10.5 10.9 1.2 10.5 10.7 17.2 1.0 1.6
3 3.8 3.5 3.6 1.1 3.5 3.6 6.4 1.0 1.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table E1B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 50.6 55.1 32.0 35.0 47.0 NA NA 50.4
Childless couple 46.7 57.4 [31.1] 28.3 38.4 NA NA 47.1
Couple with children 44.1 50.2 30.6 27.4 33.0 NA NA 44.0
Lone parent 47.5 57.8 [40.3] 30.9 44.0 NA NA 48.9
Pensionerb 34.7 42.2 21.4 28.6 31.2 NA NA 34.2
Other household 48.2 [53.1] [-] 29.0 33.8 NA NA 47.6
Average household 44.6 52.0 27.9 28.5 35.8 NA NA 44.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table E1B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 20.8 [39.7] 22.2 31.1 30.1 29.8 39.8 25.8
Childless couple [23.1] 44.6 30.5 23.5 24.9 23.1 26.2 33.2
Couple with children 38.5 48.8 30.6 23.4 25.3 22.7 25.6 38.6
Lone parent [21.8] [56.7] [31.6] 28.7 30.6 26.6 37.3 37.5
Pensionerb [-] 40.8 33.5 30.4 30.8 30.5 [24.9] 34.5
Other household [44.0] [48.9] [33.3] 27.6 28.6 27.6 27.5 40.8
Average household 32.6 47.6 31.1 26.1 27.4 26.0 27.1 36.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table E1B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 53.1 59.4 [-] 51.2 56.3 42.0 52.8 58.6
Childless couple 54.4 50.1 [-] 42.8 44.9 44.9 42.5 50.5
Couple with children 38.6 58.3 [-] 40.8 43.4 41.5 40.8 55.8
Lone parent 66.3 61.1 [-] 49.7 59.0 [-] 52.3 62.6
Pensionerb 36.4 36.8 [-] 36.4 36.5 29.6 41.4 36.6
Other household [-] 53.2 [-] 41.5 44.6 42.1 41.4 52.7
Average household 46.6 52.1 [55.9] 41.5 44.7 37.7 42.0 51.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table E1B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [54.1] [57.1] [48.6] 45.5 48.5 40.0 [57.6] 52.9
Childless couple 34.6 [53.8] [46.0] 42.6 42.3 38.5 50.1 41.7
Couple with children 43.1 [69.1] 32.7 39.2 40.3 31.3 46.0 43.5
Lone parent [75.4] [-] [-] 38.5 50.8 [36.8] [40.5] [63.1]
Pensionerb 46.5 61.2 47.1 32.4 38.3 32.0 [42.2] 52.9
Other household 52.7 57.6 42.9 37.9 40.9 36.3 43.7 51.9
Average household 47.7 61.2 38.4 38.2 40.9 34.4 45.8 48.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table E1B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 36.4 [27.6] [-] 26.4 32.3 28.1 26.0 35.8
Childless couple 36.1 [54.8] [-] 23.1 27.2 19.1 23.9 37.4
Couple with children 40.7 [42.3] [-] 19.2 23.4 17.0 19.5 40.8
Lone parent 41.1 [-] [-] 17.1 29.3 [20.1] 16.3 39.8
Pensionerb 26.0 [21.9] [-] 19.0 21.0 19.4 18.7 25.7
Other household 41.4 [-] [-] 19.0 24.0 20.9 17.9 40.2
Average household 36.4 33.7 [-] 20.2 25.1 19.5 20.4 36.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table E1B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of neighbourhood problems —
United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 44.9 57.5 [47.4] 43.0 46.9 42.3 43.4 52.8
Childless couple 45.2 56.4 [-] 42.3 43.9 40.4 43.1 49.8
Couple with children 32.7 57.2 [-] 39.4 41.5 43.6 38.7 49.2
Lone parent 54.6 50.7 [-] 32.8 45.6 [54.4] 30.5 51.7
Pensionerb 28.0 35.2 [31.3] 34.0 34.1 34.0 34.5 34.2
Other household 42.5 61.1 [-] 41.3 44.4 38.9 42.5 54.5
Average household 41.7 52.8 41.6 39.4 42.0 38.0 40.2 49.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1A/A: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — Germanya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 54.6 57.3 55.1 55.0 104.9 100.9
1 20.6 17.8 17.8 19.3 86.3 86.3
2 19.0 18.4 18.6 18.8 97.2 98.2
3 5.8 6.5 8.5 6.9 111.5 146.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1A/B: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — Hungarya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 68.8 72.1 66.9 68.7 104.8 97.3
1 16.5 13.4 15.0 15.7 81.4 90.8
2 10.9 11.2 11.7 11.1 102.4 107.7
3 3.8 3.3 6.4 4.4 86.3 166.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1A/C: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — Netherlandsa
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 59.5 55.5 50.3 55.8 93.3 84.5
1 28.3 25.9 28.8 28.3 91.6 101.8
2 8.5 11.1 14.6 11.0 129.9 171.6
3 3.7 7.5 6.3 4.9 204.6 171.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1A/D: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — Portugala
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 59.8 68.3 58.9 60.1 114.2 98.4
1 22.4 22.3 18.0 21.3 99.4 80.3
2 13.0 8.6 12.4 12.6 66.4 95.4
3 4.8 0.8 10.7 6.0 16.3 225.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1A/E: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — Swedena
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 68.8 56.6 54.2 65.9 82.2 78.8
1 19.9 26.3 35.7 22.7 132.3 179.9
2 7.5 17.1 10.0 8.3 228.7 134.1
3 3.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1A/F: Employment status by number of neighbour-
hood problems: column percentages (PH) — United Kingdoma
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.1 44.7 49.3 53.2 78.4 86.3
1 29.2 42.0 25.8 28.9 144.1 88.4
2 11.2 6.8 17.8 13.3 60.5 159.4
3 2.6 6.4 7.1 4.6 251.5 277.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = household in work, OWS =
household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out
of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table EP1B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 55.4 64.2 [40.8] 33.1 53.7 NA NA 55.8
Childless couple 54.8 [-] [-] 33.0 52.0 NA NA 57.6
Couple with children 52.4 [-] [-] 29.6 43.7 NA NA 53.3
Lone parent 45.4 [67.1] [-] [28.4] 45.1 NA NA 49.0
Pensionerb 37.4 [38.7] [12.8] 31.3 32.6 NA NA 33.6
Other household [39.3] [-] [-] [40.0] 41.7 NA NA [44.4]
Average household 49.9 63.1 28.6 32.1 44.8 NA NA 50.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate
values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [26.5] 36.4 35.7 33.8 [-] [32.9]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 22.4 24.3 22.5 [-] [33.2]
Couple with children [-] [41.3] [26.8] 23.5 26.8 23.6 [23.2] 40.6
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 31.7 36.7 29.8 [-] [47.8]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 26.8 28.0 27.9 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 35.7 40.8 34.2 [-] [-]
Average household [46.4] 51.4 36.3 27.4 30.6 27.1 29.1 44.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [40.0] 61.3 [-] [64.4] 57.4 [-] [-] 56.9
Childless couple [-] [37.4] [-] [26.8] 37.4 [-] [22.0] [40.6]
Couple with children [-] [61.3] [-] 26.2 42.8 [-] [26.7] 56.7
Lone parent [67.9] [49.4] [-] [-] 56.1 [-] [-] 57.3
Pensionerb [24.6] 34.8 [-] 36.9 33.4 [31.8] [44.7] 31.7
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 48.2 53.9 [-] 29.9 46.2 26.3 32.5 52.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [38.0] 33.3 [36.1] [-] [26.9]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 38.2 43.0 41.0 [-] [51.7]
Couple with children [35.6] [-] [27.3] 32.8 36.6 26.9 [46.8] 41.3
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [56.2] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [41.0] [66.2] [41.3] 25.2 31.7 25.7 [-] 49.2
Other household [-] [-] [-] 36.1 44.3 37.1 [-] [59.4]
Average household 39.8 72.1 37.4 32.0 38.6 31.0 38.6 49.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 35.0 [-] [-] [23.6] 31.4 [-] [22.3] 33.5
Childless couple 43.1 [-] [-] [33.2] 40.9 [-] [-] 44.0
Couple with children 37.3 [-] [-] 19.4 29.9 [-] [21.3] 38.6
Lone parent 44.3 [-] [-] [25.9] 37.1 [-] [-] 41.3
Pensionerb 21.2 [-] [-] 19.0 19.7 19.3 [18.6] 20.3
Other household [35.8] [-] [-] [-] [34.6] [-] [-] [33.9]
Average household 35.3 [22.3] [-] 22.3 30.1 22.1 22.4 34.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EP1B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one neighbourhood problems (PH) — United
Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [50.2] 63.9 [-] 42.9 55.0 40.4 [50.3] 60.7
Childless couple [15.3] 52.4 [-] 42.2 41.6 41.1 [44.3] 41.0
Couple with children [26.1] 56.3 [-] 41.7 46.1 [53.7] 38.2 49.4
Lone parent [60.9] 48.7 [-] [45.7] 50.8 [-] [43.8] 51.6
Pensionerb [25.4] 33.7 [-] 29.7 30.6 30.0 [24.3] 32.2
Other household [30.4] [51.5] [-] [47.2] 45.2 [45.5] [-] 43.8
Average household 36.6 50.2 [34.6] 38.0 43.0 36.5 40.8 46.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table EPW1/A: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 54.6 55.4 57.3 55.1 55.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1 20.6 17.8 17.8 17.8 19.3 0.9 0.9 0.9
2 19.0 18.6 18.4 18.6 18.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
3 5.8 8.2 6.5 8.5 6.9 1.4 1.1 1.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EPW1/B: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 68.8 68.7 72.1 66.9 68.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
1 16.5 14.5 13.4 15.0 15.7 0.9 0.8 0.9
2 10.9 11.5 11.2 11.7 11.1 1.1 1.0 1.1
3 3.8 5.3 3.3 6.4 4.4 1.4 0.9 1.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EPW1/C: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 59.5 51.0 55.5 50.3 55.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
1 28.3 28.4 25.9 28.8 28.3 1.0 0.9 1.0
2 8.5 14.1 11.1 14.6 11.0 1.7 1.3 1.7
3 3.7 6.4 7.5 6.3 4.9 1.8 2.0 1.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EPW1/D: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 59.8 60.8 68.3 58.9 60.1 1.0 1.1 1.0
1 22.4 18.9 22.3 18.0 21.3 0.8 1.0 0.8
2 13.0 11.6 8.6 12.4 12.6 0.9 0.7 1.0
3 4.8 8.7 0.8 10.7 6.0 1.8 0.2 2.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EPW1/E: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 68.8 54.8 56.6 54.2 65.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
1 19.9 33.7 26.3 35.7 22.7 1.7 1.3 1.8
2 7.5 11.6 17.1 10.0 8.3 1.6 2.3 1.3
3 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EPW1/F: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.1 48.5 44.7 49.3 53.2 0.8 0.8 0.9
1 29.2 28.6 42.0 25.8 28.9 1.0 1.4 0.9
2 11.2 15.9 6.8 17.8 13.3 1.4 0.6 1.6
3 2.6 7.0 6.4 7.1 4.6 2.7 2.5 2.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/A: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 64.9 59.1 61.0 58.7 64.2 0.9 0.9 0.9
1 16.4 17.9 19.9 17.4 16.6 1.1 1.2 1.1
2 14.4 16.2 14.0 16.6 14.6 1.1 1.0 1.2
3 4.3 6.9 5.1 7.3 4.6 1.6 1.2 1.7
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/B: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 73.7 68.1 68.9 67.5 73.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
1 15.9 16.8 15.3 18.0 16.0 1.1 1.0 1.1
2 7.9 10.3 12.0 8.9 8.2 1.3 1.5 1.1
3 2.5 4.8 3.7 5.7 2.7 1.9 1.5 2.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/C: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 54.8 57.7 66.2 56.4 55.2 1.1 1.2 1.0
1 29.3 26.8 19.9 27.9 28.9 0.9 0.7 1.0
2 13.1 12.2 10.5 12.4 13.0 0.9 0.8 0.9
3 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.2 2.9 1.2 1.2 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/D: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 59.4 55.3 53.6 56.1 58.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
1 24.3 23.2 23.8 22.9 24.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
2 12.4 14.7 17.1 13.6 12.6 1.2 1.4 1.1
3 3.9 6.8 5.5 7.4 4.3 1.7 1.4 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/E: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 75.0 69.0 75.0 65.1 74.8 0.9 1.0 0.9
1 18.6 22.3 15.7 26.6 18.7 1.2 0.8 1.4
2 5.0 7.9 8.6 7.5 5.2 1.6 1.7 1.5
3 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EW1/F: Number of neighbourhood problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.7 50.1 54.2 48.6 56.8 0.9 0.9 0.8
1 28.2 28.8 31.4 27.8 28.3 1.0 1.1 1.0
2 10.5 15.5 10.7 17.2 11.1 1.5 1.0 1.6
3 3.5 5.7 3.6 6.4 3.8 1.6 1.0 1.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household.
Table EX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting noise from neighbours
or from the streeta
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 35.3 25.8 27.1 0.7 26.4 27.6 32.8 1.0 1.2
HU 18.1 14.3 14.8 0.8 14.4 14.7 19.4 1.0 1.3
NL 31.9 32.1 32.1 1.0 33.1 23.7 28.8 0.7 0.9
PT 25.3 28.1 27.6 1.1 27.3 34.9 31.3 1.3 1.1
SE 16.9 12.1 12.7 0.7 12.4 15.0 20.7 1.2 1.7
UK 21.8 19.4 19.9 0.9 19.7 20.9 28.6 1.1 1.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table EX2: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting pollution, grime or
other environmental problemsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 25.9 21.2 21.8 0.8 21.4 20.7 24.1 1.0 1.1
HU 13.2 13.5 13.4 1.0 13.3 11.9 12.8 0.9 1.0
NL 17.6 13.3 13.8 0.8 12.8 15.0 16.6 1.2 1.3
PT 23.4 21.7 22.0 0.9 21.3 23.9 26.5 1.1 1.2
SE 6.4 7.1 7.0 1.1 7.4 4.4 6.0 0.6 0.8
UK 12.1 13.3 13.1 1.1 13.2 12.7 16.3 1.0 1.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table EX3: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting crime, violence or
vandalisma
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 18.8 11.4 12.4 0.6 11.6 16.6 17.9 1.4 1.5
HU 17.9 12.2 12.9 0.7 11.6 23.8 20.6 2.1 1.8
NL 18.9 17.5 17.7 0.9 18.1 12.5 17.0 0.7 0.9
PT 13.3 12.4 12.6 0.9 12.3 15.7 14.6 1.3 1.2
SE 17.7 12.5 13.1 0.7 13.0 15.5 17.2 1.2 1.3
UK 29.2 26.6 27.1 0.9 27.1 30.3 36.6 1.1 1.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table F1A/A: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — Germanya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 55.1 54.1 54.2 1.0 52.9 58.5 57.7 1.1 1.1
1 21.9 23.2 23.0 0.9 23.6 20.0 20.0 0.8 0.8
2 10.5 10.9 10.8 1.0 11.3 10.4 9.8 0.9 0.9
3 5.8 5.2 5.2 1.1 5.5 3.4 6.0 0.6 1.1
4 2.9 2.8 2.8 1.0 2.7 5.0 2.9 1.9 1.1
5 2.7 2.7 2.7 1.0 2.9 1.6 2.3 0.6 0.8
6 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1A/B: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — Hungarya
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 48.9 58.5 57.4 0.8 57.9 45.3 50.2 0.8 0.9
1 19.0 17.8 18.0 1.1 18.0 19.6 19.7 1.1 1.1
2 12.5 9.9 10.2 1.3 10.1 17.2 9.8 1.7 1.0
3 7.7 6.0 6.2 1.3 5.9 6.7 10.8 1.1 1.8
4 3.8 3.1 3.2 1.2 3.0 1.1 4.1 0.4 1.4
5 4.8 3.3 3.5 1.5 3.3 7.7 3.1 2.4 1.0
6 3.3 1.3 1.5 2.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.3 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1A/C: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — Netherlandsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 61.3 65.3 64.9 0.9 65.0 71.9 60.6 1.1 0.9
1 24.9 23.8 24.0 1.0 24.4 20.8 23.6 0.9 1.0
2 10.2 6.9 7.3 1.5 7.0 2.7 10.3 0.4 1.5
3 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.0 2.2 0.5 3.8 0.2 1.7
4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.5
5 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.4 0.4 3.2 1.0
6 0.2 0.1 0.1 2.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 11.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1A/D: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — Portugala
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 52.3 64.5 62.5 0.8 62.1 72.6 63.1 1.2 1.0
1 18.1 16.6 16.8 1.1 17.6 0.0 15.2 0.0 0.9
2 7.5 5.5 5.8 1.4 5.1 12.0 12.0 2.4 2.3
3 6.9 2.8 3.5 2.4 3.5 2.7 1.2 0.8 0.3
4 4.4 3.1 3.3 1.4 3.3 0.0 4.5 0.0 1.3
5 8.4 4.9 5.5 1.7 5.2 12.7 4.1 2.5 0.8
6 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1A/E: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — Swedena
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 58.9 62.4 62.0 0.9 62.5 70.1 50.6 1.1 0.8
1 26.5 23.2 23.5 1.1 23.4 20.1 33.5 0.9 1.4
2 7.7 8.8 8.7 0.9 8.8 7.7 8.9 0.9 1.0
3 3.8 3.4 3.4 1.1 3.4 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.6
4 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 2.1 0.8 1.6
5 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.5 1.0 2.8 2.1 5.7
6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1A/F: Poverty and employment status by indicators of accessibility problems:
column percentages — United Kingdoma
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 64.8 74.1 71.9 0.9 74.5 67.7 59.7 0.9 0.8
1 21.8 18.0 18.9 1.2 18.3 25.8 23.6 1.4 1.3
2 6.3 4.9 5.3 1.3 4.9 2.5 8.4 0.5 1.7
3 2.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.2 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.1
4 2.9 0.9 1.4 3.3 0.7 0.7 2.9 1.1 4.2
5 1.9 0.8 1.0 2.4 0.4 1.2 2.8 2.8 6.6
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor household, NP =
non-poor household, All = average household, IW = household in work, OWS = household out of
work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than a year, row numbers
show the number of problems reported.
Table F1B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 39.1 41.3 49.2 41.4 40.1 NA NA 39.7
Childless couple 35.3 28.8 [60.4] 50.4 42.3 NA NA 35.6
Couple with children 39.8 44.7 60.4 52.6 48.9 NA NA 41.6
Lone parent 44.8 41.1 [-] 51.4 46.4 NA NA 44.6
Pensionerb 38.9 42.9 52.5 45.6 43.2 NA NA 40.4
Other household 45.1 [41.7] [-] 52.2 50.7 NA NA 46.4
Average household 39.4 40.7 57.4 50.3 45.8 NA NA 40.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table F1B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 26.1 [27.5] 36.0 34.3 33.7 35.3 27.6 31.0
Childless couple [16.5] 33.1 40.8 36.3 35.6 36.9 32.4 31.1
Couple with children 49.3 45.6 32.6 47.0 46.2 46.4 48.5 41.1
Lone parent [-] [28.9] [32.6] 44.9 40.9 46.8 [37.7] 25.5
Pensionerb [-] 20.7 38.5 40.1 39.4 39.8 [49.3] 33.9
Other household [60.2] [26.4] [57.9] 44.6 44.7 43.7 49.2 47.2
Average household 38.2 34.9 39.3 43.3 42.6 42.7 46.0 37.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table F1B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 31.8 31.2 [-] 32.0 31.3 39.0 30.9 31.0
Childless couple [36.1] 31.3 [-] 33.6 33.2 44.6 32.6 32.1
Couple with children [31.2] 37.9 [-] 36.0 36.2 42.5 35.6 37.1
Lone parent [53.7] 34.6 [-] 33.4 38.5 [-] 28.5 40.5
Pensionerb 39.6 35.2 [-] 33.8 35.1 38.0 31.2 36.1
Other household [-] 29.6 [-] 39.0 35.9 [60.0] 35.3 28.0
Average household 37.0 33.7 [-] 35.6 35.1 45.0 34.4 34.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table F1B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] 44.5 43.6 [37.1] [-] [42.1]
Childless couple [35.1] [-] [-] 44.5 41.1 46.5 [41.4] [35.8]
Couple with children [30.2] [-] [43.5] 36.4 37.1 37.2 35.6 39.1
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [26.1] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [35.8] [34.8] [53.9] 35.9 37.2 36.8 [-] 39.3
Other household [29.3] [51.2] [-] 35.9 37.7 35.1 37.9 42.9
Average household 32.2 43.7 44.1 36.7 37.5 36.9 36.4 39.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table F1B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 30.7 [28.4] [-] 33.7 31.7 29.2 35.2 30.5
Childless couple 22.5 [25.3] [-] 38.5 34.1 34.0 39.4 22.7
Couple with children 37.6 [22.5] [-] 40.9 40.1 35.4 41.6 36.7
Lone parent 41.5 [-] [-] 41.9 41.9 [35.1] 43.8 41.9
Pensionerb 36.7 [46.0] [-] 38.5 38.1 40.8 36.7 37.3
Other household 26.2 [-] [-] 44.5 40.2 39.9 47.0 27.5
Average household 33.4 33.2 [-] 40.0 38.0 37.3 40.7 33.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table F1B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems —
United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 32.8 30.7 [-] 26.6 28.4 28.4 25.4 30.5
Childless couple 27.7 35.3 [-] 22.4 25.0 21.7 22.7 31.5
Couple with children 31.3 35.4 [-] 27.6 29.8 28.8 27.4 35.5
Lone parent [37.5] 36.4 [-] 28.7 34.4 [-] 28.0 36.5
Pensionerb [21.7] 32.0 [48.8] 26.7 28.1 26.6 28.0 32.4
Other household [9.6] 34.2 [-] 25.6 25.6 32.3 21.7 25.6
Average household 26.2 34.3 41.0 26.1 28.1 27.6 25.1 32.2
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1A/A: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — Germanya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 52.7 60.0 53.1 53.3 113.8 100.7
1 24.0 17.1 21.5 22.6 71.6 89.5
2 9.8 8.5 12.2 10.7 86.1 124.4
3 5.9 1.8 7.2 6.1 30.9 122.7
4 2.7 9.5 2.7 3.1 348.2 98.4
5 3.1 1.1 2.5 2.7 36.2 83.5
6 1.8 2.0 0.8 1.4 109.4 43.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1A/B: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — Hungarya
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 50.2 31.7 51.2 47.9 63.1 102.0
1 17.5 28.2 17.4 18.9 161.5 99.8
2 13.5 18.8 10.1 13.3 139.7 75.1
3 6.0 4.6 12.2 7.4 76.4 204.4
4 4.0 1.4 4.8 3.9 35.4 120.5
5 4.8 10.6 1.1 4.6 218.3 22.8
6 4.0 4.7 3.1 3.9 117.1 76.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1A/C: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — Netherlandsa
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.5 64.1 58.6 58.3 111.6 101.9
1 29.0 32.2 21.0 26.4 110.9 72.3
2 11.8 0.0 13.3 11.5 0.0 113.0
3 1.6 0.0 5.5 2.8 0.0 351.3
4 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.0 1101.9
5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 NA NA
6 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.3 NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1A/D: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — Portugala
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 50.1 30.7 58.1 51.2 61.2 116.0
1 21.9 0.0 8.2 18.8 0.0 37.2
2 3.9 48.1 22.2 8.4 1232.0 568.8
3 8.1 0.0 1.2 6.6 0.0 14.4
4 4.5 0.0 6.3 4.8 0.0 139.2
5 7.6 21.2 4.1 7.2 278.1 53.2
6 3.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1A/E: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — Swedena
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 62.9 62.6 37.9 58.7 99.5 60.3
1 23.4 37.4 45.5 27.8 159.7 194.3
2 8.1 0.0 10.5 8.1 0.0 129.9
3 4.8 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0
4 0.8 0.0 2.7 1.0 0.0 349.3
5 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.6 NA NA
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1A/F: Employment status by number of accessibility
problems: column percentages (PH) — United Kingdoma
IW OWS OWL All OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 64.2 65.5 60.4 62.8 102.0 94.0
1 25.1 30.8 20.5 23.8 122.3 81.4
2 5.5 2.3 9.6 6.8 41.0 173.1
3 2.2 0.0 2.7 2.2 0.0 120.9
4 2.5 0.7 3.3 2.7 27.3 135.8
5 0.4 0.8 3.5 1.7 201.6 871.0
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights.
PH = based on poor households. IW = households in work, OWS =
households out of work since less than a year, OWL = households
out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FP1B/A: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 38.3 45.9 [51.8] 41.6 40.0 NA NA 39.9
Childless couple 32.2 [-] [-] 51.3 37.4 NA NA 33.5
Couple with children 48.7 [-] [-] 57.8 49.7 NA NA 44.3
Lone parent 55.1 [40.3] [-] [48.4] 51.1 NA NA 51.7
Pensionerb 42.5 [45.9] [51.2] 42.9 43.6 NA NA 44.1
Other household [35.2] [-] [-] [61.6] 52.4 NA NA [39.8]
Average household 42.3 41.3 43.4 51.2 44.9 NA NA 42.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate
values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1B/B: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [42.6] 43.1 41.1 43.1 [-] [33.6]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 56.1 52.9 59.5 [-] [37.9]
Couple with children [-] [60.6] [27.4] 55.5 54.0 57.3 [47.9] 48.3
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 53.2 43.5 49.9 [-] [22.4]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 46.4 45.8 45.3 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 61.3 53.6 60.4 [-] [-]
Average household [41.2] 43.2 29.8 54.4 51.1 55.0 51.2 37.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1B/C: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [25.3] 33.6 [-] [-] 34.0 [-] [-] 32.1
Childless couple [-] [35.3] [-] [49.0] 37.1 [-] [-] [33.7]
Couple with children [-] [39.4] [-] [37.3] 37.1 [-] [40.7] [36.9]
Lone parent [59.6] [30.7] [-] [-] 42.7 [-] [-] 44.1
Pensionerb [36.4] [49.0] [-] [47.0] 46.0 [44.4] [-] 45.4
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 36.5 37.1 [-] 43.1 38.7 47.7 39.9 37.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1B/D: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] [-] [54.8] [-] [-] [-]
Couple with children [-] [-] [-] [64.6] 52.7 [63.9] [-] [40.2]
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 44.8 46.7 47.1 [-] [51.2]
Other household [-] [-] [-] [49.4] [45.6] [36.4] [-] [-]
Average household [41.4] [34.5] [45.0] 55.5 47.7 52.2 [64.4] 39.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1B/E: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 35.2 [-] [-] [31.6] 35.0 [-] [-] 35.7
Childless couple [24.8] [-] [-] [39.8] 30.2 [-] [-] [25.9]
Couple with children 48.3 [-] [-] [46.3] 46.6 [-] [48.6] 46.9
Lone parent 43.8 [-] [-] [41.4] 45.9 [-] [-] 47.4
Pensionerb 44.7 [-] [-] 40.2 43.4 [41.1] [38.9] 46.9
Other household [27.7] [-] [-] [-] [30.3] [-] [-] [26.0]
Average household 39.9 [53.9] [-] 41.5 41.1 39.4 42.9 40.8
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FP1B/F: Household type by tenure: percentage reporting at least one indicator of accessibility problems (PH)
— United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [39.7] 29.0 [-] 28.7 30.5 [26.8] [-] 31.1
Childless couple [-] [50.9] [-] 22.6 39.4 [15.0] [-] 51.3
Couple with children [-] 42.1 [-] [39.0] 43.2 [-] [36.2] 45.2
Lone parent [30.8] 40.5 [-] [-] 36.9 [-] [-] 38.2
Pensionerb [-] 31.5 [-] 26.7 28.8 26.2 [-] 32.3
Other household [-] [45.4] [-] [33.8] 31.1 [-] [-] [29.7]
Average household 29.8 39.6 [-] 30.2 35.2 29.9 30.8 38.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table FPW1/A: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 52.7 54.0 60.0 53.1 53.3 1.0 1.1 1.0
1 24.0 20.9 17.1 21.5 22.6 0.9 0.7 0.9
2 9.8 11.7 8.5 12.2 10.7 1.2 0.9 1.2
3 5.9 6.5 1.8 7.2 6.1 1.1 0.3 1.2
4 2.7 3.6 9.5 2.7 3.1 1.3 3.5 1.0
5 3.1 2.3 1.1 2.5 2.7 0.8 0.4 0.8
6 1.8 1.0 2.0 0.8 1.4 0.5 1.1 0.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FPW1/B: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 50.2 44.5 31.7 51.2 47.9 0.9 0.6 1.0
1 17.5 21.1 28.2 17.4 18.9 1.2 1.6 1.0
2 13.5 13.1 18.8 10.1 13.3 1.0 1.4 0.8
3 6.0 9.6 4.6 12.2 7.4 1.6 0.8 2.0
4 4.0 3.7 1.4 4.8 3.9 0.9 0.4 1.2
5 4.8 4.3 10.6 1.1 4.6 0.9 2.2 0.2
6 4.0 3.7 4.7 3.1 3.9 0.9 1.2 0.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FPW1/C: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.5 59.5 64.1 58.6 58.3 1.0 1.1 1.0
1 29.0 22.8 32.2 21.0 26.4 0.8 1.1 0.7
2 11.8 11.2 0.0 13.3 11.5 0.9 0.0 1.1
3 1.6 4.6 0.0 5.5 2.8 2.9 0.0 3.5
4 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.3 0.5 9.2 0.0 11.0
5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 NA NA NA
6 0.0 0.6 3.7 0.0 0.3 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FPW1/D: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 50.1 55.3 30.7 58.1 51.2 1.1 0.6 1.2
1 21.9 7.3 0.0 8.2 18.8 0.3 0.0 0.4
2 3.9 24.9 48.1 22.2 8.4 6.4 12.3 5.7
3 8.1 1.0 0.0 1.2 6.6 0.1 0.0 0.1
4 4.5 5.6 0.0 6.3 4.8 1.2 0.0 1.4
5 7.6 5.8 21.2 4.1 7.2 0.8 2.8 0.5
6 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FPW1/E: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 62.9 43.2 62.6 37.9 58.7 0.7 1.0 0.6
1 23.4 43.8 37.4 45.5 27.8 1.9 1.6 1.9
2 8.1 8.2 0.0 10.5 8.1 1.0 0.0 1.3
3 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 0.8 2.1 0.0 2.7 1.0 2.7 0.0 3.5
5 0.0 2.7 0.0 3.4 0.6 NA NA NA
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FPW1/F: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 64.2 61.3 65.5 60.4 62.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
1 25.1 22.3 30.8 20.5 23.8 0.9 1.2 0.8
2 5.5 8.3 2.3 9.6 6.8 1.5 0.4 1.7
3 2.2 2.2 0.0 2.7 2.2 1.0 0.0 1.2
4 2.5 2.9 0.7 3.3 2.7 1.2 0.3 1.4
5 0.4 3.0 0.8 3.5 1.7 7.5 2.0 8.7
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NA NA NA
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based
exclusively on poor households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in
work, OW = household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year,
OWL = household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row
numbers show the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/A: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 52.9 57.8 58.5 57.7 53.5 1.1 1.1 1.1
1 23.6 20.0 20.0 20.0 23.1 0.8 0.8 0.8
2 11.3 9.9 10.4 9.8 11.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
3 5.5 5.5 3.4 6.0 5.5 1.0 0.6 1.1
4 2.7 3.3 5.0 2.9 2.8 1.2 1.9 1.1
5 2.9 2.2 1.6 2.3 2.8 0.8 0.6 0.8
6 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/B: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 57.9 48.1 45.3 50.2 57.0 0.8 0.8 0.9
1 18.0 19.6 19.6 19.7 18.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
2 10.1 13.0 17.2 9.8 10.4 1.3 1.7 1.0
3 5.9 9.0 6.7 10.8 6.2 1.5 1.1 1.8
4 3.0 2.8 1.1 4.1 3.0 0.9 0.4 1.4
5 3.3 5.1 7.7 3.1 3.4 1.6 2.4 1.0
6 1.9 2.4 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/C: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 65.0 62.3 71.9 60.6 64.7 1.0 1.1 0.9
1 24.4 23.2 20.8 23.6 24.2 1.0 0.9 1.0
2 7.0 9.2 2.7 10.3 7.3 1.3 0.4 1.5
3 2.2 3.3 0.5 3.8 2.3 1.5 0.2 1.7
4 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.6 1.7 1.5
5 0.4 0.6 1.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 3.2 1.0
6 0.1 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.1 1.7 11.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/D: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 62.1 65.8 72.6 63.1 62.5 1.1 1.2 1.0
1 17.6 10.8 0.0 15.2 16.8 0.6 0.0 0.9
2 5.1 12.0 12.0 12.0 5.8 2.3 2.4 2.3
3 3.5 1.6 2.7 1.2 3.3 0.5 0.8 0.3
4 3.3 3.2 0.0 4.5 3.3 1.0 0.0 1.3
5 5.2 6.6 12.7 4.1 5.3 1.3 2.5 0.8
6 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/E: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 62.5 57.9 70.1 50.6 62.3 0.9 1.1 0.8
1 23.4 28.5 20.1 33.5 23.6 1.2 0.9 1.4
2 8.8 8.4 7.7 8.9 8.8 1.0 0.9 1.0
3 3.4 1.3 0.0 2.1 3.3 0.4 0.0 0.6
4 1.3 1.7 1.1 2.1 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.6
5 0.5 2.1 1.0 2.8 0.6 4.4 2.1 5.7
6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table FW1/F: Number of accessibility problems reported: column percentages
(HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
0 74.5 61.7 67.7 59.7 72.6 0.8 0.9 0.8
1 18.3 24.2 25.8 23.6 19.2 1.3 1.4 1.3
2 4.9 6.9 2.5 8.4 5.2 1.4 0.5 1.7
3 1.2 2.4 2.1 2.5 1.4 2.0 1.8 2.1
4 0.7 2.4 0.7 2.9 0.9 3.4 1.1 4.2
5 0.4 2.4 1.2 2.8 0.7 5.7 2.8 6.6
6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based
exclusively on households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW
= household out of work, OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL =
household out of work since more than a year, All = average household, row numbers show
the number of problems reported.
Table G1A/A: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 21.9 21.3 15.0 18.2 20.9 NA NA 21.7
Childless couple 16.7 25.3 [20.4] 14.3 16.1 NA NA 17.7
Couple with children 20.8 20.8 26.9 14.5 16.7 NA NA 21.2
Lone parent 25.4 28.5 [30.5] 14.0 22.9 NA NA 26.1
Pensionerb 13.3 13.7 13.5 15.1 14.3 NA NA 13.4
Other household 18.4 [27.0] [-] 14.2 15.7 NA NA 19.8
Average household 18.9 21.9 19.7 14.7 16.8 NA NA 19.3
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. NA = Not available because data on mortgages were not
collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than
20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table G1A/B: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 51.4 [62.8] 27.3 40.5 40.9 41.2 35.8 42.8
Childless couple [50.3] 49.3 53.7 32.7 35.4 32.4 34.7 51.2
Couple with children 73.3 63.6 49.6 37.7 40.4 37.0 39.8 60.2
Lone parent [49.0] [46.4] [39.3] 38.3 39.6 39.2 34.9 44.4
Pensionerb [-] 52.8 34.3 35.4 35.9 35.6 [29.2] 39.7
Other household [58.8] [39.7] [46.7] 36.8 37.5 37.5 32.7 46.8
Average household 61.6 54.1 44.3 36.6 38.3 36.6 36.9 51.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table G1A/C: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 1.1 9.0 [-] 3.2 6.4 6.2 2.7 7.9
Childless couple 0.6 7.0 [-] 1.3 2.7 1.9 1.2 6.2
Couple with children 3.8 10.7 [-] 1.0 2.5 0.4 1.1 9.8
Lone parent 5.6 9.9 [-] 1.8 6.7 [-] 2.1 8.6
Pensionerb 3.4 3.2 [-] 1.3 2.3 0.8 1.6 3.2
Other household [-] 4.7 [-] 1.8 3.3 3.4 1.5 6.9
Average household 4.7 7.4 [0.0] 1.3 3.2 1.5 1.3 6.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table G1A/D: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [19.0] [34.2] [25.6] 12.2 17.2 12.4 [11.9] 24.4
Childless couple 23.1 [41.8] [22.2] 13.4 17.1 15.6 9.4 26.7
Couple with children 23.8 [45.6] 25.5 12.7 16.7 11.4 13.8 28.6
Lone parent [41.9] [-] [-] 4.8 23.9 [0.0] [10.8] [43.1]
Pensionerb 33.3 31.8 18.8 14.7 18.8 14.6 [16.6] 28.9
Other household 37.6 22.9 45.4 14.6 18.6 14.8 14.0 33.8
Average household 29.5 33.5 29.0 13.6 17.9 13.7 13.4 30.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table G1A/E: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 12.3 [14.6] [-] 1.5 8.4 2.4 1.3 12.4
Childless couple 11.0 [14.1] [-] 1.3 4.1 1.7 1.2 11.3
Couple with children 10.9 [17.3] [-] 2.6 4.3 6.1 2.1 11.3
Lone parent 15.5 [-] [-] 3.3 9.6 [5.5] 2.7 14.9
Pensionerb 5.5 [0.0] [-] 1.6 2.7 2.7 0.6 5.1
Other household 12.4 [-] [-] 2.4 4.7 2.1 2.5 12.3
Average household 10.9 11.1 [-] 2.1 4.8 3.5 1.7 10.9
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table G1A/F: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 16.0 15.7 [-] 2.9 8.0 2.1 3.4 15.7
Childless couple 9.4 16.1 [-] 3.0 4.9 1.6 3.6 12.0
Couple with children 12.1 23.0 [-] 3.1 6.7 3.9 3.0 19.4
Lone parent 24.0 21.2 [-] 8.8 17.5 [7.5] 8.9 21.7
Pensionerb 0.0 5.0 [1.4] 1.8 2.4 1.7 3.0 4.3
Other household 14.0 15.1 [-] 3.0 5.8 1.8 3.6 14.6
Average household 13.4 16.8 6.3 3.0 6.3 2.1 3.5 15.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations.
Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/A: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — Germanya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 24.8 28.2 [8.3] 16.1 23.7 NA NA 24.5
Childless couple 21.2 [-] [-] 16.7 20.5 NA NA 21.6
Couple with children 28.0 [-] [-] 19.2 24.4 NA NA 27.9
Lone parent 30.9 [30.2] [-] [19.3] 28.6 NA NA 30.6
Pensionerb 17.5 10.0 [13.3] 16.7 16.2 NA NA 15.8
Other household [20.5] [-] [-] [13.8] 14.8 NA NA [16.2]
Average household 24.5 23.4 15.3 17.1 21.8 NA NA 23.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. NA = Not available because
data on mortgages were not collected in Germany. Values within brackets are based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate
values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/B: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — Hungarya
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [37.8] 51.9 50.6 51.3 [-] [45.7]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 35.2 43.5 31.0 [-] [82.2]
Couple with children [-] [71.2] [76.6] 46.0 52.0 48.4 [35.9] 77.5
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] 40.8 43.3 39.7 [-] [48.8]
Pensionerb [-] [-] [-] 42.0 42.1 42.7 [-] [-]
Other household [-] [-] [-] 63.0 60.5 63.6 [-] [-]
Average household [71.6] 65.4 62.2 47.4 50.9 48.4 41.7 65.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/C: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — Netherlandsa
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [1.8] 10.8 [-] [1.4] 8.2 [-] [-] 8.7
Childless couple [-] [0.0] [-] [5.5] 1.3 [-] [8.2] [0.0]
Couple with children [-] [13.5] [-] 0.0 6.8 [-] [0.0] 12.5
Lone parent [2.4] [16.4] [-] [-] 9.7 [-] [-] 10.2
Pensionerb [11.3] 3.3 [-] 2.5 4.4 [4.0] [0.0] 5.4
Other household [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-] [-]
Average household 8.7 9.7 [-] 1.0 7.1 1.2 0.8 9.5
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/D: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — Portugala
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [-] [-] [-] [7.0] 16.1 [7.2] [-] [27.5]
Childless couple [-] [-] [-] 22.8 33.4 22.9 [-] [52.5]
Couple with children [25.4] [-] [24.5] 13.5 20.5 18.9 [0.9] 29.1
Lone parent [-] [-] [-] [-] [44.2] [-] [-] [-]
Pensionerb [27.8] [46.9] [33.4] 20.4 24.6 20.8 [-] 35.8
Other household [-] [-] [-] 25.2 30.1 25.1 [-] [39.3]
Average household 31.1 46.5 33.5 19.0 25.9 20.8 8.2 36.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/E: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — Swedena
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single 14.5 [-] [-] [0.0] 11.6 [-] [0.0] 14.7
Childless couple 19.0 [-] [-] [4.5] 16.0 [-] [-] 20.6
Couple with children 8.6 [-] [-] 9.2 8.6 [-] [1.3] 8.1
Lone parent 18.6 [-] [-] [5.1] 14.5 [-] [-] 18.1
Pensionerb 5.7 [-] [-] 1.6 3.5 1.4 [2.1] 5.2
Other household [9.9] [-] [-] [-] [9.9] [-] [-] [9.4]
Average household 12.4 [11.4] [-] 4.7 9.6 7.7 2.6 12.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GP1A/F: Household type by tenure: percentage not satisfied with housing (PH) — United Kingdoma
Market Below Rent Owner Average Outright Owner with Tenant
rent market rent free occupier household owner mortgage
Working-age single [20.0] 15.7 [-] 4.2 12.7 3.9 [5.1] 16.8
Childless couple [2.7] 9.9 [-] 1.6 4.6 0.0 [4.3] 7.4
Couple with children [17.4] 21.8 [-] 5.3 14.1 [11.8] 3.5 20.8
Lone parent [24.9] 19.0 [-] [15.5] 19.4 [-] [17.3] 20.0
Pensionerb [0.0] 3.7 [-] 1.9 2.4 2.0 [0.0] 3.3
Other household [7.8] [18.0] [-] [1.8] 9.6 [2.6] [-] 15.0
Average household 13.8 15.8 [12.6] 3.5 10.2 2.9 4.6 15.4
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PH = based on poor households. Values within brackets are
based on less than 50 observations. Hyphens indicate values based on less than 20 observations.
b Households with at least one person above 64 were all classified as pensioners.
Table GPW1/A: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 78.9 74.0 85.0 72.2 76.7 0.9 1.1 0.9
Not satisfied 21.1 26.0 15.0 27.8 23.3 1.2 0.7 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GPW1/B: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 50.8 43.1 49.4 39.6 47.7 0.8 1.0 0.8
Not satisfied 49.2 56.9 50.6 60.4 52.3 1.2 1.0 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GPW1/C: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 95.1 94.3 92.5 94.6 94.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Not satisfied 4.9 5.7 7.5 5.4 5.2 1.2 1.5 1.1
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GPW1/D: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 75.5 70.0 67.4 70.7 73.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Not satisfied 24.5 30.0 32.6 29.3 26.2 1.2 1.3 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GPW1/E: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 91.2 87.3 79.9 89.5 90.4 1.0 0.9 1.0
Not satisfied 8.8 12.7 20.1 10.5 9.6 1.4 2.3 1.2
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GPW1/F: Percentage satisfied with housing (PHW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 90.3 82.0 84.3 81.5 86.6 0.9 0.9 0.9
Not satisfied 9.7 18.0 15.7 18.5 13.4 1.8 1.6 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. PHW = based exclusively on poor
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/A: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — Germanya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 83.2 78.8 86.2 77.1 82.7 0.9 1.0 0.9
Not satisfied 16.8 21.2 13.8 22.9 17.3 1.3 0.8 1.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/B: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — Hungarya
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 62.2 49.5 52.3 47.4 61.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
Not satisfied 37.8 50.5 47.7 52.6 39.0 1.3 1.3 1.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/C: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — Netherlandsa
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 97.3 97.1 96.2 97.2 97.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
Not satisfied 2.7 2.9 3.8 2.8 2.8 1.1 1.4 1.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/D: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — Portugala
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 82.8 77.1 77.4 76.9 82.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
Not satisfied 17.2 22.9 22.6 23.1 17.9 1.3 1.3 1.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/E: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — Swedena
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 95.5 91.8 92.2 91.6 95.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
Not satisfied 4.5 8.2 7.8 8.4 4.6 1.8 1.8 1.9
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table GW1/F: Percentage satisfied with housing (HOPW) — United Kingdoma
IW OW OWS OWL All OW/IW OWS/IW OWL/IW
Satisfied 94.0 86.7 92.1 84.7 93.2 0.9 1.0 0.9
Not satisfied 6.0 13.3 7.9 15.3 6.8 2.2 1.3 2.6
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. HOPW = based exclusively on
households with at least one potential worker. IW = household in work, OW = household out of work,
OWS = household out of work since less than a year, OWL = household out of work since more than
a year, All = average household.
Table CX3: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage in overcrowded accommodation
(subjective measure)a
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 12.9 7.5 8.2 0.6 9.3 13.9 12.4 1.5 1.3
HU 22.6 14.5 15.5 0.6 17.7 23.1 21.9 1.3 1.2
NL 21.8 13.2 14.2 0.6 15.6 13.7 10.8 0.9 0.7
PT 27.3 20.1 21.4 0.7 23.0 26.5 17.4 1.2 0.8
SE 19.6 13.9 14.6 0.7 16.4 20.5 21.6 1.2 1.3
UK 19.9 14.8 15.8 0.7 16.8 17.9 28.8 1.1 1.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table GX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage not satisfied with housing
conditionsa
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 21.8 16.0 16.8 0.7 16.8 13.8 22.9 0.8 1.4
HU 50.9 36.6 38.3 0.7 37.8 47.7 52.6 1.3 1.4
NL 7.1 2.7 3.2 0.4 2.7 3.8 2.8 1.4 1.0
PT 25.9 16.3 17.9 0.6 17.2 22.6 23.1 1.3 1.3
SE 9.6 4.2 4.8 0.4 4.5 7.8 8.4 1.8 1.9
UK 10.2 5.4 6.3 0.5 6.0 7.9 15.3 1.3 2.6
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table DX1: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting leaking roof, damp
walls, floors, foundation, or rot in window frames or floora
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 20.2 12.0 13.1 0.6 13.5 18.1 18.9 1.3 1.4
HU 32.0 17.5 19.2 0.5 17.2 41.4 30.6 2.4 1.8
NL 28.3 17.0 18.3 0.6 18.5 12.2 18.3 0.7 1.0
PT 31.0 17.1 19.4 0.6 18.4 18.5 26.1 1.0 1.4
SE 10.2 5.8 6.3 0.6 6.6 4.6 9.8 0.7 1.5
UK 21.2 13.1 14.7 0.6 13.9 20.2 29.5 1.5 2.1
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
Table DX2: Poverty and employment status by country: percentage reporting dwelling too dark or
not enough lighta
P NP All P/NP IW OWS OWL OWS/IW OWL/IW
DE 8.3 3.8 4.4 0.5 4.4 4.5 7.8 1.0 1.8
HU 16.9 9.6 10.5 0.6 10.1 17.8 15.6 1.8 1.5
NL 7.8 4.9 5.2 0.6 4.6 3.7 7.9 0.8 1.7
PT 24.9 15.5 17.1 0.6 16.8 14.0 21.0 0.8 1.2
SE 6.2 6.7 6.7 1.1 6.7 10.9 5.2 1.6 0.8
UK 14.7 10.3 11.2 0.7 10.6 9.7 18.3 0.9 1.7
a Source: EU SILC 2007, based on cross-sectional individual weights. P = poor, NP = non-poor, All = average
households, IW = households in work, OWS = households out of work since less than a year, OWL =
households out of work since more than a year, DE = Germany, HU = Hungary, NL = Netherlands, PT =
Portugal, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom.
